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Abstract†
This manuscript develops a framework for compositional semantics and
begins illustrating its fruitfulness by applying it to a spectrum of core lin-
guistic data, such as with quantifiers, attitude ascriptions, relative clauses,
conditionals, and questions. A key innovation is to introduce variables for
assignment functions into the syntax; semantic values are treated systemati-
cally in terms of sets of assignments, theoretically interpreted as representing
possibilities. The framework provides an alternative to traditional “context-
index”-style frameworks descending from Kamp/Kaplan/Lewis/Stalnaker. A
principal feature of the account is that it systematizes a range of seemingly
disparate linguistic shifting phenomena, such as with quantifiers, intension-
ality, and context-sensitivity under modals and attitude verbs. The treatment
of the syntax/semantics standardizes quantification across domains (individ-
uals, worlds, assignments) via a generalized (type-flexible, cross-categorial)
binder-index resulting from type-driven movement. The account affords a uni-
fied analysis of the context-sensitivity of expressions such as pronouns, epis-
temic modals, etc., in the spirit of contextualist theories, while compositionally
deriving certain recalcitrant shifting/binding data and providing a framework
for theorizing about differences in tendencies for local/global readings.
Applications to modal expressions, relative clauses, (non-)quantified noun
phrases, ‘if’-clauses, and interrogatives are explored. I show how certain inde-
pendently motivated syntactic analyses can be implemented in the assignment-
variable framework. Nominal quantifiers are treated as introducing quantifi-
cation over assignments, binding relative pronouns in headed relative con-
structions as well as other types of pronouns such as donkey pronouns. ‘If’-
clauses are treated as free relatives, interpreted as plural definite descriptions
*Draft available at goo.gl/kFVhw3. Thanks to the audience and commentators Dilip Ninan and
Brian Rabern at a 2018 Pacific APA symposium session, and to Ivano Caponigro, Salvatore Florio,
Daniel Rothschild, and Ede Zimmermann for discussion.
†Short version: A very long formal footnote to Stalnaker 1988.
of possibilities. Interrogative sentences denote a set of possible answers, con-
ceived as sets of possibilities. Additional shifting data are compositionally
derived, e.g. concerning “interrogative flip,” information-sensitivity, indexical
shift, and donkey anaphora. Applications to weak crossover and weak vs.
strong quantifiers are considered. The account affords a uniform composi-
tional semantics for ‘if’-clauses in diverse conditional constructions (adjoined
to NP/VP/IP/CP, with/without a main clause modal or ‘then’), and for indi-
vidual correlative clauses adjoined to DP/IP/CP. The result is a unified ap-
proach to the syntax/semantics of interrogatives, conditionals, and relativiza-
tion. The semantics avoids introducing added interpretive principles or com-
position rules such as for quantification, binding, movement (e.g., Predicate
Abstraction, Predicate Modification, Event Identification, Trace Conversion).
The semantics is fully compositional.
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This manuscript develops a framework for compositional semantics, and begins
illustrating its fruitfulness by applying it to certain core linguistic data. The key
move is to posit variables for assignment functions in the syntax; semantic values
are treated systematically in terms of functions from assignments, now included in
the model. The core data involve a spectrum of linguistic “shifting” phenomena,
such as with quantifiers, intensionality, and context-sensitivity under modals and
attitude verbs. Extensions to questions, conditionals, relative clauses, and various
types of pronominal anaphora such as donkey anaphora are provided. The proposed
assignment-variable-based theory affords a standardization of quantification across
domains (individuals, worlds, assignments), and a unified approach to shifting phe-
nomena in natural language.
1 Introduction
An overview of the account’s theoretical context and key features is as follows.
Following Stalnaker (1970), Kamp (1971), Lewis (1980), and Kaplan (1989),
a standard move in formal semantics is to treat expressions as interpreted with
respect to two general parameters: to a first approximation, a context c which takes
expressions to intensions, and circumstance (index) i which takes intensions to ex-
tensions. To handle quantification and free/bound pronouns, the context parameter
may be treated as an assignment function gc, mapping typed numerical indices ⟨n, τ⟩
(abbreviated: nτ) to items in the model.1 Nuances aside, the interpretation function
returns Truth for a sentence such as S = ‘It7 laughed’, JSKgc,i = 1, iff such-and-such
individual relevant in c, gc(7e), laughed in the circumstance i, where 7 is an arbitrary
index for the free pronoun (type e for individuals):
(1.1) a. LF: [ It7 laughed ]
b. J(1.1a)Kgc,i = 1 iff gc(7e) laughed in i
A trend in linguistic semantics has been to incorporate various parameters of in-
terpretation as elements of the model, and to posit linguistic reference to these
elements via covert variables.2 For instance, verbs may be treated as denoting sets
of events; modals may be treated as binding world pronouns; tenses may be treated
1For discussion of differences among single-/double-indexing variants of the views, see Lewis
1980. Some authors distinguish the coordinates c and gc, reserving c for specific features of discourse
contexts such as speaker, addressee, world, etc. Given our purposes I simplify by identifying the
context coordinate with the contextually determined assignment.
2See e.g. Partee 1973, Cresswell 1990, Percus 2000, Schlenker 2003, Büring 2004,
Hacquard 2006, 2010; for general discussion see Schlenker 2006.
1
as pronouns referring to times. Compositional details aside, and bracketing tense
and aspect, the interpretation function, now J⋅Kgc , may return a semantic value for
S as in (1.2) (type s for worlds; world-variable left free).
(1.2) a. LF: [ It7 [ laughed w3 ]]
b. J(1.2a)Kgc = 1 iff gc(7e) laughed in gc(3s)
A natural question at this stage is whether there might also be object-language
reference or variables with assignments. Diverse linguistic data involving quantifiers
have led some theorists to introduce a semantic type for assignments (Janssen
1997, Sternefeld 1998, Kobele 2010, Rabern 2012, Kennedy 2014). The project
pursued here is to investigate the prospects for a linguistic framework that goes the
further step of positing variables for assignments in the syntax; semantic values are
treated systematically in terms of sets of assignments, also included in the model.
One way of understanding the assignment-variable-based approach is as for-
mally implementing Stalnaker’s (1988, 2014) seminal “multiple context” treatment
of attitude ascriptions (cf. Swanson 2011). On Stalnaker’s view, there are multiple
contexts “available to be exploited” (1988: 156) in describing individuals’ states
of mind — the “basic” (“global”) discourse context, and a “derived” (“local,” sub-
ordinate) context representing the subject’s attitude state. In (1.3), whereas the
discourse context c1 supplies the interpretation of the embedded demonstrative ‘that
woman’, the derived context c2 representing (what is presupposed to be) Tom’s
beliefs is also available for interpreting the embedded change-of-state verb. In
the case of “Russell’s notorious yacht” (Stalnaker 1988: 158–159) in (1.4), the
intuitive idea is that whereas the second ‘it’ is interpreted in the discourse context,
the first ‘it’ is interpreted in the context representing (what is presupposed to be)
Phoebe’s beliefs; hence the belief being ascribed isn’t necessarily false. In some cases
either the discourse context or derived context may be available for interpreting an
expression, as reflected informally in (1.5), where sc1 and sc2 represent the standard
for counting as rich accepted in the discourse and the standard accepted by Alice,
respectively.
(1.3) [Context: It’s presupposed that Sue, the woman being demonstrated in the
discourse context c1, never smoked.]
Tom believes that [that woman]c1 has quitc2 smoking.
a. ≈ Tom believes that Sue used to smoke and no longer smokes
(cf. Swanson 2011: ex. 31)
(1.4) Phoebe believes itc2 is longer than itc1 is. (cf. Stalnaker 1988: 158–159)
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(1.5) [Talking about Bert:] Alice believes that hec1 is richc1/c2 .
a. ≈ Alice believes that Bert is sc1/sc2-wealthy
(cf. Silk 2016a: 165–166, 2017: 1787–1788)
Stalnaker doesn’t offer specific technical implementations of these ideas (nor
does Swanson). One might attempt a pragmatic explanation of the shifts in interpre-
tation, perhaps drawing on general pragmatic accounts of local context (cf. Schlenker
2009, 2010). One might treat attitude verbs as context-shifting operators, and posit
mechanisms for capturing the different ways shifting can occur within a single clause
(cf. Cumming 2008, Santorio 2010, 2012, Ninan 2012). A natural alternative
is to posit variables for the different “contexts.” Roughly put, in (say) an atti-
tude ascription, a context-sensitive expression receiving an intuitively global reading
would combine with a (context-)variable representing the discourse, and a context-
sensitive expression receiving an intuitively shifted reading would combine with
a (context-)variable representing the attitude state. The “multiple contexts” with
respect to which context-sensitive expressions may be interpreted are represented
via object-language variables for assignments.
Although there are precedents for introducing syntactic variables for items de-
termining shifted interpretations of referential expressions, e.g. under attitude verbs
(Percus& Sauerland 2003, Charlow& Sharvit 2014) or quantifiers (Chierchia
1992, Elbourne 2005, Johnson 2012), the project of developing an account with
variables for assignment functions — object-language variables for the sort of item
responsible for interpreting context-sensitive language generally — hasn’t been pur-
sued. Indeed, puzzles of referential expressions in attitude ascriptions can be un-
derstood as instances of (what I call) local and global readings of context-sensitive
expressions more generally. Contextualism/relativism/expressivism debates have
focused on embedding contrasts between e.g. epistemic modals (predicates of per-
sonal taste, etc.), and paradigm context-sensitive expressions which receive their
interpretation from the discourse context. Whereas ‘might’ in (1.8) characterizes
the subject’s information, ‘she’ in (1.7) is infelicitous if its gender implication isn’t
accepted in the discourse (though see Silk 2016a, 2017 and Sudo 2012, respec-
tively); as Partee observes, ‘here’ in (1.6) cannot be interpreted as “place where
I am.”
(1.6)#[Wherever I am]i John is herei too. (Partee 1984a: 170)
(1.7)#Ali thinks Bertj is a woman. Hei thinks shej is smart.
a. ≉Al thinks g(j) is a woman and is smart. (global reading obligatory)
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(1.8) Alice thinks it might be raining.
a. ≉Alice thinks g(i) is compatible with its raining, where g(i) represents
the information accepted in the discourse context
(local reading obligatory)
As a counterpoint to indexicals, classically understood — expressions obligatorily
receiving their interpretation from the discourse context — common across various
language families are conventionalized anaphoric expressions (dedicated reflexive
and reciprocal forms aside). For instance, Upper Austrian German distinguishes two
forms for 3rd-person pronouns; in contrast to the morphologically more complex
forms, which cannot be used as bound variables, the reduced 3rd-person forms
cannot be used referentially, as reflected in (1.9). Similarly, the anaphoric demon-
strative ee and personal pronoun taman in Sinhala obligatorily receive their interpre-
tation from the linguistic context ((1.10)). Only the specialized anaphoric pronoun
can serve as the main clause correlate in a correlative, as in (1.11) for Bangla. (See
Gair et al. 1999, Bhat 2004 and references therein; also e.g. Mortensen 2003,
Dixon 2010: 251–252, Tortora 2014: 70–72.)3
(1.9) a. Gestan
Yesterday
hot
has
ea/∗a
he
gsunga.
sung
‘Yesterday he sang.’
b. Neta
Only
do
det
Honsi
Hans
hot
has
a
a
Frog
question
kriagt
gotten
wos
which
ai/∗eai
he
vastondn
understood
hot
has
‘Only Hansi got a question which hei understood.’
(Wiltschko 2016: exs. 35, 37; Upper Austrian)
(1.10) a. api meekә/∗eekә kәrәmu.
‘Let’s do this.deict/*this.anaph.’
b. lamәyai
child
tamanṭәi/eyaaṭәmәii
self.anaph/he.anaph.emph
dœn∅ teerenәwanow kiyәlaunderstand
kiwwa.
said
‘The childi said that hei understood now.’
(Gair 1998: 113, 131–132; Sinhala (Indo-Aryan))
3Depending on the purposes at hand, I will often simplify glosses and omit indications for
ϕ-features, classifiers, Case, tense. In numbered examples, ‘?’/‘??’ are used to indicate mild semantic
degradedness, ‘#’ for semantic infelicity on the relevant reading, and ‘∗’ for ungrammaticality. Unless
otherwise noted, judgments in cited examples are the author’s.
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(1.11) [je
which
mee-Tii
girl
okhane
there.deict
dãRie
stand
ache]
be
Sei/∗oi
that.anaph/∗that.deict lOmba.tall
(lit. ‘Which girl is standing over there, that is tall’)
‘The girl who is standing over there is tall.’
(Bagchi 1994: ex. 3; Bangla (Indo-Aryan))
Yet most context-sensitive expressions fall somewhere in the middle regarding their
tendencies for local/global readings — e.g., with gradable adjectives and degree
standards, additives and implications of alternatives, quantifiers and domain re-
strictions, perspectival expressions and perspectives, etc. (Silk 2014a, 2016a).
(1.12) Bob:Pete thinks Al is at a local bar.
a. ≈ Pete thinks Al is at a bar local to Bob (global reading)
b. ≈ Pete thinks Al is at a bar local to Pete (local reading)
(1.13) Beth thinks Chip smokes too.
a. [Context: We’re talking about various of our colleagues C who smoke.
We know Beth is good friends with Chip; we know nothing about her
views on any of our other colleagues’ habits.]≈ People other than Chip in C smoke and Beth thinks Chip smokes.
(global reading)
b. [Context: We’re talking about Beth; we know she is convinced that var-
ious of our colleagues smoke. We know none of our colleagues smoke.]≈ Beth thinks that Chip along with other of our colleagues smoke.
(local reading)
(1.14) Alice thinks everyone can vote.
a. [Context: We’re considering Alice’s beliefs about the legal status of cer-
tain minority groups G, which we think are relevant in questions about
voting rights; we know nothing about Alice’s own moral/legal views.]≈ Alice thinks everyone in G is legally permitted to vote.
(global reading)
b. [Context: We’re considering Alice’s moral/legal views; we know she is
aware that certain minority groups aren’t legally permitted to vote.]≈ Alice thinks everyone in the groups she considers relevant to questions
about voting rights is legally permitted to vote. (local reading)
Mechanisms for capturing the varieties of shifting phenomena have grown in-
creasingly complex in current “context-index”-style frameworks (see §1.1). Adding
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assignment variables to the object-language is far from trivial. Yet I’ll show how
an account with assignment variables can compositionally derive a spectrum of
linguistic shifting phenomena using independently motivated syntactic/semantic
resources and a standardization of quantification across domains. Key features are
as follows: the proposed account
• unifies seemingly disparate shifting phenomena— e.g., with bound read-
ings of pronouns, donkey (non-c-command) anaphora, indexical shift, inten-
sionality, local/global readings — and captures them via familiar mechanisms
of quantifier movement and variable binding
• standardizes quantification, as over individuals, worlds, assignments
– defines a generalized (cross-categorial, type-flexible) binder-index to
combine with quantifiers, attitude verbs, modals, etc.
• provides compositional, non-syncategorematic treatments of quantification
and relativization
– posits no added parameters of interpretation or construction-specific
interpretation rules (e.g., Predicate Abstraction, Event Identification,
Trace Conversion)
• offers a unified analysis of the context-sensitivity of epistemic modals, pro-
nouns, etc., in the spirit of contextualist theories; yet improves in compo-
sitionally deriving certain distinctive shifting/binding phenomena (e.g. with
epistemic modals), and providing a framework for theorizing about differ-
ences in tendencies for local/global readings
Though detailed theory comparison would be premature at this stage, features such
as these should make the project of interest to ongoing work on topics such as
quantification, modality, and context-sensitivity.
An overview of the paper is as follows: §2 introduces principal elements of the
basic syntax/semantics. §3 motives a more complex clausal architecture by examin-
ing how an assignment-variable-based theory can be integrated into independently
motivated treatments of the syntax-semantics interface. The resulting account cap-
tures intensionality and local/global interpretations of context-sensitive expressions
via general mechanisms of movement and variable binding, and it affords an elegant
standardization of quantification. A definition for a generalized binder index, which
attaches directly to moved expressions, is provided; the semantics is fully com-
positional. §4 illustrates compositional derivations of various examples involving
quantifiers, attitude ascriptions, and modals using the syntax/semantics from §3.
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Speculative applications to classic puzzles of names in attitude ascriptions are briefly
considered. Working through these examples will afford opportunities for exam-
ining issues regarding quantification in the metalanguage, binding with pronouns
vs. traces, and (non-)conventionalized locality/globality principles for constraining
readings. An improved formalization of assignment modification captures binding
relations in derivations with long-distance binding. §5 recaps the main develop-
ments thus far.
§§6–10 explore how the foregoing assignment-variable-based framework may
be extended to other complex constructions, such as relative clauses and various
types of noun phrases (§§6–8), conditionals (§9), and interrogatives (§10). Nomi-
nal quantifiers are treated as introducing quantification over assignments, binding
relative pronouns in headed relative constructions as well as other types of pronouns
such as donkey pronouns (§§6–7). The assignment-variable-based account of quan-
tifiers is integrated in a general layered n syntax/semantics for noun phrases (§8).
‘If’-clauses are treated as free relatives, interpreted as plural definite descriptions
of assignments (possibilities) (§9). Interrogative sentences denote a set of possi-
ble answers, with answers conceived as sets of assignments (possibilities) (§10).
Derivations of various types of local/global readings in relative clauses, conditionals,
and questions are provided, such as involving binding phenomena with pronouns
and donkey anaphora, weak vs. strong quantifiers, indexical shift, information-
sensitivity, and “interrogative flip.” A speculative event semantics for verb phrases
in light of the proposed parallel layered n/v analyses of noun/verb phrases is briefly
considered.
Certain features of the treatments of noun phrases, relativization, conditionals,
and questions in these sections are of general interest, independent of the particular
assignment-variable-based implementation — e.g., an analysis of various types of
apparent binding out of DPs such as with donkey pronouns, genitive binding, inverse
linking; a distinction between trace-binding and pronoun-binding, with applications
to weak crossover; a general layered n syntax/semantics for quantificational and
non-quantificational noun phrases; formal diagnoses of various contrasts between
(so-called) weak vs. strong quantifiers, such as regarding “specificity,” “discourse-
linking,” modal independence, and compatibility with existential ‘there’; alternative
compositional semantics for head-raising and matching analyses of relative clauses;
a uniform compositional semantics for ‘if’-clauses in post-nominal, sentence-final,
and sentence-initial positions, with or without a main-clause modal or ‘then’, and
with declarative or interrogative main clauses; a uniform compositional seman-
tics for individual correlative clauses adjoined to the main clause or to a correlate
proform; compositional treatments of relativization and interrogatives which avoid
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additional composition rules or interpretive principles (Predicate Abstraction, Pred-
icate Modification, Event Identification, Trace Conversion); a unified analysis of
wh-words, relative determiners, and certain indefinites; and a unified approach to
the syntax/semantics of conditional, correlative, and interrogative clauses.
The specific account to be developed of course isn’t the only way of implement-
ing a syntax/semantics with object-language assignment variables. There will be
various choice points, many of them unforced, along the way. I leave additional
applications, development of alternative implementations, and comparisons with
existing frameworks for future research.
A preliminary methodological remark: The project in this paper isn’t to provide
a possibility proof; the question isn’t whether it is possible to construct a formal
syntax/semantics with object-language assignment-variables. I would be surprised
if it wasn’t. The project is to investigate the prospects for a specific type of syn-
tax/semantics of natural language so as to provide a concrete basis for overall theory
comparison. Some of the data will be new, though in many cases the aim will be
to provide a new take on old facts — to integrate data from diverse literatures in
new ways, and systematize phenomena independently familiar yet often not jointly
considered in theorizing. The goal is a more coherent theory of linguistic shifting
phenomena with improved empirical coverage and explanatory power. Sustained
investigation into a variety of linguistic phenomena is thus required. One must
ensure that particular choice points and analyses generalize across the spectrum
of examples, and can be systematized into an overall account that plausibly rivals
accounts in more traditional frameworks; the devil is in the details (lambdas, trees).
It will be critical to motivate particular syntactic implementations and apply the
account to diverse expressions and constructions. I ask for the reader’s patience
along the way. I hope the preliminary developments in this paper may illustrate
the fruitfulness of an assignment-variable-based framework for linguistic theorizing
and provide a more adequate basis for future theory comparison.
1.1 Parameters and operators: A (Ptolemaic?) road not taken
Before beginning our constructive project, this subsection briefly considers how
certain of the core data with local/global readings might be captured in a less
revisionary operator-based semantics — roughly put, a semantics which analyzes
modals, attitude verbs, etc. as operators which shift the relevant contextual fea-
tures, construed as parameters of interpretation. To fix ideas I focus on adapting
two prominent general approaches to linguistic shifting phenomena from the lit-
erature — traditional context-index-style frameworks, and approaches to indexical
shift which introduce assignment-quantification in the metalanguage. The aim isn’t
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to develop the accounts in depth, or to show that no alternative (whether developed
along the following lines or otherwise) can succeed. The aim is simply to highlight
certain prima facie costs so as to further motivate the paper’s central constructive
project. Readers satisfied with the motivations in §1 may wish to proceed to page 16.
The string in (1.15) permits a range of readings depending on context.4
(1.15) Everyone thinks that Zoe dreamt a friend of mine was rich.
• ‘a friend of mine’, Specific/Non-specific:
– Non-specific: the witness for the DP may vary across the quantificational
subject’s belief-worlds
– Specific: the witness for the DP is constant across the quantificational
subject’s belief-worlds; the belief is about a particular individual
• ‘a friend of mine’, De re/De dicto:
– De dicto: the witness for the DP is a friend of mine in the local evaluation
world; the belief is about individuals conceived as being friends of mine
– De re: the witness for the DP is a friend of mine in the actual world; the
belief is about actual-world friends of mine
• ‘everyone’, ‘a friend of mine’, domain restriction:
– Global: the domain of quantification is determined by the discourse
– Local: the domain of quantification is determined by a local attitude/information
state (e.g., where the relevant subjects differ on which friends ought to
be considered in questions about richness (do my animal friends count?
do my toddler friends count?))
• positive form relative gradable adjective ‘rich’, standard of richness:
– Global: the standard for richness — how rich one must be to count as
rich — is determined by the discourse context (each subject’s attitude
is about whether such-and-such individuals are dc-wealthy, where dc is
the contextually presupposed standard for richness)
– Intermediate: the standard for richness is determined by the quantifica-
tional subject’s beliefs (each subject o’s attitude is about whether such-
and-such individuals are do-wealthy, where do is the standard for rich-
ness accepted by o)
4See Fodor 1970, von Fintel & Heim 2011 on distinguishing the specific/non-specific dis-
tinction from the de re/de dicto distinction (more in §§4.2, 6.2). See Barker 2002, Silk 2016a
on local/global readings of relative gradable adjectives (more in §10). See Silk 2014a, 2016a on
local/global readings of quantifier domain restrictions. Terminology varies among authors.
9
– Local: the standard for richness is determined relative to the local epis-
temic possibility (the subjects may fail to accept particular standards
for richness, and each subject o’s attitude is about whether such-and-
such individuals are deo-wealthy, where deo is the standard for richness
regarded as live by o)
For instance, suppose we are millionaires and we agree that one must be a million-
aire to count as rich. Rita is one of my friends, and we are considering Alice’s, Bert’s,
and Chip’s beliefs about a dream that Zoe had about her income. I know that each
of them thinks that Zoe dreamt that Rita was a millionaire. Though I may know
nothing about Alice’s, Bert’s, or Chip’s standards for richness, or their beliefs about
the standards operative in Zoe’s dream, I can describe their states of mind using
(1.15), as reflected in (1.16). (I use the superscript/subscript indices informally to
indicate certain of the intuitive binder/bindee relations.)
(1.16) [a friend-of-minec]i [everyone thinksmc [Zoe dreamtnm [ti richc]]]
a. Intended reading: specific de re + global ‘rich’-standard
b. ≈ there is a particular individual o who is a friend of mine such that
everyone relevant in c thinks Zoe dreamt that o was dc-wealthy
Alternatively, suppose Alice, Bert, and Chip each think that Zoe had a dream about
some or other of the Sharks, who, it turns out, are friends of mine. I know that each
of Alice, Bert, and Chip accept a particular though different standard for richness.
The string in (1.15) can be used to describe their states of mind in this scenario as
well, as reflected in (1.17).
(1.17) everyone thinksmc [Zoe dreamtnm [a friend-of-minec richm]]
a. Intended reading: non-specific de re + intermediate ‘rich’-standard
b. ≈ there is some group of individuals who are friends of mine — say, the
Sharks S— such that everyone o relevant in c thinks Zoe dreamt that
some or other o′ ∈ S was do-wealthy
Let’s consider (1.15) on the reading in (1.17). Non-specific de re readings
(Fodor 1970) have provided one of the main motivations in the literature for posit-
ing object-language world variables (cf. Percus 2000, vonStechow 2008, vonFin-
tel & Heim 2011). The quantifier in ‘a friend of mine’ must take narrow scope with
respect to the attitude verb in order to capture how the subject’s beliefs needn’t
be about a particular individual; yet the predicate’s world parameter must remain
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unshifted so as to capture how the beliefs are about actual-world friends of mine.
Treating worlds as parameters of evaluation that are shifted by intensional operators
obscures how the DP’s predicate can be anchored to the actual world while scoping
under the modal/attitude verb (though see von Fintel & Heim 2011). Introducing
world variables in the syntax (cf. (1.2)), and treating modal quantifiers over worlds
parallel to determiner quantifiers over individuals, avoids the problem. Non-specific
de re readings are captured via long-distance binding of the embedded DP’s world
variable, as reflected in (1.18) and (1.19).5 (I use ‘⋋’ to distinguish the assumed
object-language binder index.)
(1.18) a. Al thinks a friend of mine won
b. [S ⋋2s Al [thinks w2] [S′ ⋋4s [S′′ [DP a [[friend w2] of mine1]] won w4]]]
(1.19) JDPKg = λPet .∃xe∶P(x) ∧ x is a friend of g(1e) in g(4s)JS′′Kg = 1 iff ∃x∶ x won in g(4s) ∧ x is a friend of g(1e) in g(2s)JS′Kg = λws.JS′Kg[w/4s] = λws .∃x∶ x won in w∧ x is a friend of g(1e) in g(2s)JthinkKg = λws.λpst.λxe.∀w′ ∈ DOXx,w∶ p(w′) = 1
S is true in c iff JSKgc(wc) = 1
iff ∀w′ ∈ DOXAl,wc ∶ ∃x∶ x is a friend of gc(1e) in wc ∧ x won in w′
In §1 we noted how the body of information relevant for interpreting epis-
temic modals under attitude verbs is generally shifted to the subject’s information
(Stephenson 2007a, Silk 2016a, 2017). In quantified epistemic attitude ascriptions
the relevant information shifts with the quantificational subject.
(1.20) a. Every boy thinks he must be stupid.
b. ≈ for every boy x, x’s beliefs imply that x is stupid.
(Stephenson 2007a: 489)
A prominent (though certainly controversial) approach to capturing this is to add
an informational coordinate to the index of evaluation, the parameter shiftable by
5For present purposes I assume a simplified analysis of ‘friend of mine’, I leave open what
generates the world-binders, and I assume a standard Predicate Abstraction rule. The positive
account developed in what follows derives the relevant binder indices from type-driven movement
and does away with non-compositional rules such as Predicate Abstraction. A detailed analysis of
genitives is given in §7.2.
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operators (Stephenson 2007a, Yalcin 2007, Hacquard 2010, MacFarlane 2014;
cf. “nonindexicalism” in the sense ofMacFarlane 2009). To a first approximation:6
(1.21) a. Al thinks a friend of mine might win.
b. [S ⋋2s Al thinks-w2 ⋋4s [S′ might ⋋7s [a friend-w2-of-mine1 win-w7]]]
(1.22) Jmight φKg,s = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ s∶ JφKg,s(w′) = 1Jthink-wi φKg,s = λxe .∀w′ ∈ s′∶ JφKg,s′(w′) = 1, where s′ = DOXx,g(is)JS′Kg,s = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ s∶ ∃x∶ x is a friend of g(1e) in g(2s) and x wins in w′JSKg,s = λws .∀w′ ∈ DOXAl,w∶ ∃w′′ ∈ DOXAl,w∶ ∃x∶ x is a friend of g(1e) in w
and x wins in w′′= λws .∃w′′ ∈ DOXAl,w∶ ∃x∶ x is a friend of g(1e) in w and x wins in w′′
(1.21) characterizes Al’s beliefs as being compatible with some actual friend of mine
being the winner, as derived in (1.22). The attitude verb obligatorily shifts the
informational coordinate in the index to the subject’s belief state.
The above sort of semantics may work well for expressions for which local
readings are conventionalized. Yet the approach is awkward for expressions permit-
ting both local and global readings — that is, the vast majority of context-sensitive
expressions.7 Take the standard-sensitivity associated with positive form relative
gradable adjectives. Since ‘rich’ can receive non-shifted readings in certain contexts,
it won’t do to treat e.g. ‘rich’ as directly dependent on a posited standard coordinate
d in the index, analogous to the semantics for ‘might’ in (1.22). So suppose we treat
‘rich’ as having an argument place filled either by a contextually provided standard-
pronoun, representing global readings, or an element stipulated as referring to the
standard coordinate of the index, representing local readings. A simplified seman-
tics is as follows, where DOX∗x,w is now a set of world-standard pairs compatible
with x’s belief state in w, and ‘o is d-wealthy’ abbreviates that o’s degree of wealth
is at least d.8
(1.23) [S ⋋2s Al thinks-w2 ⋋4s
6An additional abstraction rule analogous to Heim & Kratzer’s (1998) Intensional Function
Application could be introduced for combining modals/attitude verbs with their complements
(cf. Santorio 2010, Kennedy 2014). For simplicity I treat the informational parameter as a set
of worlds, and I bracket details about the internal syntax/semantics of different flavors of modality.
A more precise semantics in our assignment-variable framework will be given in §3.4.
7See Silk 2014a, 2016a on parallels among e.g. epistemic modals and paradigm context-
sensitive expressions in the discourse dynamics of unembedded uses.
8I ignore context-sensitivity regarding comparison classes, and bracket details about the internal
syntax/semantics of the positive form (Kennedy 2007).
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a. … [S′ Rita is rich-w4-D]]
b. … [S′′ Rita is rich-w4-d3]]
(1.24) JrichKg;s,d = λws.λdd.λxe . x is d-wealthy in wJDKg;s,d = dJthink-wi φKg;s,d = λxe .∀⟨w′,d′⟩ ∈ s∗∶ JφKg;s′,d′(w′) = 1,
where s∗ = DOX∗x,g(is) and s′ = {w ∣ ∃d′′∶ ⟨w,d′′⟩ ∈ DOX∗x,g(is)}JS′Kg;s,d = 1 iff Rita is d-wealthy in g(4s)JS′′Kg;s,d = 1 iff Rita is g(3d)-wealthy in g(4s)
Local: (1.23a) is true in c iff (roughly) for all worlds w′ and standards d′
compatible with Al’s belief state in wc, Rita is d′-wealthy in w′
Global: (1.23b) is true in c iff (roughly) for all worlds w′ and standards d′
compatible with Al’s belief state in wc, Rita is gc(3d)-wealthy in w′
Analogous moves can be made for other expressions optionally taking local or global
readings, as in (1.25)–(1.26) for quantifiers and domain variables (von Fintel
1994, Stanley & Szabó 2000, Stanley 2002). (For simplicity I treat the added
parameter G in the index as a set of individuals, and I leave ‘can-vote’ unanalyzed.)
(1.25) a. (1.14a) LF ≈ [⋋2s Alice thinks-w2 ⋋4s [[everyone P5] can-vote-w4]]
b. (1.14b) LF ≈ [⋋2s Alice thinks-w2 ⋋4s [[everyone G] can-vote-w4]]
(1.26) JeveryoneKg;s,d,G = λPet.λQet .∀x s.t. x is a person and P(x) = 1∶Q(x) = 1JGKg;s,d,G = GJthink-wi φKg;s,d,G = λxe .∀⟨w′,d′,G′⟩ ∈ s∗∶ JφKg;s′,d′,G′(w′) = 1,
where s∗ = DOX∗x,g(is), s′ = {w ∣ ∃d′′∃G′′∶ ⟨w,d′′,G′′⟩ ∈ DOX∗x,g(is)}
Global: (1.25a) is true in c iff (roughly) for all worlds w′, standards for
richness d′, and sets of individuals G′ relevant to voting rights compatible
with Alice’s belief state in wc, every person x ∈ G′ can-vote in w′
Local: (1.25b) is true in c iff (roughly) for all worlds w′, standards for
richness d′, and sets of individuals G′ relevant to voting rights compatible
with Alice’s belief state in wc, every person x ∈ g(5et) can-vote in w′
One might worry that capturing shifted readings of context-sensitive expressions
via coordinates in the index obscures one of the original motivations for distin-
guishing the index parameter in points of evaluation. Following Lewis 1980 the
index consists of those contextual features that can be shifted by operators. If
nearly all contextual features can be shifted — even arguably features determin-
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ing the interpretation of paradigm indexicals such as ‘I’ (e.g., Santorio 2012) —
one might wonder if a simpler theoretical apparatus and treatment of shifted/non-
shifted readings is available.
On a more empirical level, it isn’t evident that the approach will generalize to
more complex examples. For instance, (1.25) represented the index coordinate for
shiftable quantifier domain restrictions simply as a set of individuals. This represen-
tation would need to be complicated to account for different restrictions associated
with different quantified expressions. The parameter might be represented instead
as a function from NP-meanings to domain restrictions, roughly as in (1.27), whereJGKg;G∗,... = G∗ is type ⟨et, et⟩ and cat/dog is the set of cats/dogs (ignoring intension-
ality). Intuitively, G∗(cat) represents a set of individuals relevant when considering
cats, G∗(dog) represents a set of individuals relevant when considering dogs, etc.
(1.27) Jevery dog G ⋋1 every cat G likes t1Kg;G∗,... = 1 iff for every y s.t. y is a dog
and y ∈ G∗(dog), for every x s.t. x is a cat and x ∈ G∗(cat), x likes y
Yet examples such as (1.28) involving multiple occurrences of the same quantified
expression, where each occurrence receives a different shifted restriction, remain
problematic (cf. e.g. Stanley 2005).
(1.28) [Context: A panel survey is being carried out to discern sentiments about the
University’s practices in distributing a certain award. The panel members —
Alice, Bert, and Chloe — have different views on who should be allowed
to be nominated for the award, and who should be allowed to vote in
deciding the winner. Alice thinks that the award should be reserved for
undergraduates, and that only graduate students and faculty should be
allowed to vote for the winner; and she thinks that the award procedure
in fact proceeds accordingly. Bert thinks that the award should be open to
graduate students too, and that undergrads, grads, and faculty should all
be allowed to vote; and he thinks that the award procedure in fact proceeds
accordingly. Chloe thinks the award should be open to all members of the
University, but she thinks that faculty are (wrongfully) excluded from being
nominated. When asked about how well the University is doing regarding
sentiments about the fairness of the award practices, you report:]
Quite well. Most people think that everyone can vote for everyone.
One strategy for addressing these concerns is to abandon the notion of an in-
dex parameter, and treat expressions such as modals/attitude verbs as assignment-
shifters (cf. Cumming 2008, Santorio 2010, 2012, Ninan 2012). Previous ac-
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counts have focused on indexical shift with individual pronouns. Suppose we gen-
eralize the approach to shifting with other types of context-sensitive expressions.
Just as the attitudes and circumstances of interlocutors in a concrete discourse are
assumed to be representable by an abstract “contextually determined assignment”
which determines values for pronouns, quantifier domain restrictions, degree stan-
dards, etc. (e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998, Heim 2008), so too, we can assume, for
concrete attitude states more generally. Adapting the semantics in Santorio 2010,
suppose we relativize the interpretation function to an ordinary assignment g as
well as an assignment a shifted by certain modals/attitude verbs. The syntactic
indices in a’s domain can be distinguished accordingly, marked as [+a]. Expressions
optionally receiving local/global readings may take variables of both types; other
context-sensitive expressions may lexically specify a particular type of variable. To
a first approximation, simplified derivations for the alternative readings of (1.23)
and for (1.28) might proceed as follows.9
(1.29) a. [S ⋋2s Al thinks-w2 ⋋4s [S′ Rita is rich-w4-d3/d3[+a]]]
b. Jd3Kg,a = g(3d)Jd3[+a]Kg,a = a(3d)JrichKg,a = λws.λdd.λxe . x is d-wealthy in wJthink-wi φKg,a = λxe .∀⟨w′, a′⟩ ∈ DOXx,g(is)∶ JφKg,a′(w′) = 1JS′Kg,a = 1 iff Rita is g(3d)/a(3d)-wealthy in g(4s)JSKg,a = λws .∀⟨w′, a′⟩ ∈ DOXAl,w∶ JS′Kg,a′(w′) = 1= λws .∀⟨w′, a′⟩ ∈ DOXAl,w∶ Rita is g(3d)/a′(3d)-wealthy in w′
(1.30) a. [S ⋋2s Most people-w2 P3 think-w2 ⋋4s [everyone-w4 P5[+a] ⋋1e
everyone-w4 P7[+a] can-vote-w4 for t1]]
b. JSKg,a = λws . for most z s.t. z is a person inw and z ∈ g(3et)∶ ∀⟨w′, a′⟩ ∈ DOXz,w∶∀y s.t. y is a person in w′ ∧ y ∈ a′(5et)∶ ∀x s.t. x is a person in
w′ ∧ x ∈ a′(7et)∶
x can vote for y in w′
Such an approach may capture alternative readings where the relevant expres-
sions receive their interpretation from the discourse or embedding attitude (modal,
etc.). Yet neither operator-based account outline above captures intermediate read-
ings such as (1.17), reproduced in (1.31), where the interpretation of an expression
9Metasemantic principles could be given regarding the relation between the assignments g and a,
what particular indices represent, and what it is for an assignment to be compatible with an attitude
state. For the moment I ignore such issues; we will return to them in §§3, 4.
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is determined non-locally but with respect to an environment distinct from the
discourse context.
(1.31) a. everyone thinksmc [Zoe dreamtnm [a friend-of-minec richm]]
b. ≈ for some group of actual friends of mine S— say, the Sharks — everyone
x thinks that someone or other in S fared well economically (by x’s lights)
in Zoe’s dream. (E.g., Alice, Bert, and Chip each accept a particular
standard for richness dA, dB, dC, respectively. Alice thinks that Zoe
dreamt that someone or other in S was at least dA-wealthy; Bert thinks
that Zoe dreamt that someone or other in S was at least dB-wealthy;
Chip thinks that Zoe dreamt that someone or other in S was at least
dC-wealthy.)
(1.32) [⋋2s everyone-P5 thinks-w2 ⋋4s [Zoe dreamt-w4 ⋋7s [a friend-of-mine1-w2
rich-w7-d???]]]
On the intermediate reading in question, the supplied standard for how rich one
must be to count as rich is the standard accepted by the quantificational subject. Yet
identifying the richness-standard variable d??? in (1.32) as di would represent the
global reading, where the standard is supplied by the basic contextually determined
assignment g. And identifying the variable as di[+a] would represent the local reading
shifted by ‘dream’, where the standard is supplied by the assignment representing
the possibility compatible with Zoe’s dream state.
Such examples can be multiplied. Consider (1.33) on the intermediate reading
of ‘every adult’, where the relevant domain restriction represents the set of individ-
uals considered relevant by x in matters of voting rights, for each bigot x (ignoring
domain restrictions for ‘every bigot’ and ‘most people’).
(1.33) ‘Every bigot thinks most people think every adult can vote’
a. every bigotc thinkskc [most peoplek thinknk [every adultn Pk can-voten]]
b. Intended reading: Al, Betty, and Chuck are the bigots, who are prejudiced
in favor of their groups GA,GB,GC, respectively. Al thinks that most
people think that all the GAs (individuals in GA) can vote; Betty thinks
that most people think that all the GBs can vote; Chuck thinks that most
people think that all the GCs can vote.
This says that every bigot x is optimistic about most people’s beliefs about whether
anyone is improperly excluded (by x’s lights) from being legally permitted to vote.
To recap: Certain prominent phenomena that have led theorists to posit syntac-
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tic world variables and object-language quantification over worlds can be observed
with features associated with various context-sensitive expressions. This raises a
challenge for any account providing distinct treatments of world- and individual-
quantification/shifting, on the one hand, and quantification/shifting with context-
sensitive expressions more generally. One response would be to further complicate
the syntax/semantics and attempt to capture the spectrum of local/non-local read-
ings within an operator-based framework (see von Fintel & Heim 2011 for general
discussion and possible strategies). I suggest that we put such epicycles to the side.
The present project pursues a fundamental reorientation in theorizing about
context and “shiftiness” in natural language. The traditional approach takes unshifted
readings for context-sensitive expressions as paradigmatic. Here is Kaplan: “What
is common to [indexical words] is that the referent is dependent on the context of
use and that the meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent
in terms of certain aspects of the context” (1989: 490; cf. Fillmore 1971/1997,
Kratzer 1998a, Rullmann 2004). Though such an approach might seem initially
plausible for English expressions such as (say) ‘I’ or ‘here’, it is puzzling from the
perspective of the broader spectrum of linguistic shifting phenomena — hence the
plethora of mechanisms for intensionality, quantification, and context-sensitivity,
and epicycles for capturing local readings across context-sensitive expressions. In-
deed Kaplan goes so far as to treat strings with referential readings and strings with
bound-variable readings as uses of homonyms (1989: 489–490). Lest one scoff, note
that Kratzer’s (1998a, 2009) “minimal pronoun” account of apparent bound-variable
(“fake indexical”) uses of 1st and 2nd person pronouns is a homonym account.10
10Further, whereas local fake indexicals are treated as minimal pronouns (mere indices) inter-
preted via an ordinary λ-binder ((i)), long-distance fake indexicals are treated as fully-specified
pronouns interpreted via distinctive context-shifting λ-binders ((ii)), syncategorematically defined
as in (iii). The “true” and “fake” indexical uses of the string ‘you’ in (i-a) are homonyms; the local
and long-distance fake indexical uses of ‘you’ in (i-a) and (ii-a), respectively, are homonyms; and the
binder indices in (i-b) and (ii-b) have distinct interpretation rules.
(i) a. Only you got a question that you understood.
b. Only [2nd] [⋋2 got a question that ∅2 understood]
(ii) a. You are the only one who knows somebody who understands your paper.
b. [2nd] … [⋋[2nd] know somebody who understands [2nd]’s paper]
(iii) J⋋n αKg,c = λx.JαKg′,c, where g′ is like g, except possibly that g′(n) = xJ⋋[1st] αKg,c = λx.JαKg,c′ , where c′ is like c, except possibly that speaker(c′) = xJ⋋[2nd] αKg,c = λx.JαKg,c′ , where c′ is like c, except possibly that addressee(c′) = x
(from Kratzer 2009: exs. 53–54, 56–57; cf. 69–73)
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(1.34) a. Only I got a question that I understood.
b. [Only [1st]] ⋋1 got a question that ∅1 understood.
(1.35) J[1st]Kg,c = speaker(c)J∅nKg,c = g(n) (Kratzer 1998a: 94–95)
What classical theories ostensibly gain when it comes to prototypical global read-
ings, they lose when it comes to the spectrum of tendencies for local/global read-
ings across context-sensitive expressions. The notion of a crosslinguistic class of
specialized anaphoric pronouns — pronouns conventionally excluded from receiving
their interpretation from the discourse context (§1) — is a borderline conceptual
impossibility from a classical perspective.
It is time to rethink the foundational assumptions about shifting and context-
sensitivity motivating the traditional formalism. Our understanding of the rich-
ness of contextual dependencies in natural language — e.g., indexicality, intension-
ality, logophoricity, perspective, projection, local context, assignment shift — has
come a long way since e.g. Kaplan’s (in)famous ban on “monsters.” The project
in what follows is to develop a theory which takes the opposite approach. Shifta-
bility for context-sensitive expressions is the default; unshiftability and obligatory
shifting on the poles of the spectrum are what call for special explanation. The
proposed assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics provides unified analyses of
shifted/non-shifted readings among context-sensitive expressions, and a fully com-
positional standardization of quantification across domains (see §1). I encourage
the development of alternative overall theories with which the following assignment-
variable-based account may be compared.
18
Part I
2 Basics
2.1 Formal overview: Semantic values, models, domains, assignments, composition
I begin with core elements of the basic syntax/semantics.
Rather than having a traditional interpretation function (J Kg)g∈G parameterized
by assignments (worlds, etc.), we have an unrelativized interpretation functionJ K, which assigns expressions semantic values in terms of sets of assignments in the
model. (I’ll ignore tense/aspect and times/events.)
(2.1) ModelsM:
– E: set of entities
– T: set of truth-values, {0, 1}
– W: set of worlds
– G: set of assignments
Theoretically, I treat assignments as representing a possibility. This interpretation is
in keeping with common talk of contextually determined assignments representing
what world is actual, objects’ relative saliences, speakers’ intentions, attention, etc.
(Heim & Kratzer 1998, Schlenker 2003, Heim 2008). For instance, a syntactic
representation it7 and assignment mapping ⟨7, e⟩ to Fluffy might represent an in-
tention to refer to Fluffy with a token use of ‘it’ and a possibility in which Fluffy is
the center of attention.
It is common to identify basic semantic types with sets in the model. Since
expressions’ semantic values will be treated as involving functions from assignments,
it will simplify our formalism to define semantic types in terms of such functions
(cf. Kobele 2010; contrast Sternefeld 1998). For instance, functions from assign-
ments to truth-values in T are type t, and functions from assignments to entities in
E are type e.
Care must be taken in our formalization of assignments and semantic types.
Including assignment variables and variables of arbitrary types has the potential
for paradoxes or non-wellfoundedness (cf. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1990, 1991;
for discussion see Chierchia 1994). For instance, one cannot have a case where
g(i) = g, for some assignment-index i, lest there be assignments g in their own
codomain. Likewise, we cannot allow ourselves to ask whether an assignment g is
in the value assigned to an index k for a set of assignments, i.e. whether g ∈ g(k):
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given that functions are sets of ordered pairs, having a case where ⟨k, S⟩ ∈ g ∧ g ∈ S,
for some set of assignments S, would violate standard set-theoretic bans on ∈-chains.
Let the set of assignments G in the model be a set of ordinary assignments h—
functions from typed numerical indices ⟨n, τ⟩, for any non-assignment type τ , to
elements of the model. For instance, h(⟨4, e⟩) returns an entity o ∈ E, say Fluffy;
h(⟨4, et⟩) returns (the characteristic function of) a set of entities in E, say {Fluffy, Fido};
and so on. Ordinary assignments h ∈ G are undefined for indices for assignments
or functions involving assignments. I let the domain of assignments Dg be a set of
assignments whose domain also includes indices ⟨n, a⟩ for assignments — i.e., where
dom(g) = dom(h)∪{⟨n, a⟩ ∶n ∈ N}, and range(g) = range(h)∪G. For instance, for
some g ∈ Dg, g(⟨2, a⟩) is an ordinary assignment h ∈ G; g(⟨2, e⟩) is an entity o ∈ E,
say Fido; and so on. (For purposes of the present exposition, I refer to ordinary
assignments h ∈ G as “assignmentsM” (for assignments in the Model), and to the
richer assignments g ∈ Dg as “assignmentsD” (for assignments in the Domain). When
the distinction is irrelevant I ignore the subscripting; context should disambiguate.
For readability I often abbreviate indices ⟨i, α⟩ with iα.)
Our system avoids the worries mentioned above regarding non-wellfoundedness
and ∈-chains. Since assignmentsD gg return elements in the model, there is no case
of an assignment being in its own codomain. For h ∈ G, h(ia) is undefined; and
for g ∈ Dg, g(ia) = hj ≠ g. Since there are no high type assignment indices in the
domain of assignments in Dg (or G), expressions such as h(iat), g(iat), g(ia)(iat),
etc. are undefined. Such a restriction in assignments’ domains is motivated by our
posited theoretical role for assignment-variables as an object-language mechanism
for tracking the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions; yet the assumption
that there are no pronouns for sets of assignments is ultimately an empirical one.
So, our semantic types are as follows, where the set of assignmentsM G and do-
main of assignmentsDDg are defined as above — i.e. where the inputs of assignmentsM
h ∈ G are (non-assignment-)indices ⟨n, τ⟩ for τ ≠ g, a, ⟨. . . g/a . . . ⟩, and the inputs
of assignmentsD g ∈ Dg are indices ⟨n, σ⟩ for σ ≠ g, ⟨. . . g/a . . . ⟩. (Although the for-
malization of assignments excludes pronouns for functions involving assignments,
there may be other expressions of type ⟨a, t⟩, etc.; more on this below.)11
(2.2) Domains / Semantic types:
– Dg = domain of assignmentsD
– De = EDg
– Dt = {0, 1}Dg
11Thanks to Salvatore Florio, Dilip Ninan, and Ede Zimmermann for discussion.
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– Ds =WDg
– Da = GDg
– Dαβ = DDαβ
Unlike previous accounts introducing semantic types for assignments (§1), I
let the object-language include variables for assignments. A natural preliminary
idea would be to identify variable denotations with functions from assignments
to elements in the model — e.g., treating the denotation of an individual-variableJoiK as λgg.g(ie), where g(ie) ∈ E.12 Such a move is unavailable in the system
as developed thus far. For instance, an assignment-variable denotation (function
a ∶Dg → G) couldn’t combine via (say) ordinary function application or function
composition with functions x ∶Dg → E (individual-variable denotation), p ∶Dg → 2W
(proposition-variable denotation), etc.
As one way of allowing for variables of complex types, I treat non-assignment
variables as having an initial argument of type a, and I treat semantic composition as
proceeding via function application. Variables viα for basic non-assignment types α
denote functions JviαK ∈ Daα such that for any aa, gg, JviαK(a)(g) = a(g)(iα)— e.g.,Jo1 g1K = Jo1K(Jg1K) = λgg.g(1a)(1e). Variables of complex types may be defined
via a metalanguage “down”-style operator ↓ which maps an element of a domain to
an item composed out of associated lowered elements of the model:
(2.3) For γ of (possibly basic) type σ = ⟨σn, ⟨. . . , σ0⟩⋯ ⟩, ↓γ is defined by the
condition that, for any gg:(↓γ)(g) = the (possibly nullary) function f ∈M s.t. for any γnσn . . . γ1σ1 ,
γ(γn) . . . (γ1)(g) = f((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g))
For the degenerate case where γβ is of basic type β ∈ {e, s, t, a}, ↓γ is a function
from an assignmentD gg to the item in the model that is the image under γ of g.
For instance, for x ∈ De, (↓x)(g) is the individual (nullary function) o ∈ E such
that o = x(g), i.e. (↓x)(g) = x(g). For P ∈ D⟨e,t⟩, (↓P)(g) is the function f ∶E → T
such that for any xe, P(x)(g) = f((↓x)(g)) = f(x(g)); and so on. The denotations
of viσ of complex types σ = ⟨σn, ⟨. . . , σ0⟩⋯ ⟩ can be defined accordingly as func-
tions JviσK ∈ Daσ such that, for any gg, aa, γnσn , . . . , γ1σ1 , JviσK(a)(γn) . . . (γ1)(g) =
a(g)(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g)). For instance, a pronoun for a set of worlds[p2 g1] denotes a function Jp2K(Jg1K) ∈ Dst such that for anyws, gg, g(1a)(2st)((↓w)(g)) =
12I use bold and single quotes for object-language expressions; I’ll also use bold for highlighting
key points. I use gi for assignment variables, wi for world variables, oi for individual variables. I
continue to use h for “ordinary” assignmentsM in G in the model, and g for assignmentsD in Dg.
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g(1a)(2st)(w(g)); a choice-function pronoun [F1 g1] denotes a function JF1K(Jg1K) ∈
D⟨⟨e,t⟩,e⟩ such that for any P⟨e,t⟩, gg, g(1a)(1ete)((↓P)(g)) is a selected o ∈ E in
(the characteristic set of) (↓P)(g), where (↓P)(g) is the function f ∶E → T such
that f(x(g)) = f(x)(g) for any xe; and so on. I treat the semantic values of traces
equivalently yet lacking the initial type a argument — e.g., Jt1eK = λgg.g(1e). For
complex type σ = ⟨σn, ⟨. . . , σ0⟩⋯ ⟩, trace t, and pronoun-variable v (variables of
basic types could be understood degenerately where n = 0 and σ0 ∈ {e, s, t, a}):13
13For expository purposes I use traces in representing displacement (cf. Chomsky 1981), though
the framework is also compatible with a minimalist syntax that rejects traces as theoretical primitives.
For instance, remnants of movement may be understood as copies of the moved expression, as in a
copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1993, 1995, Sauerland 1998, Fox 2000, 2002, Hornstein
2001, Nunes 2004; see Takahashi 2010 for a comparative overview). Unless indicated otherwise,
we can assume that non-semantically-driven movement is undone at LF, and any copies not necessary
for semantic composition are uninterpreted. In movement for type reasons, i.e. Quantifier Raising
QR (May 1977, 1985), the lower copy might be interpreted via an LF-interface rule replacing the
copy with a coindexed variable; more simply, one can treat all parts of the lower copy as being
deleted except for its numerical/type features (cf. Kratzer 2004), as in (i)–(ii) (using ‘∧’ to indicate
binder features, and strikethrough for deletion in the semantic component).
(i) QR (alternative): Copy α⟨i,σ⟩ from A, and Merge with A.
(ii) a. ⋮
everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩]
[S Alice beat everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩]
[S everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩] [S Alice beat everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩] ]]
b. [S everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩] [S Alice beat everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩] ]]
LF ≈ [S everyone[∧⟨5, e⟩] [S Alice beat [⟨5, e⟩] ]]
The precise formulation of such principles may be adapted for alternative views on the theoretical
status of indices. The general framework is compatible with treating chain relations as represented
in the narrow syntax or as captured in the interfaces (e.g., indices could be understood as explicitly
represented in lexical item tokens in a lexical array (or a device for identifying complex syntactic
objects individuated in terms of such indices), or as representing the syntactic relations on which
(co)indexing in the interfaces supervenes; see also Collins & Stabler 2016, Larson 2016 for
discussion). (The accounts of relativization and interrogatives in §§6–10 will avoid introducing
additional rules for interpreting structures derived from movement, such as Predicate Abstraction
(Heim & Kratzer 1998) or Trace Conversion (Fox 2000, 2002, 2003; cf. Sauerland 2004,
Johnson 2012, Moulton 2015).) For presentational purposes I provide both interpretation rules
in (2.4)–(2.5), though the account isn’t committed to a fundamental distinction between traces and
pronoun-variables. All variables might be interpreted as in (2.4), and the definition of QR (or lower
copy replacement) could be adapted so that remnants of movement are sister to an identity function
on assignments. Yet a simpler option is afforded by our treatment of indices as features. The rules
in (2.4)–(2.5) amount to saying that J K returns the values in (iii) for numerical/type feature sets:
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(2.4) JviσK = λaa.λγnσn . . . λγ1σ1 .λgg . a(g)(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g))
a. For α ∈ {e, s, t}, JviαK = λaa.λgg . a(g)(iα) b. JgiK = λgg . g(ia)
(2.5) JtiσK = λγnσn . . . λγ1σ1 .λgg . g(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g))
a. For β ∈ {e, s, t, a}, JtiβK = λgg . g(iβ)
(Note that variables g for assignments are type a (functions Dg → G); there are no
denotations of type g. In what follows I use ‘pronoun’ both in the present techni-
cal sense for a pronoun-variable + assignment-variable [viσ gk] complex, and infor-
mally for pronounced forms such as ‘it’, ‘she’, etc.; context should disambiguate.)
2.2 Preliminary derivation: Pronouns, quantifiers, quantification
To get a feel for the basic system it will be instructive to consider a preliminary
derivation. I begin with the simple sentence in (2.6) with a free pronoun and subject-
position quantifier (see n. 12). (T is an assumed topmost assignment-binder, where
g− is, intuitively, the counterpart assignmentM h of g in G; see below. For space
purposes I leave intermediate calculations to the reader.)14
(iii) For feature set F ⊆ N ×Θ, and ⟨i, σ⟩ ∈ F,
JFK = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
λγnσn . . . λγ
1
σ1 .λgg . g(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g)), if ∣F∣ = 1
λγnσn . . . λγ
1
σ1 .λgg . g(ja)(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g)), if ∣F∣ = 2 ∧ [⟨j, a⟩] ∈ F
undefined otherwise
The pronoun complexes [viσ gj] in the main text may thus be understood, more properly, as
representing terminal feature bundles {[⟨i, σ⟩], [⟨j, a⟩]}.
14I ignore tense, aspect, voice. I often abbreviate “f(x) = 1” with “f(x).” To a first approximation,
g[i/n] is the unique assignment g′ that maps n to i and is otherwise identical to g; an improved
definition of metalanguage expressions of assignment-modification will be provided in §4.
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(2.6) Everything loves it.
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩ S1 ∶ t
everything ∶ ⟨et, t⟩ VP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
⟨e, et⟩
loves ∶ ⟨s, ⟨e, et⟩⟩ s
w1 ∶ ⟨a, s⟩ g1 ∶ a
e
it1 ∶ ⟨a, e⟩ g1 ∶ a
JlovesK = λws.λxe.λye.λgg . y(g) loves x(g) in w(g)JeverythingK = λP⟨e,t⟩.λgg.∀xe∶P(x)(g)JT⟨1,a⟩K = λTt.λgg .∀aa = λgg.g−,T(g[a(g)/1a]) (provisional)
● g− ∶= the h ∈ G s.t. for all non-assignment indices iτ , h(iτ) = g(iτ)Jw1 g1K = Jw1K(Jg1K)= [λaa.[λgg . a(g)(1s)]](λgg.g(1a))= λgg.g(1a)(1s)Jit1 g1K = Jit1K(Jg1K)= [λaa.[λgg . a(g)(1e)]](λgg.g(1a))= λgg.g(1a)(1e)JS1K = JeverythingK(JlovesK(Jw1K(Jg1K))(Jit1K(Jg1K)))= λgg.∀xe∶ x(g) loves g(1a)(1e) in g(1a)(1s)JSK = JT⟨1,a⟩K(JS1K)= λgg.∀aa = λgg.g−∶ ∀xe∶ x(g[a(g)/1a]) loves g[a(g)/1a](1a)(1e) in g[a(g)/1a](1a)(1s)= λgg.∀xe∶ x(g[g−/1a]) loves g−(1e) in g−(1s)
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S is true in c iff JSK(gc) = 1
iff ∀xe∶ x(gc[g−c /1a]) loves g−c (1e) in g−c (1s)
First, pronouns are sister to assignment variables, which determine their interpre-
tation. I assume that sentences have a topmost assignment-binder T⟨i,a⟩, which
effectively maps variables sister to assignment variables coindexed with T⟨i,a⟩ to the
values provided by the input assignment. This anchors intuitively free pronouns to
the discourse context via the definition of truth-in-a-context (Percus 2000, vonFin-
tel & Heim 2011). In more complex examples, alternative local/global readings
will be reflected in different coindexings on assignment variables. A result of §3
will be a derivation of binder expressions, like T⟨i,a⟩, from an independently defined
generalized (cross-categorial, type-flexible) binder-index ⟨i,σ⟩.
A more complex clausal architecture will be provided in §3. The world argument
of a clause’s main predicate will be supplied by a world-trace, rather than by a
world+assignment-variable complex. For the moment, given the present simpler
syntax, one may assume that in the intended interpretation the first-positioned
world g(1s) represents the world of the possibility represented by g.
Importantly, the outputs of assignments are items in the model. What is loved
according to (2.6) isn’t a function y ∈ De but an individual o ∈ E, say Fluffy. Likewise,
although the metalanguage quantification is over functions x ∶Dg → E, the items
in terms of which the condition is stated are images of the given assignment g under
x, i.e. individuals o ∈ E in the model. The universal quantification over xe includes
functions mapping g to object o1 ∈ E, functions mapping g to o2 ∈ E, etc. The
metalanguage quantificational condition ∀xe∶ . . . in (2.6) is satisfied iff regardless
of which such function we look at, its value o ∈ E loves the contextually relevant
individual (=Fluffy): if there was an oi ∈ E that didn’t love Fluffy, then any function
xi ∈ De mapping gc to oi would be such that xi(gc) doesn’t love gc(1e) (=Fluffy),
falsifying the condition; and if there was a function xj ∈ De whose value given gc
doesn’t love gc(1e), then there would be an oj ∈ De, namely xj(gc), that doesn’t
love Fluffy (=gc(1e)). In this way the universal quantification over functions x ∈ De
makes a claim about every object o ∈ E in the set of entities (cf. Kobele 2010).
So, the semantics derives that S is true in c iff in the world of c everything loves
the individual o ∈ E represented by 1.
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3 Syntax and semantics: Standardizing quantification
Adding assignment-variables to the object language raises non-trivial issues for the
syntax and lexical/compositional semantics. This section shows how a theory with
assignment-variables can be integrated into independently motivated treatments
of the syntax/semantics interface. The revised account captures phenomena of
intensionality and (non-)shifted interpretations of context-sensitive expressions via
general mechanisms of movement and variable binding, and affords an elegant
standardization of quantification in the syntax and semantics (§1).
The particular treatments of the syntax and lexical/compositional semantics
in the remainder of the paper are of course not the only way of developing an
assignment-variable-based theory. I will spare the reader all my other failed at-
tempts. I welcome the development of alternatives with which the account may be
compared.15
3.1 Preamble
A worry with any framework positing object-language variables for worlds/times/etc.
is that they have the potential to overgenerate readings. The worry might seem espe-
cially pressing for a theory with assignment variables. Absent additional constraints,
nothing would seem to exclude a structure/interpretation such as (3.1), where the
embedded pronoun receives a local reading, being sister to an assignment variable
coindexed with ‘think’, and the embedded world variable receives a global reading,
being sister to an assignment variable coindexed with the topmost assignment-binder.
15I want to flag that the general assignment-variable framework (§2) doesn’t itself require a
project of standardizing quantification. One could build assignment-binding properties directly into
the entries for modals, attitude verbs, etc., as in the Hintikka-style lexical entry in (i) (letting
Dox(o,u) be a set of assignments (possibilities) compatible with o’s beliefs in u).
(i) Jthink⟨i,a⟩K = λws.λTt.λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) ∈ Dox(x(g),w(g))→ T(g[a(g)/ia])
On this line, expressions such as ‘think’ receive an interpretation only in combination with a binder-
index feature; neither is given an independent lexical entry. Such an approach contrasts with the
standard approach to determiner quantifiers (e.g. (2.6)), where binding of particular variables results
from combining a binder-index with the quantifier, as triggered by movement. Methodologically it is
worth examining the prospects for an approach which unifies the treatments of the various shifting
phenomena. So I put options such as (i) aside.
26
(3.1) Alice thinks it cried.
a.
T⟨1,a⟩
Alice
thinks⟨2,a⟩⟨s, ⟨t, ⟨e, t⟩⟩⟩ w1 g1 it4 g2 cried w1 g1
b. ≈ for every h representing a possibility compatible with Alice’s beliefs in
the actual world (=gc(1s)), the individual o ∈ E represented with 4 by h
(=h(4e)) cried in the actual world
A proliferation of constraints on readings seems in the offing.
It is important not to overstate the explanatory burdens particular to theories
positing object-language variables for worlds, times, assignments, etc. Take ‘it’.
Suppose for the sake of argument that ‘it’ cannot receive a shifted (local) reading
under e.g. modals/attitude verbs and that this constraint is conventionalized. Fol-
lowing Kaplan and friends, such a constraint could be formally implemented by (say)
analyzing ‘it’ as a variable receiving its interpretation from a contextual parameter
on the interpretation function, and disallowing attitude verbs, modals, etc. from
shifting such a contextual parameter. An explanatory inquisition isn’t far behind.
What makes it the case that that formalism correctly represents the conventional
meaning and use of the string ‘i-t’ in such-and-such communities? Why would such-
and-such contextual parameter be unable to be shifted by attitude verbs, modals,
etc., though it can be shifted by other operators such as determiner quantifiers?
If ‘it’ is analyzed as receiving its interpretation from a modally-unshiftable contex-
tual parameter, what explains the fact that other pronouns and context-sensitive
expressions can receive shifted readings in modal environments? — and by what
alternative mechanisms are the different readings compositionally derived? If there
is a constraint against local readings of ‘it’ in English, is the constraint universally
associated with analogous pronouns across languages? If so, what general aspects of
human cognition, sociality, conversation, etc. explain the crosslinguistic universal?
There is much one might say in response. For instance, with a first-person
pronoun there is a natural relation between speaker and attitude subject that may
explain the ready retrievability of shifted interpretations in attitude ascriptions, as
are indeed attested in various languages (arguably including English). No such
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general relation seems available with ‘it’; addressees don’t generally know what the
speaker may be presupposing about what some attitude subject takes as relevantly
salient. Given the paucity of descriptive content of ‘it’, shifted readings under at-
titude verbs, modals, etc. would seem generally unretrievable. For theories using
unshiftable (or selectively shiftable) context/assignment parameters on the interpre-
tation function, such stories may be understood at the “presemantic”/metasemantic
level of what formal objects correctly represent the shifting possibilities for a given
string, or of explaining what makes it the case that a given string corresponds to
a lexical item receiving its interpretation from such-and-such parameter; for a the-
ory positing object-language assignment-variables, at (say) the syntactic or lexical
semantic level of why there is a conventionalized locality/globality principle for a
given expression. All types of theories must ultimately provide an explanation of
the contrasting tendencies — and in some cases conventionalized constraints — for
local/global readings among expressions, both in English and crosslinguistically.
Where one does is a matter of bookkeeping (cf. Silk 2016a, 2017).
Of course not all ways of carving up the explanatory terrain are empirically or
theoretically on a par — hence the present project. The classical approach takes
unshiftability for context-sensitive expressions as the default. In light of the spec-
trum of tendencies for local/global readings, I suggest we take the opposite tack.
Individual-, world-, and assignment-shifting are given a uniform general analysis.
Optionality with respect to local vs. global readings is the default; unshiftability and
obligatory shifting on the poles of the spectrum are what call for special explanation
(more on which in due course). We will see that proceeding in this way, and in-
troducing assignment variables into the syntax/semantics, affords diverse empirical
and theoretical advantages. In semantics as in tailoring (so I’m told), it is often
easier to start big and take in.
Preamble (=rant) over; the proof of the pudding is in the lambdas and whatnot,
so let us proceed.
Some limitations and patterns in available readings may be derived conversa-
tionally; not all LFs may be equally likely in representing speakers’ intentions in
uttering a given string across concrete discourses. Yet some constraints on readings
are certainly grammaticalized. In this section I would like to focus primarily on
one constraint on readings, to begin reining in the system’s flexibility: the con-
straint on embedded world-variables. As Percus 2000 observes, the world ar-
gument of a clause’s main predicate must be bound by the closest world-binder.
In the present framework, the aim is to derive that the main predicate’s world
argument receives an obligatory local reading, and to do so in a way that allows other
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embedded variables to receive global readings linked to the discourse context. This
section develops the preliminary §2-account to capture these points. The revised
account derives the binding of specific variables from basic lexical entries and a
generalized binder-index (§§1–2). (We will revisit obligatory local/global readings
of certain other types of pronouns/variables in §§4.3, 8.5, 8.7.)
3.2 Type-driven movement
There is a familiar story about what generates binder/bindee relations with object-
position quantifiers over individuals: the quantifier moves because of a type mis-
match, and a binder-index attaches to the quantifier, leaving a coindexed trace:16
(3.2) It loves everything.
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩ S′ ∶ t
everything⟨2,e⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩ S′′ ∶ t
it1 g1
loves w1 g1
t2e
Preliminary type-specific denotation for the binder-index:J⟨i,e⟩K = λQ⟨et,t⟩.λTt.λgg .Q(λxe.λg′′g .T(g[x(g′′)/⟨i, e⟩]))(g)Jeverything⟨2,e⟩K = J⟨2,e⟩K(JeverythingK)= [λTt.[λgg.∀xe∶T(g[x(g)/2e])]]Jt2eK = λgg.g(2e)
16When labeling trees I sometimes use prime symbols A′ informally to distinguish different nodes
of category A, and sometimes formally for A/A-bar in the sense of X-bar theory. Context should
disambiguate. Note that the argument of the raised quantifier is type t (cf. Heim 1982, Kobele 2010,
Kennedy 2014), rather than property type (e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998). The account maintains
the traditional view in syntax of representing indices as features on expressions: the binder-index
attaches directly to the moved expression, rather than occupying its own node and triggering a special
composition rule such as Predicate Abstraction (Heim & Kratzer 1998). More on this below.
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JS′′K = JlovesK(Jw1K(Jg1K)) (Jt2eK) (Jit1K(Jg1K))= λgg.g(1a)(1e) loves g(2e) in g(1a)(1s)JS′K = Jeverything⟨2,e⟩K(JS′′K)= λgg.∀xe∶ g[x(g)/2e](1a)(1e) loves x(g) in g[x(g)/2e](1a)(1s)JSK = JT⟨1,a⟩K(JS′K)= λgg.∀xe∶ g−(1e) loves x(g[g−/1a]) in g−(1s)
Roughly, the binder-index combines with the quantifier so that the quantifier’s scope
argument becomes the set of individuals that make the proposition JS′′K true when
returned as value for 2e (n. 16).
A natural hypothesis is to treat a parallel mechanism as at play with world-
and assignment-quantification. I suggest that we treat the relevant items as moving
because of a type mismatch. Specifically, I treat complementizers (e.g. declarative
‘that’) as base-generated at the position of the main predicate’s world argument;
as a higher-type quantifier over worlds, it moves, leaving a world-trace. I treat
modals and attitude verbs as base-generated at the position of a posited assignment
argument of the C head; as a higher-type quantifier over assignments, it moves,
leaving an assignment-trace:17
(3.3)
Z0⟨i,a⟩ CP/C
C0⟨j,s⟩
C tia
⋮
V tjs
The complementizer introduces world-quantification/binding (cf. Roberts 2001:
144–145, Ritter & Wiltschko 2014, Wiltschko 2014); modals, broadly con-
strued (n. 17), introduce assignment-quantification/binding. Both cases proceed
parallel to the case of raised quantifiers: a binder-index attaches to the quantifi-
cational expression (quantifier, complementizer, modal) due to type-driven move-
ment, leaving a coindexed (individual, world, assignment) trace.
17I often use ‘modal’ broadly for semantically modal elements of various categories (modal
verbs, attitude verbs, T), sometimes narrowly for modal verbs; context should disambiguate. Z is
a placeholder for the category of the semantically modal item. I will label the sister of T⟨i,a⟩ as CP;
however, officially, I leave open its specific location or category, e.g. whether it raises to Spec,C or
heads some extended projection in the CP layer such as ForceP (cf. Rizzi 1997). We will revisit
base-generated complementizers in §9.
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There are precedents for treating the syntax/semantics interface in the proposed
way. Hacquard 2006, 2010 proposes an analogous move for Aspect, treating
Aspect as a quantifier over events and moving from the verb’s event-argument po-
sition (see also Moulton 2015). von Stechow 2008, following Heim 2001, treats
attitude verbs as quantifiers over worlds and moving from inside the complement
(cf. von Fintel & Iatridou 2009). Similar semantic effects of head movement
have been defended in Lechner 2006, Bruening 2010, Szabolcsi 2011. As we
will see in §§6–7, a prominent approach in syntax is to treat quantifiers as mov-
ing from within the nominal/clausal complement (Campbell 1996, Matthewson
1998, Ihsane & Puskás 2001, Giusti 2002, Luján 2004). Heim 2012 treats the
question operator as moving from an internal argument of the interrogative comple-
mentizer as a quantifier over propositions (§10). On a more general level, in light of
crosslinguistic phenomena with nominal tense Lecarme (1996, 1999b, 2004) offers
parallel syntax for clauses and noun phrases in terms of verbal/nominal T-chains:
the main (verbal/nominal) predicate’s event argument ei is assumed to be bound
by a higher operator OPi in agreement with T(ense)i (where OPi/Ti may themselves
bear morphosyntactic relations with C/D), as in (3.4).
(3.4) Clausal/Nominal T-chains OPi, Ti, V(ei)/N(ei)
a. [CP OPi [C C [TP Ti [ … [VP … ei V …]]]]]
b. [DP OPi [D D [TP Ti [ … [NP … ei N …]]]]]
(Lecarme 1999b, 2004; after Guéron & Hoekstra 1995, Campbell 1996)
Lecarme doesn’t address what generates the assumed operator or establishes the
(obligatory) binding relation between OPi and ei, what the operator’s specific seman-
tics is, or how the assumed agreement relations among OPi, Ti, ei figure in a compo-
sitional derivation of the (temporal, modal) interpretation of the verbal/nominal
predicate.18 Though I will bracket projections such as for Tense, the proposed
syntax/semantics in this paper can be understood as deriving the relevant operators
and chain relations in a specific compositional semantics — e.g., linking the main
18Likewise for the other authors mentioned above, whose primary focus also isn’t on the specific
compositional semantics. Lecarme (1999b) writes: With clauses, the “relationship” between the
predicate’s variable ei and operator OPi in Spec,C is “mediated by the R(eference)-time” (e.g.,
S(peech) time); Opi “determines the value of C, which contains the R(eference)-time”; and the
[±past] tenses in Ti “tell us whether the time of an event E is before / after / simultaneous with
a given R-time. If R = S, tense locates the [event] before the ‘now’ of the utterance.” With nominals,
the “operator in Spec,D binds the variable e-position. This accounts for the context-dependency of
[strong, presuppositional] determiners: DPs are temporally restricted by the context, a local process.”
I don’t know what exactly Lecarme has in mind here regarding the specific compositional semantics.
31
predicate, complementizer, and an embedding modal via type-driven movement, as
schematized in (3.3). (Compositional semantic details will follow in due course.
§§6–8 will extend the movement-based approach to the syntax/semantics interface
to quantificational noun phrases, affording parallel treatments of nominal and ver-
bal predication, reference, quantification. Extensions to clauses with other types of
complementizers (e.g., in conditionals, interrogatives) are explored in §§9–10.)
The proposed treatment of the complementizer as the source of intensionality
could be refined accordingly in light of more detailed understandings of the clausal
architecture. For instance, the complementizer could be analyzed as raising for
type reasons from an internal world-argument of (say) Aspect, which, following
Hacquard, raises as a quantifier over events from the event argument of the main
predicate, as in (3.5), letting v be a type for events.
(3.5) ⋮
CP
C0⟨1,s⟩
C t1a
⋮
AspP
Asp0⟨1,v⟩
Asp t1s
VP
rain t1v
What is important here is the move of capturing world-quantification/binding (in-
tensionality) via the syntax/semantics of the complementizer, which moves from
an internal world-argument position inside the clause; and capturing assignment-
quantification/binding via the syntax/semantics of modal elements, which move
from the complementizer’s assignment-argument position. For present purposes I
assume the simpler syntax/semantics which treats world-quantification/binding as
arising directly from the complementizer, which moves from the world-argument
position of the verb.19
19Cf. e.g. Koopman 1984, Koopman & Sportiche 1989 for crosslinguistic discussion of verbal
complementizers. See Moulton 2015 and references therein on additional possible complications
regarding the syntactic derivation of CP complements; see also Hacquard 2006, 2010, Kratzer
2013, which argue that ‘that’-clauses supply propositional contents indirectly via “anchors” (events,
situations), such as provided by Aspect (cf. Silk 2018 on applications to verbal mood). We will
return to events in the syntax/semantics of verb phrases briefly in §8.9.
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3.3 Complementizers: World-binding
Modifying the clausal architecture as suggested in §3.2 has direct implications for the
lexical/compositional semantics. Start with the complementizer. The preliminary
§2-implementation adopted a metasemantic constraint that the first world-position
of gc, gc(1s), pick out the world of c. Even if we don’t require this, there will be some
position or other in an assignment that represents the world of the possibility that the
assignment represents (§2). Accordingly, it can be useful to define a metalanguage
function @ ∶G → W that maps an assignment h to the world of the possibility
represented by h. I offer (3.6) as a lexical entry for (possibly unpronounced) ‘that’.
(3.6) JthatK = λaa.λp⟨s,t⟩.λgg .∀ws = [λg′g.@(a(g′))]∶ p(w)(g)
(3.7) CP
[C0]⟨1,s⟩
that tia
IP⋮
rained t1s
Roughly put, (3.7) denotes the proposition that it rained in the world identical to
the world of the given possibility, @(a(g)). As we will derive below, the modal
element base-generated in the complementizer’s assignment-argument position will
determine the local modal domain. Note that the verb’s world argument is now a
trace, directly bound by the complementizer.
3.4 Modals, Attitude verbs: Assignment-binding
To fix ideas I focus on the top-level assignment-binder T, the attitude verb ‘think’,
and the modal verb ‘may’. Consider T. We need to ensure two things after it com-
bines with the binder-index: that it interprets the embedded CP with respect to a
modified assignment that maps coindexed assignment-variables to the (counterpart
of the) input assignment (g[g−/ia] above), and that the modal domain for evaluating
the embedded proposition is the actual world. Likewise for modals/attitude verbs,
except that the embedded CP is interpreted with respect to a modified assignment
mapping coindexed assignment-variables to the assignments being quantified over,
and the modal domain is the set of worlds compatible with the modality/attitude.
Our metalanguage function @ offers a way of unifying the modals’ lexical entries:
In each case the modal domain is λw.λg.w(g) = @(a(g)); what differs is the quan-
tification over a— for T it’s over the a such that a(g) = g− for any g; with ‘may’ it’s
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over a such that a(g) is in the set of accessible possibilities; and with ‘think’ it’s over
a such that a(g) is compatible with the subject’s state of mind:
(3.8) JTK = λA⟨a,t⟩.λgg .∀aa = [λgg.g−]∶A(a)(g)
(3.9) JmayK =
a. λws.λr⟨s,at⟩.λA⟨a,t⟩.λgg .∃aa∶ r(w)(a)(g) ∧A(a)(g)
b. λA′⟨a,t⟩.λA⟨a,t⟩.λgg .∃aa∶A′(a)(g) ∧A(a)(g)
(3.10) JthinkK = λws.λA⟨a,t⟩.λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with x(g)’s state of
mind in w(g)→ A(a)(g)
The meaning for the modal verb in (3.9) can be understood as adapting a famil-
iar Kratzer-style semantics, treating modals as quantifying over a set of contextually
relevant possibilities (Kratzer 1977, 1981). For simplicity I use a basic accessi-
bility relation r (“modal background”), which maps the world argument to a set
of assignments. The alternative entries in (3.9) correspond to alternative possible
argument structures. The (a)-option represents an argument structure where the
modal takes its world argument separately; the (b)-option represents an argument
structure where the world and modal-background pronouns combine, yielding a
world-indexed set of possibilities that combines with the modal (cf. von Fintel &
Heim 2011). To fix ideas I will assume the latter option, in (3.9b).20 As usual,
the meaning for ‘think’ in (3.10) lexically specifies the set of possibilities being
quantified over. As we will see in the compositional derivations in §4, the set of
worlds at which a clause is evaluated is ultimately determined by the assignment-
quantification introduced by the modal. For example, with ‘think’, the complement
is evaluated at a multiplicity of worlds (assuming one isn’t maximally opinionated),
i.e. the worlds w(g) identical to worlds @(a(g)) of assignments representing pos-
sibilities compatible with the subject’s state of mind. With T, the main clause is
evaluated at a singleton set, {@ (a(g))} = {@ (g−)}, i.e. ultimately the world of the
assignment representing the discourse context.
Recall that assignments are understood theoretically as representing possibil-
ities, where “possible ways things might be” may include what world is actual,
foci of attention, objects’ relative saliences, etc. It is important to distinguish the
compositional semantics, which takes as given an abstract representation such as
an assignment, from the metasemantics of what makes it the case that (say) an
20As we will see in §§6–9, proceeding this way will provide an elegant way of characterizing the
semantics of modal and determiner quantifiers. I revisit the argument structure for attitude verbs
in §8.1.
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assignment or set of assignments represents a particular concrete content-bearing
state, such as a discourse situation, body of information, or state of mind. As is
common, for purposes of developing the formal syntax and semantics I will put
the latter metasemantic issues to the side. The task of addressing such issues is
common to any overall theory which utilizes a notion of the “assignment of the
context” gc, or an “assignment determined by” “the physical and psychological cir-
cumstances” (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 243; cf., e.g., Percus & Sauerland 2003,
Schlenker 2003, Hacquard 2006, Cumming 2008, Santorio 2010, 2012, Ninan
2012, Silk 2018). (Work on indexical shift and concept generators may provide
additional (gramatical/lexical/metasemantic) resources for reining in the system’s
flexibility (§3.1). For instance, one might require, say, that in the intended inter-
pretation the first-positioned individual in an assignment representing an epistemic
possibility determined by gc be an epistemic counterpart of the first-positioned indi-
vidual in gc, who is the speaker of c— or, generalizing, that the syntactic indexing
determined by the concrete discourse be such that, for any relevant index ⟨i, σ⟩,
a(g)(iσ) represents an epistemic counterpart of gc(iσ). More pedantically, one
might require that if a concrete discourse c determines that a particular syntactic
indexing ⟨i, σ⟩ and abstract assignment gc would represent an intention to pick out
such-and-such item s in the model with a token use of an expression α in c, then for
any assignment h representing an epistemic possibility (possibility compatible with
so-and-so’s state of mind, etc.), h(iσ) is an epistemic (doxastic, etc.) counterpart of
gc(iσ) = s.)
3.5 Generalized binder-index
Previous definitions of object language binder indices have been limited to DPs in
the binding of individual variables (e.g., Kobele 2010, Kennedy 2014). The above
treatments of the syntax/semantics afford a means of standardizing quantification
and defining a generalized binder-index, applying to quantificational expressions of
various types. I propose (3.11) — where χτ is a variable for the type of what is being
quantified over, σ is the type of the mother node (i.e. the result of combining the
binding expression with its scope argument), and γ1σ1 . . . γnσn are variables for any
intermediate arguments.
(3.11) Generalized binder-index featureJ⟨i,τ⟩K = λα⟨⟨τ,⟨1σ1⋯σn, t⟩1⋯⟩n⟩,σ⟩ . λβ⟨1σ1⋯σn, t⟩1⋯⟩n .
α(λχ.λγ1⋯λγn.λg . β(γ1)⋯(γn)(g[(↓χ)(g)/iτ]))
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(3.12) J[everything]⟨i,e⟩K = J⟨i,e⟩K(JeverythingK)= λTt.λgg .∀xe∶T(g[x(g)/ie])
(3.13) J[that tja]⟨i,s⟩K = J⟨i,s⟩K(Jthat tjaK)= λTt.λgg .∀ws = λg′g.@(g′(ja))∶T(g[w(g)/is])
(3.14) J[think tjs]⟨i,a⟩K = J⟨i,a⟩K(Jthink tjsK)= λTt.λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with x(g)’s state of mind in
g(js)→ T(g[a(g)/ia])
The binder-index feature defined in (3.11) is cross-categorial and type-flexible — it
attaches to quantificational elements of any category in the binding of variables of
any type, simple or complex. Roughly put, the binder-index ⟨i,τ⟩ takes an expression
α that quantifies over items of type τ (e.g. individuals/worlds/assignments), and it
lets α combine with its scope β by feeding α the set of τ -type items that verify β
when returned for ⟨i, τ⟩.
The account in this section contrasts with prominent theories of the syntax
and semantics of QR, which generally rely on syncategorematic treatments of bind-
ing/quantification — including implementations in trace theories (e.g.Heim&Kratzer
1998), copy theories (e.g. Fox 2002), and multidominant theories (e.g. Johnson
2012) (n. 22; see Rabern 2012, Kennedy 2014 for critical discussion). The account
developed here avoids treating the movement in QR as introducing a distinct node
for a binder index inserted under the moved expression, and it avoids positing spe-
cialized syntactic and semantic rules for deriving the interpretation of the resulting
post-movement structures, such as Predicate Abstraction or Trace Conversion. The
binder-index combines with the QR’d expression via function application, rather
than (say) occupying its own node and triggering a special composition rule.
Important advances in syntax have come from explaining movement operations
such as QR in terms of more fundamental grammatical principles — e.g., treating
QR as an instance of the general syntactic rule Move α, α any category (Chomsky
1981, May 1985), or in later minimalist syntax analyzing Move in terms of Merge
(“remerge,” “copy and merge”) (Chomsky 1993, 1995, Fox 2000, Collins & Sta-
bler 2016). The assignment-variable account developed here may be understood
as following in the spirit of such developments. On the semantic side, expressions
undergoing QR combine with a generalized binder-index via function application,
and the QR’d expression combines with its sister via function application. The
compositional semantics of structures resulting from type-driven movement is an in-
stance of ordinary function application. On the syntactic side, the account maintains
the traditional view in syntax of representing indices as features on expressions. The
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movement operations in QR may proceed by Merge: The expression α merges with
the binder index in its base position, yielding α⟨i,σ⟩, remerged later in the deriva-
tion. Though our general framework needn’t be committed to a particular theory
of syntactic structure building or the interfaces, a natural way of understanding
the syntactic contribution of the generalized binder-index is as providing a “trigger”
feature (Collins & Stabler 2016), which would be checked by the application
of Merge in generating the post-movement structure.21 The lower copy may be
replaced with a coindexed variable viσ directly, as in a trace theory, or via a general
post-syntactic replacement/deletion rule in the semantic component (see n. 13).
The generalized binder index would thus be what triggers QR syntactically, and
allows for combination via function application semantically. The result is a syntax
and compositional semantics of type-driven movement in terms of ordinary feature-
driven Merge and function application.22
21In a model such as that in Groat & O'neil 1996, type-driven overt vs. covert movements
(e.g., with attitude verbs vs. object-position determiner quantifiers) would be distinguished in terms
of whether phonological features are moved to the head of the chain. In a theory with local
morphophonological spell-out, covert instances of QR would take place after spell-out (cf. Fox &
Nissenbaum 1999, Nissenbaum 2001, Cecchetto 2004, Tanaka 2015; more on this in §8.5).
22Contrast the present sort of simplified derivation for a basic case of QR in (i) with the trace-
theoretic, copy-theoretic, and multidominant alternatives in (ii)–(iv) (cf. n. 13). (For concreteness
in (i) I use ‘∧’ to indicate the binder feature and derive the variable in the lower position via deletion;
see n. 13. Fox’s Trace Conversion in (iii) converts the lower copy of a quantificational DP to a definite
description by replacing the D head (here ‘every’) with ‘the’ and inserting an identity predicate
in the complement (here yielding [[boy][=o5]] from [boy]). I return to comparisons with Trace
Conversion in §6. Regarding (iv), in a multidominant syntax remerged syntactic objects are literally
in both positions — hence Johnson’s (2012) need to generate the quantifier (here ∀) in the higher
position, independent of the NP assumed to be its complement. (Johnson assumes that, by some
morphosyntactic principles, the syntactically displaced ∀ and ‘the’ get pronounced as ‘every’.) I don’t
know how such an approach would generalize across varieties of type-driven movement.)
(i) Merge + Function Application
a. [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩]⋮
[S Alice beat [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩] ]
[S [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩] [S Alice beat [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩] ]] (by Merge)
[S [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩] [S Alice beat [every boy]∧[⟨5, e⟩] ]]
b. LF: [S [every boy]⟨5,e⟩ [S Alice beat [⟨5, e⟩] ]]
c. ≈ for every boy o, Alice beat o (by FA)
(ii) Traces + QR + Predicate Abstraction (PA) (Heim & Kratzer 1998)
a. [every boy]⋮
SS: [Alice beat [every boy]5] (by Merge)
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The next section shows how the lexical entries and derived binder denotations in
this section capture the requisite binding relationships in sentences’ quantifications
over individuals/worlds/assignments.
b. LF: [[every boy] [5 [Alice beat t5]]] (by QR)● QR: [. . . αi . . . ]⇒ [αi [i [. . . ti . . . ]]]
c. ≈ for every boy o, Alice beat o (by PA, FA)
(iii) Copies + Trace Conversion (TC) + PA∗ (cf. Fox 2002, 2003)
a. [every boy]5⋮
[Alice beat [every boy]5]
[[every boy]5 [Alice beat [every boy]5]] (by Merge)
b. LF: [[every boy]5 [Alice beat [DP the [NP boy] [=pro5]]]] (by TC)
c. ≈ for every boy o, Alice beat the o′ s.t. o′ is a boy ∧ o′ = o (by PA∗, PM, FA)● PA∗: JDPi [. . .DPi . . . ]K = JDPiK (λx.JDPiKg[x/i])
(iv) Multidominance + Decomposed scattered ‘every’ + Agree + PA∗ (cf. Johnson 2012)
a. [DP [the∗ pro5] boy]⋮
[Alice beat [DP [the∗ pro5] [NP boy]]]
[Alice beat [DP [the∗ pro5] NP]] [QP∀ NP] (by Merge)● NP: identical token = [NP boy], sister to both Q0 and D0 (multidominance)
b. LF: [[Alice beat [DP [the∗ pro5] NP]] [QP5 ∀ NP]] (by Merge, Agreement∗)● Stipulated Agreement∗: QPi must have the same index as the index sister to D0 in
[D0 D0 proi] that is sister to the lower occurrence of the NP sister to Q
c. ≈ for every boy o, Alice beat o, provided o is a boy (by PA∗, FA)● Jthe∗K = λxλP ∶P(x) = 1 . x
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4 Examples: Attitude ascriptions
4.1 Attitude Ascription: Intensionality, local/global readings
Start with a simple attitude ascription such as (4.1) with a “free” (global) reading
of an embedded pronoun. (I use ‘Cd’ for an unpronounced declarative comple-
mentizer, JCdK = JthatK, assumed to head the main clause (cf. Chomsky 1995,
Lecarme 1999a, Franco 2013). For readability I abbreviate ‘o’s state of mind in
u’ with ‘SOMo,u’; I suppress certain irrelevant assignment modifications, indicated
with ‘≈’; I leave intermediate calculations to the reader.)23
(4.1) He thinks it cried.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CPm
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a he1 g1 VP
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CPn
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
it2 g1 t2s criedJCPnK = λgg .∀ws = λg′g.@(g′(2a))∶ g[w(g)/2s](1a)(2e) cried in w(g)JVPK = J[think t1s]⟨2,a⟩K(JCPnK)= λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMx(g), g(1s) →∀ws = λg′g.@(g′(2a))∶
g[a(g)/2a][w(g)/2s](1a)(2e) cried in w(g[a(g)/2a])
23I often use ‘S’ multiply for root sentences, TP, ModP; see nn. 16, 17. Though the root
declarative complementizer is unpronounced in English, in other languages the complementizer
in root sentences may — and in some cases must — be overt (cf. Rizzi 1997, Lecarme 1999a). I
ignore independent syntactic differences between the null declarative Cd and overt declarative ‘that’
in English (e.g. Pesetsky 2017). See §§2–3 for relevant lexical entries and derived denotations for
the binding expressions. A revised argument structure for the attitude verb is given in §8.1.
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≈ λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMx(g), g(1s) →
g(1a)(2e) cried in @(a(g))JCPmK = J[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩K(JVPK(λg′g.g′(1a)(1e)))≈ λgg .∀w′s = λg′g.@(g′(1a))∶∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg(1a)(1e),w′(g) →
g(1a)(2e) cried in @(a(g))≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg(1a)(1e),@(g(1a)) →
g(1a)(2e) cried in @(a(g))JSK = JT⟨1,a⟩K(JCPmK) = λgg .∀a′a = λg′′g .g′′−∶ JCPmK(g[a′(g)/1a])≈ λgg .∀a′a = λg′′g .g′′−∶ ∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMa′(g)(1e),@(a′(g)) →
a′(g)(2e) cried in @(a(g))≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg−(1e),@(g−) →
g−(2e) cried in @(a(g))
Roughly put: (4.1) is true in c, JSK(gc) = 1, iff gc(2e) cried in the world of every
possibility compatible with gc(1e)’s state of mind in @(gc). (For readability I will
often omit the superscript in ‘g−c ’, though it should be understood (§2.2).)
Parallel to the movement of the quantifier in (3.2), movement of the comple-
mentizer from the world-argument position of the clause’s main predicate leaves a
trace (t1s, t2s), and the binder-index attaches to the moved expression. The type-
driven movement of the embedding modal element determines the local modal
domain. This captures Percus’s point (§3.1): Percus’s point is diagnosed as an
obligatory local reading of the world argument of the clause’s main predicate; it is
captured via general mechanisms of movement.
The embedded world argument is obligatorily shifted to the embedding pred-
icate ‘think’, being supplied directly by a trace left from movement of the clause’s
complementizer; however, the embedded pronoun can still receive a non-shifted
reading, receiving its interpretation from an assignment-variable. The intuitively
free, or global reading, of ‘it’ is reflected in its being sister to an assignment-variable
coindexed with the topmost assignment-binder, anchoring its interpretation to the
discourse context (via g[a′(g)/1a](1a)(2e) = a′(g)(2e) = g(2e)).24
24The talk of intuitively free/bound readings of pronouns can be formalized more precisely. An
intuitively “free” reading of a pronoun, represented syntactically via a pronoun-+assignment-variable
complex [viσ gj], is reflected in an LF where (a) the nearest c-commanding assignment-binder, if any,
is T⟨j,a⟩, and (b) there is no ⟨i,σ⟩-binder c-commanded by the topmost world-/assignment-binders that
c-commands it.
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As with individual-quantification (§2.2), although the items quantified over by
the complementizer/modal are functions in Ds/Dg, the conditions are conditions on
worlds/assignments in the model. This reflects a philosophical point from Stalnaker
(1988, 2014), in his emphasis on understanding shifted “contexts” as derived, in the
sense of being determined by the discourse. Which features of the subject’s state of
mind are relevant for interpreting embedded material can depend on context. The
formalism represents this in treating the condition placed by the attitude verb as a
condition on ways a of mapping the discourse assignment g to an assignment a(g)
representing a possibility compatible with the subject’s state of mind.
Likewise, the “…cried in @(a(g))” in the last line shouldn’t mislead. The pro-
posed meanings for ‘think’ and Cd/‘that’ restrict the quantification to functions w
mapping g to worlds w(g) = @(a(g)) of the possibilities compatible with the sub-
ject’s state of mind. The attitude ascription requires that the relevant individual
cried in any such world @(a(g)) ∈W compatible with the subject’s state of mind.
4.2 De re/de dicto, Specific/non-specific: Global vs. local readings of world
arguments
(4.1) highlights a contrast between pronouns and traces in the system.25 The
trace filling the world argument of a clause’s main predicate is coindexed with the
nearest c-commanding world-binder due to movement of the complementizer. This
captures the obligatory local reading of the main predicate: (4.2) cannot receive the
interpretation in (4.3).
(4.2) Alice thinks a friend of mine won.
(4.3) (4.2) ≉
a. there is a winner that Alice thinks is a friend of mine
b. for all u′ compatible with Alice’s beliefs in u, some o who won in u is a
friend of mine in u′
Pronouns, in contrast, receive their interpretation from an assignment-variable (§2.1).
This predicts that world-pronoun arguments of embedded non-main predicates —
e.g. ‘a friend of mine’ in (4.2) — should receive optional local/global readings.26
(4.4) JaK = λP⟨e,t⟩.λQ⟨e,t⟩.λgg .∃xe∶P(x)(g) ∧Q(x)(g)JFoMK = λws.λxe . x(g) is a friend of mine in w(g)
25I return to issues with pronominal anaphora and binding of traces vs. pronouns in §§6–8.
26I ignore possible further structure from quantifier domain variables (von Fintel 1994, Stanley
& Szabó 2000, Martí 2002, Stanley 2002, Büring 2004, Etxeberria 2005, Gillon 2013).
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Ja [FoM [wi gj]]K = λQ⟨e,t⟩.λgg .∃xe∶ x(g) is a friend of mine in g(ja)(is) ∧Q(x)(g)
Binding configurations with world-pronouns afford a locus for capturing classic
contrasts between de re/de dicto and specific/non-specific readings.
Non-specific de dicto readings are captured via structures involving local binding
of the embedded world-pronoun, as in (4.5). Specific de re readings are captured
via structures where the DP is raised, hence local = global binding, as in (4.6):
(4.5) De dicto, Non-specific:≈ Alice thinks there is some individual or other who is friend of mine that won
S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a Alice
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a DP
a FoM w2 g2
t2s won
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(4.6) De re, Specific:≈ there is some particular individual who is a friend of mine such that Alice
thinks (s)he won
S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a DP⟨1,e⟩
a FoM w1 g1
Alice
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
t1e t2s won
As observed in Fodor 1970, DPs such as ‘a friend of mine’ in (4.2) can also have a
so-called non-specific de re reading — informally, a reading ascribing a belief that is
“de re” in the sense that it’s about actual-world friends-of-mine, yet “non-specific”
in the sense that it isn’t about any particular individual. Fodor’s non-specific de re
readings can be captured via structures involving long-distance binding of the predi-
cate’s world-pronoun:
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(4.7) De re, Non-specific:≈ there is some group of individuals who are friends of mine (say, the Sharks)
such that Alice thinks some or other of them won
S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a Alice
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a DP
a FoM
w1 g1
t2s won
Like other accounts with covert world-variables, the present account has a resource
for capturing Fodor’s “third reading” in terms of long-distance/local binding. What
is particular to the present account is how the binding is implemented — via coin-
dexing involving the world-variable’s sister assignment-variable — and what gives
rise to the potential, or lack thereof, for the alternative readings with different pred-
icate positions. Intensionality is diagnosed as local context-sensitivity of embedded
world-variables, and it is captured via general mechanisms for capturing (possibly
obligatory) local interpretation. Distinctions among readings are diagnosed in terms
of movement and the general phenomenon of optional local/global readings of
pronouns, here world-pronouns. Constraints on possible readings are explained in
terms of the treatment of pronouns vs. traces.27
4.3 Quantified modal attitude ascription
This section applies the proposed syntax/semantics to a more complex example such
as (4.8) with a quantified modal ascription. Working through this example will
27We will examine alternative treatments of specific and nonspecific readings of indefinites in
§§6–8. A more precise account of possibilities for local/global (de dicto/de re) readings of world
arguments in different types of noun phrases will be given in §§8.5–8.9.
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help illustrate a range of features of the account, as concerning free/bound pro-
nouns, modality, and local/global readings with context-sensitive expressions. (To
improve readability I will continue to omit explicit reference to the quantification
overw ∈ Ds when the modal domain has been derived. As above I suppress irrelevant
assignment modifications, indicated with ‘≈’. Certain equivalences from assignment
modification are highlighted for comment below. I use ‘r’ for type ⟨s, at⟩.)28
(4.8) Everything thinks that it might love something.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a [everything]⟨1,e⟩
t1e VP
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CPm
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
ModP
⟨3,a⟩
might
r1 g2 t2s
CPm
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a [something]⟨2,e⟩
o1 g1
t3s love t2e
28Here and throughout I represent the non-finite clausal complement of the modal at LF as CP,
and use Cd again for the implicit C. (See Bhatt 2006 on modally interpreted non-finite CPs more
generally; cf. Kayne 1994, Mavrogiorgos 2010. I don’t assume that all non-finite clauses need be
CPs.) For space purposes further intermediate calculations are again left to the reader:JCPnK ≈ λgg .∃xe∶ g[w(g)/3s][x(g)/2e](1a)(1e) loves x(g[w(g)/3s]) in @(g(3a))J[r1 g2]K = Jr1K(Jg2K)= [λa′a.[λws.[λaa.[λgg . a′(g)(1r)(w(g))(a(g))]]]](λgg.g(2a))= [λws.[λaa.[λgg . g(2a)(1r)(w(g))(a(g))]]]
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JSK ≈ λgg .∀a′′a = λgg.g−∶∀ye∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMy(g),@(a′′(g)) →(∃a′a∶ a(g)(1r)(@(a(g)))(a′(g)) ∧∃xe∶ g[a′′(g)/1a][y(g)/1e](1a)(1e) loves x(g) in @(a′(g)))= λgg. . . . ∃xe∶ g[a′′(g[y(g)/1e])/1a](1a)(1e) loves x(g) in @(a′(g))= λgg. . . . ∃xe∶ a′′(g[y(g)/1e])(1e) loves x(g) in @(a′(g))= λgg. . . . ∃xe∶ g[y(g)/1e]−(1e) loves x(g) in @(a′(g))= λgg .∀ye∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMy(g),@(g−) →(∃a′a∶ a(g)(1r)(@(a(g)))(a′(g)) ∧ ∃xe∶ y(g) loves x(g) in @(a′(g)))
Roughly put: (4.8) is true iff for every individual o, for every possibility h compatible
with o’s beliefs, there is some possibility h′ accessible from h such that there is some
individual o′ whom o loves in the world of h′.
4.3.1 Standardizing quantification. Binding with pronouns and traces
As discussed previously, bound readings of pronouns, intensionality, shifting under
modals, and context-sensitivity are captured via uniform syntactic/semantic mech-
anisms introducing quantification over individuals, worlds, and assignments.
Obligatory binding relationships may be established by (type-driven) movement.
Movement generates a cross-categorial binder-index attaching to moved expres-
sions, combining via function application. Notably, the complementizer moves from
the main predicate’s world-argument position, leaving a coindexed world-trace,
followed by the modal element’s movement from the complementizer’s assignment-
argument position, leaving a coindexed assignment-trace. This coindexing-via-movement
generates the local reading of each clause’s main predicate: the “loving” occurs
in worlds u′ (=@(a′(g))) compatible with the relevant information; the relevant
information is determined relative to the worlds u (=@(a(g))) compatible with
the subject’s attitude state; the subject’s attitude state is assessed at the world u′′
(=@(g−)) of the discourse context.
In contrast, the optional bound reading of ‘it’ is implemented via coindexing con-
figurations with the pronoun-complex [o1 g1]. The binder-index on everything⟨1,e⟩
JModPK = J[might [[r1 g2] t2s]]⟨3,a⟩K(JCPnK)≈ λgg .∃aa∶ g(2a)(1r)(g(2s))(a(g)) ∧ ∃xe∶ g(1a)(1e) loves x(g) in @(a(g))JVPK = J[think t1s]⟨2,a⟩K(JCPmK)≈ λye.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMy(g), g(1s) →∃a′a∶ a(g)(1r)(@(a(g)))(a′(g)) ∧ ∃xe∶ g(1a)(1e) loves x(g) in @(a′(g))
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says to interpret o1 with respect to the input assignment modified to take ⟨1, e⟩ to (in
this case) y(g). Although embedded under several assignment-shifters, the pronoun
can be linked to the main-clause quantifier via its assignment-variable g1 coindexed
with the topmost assignment-binder.
Analogous points hold with the modal’s epistemic modal-background pronoun[r1 g2]. The variable r1 is interpreted with respect to (takes as argument) the as-
signment variable g2 coindexed with the assignment-binder attaching to the attitude
verb. Just as a concrete discourse may be represented via an abstract assignment
that assigns a set of epistemic possibilities to a certain syntactic index, say 1r, so
too with a subject’s concrete state of mind (§3.4). The shifted modal background
a(g)(1r) represents a doxastic counterpart of the (epistemic) modal background
gc(1r) that would be determined by the discourse, and the set of accessible possi-
bilities is determined by the possibilities a(g) compatible with the subject’s state of
mind. The generalized semantics for variables/traces (§2.1) derives how, although
the modal quantifies over functions a′ ∶Dg → G, the value returned by a(g)(1r) is
a function from worlds u ∈W to a set of assignments (possibilities) h′ ∈ G, and the
quantified condition is a condition on a possibility h′ ∈ G in this set a(g)(1r)(u)
(n. 28). (I return to issues about local/bound readings of modal-background pro-
nouns below.)
4.3.2 Assignment modification and bound pronouns
Capturing the bound interpretation of ‘it’ raises interesting general issues about
assignment modification. The notion of a modified assignment is standardly intro-
duced by saying something to the effect that g[x/i] is the unique assignment which is
just like g except that i is mapped to x. A question rarely (if ever) addressed is how
to interpret expressions “g[...g.../i]” in our metalanguage, where the description
of what i gets mapped to uses the same letter as the letter used for the original
assignment (here ‘g’). This question becomes pressing in derivations involving re-
peated assignment modifications — in particular, when encountering assignment-
descriptions of the form “g[...g.../i][⋯].”
The final steps in (4.8) provide such a case when g[y(g)/1e] is to be modified
to g[a′′(g)/1a][y(g)/1e]. Given the standard characterization of modified assign-
ments, g[y(g)/1e] is the assignment g′ that is just like g except that 1e is mapped
to y(g); this modified assignment is modified to the assignment g′′ that is just like
g′ except that 1a is mapped to a′′(g). So, feeding 1a to g′′ would seem to return
a′′(g). Since a′′ is (roughly) the identity function, a′′(g) = g−, and so, it would
seem, g′′(1a) = g−. The critical question is what this resulting assignment returns
for 1e. What we want isn’t whatever happens to be returned by the (counterpart in
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G of the) original assignment g, i.e g−(1e), but what is returned by g as modified by
the initial modification, i.e. g[y(g)/1e](1e) = y(g). What we need — and as yet fail
to have — is a way of ensuring a sort of dynamic updating in repeated assignment
modifications, so that references to “g” in later modifications refer to the assignments
as modified in earlier steps.29
To capture this, I propose that we treat assignment modifiers as operators on
assignments, and repeated modifications as proceeding via function composition.
(4.9) Assignment modification
a. [z/iτ] ∶= λgg . ιmg∶m(iτ) = z ∧m(jσ) = g(jσ), for all jσ ≠ iτ
b. [⋯][...] ∶= [⋯] ○ [...]
c. gg[⋯]1 . . . [⋯]n ∶= [⋯]1 ○ . . . ○ [⋯]n(g)
These definitions derive the crucial equivalence step in (4.8), reproduced in (4.10);
the modifier [a′′(g)/1a] is correctly treated as mapping m = g[y(g)/1e] to an as-
signment m′ that is just like m except that it maps 1a to its image under a′′.30
29The only place I’ve seen this issue addressed is Sternefeld 1998: 16–17. Sternefeld cheats in
the way mentioned in the main text.
30For readability I abbreviate the right conjunct in (4.9a) as m(jσ,≠ iτ) = g(jσ,≠ iτ); I use large
parentheses to enclose descriptions of assignments when prefixed to an argument, e.g. (ιg ∶ ...)(1s):
(i) [a′′(g)/1a] = λgg . ιm∶m(1a) = a′′(g) ∧m(jσ,≠ 1a) = g(jσ,≠ 1a)[y(g)/1e] = λgg . ιm∶m(1e) = y(g) ∧m(jσ,≠ 1e) = g(jσ,≠ 1e)
g[a′′(g)/1a][y(g)/1e]= ([a′′(g)/1a] ○ [y(g)/1e])(g)= [λg′g . [a′′(g)/1a]([y(g)/1e](g′))](g)= [λg′g . [λg′′g . ιm∶m(1a) = a′′(g′′) ∧m(jσ,≠ 1a) = g′′(jσ,≠ 1a)](ιm′∶m′(1e) = y(g′) ∧m′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g′(jσ,≠ 1e))](g)= [λg′g . ιmg∶m(1a) = a′′(ιm′∶m′(1e) = y(g′) ∧m′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g′(jσ,≠ 1e))∧ m(jσ,≠ 1a) = (ιm′∶m′(1e) = y(g′) ∧m′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g′(jσ,≠ 1e))(jσ,≠ 1a)](g)= ιmg∶m(1a) = a′′(ιm′∶m′(1e) = y(g) ∧m′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g(jσ,≠ 1e))∧ m(jσ,≠ 1a) = (ιm′∶m′(1e) = y(g) ∧m′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g(jσ,≠ 1e))(jσ,≠ 1a)= [a′′(ιh′∶h′(1e) = y(g) ∧ h′(jσ,≠ 1e) = g(jσ,≠ 1e))/1a](g)= [a′′([y(g)/1e](g))/1a](g)= g[a′′(g[y(g)/1e])/1a]
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(4.10) g[a′′(g)/1a][y(g)/1e](1a)(1e) = g[a′′(g[y(g)/1e])/1a](1a)(1e)
g[...g...][⋯] = g[...g[⋯]...]
The remainder of the derivation proceeds straightforwardly: Given 1a, the resulting
assignment g[a′′(g[y(g)/1e])/1a] returns a′′(g[y(g)/1e]). Since a′′ = λgg.g−, this
reduces to g[y(g)/1e]−, which, given 1e, returns y(g), capturing the bound reading
of the pronoun by the quantifier, as desired.
4.3.3 Epistemic modals: Locality and binding
Paradigm context-sensitive expressions are at least optionally (if not obligatorily)
interpreted with respect to the context of utterance when embedded in attitude
ascriptions (§1). A principal challenge for contextualists has been to capture the
contrasting behavior of epistemic modals, which seem obligatorily linked to the
subject (§1). Likewise with quantificational subjects, as in (4.8), seeming to reflect
a kind of binding. There is apparently no reading of (4.11) which ascribes to every
contestant o the belief that it’s compatible with Alice’s/Bert’s evidence that o is
the winner.
(4.11) Alice: Bert thinks that [every contestant]i thinks shei might be the winner.
(cf. Stephenson 2007b: 22–23)
Relativist/expressivist theories offer general shifting mechanisms to capture this (§1.1).
No rigorous compositional semantic account of the shifting and binding properties
of epistemic modals has been attempted by contextualists.
The syntax/semantics in this paper compositionally derives local and bound
readings of embedded epistemic modals, as in (4.8). Moreover it does so in a
framework which maintains the core contextualist idea of modeling the context-
sensitivity of recalcitrant expressions such as epistemic modals in the same kind
of way as the context-sensitivity of paradigm context-sensitive expressions such
as pronouns, namely via quantification/binding with assignment-variables.31 The
account may thus be of interest to theorists who are compelled by the thought that
the interpretation of (e.g.) epistemic modals depends, in some sense, on context,
but have reservations about innovations introduced by relativism/expressivism.
An assignment-variable-based account provides a framework for theorizing about
differences among expressions in tendencies for local vs. global readings (Silk
2016a, 2017). For expressions permitting local and global readings, conversational
explanations may be given regarding the expressions’ tendencies for different read-
31There may of course be other differences among them (Tonhauser et al. 2013, Silk 2016a).
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ings. Such explanations would be understood at the “presemantic” level of what
LFs are (not) determined by token utterances. For certain types of epistemic uses of
modals a locality principle might be given which excludes LFs in which the modal-
background pronoun’s assignment-variable isn’t coindexed with the closest c-com-
manding assignment-binder.32 Such a principle would be no more ad hoc than a
globality principle excluding LFs in which the relevant assignment-variable is bound
by an element other than T, such as for (say) English gendered pronouns or lan-
guages with conventionalized referential pronouns, as in (4.12)–(4.13) (cf. Déchaine
& Wiltschko’s (2002) class of “pro-DPs”; see also §1).
(4.12) Zë’cy
thus
nnah
say
Gye’eihlly
Mike
nàiy
yesterday
me’s
teacher
g-uhc-ëng.
perf-be-3sg.prox
‘Mikei said yesterday that hek/∗i was a teacher.’ (Lee 2003: ex. 13;
Zapotec)
(4.13) Mékw’
every
ye
det.pl
swíyeqe
man
kw’ákw’ets-et-es
looking
te
det
stóles-s
wife-3poss
tú-tl’òlem.
det-3pl
‘All meni are looking at theirk/∗i wives.’
(Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002: ex. 10; Halkomelem (Salish))
Likewise, as discussed in §1, just as there may be expressions conventionally speci-
fied for local vs. global readings, common across various families of languages are
conventionalized anaphoric pronouns — pronouns which obligatorily receive their
interpretation from the linguistic context.
An elegant picture emerges regarding the landscape of (non-)conventionalized
readings: (i) classical indexicals with conventionalized global readings, lexically
excluded from being bound by an element other than T; (ii) obligatorily shifty
expressions with conventionalized local readings, lexically required to be bound by
the nearest c-commanding assignment-binder; (iii) specialized anaphoric expres-
sions with conventionalized non-global readings, lexically excluded from being un-
bound or bound by T;33 and (iv) the majority of context-sensitive expressions, which
32See Silk 2016a, 2017 on characterizing the relevant type of uses (dubbed “endorsing uses”) of
modals, and discussion of the putative conventionalization of the local readings.
33Such a formulation would need to be refined for conventionalized anaphoric expressions
compatible with discourse anaphora; I continue to focus exclusively on intra-sentential binding
and anaphora. Conventionalized anaphoric pronouns requiring specifically local antecedents —
expressions obligatorily receiving local non-global readings — are possible as well, as with e.g.
specialized anaphoric pronouns in correlatives (§1), or the Russian possessive svoj in (i).
(i) Vanjai
‘Vanjai
znaet
knows
ct̆o
that
Voledjak
Volodjak
ljubit
loves
svojuk/∗i
hisk/∗i sestru.sister.’ (Rappaport 1986: ex. 13)
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are conventionally compatible with both shifted and non-shifted readings. The
proposed assignment-variable framework affords a unified analysis of the context-
sensitivity of the different classes of expressions, along with a principled basis for
distinguishing and theoretically representing patterns of shifted/non-shifted read-
ings.34
4.4 Pierre and friends
The reader may have wondered how (/been grateful that) we have made it thus far
without mentioning Frege puzzles. A natural application of the assignment-variable
framework is to shifted interpretations of names in attitude ascriptions. I mentioned
in §1 that ways of situating the present project are as formally implementing Stal-
naker’s (1988) informal “multiple context” approach to attitude ascriptions, and
as generalizing accounts which introduce syntactic variables for items determining
the interpretation of referential expressions. Swanson (2011) suggests extending
Stalnaker’s approach to the interpretation of the two occurrences of ‘London’ in
(4.14), where the proposition presupposed and not realized by “Puzzling Pierre”
isn’t necessarily true (Kripke 1979).
(4.14) Pierre doesn’t realize that Londonci is Londonck . (Swanson 2011: ex. 34)
Though Stalnaker and Swanson don’t offer specific formal implementations, re-
cent work provides various mechanisms, such as variables for “guises” or “concept
generators,” for capturing how the interpretation of certain referential expressions
can shift in embedded clauses (cf. Uriagereka 1998, Percus & Sauerland 2003,
Cumming 2008, Santorio 2010, Ninan 2012, Charlow & Sharvit 2014). Such
machinery could of course be layered into the general assignment-variable frame-
work developed thus far. Since the terrain here is already well-trod, it may be more
interesting to consider an approach that hasn’t quite been considered as such. I
leave it to the reader to make relevant adjustments depending on their preferred
broader views on the syntax and semantics of names.
Consider a predicativist-style account in which a name ‘N’, qua lexical item,
denotes the property of being called N (cf. Burge 1973, Geurts 1997, Elbourne
2005, Fara 2015).35 In sentences such as (4.15) the name is in a predicate position,
complement to an overt determiner quantifier. In ordinary bare singular uses pred-
34We will examine other types of constraints on readings of pronouns/variables in §§7–8.
35Cf. Beaver 2001, Cumming 2008 for analyses of names as definites or variables, respectively.
For treatments of names as constants, see Kripke 1980, Salmon 1986, Soames 2002. See Fara
2011 on the importance of the “called N” vs. “called ‘N’ ” distinction.
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icativists posit that the name the complement of an implicit determiner, reflected
in (4.16). In languages such as Italian the determiner may be more generally pro-
nounced, as in (4.17)–(4.18); deleting the overt D-element and leaving the name
in its NP position renders the sentence ungrammatical.36
(4.15) a. Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane. (Burge 1973: 429)
b. There are at least two Tylers with philosophy degrees from Princeton.
(Fara 2015: ex. 8)
(4.16) Alfred is crazy.
a. [DP ∅D [NP Alfred]] is crazy
b. ≈ “the relevant individual called Alfred is crazy”
(4.17) a. La
the
Callas
Callas(fem)
ha
has
cantato.
sang
‘Callas sang.’
b. *Callas
Callas(fem)
ha
has
cantato.
sang (Longobardi 1994: ex. 25; Italian)
(4.18) a. Il
the
mio/∗Mio
my
Gianni
John
ha
has
finalmente
finally
telefonato.
called
‘My John has finally called.’
b. [DP the [AgrP my [NP John]]] has finally called
(Longobardi 1994: ex. 28, Bernstein 2001: exs. 11-12; Italian)
It is common among predicativists to treat the implicit determiner in examples
such as (4.16) as a demonstrative (e.g. Burge 1973) or definite article (e.g. Elbourne
2005, Fara 2015). Since such moves are familiar, let’s consider a variant approach
in which names in bare singular uses are sister to an implicit choice-function pro-
noun— a pronoun for a function Fcf which selects a particular individual from a
(non-empty) set of individuals, i.e. a function F such that for any P in F ’s domain,
P(Fcf(P)), as reflected in (4.20). (I use ‘cf’/‘F’ for indices/variables of type ⟨et, e⟩
that are choice functions. Recall ↓ which “lowers” an item in a domain to an item
composed out of associated elements of the model (§2). I use (e.g.) ‘Alfredu’ for
the characteristic function of the set of individuals o ∈ E such that o is called Alfred
in u.)
(4.19) F ∶ [X → T] → X is a choice function iff for all non-empty S ⊆ X, F(χS) ∈ S
(where χS is the characteristic function of S)
36Apt: Burge 1973 / Longobardi 1994.
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(4.20) [DP F1 g1 [NP Alfred w1 g1]]JAlfredK = λws.λxe.λgg . x(g) is called Alfred in w(g)JF1 g1K = λPet.λgg . g(1a)(1cf)((↓P)(g))JDPK = λgg . g(1a)(1cf)([λgg.the function f s.t. ∀ye∶ f(y(g)) iff y(g) is called
Alfred in g(1a)(1s)](g))≈ λgg . g(1a)(1cf)(Alfredg(1a)(1s))
The implicit choice-function pronoun [F1 g1] denotes a function Fcf (=g(1a)(1cf))
which selects a particular individual o ∈ E from the set of individuals (=Alfredg(1a)(1s))
denoted by ‘Alfred’ in the world in question.
Appeals to choice functions and choice-function pronouns are common in se-
mantics for specific indefinites and functional readings of questions (e.g.,Chierchia
1993, Dayal 1996, Kratzer 1998b).37 The structure in the choice-function pred-
icativist implementation affords resources for capturing various types of shifted
and unshifted readings with names. First, like other predicativist and variabilist
accounts, we capture the context-sensitivity of unembedded uses, as schematically
in (4.21).
(4.21) [Context: from a UK advertising campaign in which the character Freddo is
standing next to a Freddo cookie]
a. Freddoi met Freddok.
b. [S T⟨1,a⟩ … [DP F1 g1 [NP Freddo w1 g1]] met-ts [DP F2 g1 [NP Freddo
w1 g1]]]
c. JSK ≈ λgg . g−(1cf)(Freddog−(1s)) met g−(2cf)(Freddog−(1s)) in @(g−)
The first use of ‘Freddo’ is interpreted with respect to a choice-function pronoun[F1 g1] which denotes a choice function F1 (=gc(1cf)) that selects the Freddo char-
acter o1 ∈ E from the set of individuals called Freddo (=Freddog−(1s)); the second use
of ‘Freddo’ is interpreted with respect to a choice-function pronoun [F2 g1] which
denotes a choice function F2 (=gc(2cf)) that selects the particular Freddo cookie in
the ad o2 ∈ E from the same set. The selection in (4.21) is from individuals that are
called Freddo in the actual (evaluation) world. Every account must adopt some
metasemantic assumptions — general or specific to particular discourses — about
the intended interpretations of different syntactic indices and about the relations
among values assigned to shifted assignments (§3.4). In what follows I will retain
37Indeed we will consider broader applications of choice functions in the treatments of relativiza-
tion, specific indefinites, conditionals, and wh interrogatives in §§6–10.
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our metalanguage@ operator while also assuming that the first-positioned world 1s
represents the world of the possibility represented by the assignment, i.e. h(1s) =
@(h), for any h ∈ G.
Turning to attitude ascriptions, first consider (4.22), adapted from an example
from Jennifer Saul (1998: 366), on a global reading of ‘Bob Dylan’.
(4.22) [Context: We’re talking about people’s views on Bob Dylan’s singing abil-
ities. I know that Glenda, one of his childhood friends, knows him only
under the name ‘Robert Zimmerman’. Since you know him only under the
name ‘Bob Dylan’, I say:]
Glenda thinks Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice. (Saul 1998: cf. ex. 7)
I can felicitously use ‘Bob Dylan’ to characterize Glenda’s belief, even though she
wouldn’t “put it that way,” since what matters for our purposes is Glenda’s belief
about the individual whom we associate with ‘Bob Dylan’ (cf. Silk 2016a: §§4.2, 4.4;
2017: §3.3). A simplified LF and derivation for the specific global reading of ‘Bob
Dylan’ in (4.22) is as follows (treat ‘Bob-Dylan’ and ‘sings-beautifully’ as unanalyzed
predicates).
(4.23) S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a she1 g1
VP
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
F1 g1 BD w1-g2 sings-beautifully t2sJCPK ≈ λgg . g(1a)(1cf)(BDg(1a)(1s)) sings-beautifully in @(g(2a))JSK ≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg−(1e),@(g−) →
g−(1cf)(BDg−(1s)) sings-beautifully in @(a(g))
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The choice-function pronoun [F1cf g1] is linked to the topmost assignment-binder
T⟨1,a⟩, anchoring its interpretation to the discourse assignment gc. The contextually
determined value gc(1cf) selects the particular relevant individual o ∈ E called Bob
Dylan in the world of the discourse (gc(1s) = @(gc)). The attitude ascription is
true iff for every possibility h compatible with Glenda’s (=gc(1e)’s) state of mind,
the selected individual o = gc(1cf)(BDgc(1s))— the individual with whom we in the
discourse context associate the name — has a beautiful voice in @(h). Whether o is
called Bob Dylan in @(h) is irrelevant.
As those with anti-Millian intuitions may be keen to point out, (4.22) may also
have a reading on which it seems false. To bring out such a reading, consider the
alternative context in (4.24).
(4.24) [Context: Gwen attends an afternoon reunion where she hears her child-
hood friend going by the name ‘Robert Zimmerman’ sing a dedication song.
Feeling nostalgic she says ‘I love Robert; he always sang so beautifully’.
Later that evening she attends a concert of a man named ‘Bob Dylan’. She
can’t stand big public events and says ‘This is awful; this Bob Dylan guy
has a terrible voice’. Since Bob Dylan is excellent at keeping his star sta-
tus concealed to his childhood friends, Gwen doesn’t realize that the man
singing at the concert is her childhood friend who also sang at the reunion.
We’re talking about how factors such as kinship, environment, etc. can affect
people’s perceptions; you say:]
a. Gwen thinks Robert Zimmerman has a beautiful voice.
b. Gwen thinks Bob Dylan has a terrible voice.
In such a context your uses of (4.24a)–(4.24b) may both have readings on which
they seem true. One way of representing such uses is as follows (mutatis mutandis
for (4.24a)):
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(4.25) S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a she2 g1
VP
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
F2 g1
BD w1-g2
sings-terribly t2s
JSK ≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg−(2e),@(g−) →
g−(2cf)(BDa(g)(1s)) sings-terribly in @(a(g))
Each of Gwen’s (=gc(2e)’s) belief-worlds includes two epistemic counterparts of the
actual individual BD/RZ — a childhood friend going by the name ‘Robert Zimmer-
man’ who sings beautifully, and a distinct celebrity going by the name ‘Bob Dylan’
who sings terribly. In the context in (4.24) the contextually determined value for the
choice-function pronoun, here gc(2cf), selects for any world u (=a(g)(1s) = @(a(g))
compatible with Gwen’s beliefs and set of individuals S = {o′ ∶ o′ is called Bob Dylan in u},
the individual o who is the singer-counterpart in u of BD/RZ. The attitude ascrip-
tion is true insofar as every such selected individual o (=gc(2cf)(BDa(g)(1s))) sings
terribly in every such world u.
The above assignment-variable analysis captures how the embedded choice-
function pronoun receives its interpretation from the discourse context, while the
world-pronoun of the name-qua-predicate receives a local reading shifted by the atti-
tude verb: The discourse context determines the basis for selecting the relevant indi-
vidual o ∈ S in each of Gwen’s belief-worlds u, while each such set S is determined on
the basis of Gwen’s beliefs. Whereas the contextually relevant choice function in the
context in (4.22) selects BD/RZ from any set including him, as represented in (4.23),
the contextually relevant choice function in the context in (4.24) selects, from any
set of Bob Dylans in Gwen’s belief-worlds, a particular epistemic counterpart o of
BD/RZ, namely the singer-counterpart. In each possibility compatible with Gwen’s
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beliefs the selected individual is called Bob Dylan. In the terminology from §4.2 the
use of the name is represented as having a specific de dicto reading — “specific”
in the sense that every such o is identical to one another (or at least metaphysical
counterparts of one another (Lewis 1986)), and “de dicto” in the sense that the
selected terrible singer is conceptualized as being called Bob Dylan. Indeed (4.24b)
could be used to characterize Gwen’s state of mind even if the “Bob Dylan” craze was
an elaborate hoax and there is in fact no such individual. Ordinary uses of names
may thus constitute a systematic case of the specific de dicto. Santorio 2013 argues
that capturing such readings in the case of indefinite DPs requires overhauling the
semantics for descriptions; some have even expressed doubt about the possibility of
specific de dicto readings (e.g., von Fintel & Heim 2011). No such innovations or
skepticism need be required. The readings in contexts such as (4.24) follow from an
off-the-shelf predicativist semantics with choice functions, implemented in a general
assignment-variable-based framework.
Finally, recall the “Puzzling Pierre” (Kripke 1979) example in (4.14) in which
two uses of ‘London’ receive different interpretations under the attitude verb. In
Kripke’s case, Pierre is a native French speaker who hears wonderful things about a
beautiful distant city named Londres. Later, he happens to move to an unattractive
part of London, and learns that it is named ‘London’; finding it ugly, he says ‘London
isn’t pretty’. Not realizing that the city he currently lives in is the same city as the city
he heard about while in France, he continues to accept the French sentence Londres
est jolie. Hence:
(4.14) Pierre doesn’t realize that London is London.
Pierre’s state of mind is such that each of his belief-worlds includes a city called
Londres which is pretty, and another dreary city called London where he lives. There
are various formalizations that would derive how a use of ‘London is London’ in
(4.26) in the given context may fail to characterize Pierre’s state of mind.
(4.26) Pierre thinks London is London.
For the sake of argument let’s assume an “is-of-identity” reading for ‘is’. A sample
LF and semantic value is in (4.27).
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(4.27) S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a he3 g1 ⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
F2-g1 London-w1-g2 is t2s
F3-g1 London-w1-g1JSK ≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMg−(3e),@(g−) →
g−(2cf)(Londona(g)(1s)) = g−(3cf)(Londong−(1s)) in @(a(g))
Roughly put, this says that the attitude ascription in (4.26) is true, on the relevant
reading, iff for every possibility h compatible with Pierre’s (=gc(3e)’s) state of mind,
the city o1 = F(London@(gc)) selected from among the things actually called London
is identical to the city o2 = F′(London@(h)) selected among the things called London
in Pierre’s belief-worlds @(h) (=a(g)(1s)).
The first occurrence of ‘London’ is represented as receiving a local reading,
picking out the city called London as Pierre conceives it; the second occurrence
of ‘London’ is represented as receiving a global reading, picking out the actual
city of London — though perhaps not so-called in Pierre’s belief-worlds. In the sec-
ond occurrence, the contextually determined value for the choice-function pronoun[F3cf g1], gc(3cf), selects the present capital city of England from any set which
includes it; hence F(Londongc(1s)) = o1 = London, an entity that includes areas
believed pretty by Pierre. In contrast, the world-pronoun in the first occurrence
of ‘London’ receives a local reading. The contextually determined choice-function
gc(2cf) selects the dreary city o2 where he lives from any set of things called London
in Pierre’s belief-worlds. Hence the belief ascribed isn’t necessarily true; indeed
(4.27) is correctly derived as false: the selected objects o1, o2 are non-identical in
(some if not all of) Pierre’s belief-worlds @(h). Among other things, the entirety
of o2 is ugly and named ‘London’ throughout the worlds @(h); not so for o1, which
includes areas that are pretty and named ‘Londres’. The analysis in (4.27) captures
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how the complement of the attitude verb can express a contingent proposition that
fails to characterize Pierre’s state of mind.
The assignment-variable account outlined in this section maintains features mo-
tivating various types of semantics for names. First, with predicativists, we give a
uniform semantics for names qua lexical items in predicative and bare singular uses.
In both environments the name ‘N’ denotes the property of being called N.
Second, like many non-Millian accounts, the account captures the context-sensitivity
of uses of names without treating names as systematically ambiguous. The uses of
the string ‘F-r-e-d-d-o’ in (4.21) are uses of the same lexical item. The different
interpretations are derived from the contextually determined values for the choice-
function pronouns; the first use of ‘Freddo’ is interpreted with respect to a choice
function selecting Freddo the character, the second use with respect to a choice
function selecting Freddo the cookie.
Third, the semantics is compatible with certain uses of names being “rigid desig-
nators,” in the sense (roughly) of being used to designate the same individual across
worlds. For instance, in a bare singular use of ‘N’ context may determine a value for
the choice-function pronoun, F, that is defined only for sets including a particular
individual o, and selects o given every such set:
(4.28) A choice-function F ∶ [E → T] → E is rigid iff for some o ∈ E and every
non-empty S ⊆ E∶F(S) = o if o ∈ S, else undefined
However, rigidity isn’t encoded in the conventional meaning of names themselves.
This is for the better in light of descriptive uses such as (4.29) (see also Cumming
2008).
(4.29) [Context: Bert has been receiving daily unsigned letters ostensibly from a
secret admirer. Bert doesn’t know who they’re from, and even wonders
whether they’re all from the same individual. We, who deliver the letters,
deliver them without the envelopes, which we see are in each case addressed
from ‘Ernie’. We see Bert walking excitedly to the mailbox; you say:]
Bert thinks Ernie sent him another letter.
Your use of ‘Ernie’ in (4.29) is appropriate even if (it’s presupposed that) it’s not the
case that there is some particular individual o ∈ E who sends Bert a letter across
Bert’s belief-worlds.
With variabilist accounts, we capture various types of “shifted” readings in em-
bedded contexts. Classic puzzles of names in attitude ascriptions are assimilated to
phenomena with local/global readings of context-sensitive expressions. The range
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of readings are derived from independently motivated resources from the litera-
ture — choice-function pronouns and predicativism — and our general assignment-
variable syntax and semantics. Additional mechanisms specific to names or intu-
itively referential expressions (e.g., substitutional quantification, guises, etc.) aren’t
required.38
Our assignment-variable-based framework formally implements the Stalnake-
rian (1988) idea that “multiple contexts” can be available for interpretation within
a single embedded clause (§1). Devices such as names can be used both to char-
acterize an individual’s “psychological semantic representation of a word” (Partee
1979: 11), and also “to pick out individuals in the basic context, and… express
propositions that alter the derived context” representing a subject’s state of mind
(Stalnaker 1988: 158–159). These dual functions, conspiring in classic puzzle
cases such as in (4.22)–(4.25), come together vividly in “Puzzling Pierre” exam-
ples such as (4.14)/(4.27). It isn’t evident how to capture such examples in an
operator-based variabilist semantics, where names are analyzed as simple variables
(e.g. Cumming 2008), without treating the names as ambiguous. By contrast, the
lexical item ‘London’ in (4.27) is treated as having the same semantic value in both
occurrences. The spectrum of shifted/unshifted readings are derived via interactions
between how individuals are selected (local/global readings of the choice-function
pronoun) and which individuals are candidates for selection (local/global readings
of the name-qua-predicate’s world pronoun).
Many variabilist and predicativist accounts of names are motivated by appeal-
ing to various types of non-purely-referential uses. Any overall account must also
be able to say something about the apparent differences in shiftability of names
in comparison with other context-sensitive expressions such as pronouns, definite
descriptions, etc., as in e.g. (4.30)–(4.31) (cf. Schlenker 2005).
(4.30) a. Every professor invited Alice to class.≠ “every professor x invited the relevant individual x knows called
Alice to x’s class”
b. Every professor made the final exam as hard as possible.≈ “every professor xmade the final exam for x’s class as hard as possible”
c. The contestant answered every question before the question was fin-
ished.≈ “the contestant answered every question x before x was finished”
38Contrast: “it is impossible to make substantial claims about the semantics of names without
making quite fundamental assumptions about the status and aims of semantic theory” (Geurts 1997:
343).
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d. Every guitarist thinks he plays the fastest.≈ “every musician x thinks x plays the fastest”
(4.31) a. Only Alfred did Alfred’s homework.≠ “only Alfred = o is such that [λx.x did x’s homework](o) = 1”
b. Only you did your homework.≈ “only you = o are such that [λx.x did x’s homework](o) = 1”
This isn’t the place to provide a general binding theory for names. For present pur-
poses suffice it to say that binding phenomena with names are far from straightfor-
ward. For instance, unlike languages such as English, copy reflexive languages read-
ily use names with bound-variable readings, as in (4.32)–(4.33) (see also Lasnik
1989, Mortensen 2003, Boeckx et al. 2007).
(4.32) Johni
John
koonnuat
shave
khong
of
Johni
John
lae
and
Peterk
Peter
ko
the
muankan.
same
‘Johni shaved himselfi, and Peterk did too (shave himselfk).’ (Lee 2003;
Thai)
(4.33) R-ralloh
think
Gye’eihllyi
Mike
r-yu’lààa’z-ënn
like.1pl
Gye’eihllyi
Mike
chiru’
also
zë’cy cahgza’
likewise
Li’ebk.
Felipe
‘Mikei thinks we like himi, and so does Felipek (think we like himk).’
(Lee 2003; SLQZ)
Even in English bound-variable readings may be possible in certain contexts. After
a surge of presidential apery one might say (4.34).
(4.34) ?Every Donald thinks Donald is the best.≈ “every person x called Donald thinks x is the best”
Suppose then that in response to a wave of familial scorn ((4.35)), several Donalds
change their ways and begin telling others they are called Ronald. Characterizing
their families’ and partners’ states of mind, one might say (4.35), and later (4.36).
(4.35) ?Every family with a Donald thinks Donald should grow up.
(4.36) ?Every partner of a Donald thinks Donald is called Ronald.≈ “every x such that x is the partner of some y called Donald thinks y is
called Ronald”
It isn’t immediately evident how such examples, if available, would be captured in
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existing variabilist or predicativist accounts.39 The extra structure afforded by the
choice-function implementation in this section would provide a natural account; a
first-pass LF for (4.34) may be as follows (assuming that in the intended interpreta-
tion the index 2cf represents roughly a “bestness” choice function):
(4.37) [S T⟨1,a⟩ … [[DP every Donald-w1-g1 ] [[thinks t1s]⟨2,a⟩ … [IP [DP F2-g2 Donald-
w1-g1/2] …]]]] (preliminary)
The bound shifted reading of the embedded ‘Donald’ in (4.37) is represented pre-
cisely analogously to the bound shifted reading of the embedded epistemic ‘might’
in (4.8). I leave further refinements in light of binding phenomena with names
crosslinguistically, and comparisons with alternative (assignment-variable-based)
variabilist and predicativist analyses, for future work.40 (Hereafter I put the compli-
cations in this section with names aside; unless otherwise noted I will treat names
as constants.)
39Examples combining predicative and bare singular uses of names would raise challenges for
variabilist accounts; examples such as (4.36) would raise a distinctive challenge for predicativist
semantics analyzing names along the lines of “being called N.”
40If the reader finds (4.35)–(4.36) to bear an uncanny resemblance to donkey sentences: indeed.
A revised account is given below. I reconsider issues with pronoun binding and donkey anaphora in
§§6.2, 7.3, 7.4, 8.8 (also §§9.7, 10.3).
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5 Recap. Next steps
Let’s take stock. Independent linguistic phenomena have led various theorists to
introduce assignments into the model, and to posit variables in the syntax for (e.g.)
worlds, times, and elements interpreting referential expressions. This paper begins
developing a linguistic theory which posits object-language variables for assignment
functions — variables for the sort of item responsible for interpreting quantifiers
and context-sensitive language generally — and treats compositional semantic val-
ues systematically in terms of sets of assignments. Principal features of the account
are that it standardizes quantification across domains (e.g. individuals, worlds, as-
signments); and it systematizes a range of linguistic shifting phenomena, as with
quantifiers, intensionality, and local/global readings of context-sensitive expressions.
A particular version of an assignment-variable-based account has been devel-
oped. The syntax and lexical/compositional semantics delineate the sources of
intensionality and assignment-shifting: world-quantification/binding arises from
the complementizer, which moves from the world-argument position of the clause’s
main predicate; assignment-quantification/binding arises from modals (broadly con-
strued), which move from the assignment-argument position of the C head. Bind-
ing with individuals/worlds/assignments is derived uniformly from a generalized
binder-index resulting from type-driven movement. This binder-index attaches di-
rectly to moved expressions. The account avoids quantification-specific compo-
sition rules or added parameters of interpretation. A distinction between trace-
binding and pronoun-binding — something arguably desirable for independent rea-
sons (Büring 2004, 2005) — falls out directly (more on which in §7). An improved
formalization of assignment modification was provided, which helps capture bind-
ing relations in examples with repeated modifications.
Philosophically, the account can be understood as providing a precise formal im-
plementation of Stalnaker’s “multiple context” approach to attitude ascriptions. The
syntax/semantics affords a unified analysis of the context-sensitivity of pronouns,
epistemic modals, etc., in the spirit of contextualist theories. Yet it improves in
compositionally deriving certain distinctive shifting phenomena (e.g. with epistemic
modals), and providing a framework for theorizing about expressions’ different
tendencies for local/global readings. Further (grammatical, lexical, metasemantic,
conversational) constraints on readings call for more thorough investigation (more
on which throughout the following sections).
§§2–4 applied the assignment-variable-based framework and particular treat-
ment of the syntax/semantics interface to certain phenomena with quantifiers, at-
titude verbs, and modal verbs. The remainder of the manuscript examines how
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the account may be extended to other types of constructions. I focus primarily on
local/global readings in relative clauses, noun phrases, conditionals, and questions.
Extending an assignment-variable-based account to a particular expression or
construction isn’t as straightforward as taking one’s favorite style of analysis and
adding assignment-variables to interpret any other variables or context-sensitive
elements. The treatments of intensionality and modals in §3 relied on particular
assumptions about the syntax and semantics to motivate a basis for introducing
the relevant world- and assignment-binders, traces, and variables. Whatever style
of analysis one assumes for a given further expression, one needs to ensure that
any binder indices and sources of shifting phenomena can be derived from features
of the syntax/semantics that are independently attested and continuous with the
theory developed thus far — e.g., base-generating complementizers in the world
argument position of the clause’s main predicate, and base-generating assignment-
shifters, such as certain semantically modal expressions, in a relevant assignment-
argument position. §6 draws on prominent head-raising analyses of relative clauses
to develop an assignment-variable approach to restrictive relative clauses and don-
key anaphora: nominal quantifiers are treated as introducing quantification over
assignments, binding pronouns such as relative pronouns and donkey pronouns.
§7 examines how an assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for quantifier
phrases can help capture various further phenomena with quantifiers and pronoun
binding; §8 further develops the account in a more general assignment-variable-
based syntax/semantics for different types of noun phrases. An alternative matching
account of relative clauses is provided (§8.7), which improves on the §6-account. Ex-
tensions to events in light of the proposed parallel layered n/v analyses of noun/verb
phrases are briefly explored (§8.9). §9 turns to local/global readings in condi-
tionals, drawing on developments on ‘if’-clauses as free relatives, now construed
as definite descriptions of possibilities, i.e. assignments. The approach to certain
types of pronominal anaphora from §§6–7 is applied to proforms in correlatives and
‘then’ conditionals. §10 examines local/global readings in interrogative sentences,
drawing on developments from Heim of an approach to questions as sets of possible
answers, with answers now construed as sets of assignments. The proposed syn-
tax/semantics afford uniform analyses of wh-words, indefinites, and relative words
as choice-function pronouns, and of interrogative sentences, ‘if’-clauses, and non-
modal correlative clauses; and they capture a spectrum of shifting phenomena with
‘if’-clauses in sentence-initial, sentence-internal, and sentence-final positions (ad-
joined to NP/VP/IP/CP), with individual correlative clauses adjoined to DP/IP/CP,
and with conditionals with modalized/non-modalized and declarative/interrogative
main clauses.
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Part II
6 Relative clauses (I)
The following sections examine applications of the assignment-variable framework
to various types of non-declarative clauses and linguistic anaphora. I begin with
relative clauses. §6.1 motivates an account of determiner quantifiers in headed
relative clauses as introducing quantification over assignments. §6.2 applies the
treatment of relative clauses from §6.1 to several types of donkey anaphora. §§7–8
explore ways of extending the approach to the syntax/semantics from this section
to other types of noun phrases, restrictive modification, and pronoun binding; a
revised analysis of headed relative clauses is also provided. Features of the proposed
assignment-variable-based account include:
• The syntax/semantics of relative clauses derives individual- and assignment-
binders from independently motivated D-complement and raising analyses.
• The semantics is fully compositional.
• The analysis of nominal quantifiers and donkey pronouns avoids the propor-
tion problem, and allows for alternative universal/existential readings and
specific/nonspecific readings of donkey pronouns.
I focus on headed restrictive relative clauses such as (6.1), in which a nominal
(‘baby’) is modified via a (possibly implicit) relative pronoun/determiner (‘which’)
or complementizer (‘that’). I return to free relatives and correlatives in §9.7.1.
(6.1) a. Every [baby which __ laughed] is cute.
b. Every [baby that Alice likes __] is cute.
(I use ‘relative clause’ for expressions such as the bracketed material, ‘relative phrase’
for the combination of the relative word and nominal (‘which baby’), and ‘nominal
head’ for the nominal in the relative phrase (‘baby’). This informal usage doesn’t
presuppose particular views on the syntactic category or semantic type of the matrix
determiner’s restrictor argument, the relation between relative words and interrog-
ative wh words, or the semantic type of relative words such as ‘which’.)
6.1 Relative clauses and head raising
6.1.1 Syntax
It is common following Quine 1960 to treat restrictive relatives as supplying an
additional restriction to the domain of the matrix determiner — e.g., treating ‘baby
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which laughed’ in (6.1a) as restricting the domain of ‘every’ to the set of babies
o such that o laughed. How to derive this intuitive interpretation in the syntax
and compositional semantics is controversial. A familiar idea, following e.g. Heim
& Kratzer 1998, is that the relative word triggers Predicate Abstraction, and the
nominal head and relative clause combine by Predicate Modification:
(6.2) a. [NP baby [CPrel whichi [IP ti laughed]]]
b. JCPrelK ≈ {o ∶ o laughed}JNPK ≈ {o ∶ o is a baby} ∩ {o ∶ o laughed} = {o ∶ o is a baby ∧ o laughed}
The syntax/semantics of relative clauses might necessitate additional composition
rules such as Predicate Abstraction. Yet assuming such rules would be theoretically
awkward at this stage, given the emphasis throughout the paper on avoiding syn-
categorematic treatments of binding and quantification.
A prominent approach in many early and contemporary syntax for relative clauses
is to treat the head NP as having a representation inside the relative clause. One com-
pelling source of evidence comes from languages with circumnominal relatives —
relative constructions in which the relative phrase is pronounced inside the relative
clause (de Vries 2002, Hiraiwa 2005, 2017). Theories differ on what position
the head NP occupies at LF, and how the pronounced form is derived from the
posited narrow syntactic structures. What will be important in what follows is
simply that the relative phrase forms a constituent. To fix ideas, in this section
I follow head-raising analyses in treating the head NP as base-generated inside
the relative CP, and I assume that the relative CP is the complement of the matrix
determiner, reflected schematically in (6.3) (cf. Åfarli 1994, Kayne 1994, Bianchi
1999, Bhatt 2002, de Vries 2002, Sportiche 2017).41
(6.3) “Head-raising” + D-complement
[DP D [CPrel … [rel NP] … ]]
41I ignore syntactic differences between postnominal relatives in languages such as English and
left-headed circumnominal relatives; and between D+CP analyses in which the head NP is in the
specifier of the CP, and D+XP analyses in which the NP undergoes additional raising to a nominal
projection which takes the relative CP as its complement (see Bhatt 2002, de Vries 2002, Hiraiwa
2005, 2017, Donati & Cecchetto 2015; see also §§7.1–7.2). In “matching” analyses, the head NP
has distinct representations internal and external to the relative clause, not related by movement
(Lees 1960, Chomsky 1965, Sauerland 1998, 2003, Cinque 2013, 2015; see §8.7). That the
relative clause is a complement rather than an adjunct is accepted by theorists in head-external and
head-internal camps (see also Partee 1975, Fabb 1990). For discussion of the syntax of relativization
crosslinguistically, see Chomsky 1977, Dayal 1996, de Vries 2002, Hiraiwa 2005, Cinque 2013.
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I will suggest that an assignment-variable-based compositional semantics can pro-
vide a basis for an improved head-raising analysis of relative clauses. An alternative
“matching” analysis (Lees 1960, Sauerland 1998, 2003) is developed in §8.7.
6.1.2 Trace Conversion?
Treating the head NP as interpreted inside the relative clause raises a prima facie
challenge for the compositional semantics. This challenge is at times underappreci-
ated in syntactic accounts.42 Here is Bianchi (typos corrected; emphasis added):
[I]n LF the relative DP is reconstructed in the trace [=gap] position…
[T]he relative DP within IP has an open position and is bound by a higher
operator, namely the external D0… [H]ere [(6.4b)]… the whole struc-
ture is c-commanded by the higher determiner, and hence constitutes
its restrictive term rather than its nuclear scope [(6.4c)].
(6.4) a. [DP the [CP [DP boy [who boy]] [IP I met [who boy]]]]
b. [DP the [CP [IP I met [DP who boy]]]]
c. the x such that (x is a boy) & (I met x)
(Bianchi 1999: 81)
Deriving the intuitive interpretation in (6.4c) from the LF in (6.4b) is non-trivial.
Bianchi’s informal idea is that the relative phrase ‘who boy’ contains a variable
which is bound by the matrix determiner ‘the’; even if there is such a variable,
the predicative interpretation for the relative clause isn’t thereby compositionally
derived. The verb ‘met’ in Bianchi’s example requires a sister of type e, but the
noun ‘boy’ is type ⟨e, t⟩. So, either (i) simply reconstructing the head NP ‘boy’ to
the gap position, or (ii) reconstructing the entire relative phrase (as in (6.4b)) and
treating ‘who’ as vacuous, would create a type mismatch. An alternative semantics
for the relative word might yield a type e argument to combine with ‘met’ (or yield
a generalized quantifier of type ⟨et, t⟩ to QR and leave a type e trace). However,
such an approach would seem to predict that the relative clause is sentence-type,
although the determiner (‘the’) presumably requires an argument of type ⟨e, t⟩. The
compositional challenge is to capture both (i) that the IP-internal predicate can
42Contrast e.g. McCloskey (2002: 219), in concluding his extensive discussion of the syntax of
relativization in Irish: “The semantic system of natural language is clearly one that is rich enough
and powerful enough to allow for the construction of arbitrarily complex properties… But the
locality requirements that are an integral part of the syntactic system mesh poorly with this power,
and there is, as a consequence, a certain awkwardness in the fit between syntactic and semantic
representations. The ungainly morphosyntax of the complementizer system (which Irish gives us an
uncommonly clear glimpse of) can, perhaps, be viewed as a response to this mismatch.”
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combine with whatever fills the gap position, e.g. yielding type t denotation for
the IP, and (ii) that the relative clause CP is predicate-type so that it can combine
with the matrix determiner.
The principal attempt to address this compositional semantic challenge for head-
raising analyses comes from Bhatt 2002, which resorts to non-compositional op-
erations for interpreting traces (qua copies of movement; n. 13) and effects of
reconstruction (for parallel moves see Elbourne 2005, Moulton 2015). On Bhatt’s
analysis, the relative phrase ‘rel NP’ reconstructs to be interpreted in the gap posi-
tion in IP, and a mechanism of Trace Conversion from Fox (2000, 2002) converts
the relative phrase to a definite description ≈ “the NP identical to xi.” The variable
xi is bound by a binder-index in the position of the highest copy of the relative
phrase, where the binder-index is assumed to remain above the IP even though the
relative phrase, whose movement triggered the insertion of the binder, is deleted.
Formally, the derivation proceeds from a full chain such as (6.5a) to (6.5b), in which
deleting the non-lowest copies is assumed to leave a binder index in the position of
the highest copy, and then from (6.5b) to (6.5c) by Trace Conversion, in which the
relative phrase is replaced by a variable-bound definite description.
(6.5) Bhatt 2002: Head-raising syntax with Trace Conversion
a. every [[which baby] Alice thinks [[which baby] that Bert likes [which baby]]]
b. every λx [Alice thinks [that Bert likes [which baby]]]
c. every λx [Alice thinks [that Bert likes [the baby identical to x]]]
(adapted from Bhatt 2002: exs. 35–38)
Bhatt’s notation conceals various non-compositional operations. In order to
generate the λ-binder above the IP Bhatt “assume[s] that when a copy is deleted,
the λ abstraction created as part of the movement is retained” (2002: 64). However,
such an assumption, consistently applied, would require retaining the λ-binder over
the deleted intermediate copy as well, reflected in (6.6). (I use the numerical
indices to highlight the assumption that the semantic λ-abstraction is created by an
independent Predicate Abstraction rule. Assume for the moment, following Heim &
Kratzer 1998, that the binder indices are introduced in the movement operation.
The strikethrough here indicates syntactic deletion. The steps in (6.6b)–(6.6c) indi-
cate the dual operations of Quantifier Replacement + Variable Insertion for deriving
the definite description in the gap position. The nodes for ‘baby’ and ‘=o1’ combine
by Predicate Modification.)
(6.6) a. every [[which baby]1 1 Alice thinks [[which baby]1 1 that Bert likes [which baby]1]]
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b. every [1 Alice thinks [1 that Bert likes [which baby]1]]
c. every [1 Alice thinks [1 that Bert likes [the [[baby] [=o1]]]]]
The LF in (6.6c) is uninterpretable. The complement of ‘think’ is represented as
denoting (roughly) [λxe.Bert likes the baby identical to x]. This isn’t what Lewis
1979 had in mind in treating properties as the objects of belief. Even if the type-
mismatch were resolved, note that the highest binder-index doesn’t (syntactically
or semantically) bind the variable in the position of the lowest copy. The predicted
denotation of the relative clause (complement of ‘every’) is a constant function.
One way of avoiding these problems would be to stipulate different effects at LF
of deleting copies in different positions — say, that deleting a copy involves deleting
the binder-index created by its movement unless the copy is the highest copy of a
relative phrase. Such a principle would have to be specific to certain constructions,
such as relative clauses; it isn’t in general the case that retaining the binder-index
of the highest copy in a chain leads to an interpretable structure. As Bhatt himself
argues in Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, drawing on Iatridou 1991, certain sentence-
initial ‘if’-clauses must reconstruct — e.g., in (6.7) to a position under the attitude
verb, and in (6.8) to a sentence-final position under the quantifier, hence the Con-
dition C violations in (6.7b)/(6.8b).
(6.7) [If it rains]i, Bert thinks ti the party should be canceled.
a. [If it rains]i Bert thinks [if it rains]i the party should be canceled.
b. *[If Bertk is sick]i hek thinks [if Bertk is sick]i the party should be canceled.
(6.8) [If hisk teacher is out sick]i, every boyk will be happy ti.
a. [If hisk teacher is out sick]i every boyk will be happy [if hisk teacher is
out sick]i.
b. *[If Alicej gives hisk teacher food poisoning]i every boyk will be grateful to
herj [if Alicej gives hisk teacher food poisoning]i
It would be unattractive to posit that ‘if’ conditionals are ambiguous depending on
whether the ‘if’-clause is interpreted in its base position.
(6.9) a. Chloe said that if hisk teacher is out sick, every boyk will be happy.
b. Chloe said that every boyk will be happy if hisk teacher is out sick.
An apparently simple Copy operation in the syntax of movement yields “copy and
delete along with any binder indices, unless at the base, in which case reinterpret
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via Trace Conversion, and unless a relative phrase with no higher copies, in which
case delete but retain the binder index” at the syntax/semantics interface.
One way of alleviating at least some of these distinctions would be to treat
the relative phrase as only partially reconstructing (cf. Chomsky 1995, Moulton
2015). Compare (6.11) in which the intermediate copies are erased at LF (indi-
cated by the strikethrough), the relative word is interpreted in the highest copy,
the (pied-piped) complement NP is interpreted in the gap position, and the lowest
copy is converted such that ‘the’ is inserted into the empty D position and a variable
coindexed with the relative DP is inserted in the identity predicate sister to the NP.
(6.10) Trace Conversion (modified)
a. Binder Insertion: DPi[…DPi…] ↝ DP i […DPi…]
b. Determiner Insertion/Replacement: [DP (D) NP]i ↝ [DP the NP]i
c. Variable Insertion: [DP the NP]i ↝ [DP the [NP =oi]]
(6.11) a. every [[which baby]1 Alice thinks [[which baby]1 that Bert likes [which baby]1]]
b. every [[which baby] 1 Alice thinks [[which baby] 1 that Bert likes [which baby]1]]
c. every [[DP which] 1 Alice thinks [that Bert likes [DP baby]1]]
d. every [[DP which] 1 Alice thinks [that Bert likes [DP the baby]1]]
e. every [which 1 Alice thinks that Bert likes [DP the [baby =o1]]]
Following Heim & Kratzer 1998 the binder-index triggers Predicate Abstraction,
which binds the coindexed variable inside the gap position, and the relative word
can be treated as denoting the identity function λPet.P. The relative clause denotes
(roughly) [λx .Alice thinks Bert likes the baby identical to x].
The LF in (6.11e) yields an intuitively correct denotation for the relative clause.
Consider the needed array of assumptions: (a) Deleted copies are syntactically
represented and semantically interpreted differently in different positions — e.g.,
the highest copy of ‘baby’ and the intermediate copy of the relative phrase are
erased at LF, whereas the deleted lowest copy of ‘which’ is replaced at LF with an
interpreted definite determiner. (b) Inserted sister to the NP in the lowest copy
is an identity predicate ‘= o1’, where the variable ‘o1’ internal to the gap-position
DP is coindexed with that very DP — i.e., with the DP originally represented with
the relative phrase [which baby]1, the movement of which created a coindexed λ-
binder. (c) The inserted identity predicate (type ⟨e, t⟩) combines with the nominal
‘baby’ (type ⟨e, t⟩) via a rule of Predicate Modification. (d) The λ-abstraction at
the top of the relative clause is derived syncategorematically via an added Predicate
Abstraction rule; the node consisting of the binder-index isn’t given a denotation.
Further, note that there is no constituent for the relative phrase ‘which baby’ in
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the final representation of the relative clause; ‘which baby’ doesn’t itself receive a
semantic value.
The above operations formalize what needs to be explained — roughly put, how
the relative clause CP ‘wh-NP Crel IP’ comes to have a property-type ⟨e, t⟩ denotation,
where the gap element of the IP is interpreted as coreferential with the NP-individual
intuitively abstracted over. Other things equal it would be preferable to provide a
semantics for the head-raising analysis without needing to invoke additional (non-
compositional) syntactic and semantic mechanisms such as these.43,44
The goal is to compositionally derive an interpretation of the relative clause from
the lexical semantics of the relative word and relative complementizer, function
application, and binding relations arising from type-driven movement. An attractive
strategy is to treat the syntax/semantics of DPs in headed relative constructions
43The above discussion followed Bhatt 2002 (following Fox 2000, 2002) in treating operations
such as Trace Conversion are syntactic rules. The points carry over straightforwardly to implemen-
tations of Trace Conversion as a semantic rule. Adapting a suggestion in Fox 2003, one might treat
the narrow syntax as delivering (i-a), which is converted to (i-b) by copy deletion, and interpreted
straightway via the sort of semantic rule in (ii). The interpretation of the sister of ‘every’ in (i-b) may
be derived roughly as in (iii) (again assuming scattered copy deletion, and letting the relative ‘wh’
denote the identity function).
(i) a. every [CPrel [which baby]1 Alice thinks [[which baby]1 that Bert likes [which baby]1]]
b. every [CPrel [DP which]1 Alice thinks that Bert likes [DP baby]1]
(ii) Trace Conversion (semantic)
Let α be a structure of the form: DPi [β …DPi…]. JαK = JDPK(λx.Jβ′x/iK), where
a. β′x/i is the structure derived from replacing the (possibly empty) head of every i-indexed
constituent in β with thex, where
b. JthexK = λPet.JtheK(λy.y = x ∧ P(y) = 1) (cf. Fox 2003: ex. 52)
(iii) JCPrelK = (λQet.Q)(λx.J[. . .Bert likes [DP baby]1]′x/1K)= λx . J. . .Bert likes [thex baby]K= λx . . . .Bert likes JtheK(λy.y = x ∧ JbabyK(y) = 1)≈ λx .Alice thinks Bert likes the unique baby identical to x
The formalization of Trace Conversion in (ii) simply encodes the series of syntactic operations
considered in the main text in a compositional semantic rule. The effect is no more explanatory
for purposes of compositional semantics.
44Compare Safir 1999, which analyzes certain lower copies like pronouns, and Sportiche
2006, which analyzes the lower copies as demonstratives. Safir appeals to Fiengo & May’s (1994)
mechanism of “vehicle change” to motivate treating copies of names and definite descriptions as
“evaluated as pronouns with respect to interpretive principles” (Safir 1999: 587); however, crucial
to Safir’s general account is that quantified expressions, which include relative clause heads, “do not
permit their variables to undergo vehicle change” (1999: 615). Given their purposes, neither Safir
nor Sportiche provide derivations for their posited interpretations in the compositional semantics.
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parallel to the syntax/semantics of assignment-quantifiers such as modals from §3.
Research into parallels between nominals and clauses has a rich history in diverse
areas of syntax and semantics. As noted in §3.2, DP-internal operator-movement
from the complement of D has independent precedents in syntactic work on quan-
tificational/definite DPs (Campbell 1996, Matthewson 1998, Lecarme 1999b,
Ihsane & Puskás 2001, Giusti 2002, Luján 2004, Larson 2014). So, we can try
saying, just as modal quantifiers raise for type reasons from inside their clausal com-
plement, determiner quantifiers raise for type reasons from inside the relative clause
complement in headed restrictive relative clauses, (cf. Luján 2004). An assignment-
variable-based syntax/semantics for relativization along the lines pursued here may
thus provide yet another instance of the linguistic parallels between individual and
modal domains.45
There are various ways of implementing the approach in the compositional
semantics. Choice points include (i) the relation between relative words and in-
terrogative wh words; (ii) the position of the relative phrase at LF; (iii) the inter-
actions among the relative complementizer, relative phrase, and (possibly gappy)
IP in deriving a suitable argument for the matrix determiner. For purposes of com-
Compare also Caponigro 2003 on semantics for various types of free relatives. Caponigro treats
relative determiners in free relatives as raising from the IP gap position to Spec,C, leaving a λ-binder
in C; the [C λiIP] node is interpreted via a non-compositional abstraction rule. Caponigro is careful
to restrict his analysis to free relatives. It isn’t immediately evident how it would apply to headed
relatives (or to wh-interrogatives, though Caponigro assumes that free relatives are introduced
with wh-words). I am not aware of other analyses of QR/wh-movement which treat the λ-binder
as occupying a head position, such as that for the complementizer C. That aside, an analogous
Caponigro-style treatment of headed relatives would need to assume that in headed relatives with an
overt complementizer (e.g. ‘baby that Bert likes’), the complementizer gets fully deleted prior to wh-
movement. Yet such an assumption would raise issues for (wh) interrogative clauses, which require
the presence of the substantive interrogative complementizer throughout the derivation (e.g., to
trigger wh movement and satisfy selection requirements of question-embedding expressions (§10)).
45For discussion with further examples of DP-internal movement, see Tellier 1991, Longobardi
1994, 2001, Campbell 1996, Alexiadou & Wilder 1998b, denDikken 1998, Matthewson 1998,
Bhattacharya 1999a,b, Bernstein 2001, 2008, Boeckx 2001, Ihsane & Puskás 2001, Giusti
2002, Luján 2004, Hiraiwa 2005, Laenzlinger 2005, Larson 2014, Ilkhanipour 2016. For
general discussion on syntactic parallels in nominal/verbal extended projections and interpretive
parallels across domains (individual, spatial, temporal, modal), see also Chomsky 1970, Partee
1984b, Fukui & Speas 1986, Abney 1987, Szabolcsi 1987, 1994, Guéron & Hoekstra 1995,
Webelhuth 1995, Bittner & Hale 1996, Lecarme 1996, 1999b, 2004, 2008, Siloni 1997, Stone
1997, Kratzer 1998a, Cardinaletti & Starke 1999, Pesetsky & Torrego 2001, Rijkhoff 2002,
2008, Koopman 2003, 2005, Aboh 2004, Bhat 2004, Svenonius 2004, Grimshaw 2005, Ticio
2005, Alexiadou et al. 2007, Aikhenvald 2008, Megerdoomian 2008, Wiltschko 2014; also
n. 2, §§7.2, 8.
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parison, the remainder of this section explores how our assignment-variable-based
framework can help provide an improved compositional semantics for head-raising
analyses of relative clauses. As we will see, there are reasons to think that the
resulting account cannot be right for the general case. However, the following
preliminary discussion will be instructive in illustrating resources for developing
the assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics from §3. An alternative matching
analysis is given in §8.7 in the context of a more general syntax/semantics for noun
phrases.
The core components of the account of (headed restrictive) relative clauses in
this section are as follows. Regarding (i), I will suggest a unified analysis of relative
pronouns, wh-words, and (at least some) indefinites as choice-function pronouns
(more on interrogative wh words in §10.3). Regarding (ii), one option is to treat the
relative phrase [whrel NP] as originating Spec of Crel (Sternefeld 2001, Gračanin-
Yuksek 2008). So, for (iii), just as the declarative complementizer raises for type
reasons from the clause’s verbal head, Crel in an individual relative clause raises
for type reasons from the nominal gap position. And just as modal quantifiers raise
from an internal argument of the matrix complementizer, the matrix determiner can
be analyzed as raising from an internal argument of the relative complementizer.
A simplified LF is as follows (using ‘wh’ for relative words, ignoring worlds, and
treating names as constants (§4.4); I address the question marks shortly).
(6.12) Headed restrictive relative DP: D CPrel (preliminary)
a. ‘every baby which Alice likes’
b. DP
every⟨i,?⟩ CPrel
wh g? baby
C
⟨j,e⟩
Crel ti?
IP
Alice likes tje
Free relatives in argument positions might be treated analogously (though seeCaponigro
2003, Gračanin-Yuksek 2008). Adapting Comp accounts of free relatives (Groos
& van Riemsdijk 1981), the relative phrase in (6.13) is in a specifier position and
what raises from C0rel is a definite-like element, which picks out the (possibly plural)
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individual in the relevant domain (=[Pet g]) that satisfies the property denoted by
the relative clause (cf. e.g. Jacobson 1995, Rullmann 1995, Dayal 1996, Grosu
& Landman 1998, Caponigro 2003, 2012; for simplicity assume ‘what’ ≈ ‘which
relevant thing(s)’).46
46The definite-like element, though implicit in English, is overt in various languages, as in (i).
Like other definites, free relatives are generally incompatible with existential ‘there’ sentences (more
on which in §8.4).
(i) [le
det
[ba’ax
what
k-in
hab-erg.1s
tsikbal-t-ik-∅
chat-trans-ind-abs.3s
te’ex]-a’
2.pl-cl
‘this (thing) which I’m telling you about’ (Gutiérrez-Bravo 2012: ex. 10; Yucatec Maya)
(ii) a. *There is what Alice likes. (ok only with locative ‘there’)
b. There is something/∗the book Alice likes.
An interesting precedent for the analyses in (6.12)–(6.13) is Rullmann 1995: 149–150; in Rull-
mann’s (iii), the relative complementizer also binds a variable occupying the gap position and
the relative word is in Spec,C. (Rullmann stipulates that the empty complementizer is parsed as
a lambda abstractor and coindexed with the variable assumed to occupy the gap position. Rullmann
treats the relative word as itself the maximality operator; the account isn’t applied to restrictive
(non-maximalizing) relatives.)
(iii) [CP what [C ei [IP John ordered ti]]] (Rullmann 1995: 150)
Caponigro (2003) also treats DP-like standard free relatives as denoting a maximal entity, but treats
the free relatives as CPs with the covert pluralization operator in an adjoined position (as opposed to
treating the free relatives as DPs with the operator as a covert D head). The approach in (6.13) could
be adapted accordingly. As we will see, the analyses of relative and wh words proposed below and in
§10, respectively, maintain a uniform semantics for relative and wh words, and are thus compatible
with Caponigro’s (2003) proposal to identify interrogative wh-words and the relative words in free
relatives. See Caponigro 2003, Gračanin-Yuksek 2008 on various respects in which free relatives
pattern with wh-interrogatives in contrast to headed relatives crosslinguistically.
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(6.13) Free relative as DP: D∅ CPrel (preliminary)
a. ‘(Bert likes) what Alice likes’
b. DP
ι⟨i,?⟩o CPrel
wh g? P g
C
⟨j,e⟩
Crel ti?
IP
Alice likes tje
6.1.3 Semantics: Assignment-quantification with determiners
Principal issues for the lexical/compositional semantics concern the nature of the
quantification introduced by the matrix determiner, and binding relations among
the matrix determiner, relative complementizer, and choice-function pronoun ‘which’.
To motivate answers to these questions, I take a brief detour to examine indefinites.
Indefinites in embedded contexts raise notorious challenges for compositional
semantics. What is relevant here is simply that the interpretation of indefinites can
vary with a quantificational subject. First, certain indefinites can exhibit apparent
intermediate readings in embedded contexts — readings “intermediate” between or-
dinary nonspecific readings, as in (6.14), and specific readings about a particular
individual, as in (6.15), where the indefinite is specific relative to an attitude sub-
ject, supposition, or quantificational subject (Abusch 1994, Kratzer 1998b), as in
(6.16)–(6.18). The intermediate reading of (6.17) says that for every baby o there
is a specific toy of mine that scared o, though which toy did the scaring may vary
across babies (for Joe it was the clown, for Annie the jack-in-the-box, etc.).
(6.14) Alice thinks a friend of mine died in the fire.
a. Nonspecific reading: ≈ Alice thinks I had some friend or other who died
in the fire
(6.15) If a friend of mine from Texas had died in the fire, I would have inherited a
fortune. (Fodor & Sag 1982: ex. 60)
a. Specific reading: ≈ there is some particular friend of mine, say Tex, such
that I would have inherited a fortune if he had died in the fire
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(6.16) Bert might think some stalker is out to get him.
a. Intermediate reading: ≈ it’s possible that there is some particular stalker
o such that Bert thinks o is out to get him (might > indef > think)
(6.17) Every baby cried because a (certain) toy of mine scared them.
(every > indef > because)
(6.18) Every professor rewarded every student who read a/some book he had
recommended. (every prof > indef > every student)
(Abusch 1994: ex. 10; Kratzer 1998b: ex. 16)
Second, in donkey sentences the interpretation of the pronoun varies as a function
of the indefinite and supposed circumstance or quantificational subject:
(6.19) a. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
b. Most farmers who own a shovel use it.
(6.19b) isn’t true simply if most farmer-shovel pairs ⟨x, y⟩ are such that x uses y, or
if most shovel-owning farmers use some stolen shovel or other; the truth of (6.19b)
requires that most farmers x use some shovel owned by x. The quantificational
force and content of the donkey pronoun varies with the subject and value for the
indefinite in the quantifier’s restriction.
The interpretation of certain indefinites and expressions linguistically dependent
on them can shift, not only in “shifty” contexts such as conditionals and attitude
ascriptions, but also under ordinary quantifiers. A hypothesis is that just as modal
quantifiers can shift the interpretations of pronouns, so too, at least in some cases,
with determiner quantifiers. This section develops a syntax/semantics of determiner
quantifiers as involving quantification over assignments. §6.2, as well as §§7.3,
7.4, 8.8, apply the account to several types of pronominal anaphora. I leave appli-
cations to specific indefinites and other types of linguistic and discourse anaphora
for future work.
I suggest that we treat determiner quantifiers in headed relative clauses as quan-
tifying over assignments, and raising for type reasons from an internal assignment-
argument of the relative complementizer. Intuitively put, a DP such as ‘every baby
which Alice likes’ quantifies over those individuals which could be chosen from
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among the babies and would correctly answer the question of what Alice likes. I
offer the following lexical entry for the relative complementizer Crel:47
(6.20) JCrelK = λaa.λPet.λye.λxe.λgg . x(g) = y(g) ∧ P(x)(g)
A relative clause, CPrel, denotes a singleton set of individuals — the singleton of
individuals x(g) ∈ E which have property ↓P and are identical to a given individual.
The property is supplied by the IP complement of Crel; the individual is supplied by
the relative phrase. In some languages the relativizing element may be a specific
indefinite determiner, as in the (circumnominal) relative clause in (6.21) (see also
Williamson 1987, Hiraiwa 2005, Hiraiwa et al. 2017; we will return to this
in §8.7).
(6.21) [[Fo
you
s￿ ￿
C
yã
saw
daw-ninga/∗dawã
man-spec.indef/∗man.the zaam￿ ￿ ]yesterday wã]the kula me.went-home
47Dayal (1996: 191–193) also proposes a substantive semantic value for the relative complemen-
tizer. The relative complementizer is treated as type ⟨et, ⟨et, ⟨et, t⟩⟩⟩; the relative clause CP ‘wh-NP
C IP’ is a type-⟨et, t⟩ plural definite description, denoting the set of properties of the unique maximal
plural individual which is NP and has the property created by abstracting over the gap position in
IP. Though such a semantics may be suitable for free relatives combining with a property-type or
individual-taking argument, it doesn’t apply to relatives combining with a determiner quantifier.
Dayal is thus forced to treat relative expressions as ambiguous. Cf. also Gajewski 2008 which
captures the maximizing effects via a syntactic definite feature on the relative complementizer.
Treating the relative clauses themselves as definite/maximizing may also be problematized by
relatives that are incompatible with definite interpretations, as in the (internally headed) relatives
in (i). (Regarding (i-a) Williamson remarks, “the speaker has no particular apple… in mind (and,
indeed, these objects may not even exist)” (1987: 182).)
(i) a. [[Thaspa
apple
wa-ži
a-irr
taya
well
yužaža
wash
pi]
pl
cha]
indic
wachi.
I-want
‘I want an apple that is well washed.’ (Williamson 1987: 182; Lakota (Siouan))
b. [Ata
Ata
ni
c
bi
neg
tu
insult
do
man
so]
rel
kpe
enter
na.
loc
‘A man that Ata has not insulted has entered.’
(Hiraiwa et al. 2017: ex. 86; Dagbani (Niger-Congo))
By contrast, the entry in (6.20) and assignment-variable-based treatment of relative words gen-
eralizes to headed and free relative clauses. The distinctive definiteness effects associated with
free relatives are captured, not via a distinct determiner-like relative complementizer, but via an
implicit maximalizing operator (ιo in (6.13)), analogous to the matrix determiner in restrictive
relatives. In both cases the relative CP denotes a set of individuals. This clause is suitable to combine
with a determiner quantifier, as in headed relatives, or maximalizing operator, as in free relatives.
Maximization/definiteness effects are distinguished from relative clauses proper.
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‘The man who you saw yesterday went home.’
(Peterson 1974: 74; Mooré (Niger-Congo))
A common approach is to treat specific indefinites as introducing a variable for a
choice function (Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 1998b). Drawing on data such as (6.21)
I suggest that we treat relative words as choice-function pronouns. As we saw in
§4.4, a choice function Fcf of individuals selects a particular individual o ∈ E from a
non-empty set of individuals. The external individual argument ofCrel is supplied by
the selected individual denoted by the relative phrase [relcf NP]. The assignment-
quantification introduced by the determiner shifts what individual is selected and
determines the domain.
A first-pass entry for ‘every’ base-generated internal to a relative clause is in
(6.22). The derived semantic value of a simple sentence with a free pronoun and
headed relative follows in (6.23). (Here and in what follows I continue to as-
sume that in the intended interpretation h(1s) is the world of the possibility rep-
resented by h, i.e. h(1s) = @(h) (§§3, 4.4). I will use ‘cf’ and ‘Fcf’ specifically for
indices/variables of type ⟨et, e⟩ that are choice functions. Recall ↓ which “lowers”
an item in a domain to an item composed out of associated elements of the model
(§2). I use (e.g.) ‘babyu’ for the characteristic function of the set of individuals
o ∈ E such that o is a baby in u. For space purposes I will continue to omit many
intermediate steps in derivations; further calculations are left to the reader.)48
(6.22) JeveryK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶P+(a)(x)(g)→ Q+(a)(x)(g)
48In the general definition of the binder-index: with every, τ = a, σ = ⟨⟨a, et⟩, t⟩, σ1 = e; with
DP: D CPrel, τ = a, σ = t, σ1 = e. I assume that the relative word must have the same assignment-
variable as the local relative complementizer, as due to agreement (Williams 1980, Chung 1998,
Kratzer 2009; we will revisit this in §§8.7–8.8). As with other determiners, there may be reasons
for incorporating domain variables to further restrict the domains of relative words. In (6.23) the
domain variable may be treated as sister to ‘baby’ or as an additional argument of ‘which’, restricting
the domain of the choice-function pronoun to a set of contextually relevant babies; see n. 26. For
simplicity I continue to ignore such further structure.
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(6.23) ‘Every baby which she likes laughed’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP⟨2,a⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ CPrel
DP∗
wh2 g2 baby w1 g1
⟨2,e⟩
Crel t2a she1 g1
likes w1 g1
t2e
t1s laughed
Jwh2 g2K = λPet.λgg . g(2a)(2cf)((↓P)(g))JDP∗K = λgg . g(2a)(2cf)(the function f s.t.∀ye∶ f (y(g)) iff y(g) is a baby in g(1a)(1s))= λgg . g(2a)(2cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))JCPrelK ≈ λxe.λgg . x(g) = g(2a)(2cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))∧ g(1a)(1e) likes x(g) in g(1a)(1s)JDP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λQet.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))∧ g(1a)(1e) likes x(g) in g(1a)(1s))→ Q(x)(g[a(g)/2a])JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s)) ∧ g−(1e) likes x(g) in g−(1s))→ x(g) laughed in @(g−)
This says, roughly, that for every individual o ∈ E and assignment h ∈ G, if o is
the individual selected among the babies (babygc(1s)) by the choice function h(2cf)
and is liked by the contextually relevant individual (gc(1e)), then o laughed. The
DP ‘every baby which she likes’ quantifies over those individuals that are chosen by
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some choice function or other from among the babies and are liked by gc(1e). The
sentence (6.23) is true iff every such individual laughed.
For instance, suppose there are four individuals o1-4; only o1-3 are babies; only
o1-2 are liked by gc(1e); and only o1 laughed. And suppose that h1(2cf) selects o1
among the babies; h2(2cf) selects o2; and h3(3cf) selects o3. So, for individual o2
and assignment h2, the restrictor condition is satisfied: o2 = h2(2cf)(babygc(1s)), and
gc(1e) likes o2. Yet o2 didn’t laugh. Hence (6.23) is false.
The above syntax/semantics compositionally derives the intuitive interpretation
delivered by familiar semantics with Predicate Abstraction and intersective mod-
ification, and does so without positing additional composition rules or principles
for interpreting reconstructed phrases (e.g. Trace Conversion). The syntax is co-
opted from prominent head-raising and D-complement analyses of headed rela-
tives. The compositional semantics parallels the treatments of type-driven bind-
ing/quantification with verbal quantifiers from §§3–4: Just as a declarative clause
predicates a property of a world identical to a world in a domain determined by an
embedding modal, a relative clause predicates a property of an individual identical
to an individual in a domain determined by an embedding determiner quantifier.
Complementizers in matrix clauses raise from VP as quantifiers over worlds, captur-
ing the obligatory local reading of the main predicate’s world argument; analogously
the relative complementizer raises from the gap position in the relative clause, cap-
turing the obligatory link between the gap and the nominal head. Semantically
modal elements raise from inside their complement clause as quantifiers over as-
signments, determining the relevant modal domain; analogously the determiner
quantifier ‘every’ in (6.23) raises from inside its complement CPrel, determining the
relevant domain of individuals. The basic type-⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩ semantics for deter-
miner quantifiers parallels the basic type-⟨at, ⟨at, t⟩⟩ of modal quantifiers from §3.
The syntax/semantics of quantificational DP: D CP is a nominal counterpart of the
syntax/semantics of modals in the domain of individuals (§6.1.2).
It is standard in syntax to treat features on a head X as projecting to the XP.
Given the treatment of binder-indices as features on expressions, the assignment
binder-index on ‘every’ projects to the DP. In what follows I will suggest that this as-
signment binder affords a resource for capturing shifted interpretations of pronouns
and various phenomena with donkey anaphora.
6.2 Donkey anaphora (I)
6.2.1 Pronouns and copies
Consider (6.24), schematically represented in (6.24a) (ignoring worlds).
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(6.24) ‘Every baby which got a toy liked it’
a. [S …[[DP every⟨2,a⟩ [CPrel wh2 g2 baby [[Crel t2a]⟨2,e⟩ [t2e got ???-toy]]]] liked ??? ]]
As is familiar, the donkey pronoun ‘it’ isn’t c-commanded by its apparent linguistic
antecedent, the indefinite ‘a toy’. Simply representing ‘it’ with some individual
pronoun [it3 gi] doesn’t capture the intuitive anaphoric49 interpretation: coindexing
the assignment-variable with the topmost assignment-binder yields a claim about
gc(3e), and coindexing it with every⟨2,a⟩ yields a claim about gc(2a)(3e). Ap-
proaches to donkey anaphora are diverse. One might layer resources from one’s
preferred theory into an assignment-variable-based framework — e.g., adding uns-
elective binders and revising the treatment of indefinites (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982),
or treating donkey pronouns as E-type descriptions and introducing mechanisms for
recovering the relevant descriptive content (Heim 1990, Büring 2004, Elbourne
2005). However, it is worth exploring whether the assignment-quantification with
determiners could be exploited for developing an account of apparent non-c-com-
mand anaphora such as donkey anaphora.
A common approach in both dynamic and non-dynamic theories is to treat indefi-
nites as introducing a (new) variable, as for an individual (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982)
or choice function (Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 1998b). Following our treatment
of relative words, suppose we represent the relevant uses of indefinites such as ‘a’
likewise as choice-function pronouns. To a first approximation, I suggest repre-
senting donkey pronouns in sentences such as (6.24) as copies of their linguistic
antecedent.50 There are various ways of implementing this idea. One option —
the option I wish to pursue here — is to represent the anaphoric pronoun (n. 49)
as a copy of the interpreted material of the antecedent (refinements to follow). A
donkey pronoun such as ‘it’ in (6.24) is spelled out at LF with a coindexed choice-
49Here and throughout I use ‘anaphora’ and its kin informally for phenomena in which an
expression seems to receive its interpretation directly from the linguistic context. For familiarity I use
‘anaphor’/‘anaphoric pronoun’ broadly to cover uses of pronouns with intuitively bound readings,
though sometimes to the exclusion of anaphors proper; context should disambiguate. My usage
doesn’t presuppose that pronouns with “anaphoric” or “intuitively bound” readings are to be analyzed
as syntactically or semantically bound by their felt linguistic antecedents. I briefly consider anaphors
proper, such as reflexives, and ordinary bound readings of pronouns in §7.3. I focus exclusively on
intra-sentential linguistic anaphora.
50We will reexamine the internal/external syntax and semantics for choice-functional uses of
indefinites and donkey pronouns in §8.8.3. I don’t assume that all indefinites are to be analyzed
uniformly as choice-function pronouns; see e.g. Kratzer 1998b for an ambiguity account positing
choice-function/quantificational analyses of specific/nonspecific indefinites, respectively; cf. Fodor
& Sag 1982.
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function pronoun and elided nominal complement, as in (6.25). (Hereafter, unless
indicated otherwise I use the strikethrough for material that is interpreted at LF
but unpronounced. I will sometimes use ‘oi’ as short for ‘oicf’ with choice-function
variables.)51
51The present approach might be understood as an assignment-variable analogue of the NP-dele-
tion E-type theory in Elbourne 2001, 2005, 2013 (though see below; cf. Cooper 1979, Heim &
Kratzer 1998, Büring 2005); see Postal 1969, Wiltschko 1998, Radford 1997, Déchaine
& Wiltschko 2002, Panagiotidis 2002, Baltin 2012, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017 for broader
“X+elided-complement” analyses of certain pro-forms crosslinguistically. I focus exclusively on
instances of donkey anaphora where the pronoun has a linguistic antecedent. I leave open how
the account may be extended to “paycheck” pronouns, as in (i), where the pronoun’s covarying
interpretation is contextually determined.
(i) [Context: A new faculty member picks up her first paycheck from her mailbox. Waving it in the
air, she says to a colleague:]
Do most faculty members deposit it in the Credit Union? (Jacobson 2000: 89n.12)
I don’t assume that all pronouns or anaphoric expressions need be analyzed in this way. For
instance, depending on one’s views on the relation between referential and anaphoric/bound pro-
nouns, free readings could be represented with simplex individual-type pronouns [oe g], or with
choice-function pronouns coindexed with T and a (possibly trivial) property-type pronoun (≈“which
(relevant) thing”). For unified theories of pronouns, see e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998, Panagiotidis
2002, Elbourne 2005, 2013; for contrasting approaches, see Aoun & Hornstein 1992, Noguchi
1997, Hornstein 2001, 2007, Bhat 2004, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, 2017b, Kratzer 2009.
Likewise I leave open the specific syntactic category of the relevant English pronouns; the account
needn’t be committed to treating choice-function pronoun elements as uniformly in D positions (see
Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, 2015, 2017a,b, Alexiadou et al. 2007, Baltin 2012, Patel-Grosz
& Grosz 2017 for overviews on potential structural differences among pronouns crosslinguistically;
also n. 77). Given our purposes I ignore internal projections such as for ϕ-features. The analysis is
compatible with there being differences in ϕ-features in certain examples, as in (ii). Such examples
may be assimilated to independent phenomena in which a pronoun’s ϕ-features are apparently
uninterpreted (e.g. due to Feature Deletion or Feature Transmission), as with “fake indexicals” such
as in (iii) (cf. von Stechow 2003, Rullmann 2003, Hornstein 2007, Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009,
Sudo 2012, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2015, Wiltschko 2016).
(ii) Every freshman who met a senior hoped that they would become friends.
(iii) a. I’m the only one around here who will admit that I could be wrong. (Partee 1989a: fn. 3)
b. Only you remember our first appointment. (Kratzer 2009: ex. 87)
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(6.25) ‘Every baby which got a toy liked it’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP⟨2,a⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ CPrel
wh2 g2 baby-w1-g1
⟨2,e⟩
Crel t2a t2e
got-w1-g1 a3 g2 toy-w1-g1
VP
liked t1s
it3 g2 toy-w1-g1
JDP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λQet.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))∧ x(g) got a(g)(3cf)(toyg(1a)(1s)) in g(1a)(1s))→ Q(x)(g[a(g)/2a])JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s)) ∧ x(g) got a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s))
in g−(1s))→ x(g) liked a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in @(g−)
CPrel denotes a singleton set of individuals that are selected by some particular
choice function and got a toy selected by some particular choice function. The de-
terminer’s assignment-binder binds the assignment-variables in the choice-function
pronouns representing the indefinite ‘a toy’ and relative phrase ‘which baby’. Roughly,
the DP ‘every baby which got a toy’ universally quantifies over those individuals
o ∈ E and choice functions F,F′ such that F (=a(g)(2cf)) selects o from among
the babies, F′ (=a(g)(3cf)) selects some o′ (=a(g)(3cf)(toygc(1s))) from among the
toys, and o got o′ — babies o that got some toy or other o′. The sentence is true
iff for every such o, o liked o′. The apparent anaphoric connection between ‘a toy’
and ‘it’ is captured by (i) the syntactic identification of the donkey pronoun with
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its antecedent [a3-g2 toy-w1-g1], and (ii) the assignment-binding introduced by the
determiner quantifier.
Treating instances of donkey anaphora as copies of their linguistic antecedent
affords a straightforward implementation of the prominent idea that “there is a
pairing of indefinite antecedents with donkey-pronouns that is purely syntactic (as
expected under the unselective binding approach, but not available under the E-type
approach)” (von Fintel 1994: 176, drawing on Kratzer 1995; emphasis mine;
cf. e.g. Heim 1990, Ward et al. 1991, Elbourne 2005, Patel-Grosz & Grosz
2010). However, the proposed treatment of certain anaphoric pronouns as “copies”
of their linguistic antecedents shouldn’t be conflated with copies in the sense of the
copy theory of movement (see n. 13). Copies of movement are treated as identical to
the moved expression (or at least identical with respect to ϕ-features, [wh] features,
Case, etc.; cf. also Nunes 2004, van Koppen 2007). In contrast, the anaphoric
expressions in question, on the present proposal, need only be equivalent to their
antecedents with respect to features interpreted at LF (n. 51). The pronouns needn’t
be identical to their antecedents with respect to other features relevant for non-
semantic (purely syntactic, phonological) reasons. It is a substantive question, for
a given type of anaphoric expression, whether the anaphoric “copy,” in the present
usage, is the result of some syntactic Copy operation. (More on these issues below
and in §§7.4, 9.7, 10.3.)
If the LF representations of donkey pronouns were syntactically complex in
the proposed way, one might expect to find evidence for this complexity in other
languages (n. 51). First, indirect evidence may come from independently attested
structure in pronouns used as donkey pronouns. For instance, in languages with
nominal tense such as Somali, tense morphology may appear on any common noun,
as in (6.26) (Lecarme 1996, 2004, Nordlinger & Sadler 2004, Adamou 2011;
cf. Aikhenvald 2008). Interestingly, whereas (e.g.) indefinite nominals and even
certain syntactically marked definites are tenseless in Somali, individual pronouns
may be marked for tense — not only in referential uses, as in (6.27), but also in
bound uses and donkey sentences, as in (6.28). As with other nominals, the tense
on a pronoun can be independent of clausal tense.
(6.26) Nín-ka
man-def.nonpast
cáan-ka
fame-def
ah
be
ee
and
búug-gani
book-def.dem.past
qoray
wrote.past
waa
decl
Shákisbíir.
Shakespeare
‘The famous man who wrote this book is Shakespeare.’
(Lecarme 2008: ex. 3a)
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(6.27) a. Isá-gíi
he-emph.past
baa
decl
hádal-kíi
talk-def.past
qaatáy,
take.past
oo
and
yiri:
said
‘He began to speak, and said:’ (Lecarme 2008: ex. 10a)
b. Isa-ga
him-emph.nonpast
waxaa
decl
arkay
saw.past
Axmed.
Axmed
‘Axmed saw him.’ (Özyıldız & Ivan 2017: ex. 6)
(6.28) a. Qof
person
walba
every
oo
rel
hali
she-camel
leh
has
iya-dai
her-emph.nonpast
wuu
decl
garacaa.
beats
‘Everyone who has a cameli beats iti.’ (Özyıldız & Ivan 2017: ex. 18a)
b. Nini
man
hád-díi
time-def.past
uu
he
seexdó
sleeps
oo
and
sóo
dir
toosó,
wakes-up
waa
decl
isá-gíii
him-emph.past
ún.
only
‘If a mani goes to sleep and then wakes up, hei is only himself (i.e. the
same as he was before).’ (Lecarme 2008: ex. 19a)
Somali tense-related DPs have full TP complements (Lecarme 2008, 2012). Exam-
ples such as (6.28) suggest that such structure can apply to donkey pronouns, e.g.
roughly as in (6.29).
(6.29) Somali (pro-)DP: D+TP (Lecarme 2008, 2012)
[DP D [TP T [ … NP]]]
a. [DP itcf [TP Tnonpast [ … [NP camel]]]]
b. [DP hecf [TP Tpast [ … [NP man]]]]
Second, in some Romance and Scandinavian languages certain pronominal forms
freely allow overtly modified complements, even full restrictive relative clauses, as in
(6.30)–(6.31). The forms used in (6.30)–(6.31) are also used in donkey sentences,
as in (6.32).
(6.30) a. det
it
som
which
jeg
I
spiste
ate
b. han
he
med
with
rød
red
hatt
hat (Hestvik 1992: exs. 27, 29; Norwegian)
(6.31) a. lo
it
bueno
good
‘that which is good’
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b. los
they
buenos
good
‘the good ones’
c. lo
it
que
that
agrada
pleases
‘that which pleases’ (Luján 2004: exs. 2, 4; Spanish)
(6.32) a. Hvis
if
en
a
mann
man
eier
owns
et
a
esel,
donkey
slår
beats
han
he
det.
it
b. Si
if
un
a
hombre
man
tiene
has
un
a
burro,
donkey
lo
it.acc
trata
treats
mal.
badly
It is controversial how to analyze such constructions.52 One hypothesis might be
that the pronouns are pro-NPs (pro-forms with the syntax of nouns), which can also
take overt modifiers, as in (6.33)–(6.34) with Japanese kare and English anaphoric
‘one’ (Postal 1969, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, Falco & Zamparelli 2016).
(6.33) a. [DP kono
this
[NP kare]]
he
‘this guy here’
b. tiisai
small
kare
he
‘he who is small’ (Noguchi 1997: 777; Japanese)
(6.34) a. this one
b. small one
However, such a hypothesis can be excluded. Unlike the Spanish/Norwegian pro-
52Notably, the Spanish third-person proclitic pronouns and Norwegian third-person gender-
neutral pronouns share a common form with (specific/definite, demonstrative) determiners. Such
synchronic and diachronic morphosyntactic connections among third-person pronouns, determiners,
and relative words are crosslinguistically common (Diessel 1999, Lyons 1999, Heine & Kuteva
2002, Bhat 2004; also e.g. Jespersen 1924, Postal 1969, Wiltschko 1998, Gair et al. 1999,
Luján 2004, Trutkowsky & Weiß 2016, Thurgood & LaPolla 2017). Luján (2004) analyses
examples such as (6.31) as pronoun-headed DPs, though the matter is controversial. With Luján,
I assume as a working hypothesis that the Spanish examples are like the Norwegian examples
(Hestvik 1992) in being overtly modified pronouns (though as discussed below I remain neutral
on whether the pronouns are Ds; n. 51). Proceeding under this assumption allows us take the overt
complements at face value as e.g. adjectives/relative clauses (as opposed to, say, being systematically
reanalysed as nominalizations), as shown below.
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forms, pro-NPs are generally incompatible with bound-variable readings (Déchaine
& Wiltschko 2002):53
(6.35) a. *Daremoi-ga
everyone
karei-no
he-gen
hahaoya-o
mother
aisite-iru.
love
‘Everyone loves his mother.’ (Noguchi 1997: 770; Japanese)
b. *Everybodyi thinks onei is better than average.
(6.36) a. Hver eneste
every
gutti
boy
satte
put
stolen
chair.def
bak
behind
hami.
him
‘Every boy put the chair behind him.’
b. Nadiei
nobody
desea
wants
que
that
el
the
director
director
lei
him
dé
give
un
an
premio.
award
‘Nobodyi wants the director to give himi an award.’
FollowingDéchaine&Wiltschko’s (2002) typology, the pro-forms in (6.30)–(6.32)
thus have at least the structure of a ϕP, if not a DP (n. 52), which also take nom-
inal complements [ϕP ϕ [NP N]] (Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017).54 A diagnosis of
(6.30)–(6.31) follows straightway: The modifiers modify the implicit NP, e.g. roughly
as in (6.37) for (6.30) (using the English glosses). The position of the copied NP
posited in the representation of the donkey pronouns in (6.32) is the same position
as the position of the implicit NP overtly modified in (6.30)–(6.31), as in (6.38).
(6.37) a. [hancf/hecf [NP NP [PP with the red hat]]]
b. [detcf/itcf [CPrel [which NP] … I ate t]]
(6.38) [detcf/itcf [NP donkey]]
What distinguishes ‘it’ from han, det, etc. is whether it has a selectional property of
disallowing an overtly modified complement (e.g.,CPrel or a multi-segmented NP).55
53Though see Yashima 2015 on the specific binding-theoretic properties of Japanese kare.
54As is common, I use ϕP as a cover term for the relevant intermediate functional projection(s)
in the extended projection of N.
55Certain modified implicit complements of third-person plural ‘them’ may be possible to different
extents in some dialectics of American English, as in (ii).
(i) a. Them linguists are subversive.
b. [ϕP them [NP linguists]] (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002: ex. 35a)
(ii) a. ?Them with the weird symbols are subversive.
[ϕP them [NP NP [PP with the weird symbols]]]
b.??Them who you used to hang with, what happened to ’em?
[ϕP them [CPrel [rel NP] … you used to hang with t]]
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More direct crosslinguistic support for the proposed analysis of donkey pronouns
as (internally complex) copies of their linguistic antecedents may come from the
morphosyntax of the donkey-anaphoric expressions themselves. Notably, in certain
Chinese and Hmong donkey sentences the anaphoric expression must be a complete
copy of its (non-c-commanding) antecedent, as in (6.39)–(6.40) with the indefinites
shei and (tug) twg.
(6.39) a. ni
you
xihuan
like
sheii
who
wo
I
piping
criticize
sheii.
who
‘If you like X, I will criticize X’ / ‘Whoever you like, I will criticize them.’
b. *ni
you
xihuan
like
sheii
who
wo
I
piping
criticize
tai/∅i/na-ge-reni/shenme reni.
him/her/∅/that-person/what-person
(Cheng & Huang 1996: exs. 14, 17; Mandarin Chinese)
(6.40) a. Tug
clf
twgi
which
pum
see
(proj) los
top
tug
clf
twgi
which
yeej
always
nyam
like
(proj).
‘Whoever sees him will surely like him.’
b. *Tug
clf
twgi
which
pum
see
(proj) los
top
nwgi/proi
3sg/∅ yeejalways nyamlike (proj).
(Mortensen 2003: ex. 35; Hmong)
Interestingly, overtly prenominal uses of English ‘it’ are even attested in toddler
speech, as in the naturally occurring example in (6.41a).
(6.41) a. Get it ladder! (McNeill 1970: 29; toddler English)
b. [DP [D it] [NP ladder]] (Radford 1997: ex. 81)
Following Radford, uses such as (6.41) reflect a developmental stage where the
child hasn’t yet learned that the particular word ‘it’ in English selects for a phoneti-
cally unrealized complement (unlike, say, ‘we’; see below).56 One might imagine a
precocious counterpart of McNeill’s toddler saying ‘Everyone who has a ladder likes
it ladder’, parallel to (6.39)–(6.40).
Second, although Déchaine & Wiltschko’s (2002) class of pro-DPs generally re-
sist bound readings, some are compatible with overtly realizing the morphosyntactically
complex DP, as in (6.42a) with the pronoun thú-tl’ò, in (6.42b) with English ‘we’,
and in (6.43) with the pronoun yi. Wiltschko 1998 argues on independent grounds
c. *them good
[ϕP them [NP good N]]
56Suggestively, Radford even glosses the toddler’s use of ‘it’ in (6.41) as analogous to an adult
speaker’s use of a specificity determiner such as ‘the’ (1997: 155; see n. 52).
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that German d-pronouns are also syntactically complex DPs with an elided nomi-
nal complement (see also Schwarz 2009, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017). Notably,
though d-pronouns are generally unacceptable with bound variable readings, they
may be used as donkey pronouns, as in (6.45). Class pronouns in languages such
as Bùlì exhibit no restrictions in bound or anaphoric readings, yet they also occur
freely with full nominals, as in (6.44) with wá (cf. also Postal 1969, Pesetsky 1978,
Collins 1993, Radford 1997).
(6.42) a. Tl’ó-cha-l-su
then.1sg
qwemcíwe-t
hug
thú-tl’ò
d.fem-3sg
q’ami.
girl
‘Then I’m going to hug her/that girl.’
(Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002: ex. 5; Halkomelem (Salish))
b. We students stick together.
(6.43) a. me
I
na
gave
agbo
ram
yi.
d.him
‘I gave him a ram.’
b. Kofi
Kofi
kpa
carved
ati-ɛ
stick-def
tati
pestle
yi.
d
‘Kofi carved the stick into a pestle.’
(from Collins 1993: 20–24, 32–33; Ewe (Niger-Congo))
(6.44) a. Siri
bee
l￿ ￿
prt
dom
bite
wā.
d.cl1
‘A bee stung her.’
b. Nur
person
ne
with
wà
d.cl1
doa
friend
ale
and
jam
past
b￿ ￿ ro.
exist
‘There was a man and his friend.’ someone likes his mother-d
(Schwarz 2016: exs. 14, 21, Hiraiwa 2005: 200–201; Bùlì (Niger-
Congo))
(6.45) Wenn
if
ein
a
Bauer
farmer
einen
a
Eseli
donkey
hat,
has
dann
then
schlägt
beats
er
he
deni.
d-pron
‘If a farmer owns a donkey, then he beats it.’
(Wiltschko 1998: ex. 57; German)
On the flip side, in Hindi donkey sentences the anaphoric expression can be
overtly realized as a copy of the antecedent nominal, as in (6.46) in which the bare
gadheKO ‘donkey’ is anaphorically linked to the non-c-commanding indefinite koii
gadhaa ‘some donkey’.
89
(6.46) har
every
aadmii
man
jis
rel
ke paas
with
koii
some
gadhaai
donkey
hotaa hai
has
gadheKOi
donkey
maartaa hai.
beats
‘Every man who has a donkey beats it.’ (Srivastav 1991: ex. 45a; Hindi)
Such examples can be represented parallel to their English counterparts at LF, as re-
flected schematically in (6.47) for (6.46) (ignoring worlds and using English glosses).
(6.47) Hindi donkey LF (schematic)
… [DP … [a3-g2 donkey]]⟨2,a⟩ beats [F3-g2 donkey]
In (6.46) it is the NP which is pronounced and the choice-function pronoun is im-
plicit. The representation of the Hindi donkey anaphor is the mirror image of the
representation of ‘it’ in (6.25).57
A potentially contrasting hypothesis regarding (6.46) is that the definite expres-
sion includes a covert demonstrative determiner, and that it is this demonstrative
that captures the felt anaphoric connection. (6.46) would be relevantly analogous
not to (6.24), the thought goes, but to (6.48) (cf. Abbott 2002).
(6.48) Every child who got a toy will bring that toy for show-and-tell.
As noted above, many languages use the same format for demonstratives and pro-
nouns such as third-person pronouns (n. 52). Yet it won’t do to respond by simply
positing a covert demonstrative. Compare (6.46), in which the bare nominal can
function as the anaphoric expression, with (6.49), in which removing the demon-
strative renders the sentence ungrammatical.
(6.49) a. [jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai]i
is
vo
dem
laRkiii
girl
lambii
tall
hai.
is
lit. ‘Which girl is standing, that girl is tall.’
(=‘The girl who is standing is tall.’)
b. *[jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai]i
is
laRkiii
girl
lambii
tall
hai.
is
(Srivastav 1991: exs. 13a, 17a)
Although correlative constructions such as in (6.49) generally require a demonstra-
tive correlate in the main clause, the ungrammaticality of (6.49b) cannot be due
57It is perhaps interesting that the ostensible bound names in (4.35)–(4.36) may be represented
analogously to the Hindi donkey anaphor in (6.47), with an elided choice-function pronoun and
pronounced NP, roughly as in (i).
(i) [ … [[DP every⟨2,a⟩ [CPrel … a2-g2 Donald]]⟨2,a⟩ [VP …F2-g2 Donald … ]]] (cf. (4.34)–(4.36))
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to the lack of an overt demonstrative. (6.50), in which the correlate is implicit, is
acceptable (Srivastav 1991, Bhatt 2003; cf. Lipták 2012 on Hungarian).
(6.50) [jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai]
is
lambii
tall
hai.
is
If a covert demonstrative could capture the anaphoric connection in (6.47), one
might wonder why it couldn’t do as well in (6.49b).
The account of donkey anaphora in this section affords a unified syntax and
semantics for the English and Hindi donkey sentences in (6.24) and (6.46). In both
cases the anaphoric expression is spelled out via a copied choice-function pronoun
and NP complement. What distinguishes them is which material is pronounced.
(We will return to alternative structures for donkey pronouns and applications to
anaphoric demonstratives in correlatives in §§8.8.3, 9.)
6.2.2 Asymmetric, universal, and existential readings
Although the entry for ‘every’ in (6.22) introduces quantification over assignments,
the determiner’s semantics is still a selective quantification that relates sets of in-
dividuals. The account avoids the proportion problem (Heim 1990) facing unse-
lective binder approaches, which fundamentally relate sets of assignments (Lewis
1975, Kamp 1981, Heim 1982). Consider an asymmetric reading with ‘most’ in
(6.52), given an LF parallel to (6.25). (Assume a simple “more than half” semantics
for ‘most’; and assume an off-the-shelf semantics for the plural such that (e.g.)
‘babiesu’ is the set of pluralities of babies — formally, the closure under sum for-
mation of the set of atomic babies in u.)58
(6.51) JmostK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .#o[∃aa∶P+(a)(λgg.o)(g)∧Q+(a)(λgg.o)(g)]÷ #o′[∃a′a∶P+(a′)(λgg.o′)(g)] > 1/2● #o[ . . . o . . . ] ∶= the cardinality of the set of atoms o s.t. . . . o . . .
(6.52) a. ‘Most babies which got a toy liked it’
b. ≈ λgg .#o[∃aa∶ o = a(g)(2cf)(babiesg−(1s)) ∧ o got a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s))
in g−(1s) ∧ o liked a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in @(g−)]÷#o′[∃a′a∶ o′ = a′(g)(2cf)(babiesg−(1s))∧ o′ got a′(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s))
in g−(1s)] > 1/2
58Following Link 1983, E is structured to include (plural) sums of atomic individuals. (An atomic
individual is an individual whose only atomic part is itself. Note that atoms are included in babiesu
(Krifka 1989).) We will return to number in §§8.1–8.2.
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The entry for ‘most’ in (6.51) says, roughly, that the number of atomic individuals
that satisfy the restrictor and scope arguments is greater than the number of atomic
individuals that satisfy the restrictor but not the scope. Suppose there are three
babies b1-3; b1 got four toys and liked them; and neither b2 nor b3 liked the unique
toy they got. So, b2/b3 satisfy the restriction that there are choice functions which
select them from among the babies and select a toy they got; however, b2/b3 fail to
satisfy the scope condition since they don’t like the selected toy, i.e. a(g)(3cf)(toy).
The semantics avoids giving symmetric construals of asymmetric readings.
The semantics for ‘every’ in (6.22) derives a so-called “universal reading” for
donkey sentences: The derived truth condition in (6.25) is falsified if there is a
baby o′ and choice function F′ such that o′ got F′(toy), and o′ didn’t like F′(toy).
Although many theories predict only universal readings for donkey sentences (Kamp
1981, Heim 1982, Groenendijk & Stockhof 1991, Elbourne 2005), it has been
observed that some donkey sentences have existential readings. (6.53b) is intu-
itively true as long as every person who has a dime will put some dime that she has
in the meter.
(6.53) a. Yesterday, every person who had a credit card paid his bill with it.
(R. Cooper)
b. Every person who has a dime will put it in the meter.
(Pelletier and Schubert 1989)
c. Every person who submitted a paper had it rejected once.
(Chierchia 1995: ex. 3)
One way of capturing existential readings is to weaken the semantics of the quanti-
fier. Consider the following alternative entry for ‘every’ and semantic value for (6.25):
(6.54) Jevery2K = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∀xe∶ (∃aa∶P+(a)(x)(g))→ (∃a′a∶P+(a′)(x)(g) ∧Q+(a′)(x)(g))
(6.55) J(6.25)K ≈ λgg .∀xe∶ (∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s))∧ x(g) got a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in g−(1s))→ (∃a′a∶ x(g) = a′(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s))∧ x(g) got a′(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in g−(1s)∧ x(g) liked a′(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in @(g−))
The semantics in (6.54) requires that, for every individual satisfying the restriction,
there is some assignment that verifies both the restriction and scope. The derived
semantic value for (6.25) represents the existential reading: (6.55) says, roughly,
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that for any o ∈ E for which there are choice functions F,F′ such that o = F(baby)
and o got F′(toy), there is a choice function F′′ that selects a toy that o got and
liked. There is universal quantification over the subject-babies o, but existential
quantification in the scope over toys liked by o— more precisely, over assignments
which determine choice functions that select a toy o liked from among the toys o
received. The condition “P+(a′)(x)(g)” in (6.54) ensures that the choice function
F′′ relative to which the individuals o satisfy the scope condition — that o likes
F′′(toy)— selects a toy received by o. (6.24) is still correctly predicted false in a
scenario where a baby liked some toys or other but hated all the toys it received.
It is controversial whether some donkey sentences conventionally have both
existential and universal readings. I leave open whether all universal readings can be
derived conversationally, or positing some sort of ambiguity is ultimately necessary
(see Kanazawa 1994, Chierchia 1995, King 2004, Brasoveanu 2007). Here-
after, unless indicated otherwise, I will simplify by assuming “universal reading”
entries such as (6.22).
6.3 Recap. Features and bugs
This section has explored how our assignment-variable-based framework can afford
an improved compositional semantics for head-raising analyses of relative clauses.
Features of the proposed account include:
• The syntax/semantics derives individual- and assignment-binders from inde-
pendently motivated D-complement and raising analyses.
• The account advances our project of standardizing quantification across do-
mains: the syntax/semantics of quantificational DP: D CP is a nominal coun-
terpart of the syntax/semantics of modal elements; the basic type-⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩
semantics for determiner quantifiers parallels the basic type-⟨at, ⟨at, t⟩⟩ se-
mantics of modal quantifiers, adapted for quantification over individuals.
• The semantics is fully compositional: the account doesn’t require additional
composition rules such as Predicate Abstraction, Predicate Modification, or
Hamblin Function Application, and it avoids introducing independent princi-
ples for interpreting reconstructed phrases or traces vs. pronouns.
• The analysis of donkey pronouns as copies of their linguistic antecedents
and assignment-quantificational semantics for quantifiers allow for existential
readings of donkey sentences; capture specific and nonspecific readings of
donkey pronouns in intensional contexts; and avoid the proportion problem.
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Although the account captures the core linguistic shifting data in this section, there
are reasons to be dissatisfied. There are reasons to think that any account which
represents the relative complementizer as originating in the “gap” position cannot be
correct for the general case of headed restrictive relative clauses crosslinguistically.
There is compelling syntactic and semantic evidence that, in at least some cases,
it’s the relative phrase that originates in the nominal gap position. Notably, in
languages with circumnominal relative clauses, the relative phrase is pronounced in
this position, as in (6.56) (de Vries 2002, Hiraiwa 2005, 2017). Although leaving
Spec,Crel empty is ungrammatical in (6.57b), elements other than the relative phrase
can satisfy Crel’s EPP properties, as in (6.57a) (Hiraiwa 2005). Relative phrases in
DP-like free relatives can also appear inside the relative clause, as in (6.58)
(6.56) [[CPrel Atia
Atia
n
c
da’
buy.perf
[bua
goat
seka]
rel
da’a
market
zaam]
yesterday
la]
d
bɔi
lose.perf
mɛ.
prt
(lit. ‘The [Atia bought which goat at the market yesterday] got lost.’)
‘The goat that Atia bought at the market yesterday got lost.’
(Hiraiwa et al. 2017: 5; Gurenɛ (Niger-Congo))
(6.57) a. Atim
Atim
ale
c
da
bought
mango-kuui
mango-rel
la
dem
‘the mango that Atim bought’
b. ∗ale/∗ate/∗∅
c
Atim
Atim
da
bought
mango-kuui
mango-rel
la
dem
(Hiraiwa 2005: 297; Bùlì (Niger-Congo))
(6.58) [[CPrel Mary
Mary
[taku]
something
ka￿ ￿ e]
make
ki]
the
ophewathų.
I.buy
‘I bought what Mary made.’ (Williamson 1987: 188; Lakhota (Siouan))
It is hard to see how relative clauses such as these could be derived if the relative
phrase originated in Spec,Crel (or outside CPrel, as in head-external analyses). In
(6.56)/(6.57a) the relative clause subject is apparently pronounced in this position.
Even in English there are semantic reasons for thinking that the relative phrase
can have a representation in the gap position. Consider (6.59) (the indices are used
informally to indicate the interpretation of the predicate’s world argument).
(6.59) Callie wants to hug every unicorni which Timmy thinksi he found.
Roughly put, (6.59) says that Callie wants to hug every o such that for every pos-
sibility h compatible with Timmy’s beliefs, o is a unicorn in h and Timmy found o
in h. (6.59) needn’t imply that there are actually unicorns. Details aside, it is hard
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to see how the world argument for ‘unicorn’ could be linked to ‘thinks’ if the relative
phrase ‘which unicorn’ originates in Spec,Crel above the attitude verb, as in (6.60).
(6.60) [every [CPrel wh unicorn-w??? [C0
⟨2,e⟩
rel [IP Timmy thinks [he found t2e]]]]]
Alternative local and intermediate readings of the nominal head’s world argument
are also possible. In (6.61) the world argument of ‘monster’ is intuitively associated
with the lower intensional verb in the relative clause. (6.61) says, roughly, that
Timmy gets nightmares from every o such that for every possibility h compatible
with Alice’s beliefs and every possibility h′ compatible with what Timmy fears in
h, o is a monster in h′. In (6.62) the world argument of ‘monster’ is intuitively
associated with the higher attitude verb ‘thinks’ in the relative clause.
(6.61) [Context: Alice doesn’t believe in monsters.]
Every monsteri which Alice thinksk Timmy is afraidi of gives him nightmares.
(6.62) [Context: Timmy thinks that his mother doesn’t believe in monsters, and
that the noises she’s scared of are actually monsters.]
Every monsteri which Timmy thinksi his mother is afraidk of gives him
nightmares.
In some manner to be explained, the matrix quantifier needs to be able to identify
the head NP for determining the domain of quantification, while still allowing the
head NP to receive non-global readings under elements inside the relative IP, as
reflected informally in (6.63) for examples (6.59), (6.61), (6.62).
(6.63) a. [everyj [CPrel … [IP Timmy thinksi she found [wh unicorni]j]]]
b. [everyj [CPrel … [IP Alice thinksk [Timmy is afraidi of [wh monsteri]j]]]]
c. [everyj [CPrel … [IP Timmy thinksi [his mother is afraidk of [wh monsteri]j]]]]
Intensional gap readings (as we might call them) raise a challenge for any account
in which the head NP isn’t represented in the gap position.
One needn’t assume that restrictive relative clauses in all languages are formed
from the same underlying structure (Carlson 1977,Åfarli 1994, Sauerland 1998,
Bhatt 2002, Grosu 2002, Hastings 2004, Gračanin-Yuksek 2008, Kalivoda &
Zyman 2015; contrast Cinque 2013, 2015, Sportiche 2017). The analysis in this
section might be correct for certain types of relative clauses. (Indeed the analyses
of correlative clauses, free relative ‘if’-clauses, and interrogative clauses in §§9–10
will be modeled after the application to free relatives from §6.1.2.) Yet it is worth
investigating how we might develop a compositional semantics applicable to both
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circumnominal and overtly head-external relativization strategies. The next section
offers an alternative account of headed relative clauses integrated in a more gen-
eral assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for noun phrases. The proposed
“matching” analysis (Lees 1960, Sauerland 2003) in §8.7 maintains the features
of the head-raising account and treatment of donkey pronouns in this section, while
giving the relative phrase an IPrel-internal representation. The account applies to
head-internal and head-external relative clauses in other languages, and captures
the further linguistic shifting data from intensional gap readings. Before returning to
relative clauses, it will be useful to have on the table a more detailed understanding
of the internal syntax/semantics of noun phrases more generally. The next section
begins by extending the assignment-quantificational approach to determiner quanti-
fiers in headed relative constructions to quantifiers with non-relative complements.
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7 Quantifiers (I)
The semantics in §6 treats nominal quantifiers in headed relative clauses as rais-
ing from an assignment-argument position internal to the relative clause. The as-
signment binder-index resulting from the type-driven movement of the quantifier
helped capture the link between the relative phrase and gap position in the relative
clause, and certain anaphoric dependencies between the determiner’s restrictor and
scope. This section examines how a generalized assignment-quantificational syn-
tax/semantics for noun phrases can help capture various further phenomena with
complex quantifier phrases and pronoun binding — in particular, phenomena con-
cerning specificity (§7.1), restrictive modification (§7.2), anaphoric noun phrases (§7.3),
and weak crossover (§7.4). §8 further develops the accounts in a more detailed,
general analysis of the syntax and compositional semantics of noun phrases. The
proposed assignment-variable-based account of noun phrases affords a unified syn-
tax/semantics for quantifier words with relativized and non-relativized complements,
with applications to “free R” (modifier) and “inherent R” (argument) readings of
prenominal and postnominal genitives (§§7.2, 8.2, 8.7–8.9); it extends the account
of donkey anaphora to apparent binding out of DPs with inverse linking and genitive
binding, and uses of donkey pronouns in intensional contexts (§§7.4, 8.8); and it
provides formal diagnoses of differences between “weak” vs. “strong” quantifiers,
such as in presuppositionality, modal independence, and compatibility with exis-
tential ‘there’ constructions (§8). An alternative analysis of headed relative clauses,
which addresses the concerns in §6.3, is layered directly into the general syntax and
semantics for noun phrases (§8.7).
I want to flag that certain parts of §§7–8 will be a bit more syntactically oriented
than the other sections. While this may be of general interest, independent of the
assignment-variable-based framework, the syntactic speculations aren’t merely tan-
gential. It is critical for developing our syntax/semantics with assignment variables
that any binder indices and sources of linguistic shifting be derived from inde-
pendently motivated syntactic structures. Otherwise the proposed compositional
derivations will be little more than an ad hoc technical exercise. We will see that a
generalized assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for quantifier phrases can
be motivated by crosslinguistic data on expressions of quantification, and integrated
in syntactic work on different types of noun phrases.
7.1 “Specificity” (I)
The semantics in (6.22)/(6.54) treat determiners such as ‘every’ in headed relative
clauses as type ⟨⟨a, et⟩, ⟨⟨a, et⟩, t⟩⟩. A pressing question is how this syntax/semantics
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in relative constructions relates the syntax/semantics when combining with non-
relativized complements and simple noun phrases, as in (7.1).
(7.1) Every baby laughed.
A conservative response would be to treat determiner quantifiers as systematically
ambiguous between items taking arguments of type ⟨e, t⟩ vs. ⟨a, et⟩, or to intro-
duce a general lexical rule which converts the basic ⟨et, ⟨et, t⟩⟩ lexical entry into an
“assignment-lifted” entry. Such moves are familiar from type-shifting and flexible-
type approaches to quantifiers, connectives, etc. (Partee & Rooth 1983, Hendriks
1993, Jacobson 1999; cf. Heim & Kratzer 1998). LFs with the “wrong” homonym
or entry could be semantically excluded due to incurring a type-mismatch, as when
the determiner is generated inside a relative clause.
An alternative option is to analyze quantifier phrases generally as having internal
structure relevantly analogous to structure in a relative clause.
(7.2) [DP every [ZP … [NP baby ] …]]
Headed relative constructions aren’t the only case of determiners taking clausal com-
plements crosslinguistically (cf. Kayne 1994, Uriagereka 1998, Caponigro 2002,
de Vries 2002, Koopman 2003, 2005, Larson 2003, Hiraiwa 2005, Law 2011,
Hankamer & Mikkelsen 2012). In some languages the determiners in headed
relative constructions can be used with factive clauses or root clauses:
(7.3) a. naa
cow
bu
cl
la
dem
‘that cow’
b. Amoak
Amoak
nya
saw
[[CP Atim
Atim
ale
c
sua
own
naa
cow
buui]
rel]
la].
dem].
‘Amoak saw the cow that Atim owned.’
c. [[CP Atim
Atim
ale
C
dɛ
ate
mango-kú]
mango-D
la]
dem
tɛ
gave
Amoak
Amoak
po
stomach
pienti.
whiten
‘That Atim ate the mango pleased Amoak.’
d. [[CP Atim
Atim
nagi
hit
Amoak]
Amoak
la].
dem
‘Atim hit Amoak, as I said.’
(Hiraiwa 2005: 31, Hiraiwa et al. 2017: 5–6; Bùlì (Niger-Congo))
In light of crosslinguistic phenomena with nominal tense-marking, Lecarme (2008,
2012) and Chang (2012) explicitly treat DPs as taking tensed TP complements,
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yielding a structure for DPs analogous to that for sentences (see §3.2); the time-
dependence of noun phrases is captured not in D itself but in DP-internal T(ense)
(see also Hiraiwa 2005, Ilkhanipour 2016). As we have seen, the assignment(s)
relevant for interpreting the clause’s main predicate can differ from the assign-
ment(s) for interpreting other predicates as well. Following Kayne 1994, general-
ized D+CP analyses of DPs have been defended by e.g.Campbell (1996), Koopman
(2003, 2005), and Luján (2004) (in non-relative/reduced-relative complements the
CP may be or contain a small clause, lacking Tense). In Campbell’s and Luján’s
accounts, the main operator is even analyzed as moving from within the complement
of the determiner, as in (7.4) (cf. also Alexiadou & Wilder 1998a, Matthewson
1998, Ihsane & Puskás 2001, Giusti 2002, Alexiadou 2003, Laenzlinger 2005,
Larson 2014).
(7.4) a. [DP Di [CP ti NP]] (Luján 2004)
b. [DP OPi [the [CP ti NP]]] (Campbell 1996)
The focus in the above-cited accounts is on matters of syntax rather than compo-
sitional semantics. Though some of the authors gesture at interpretive and discourse
effects of the posited DP-internal movements, semantic entries and derivations aren’t
provided. The generalized assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for quan-
tificational DPs pursued here can be understood as deriving the relevant move-
ment operations and DP-internal/-external binding relations in a specific compo-
sitional semantics via type-driven movement. The type-⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩ implemen-
tation with determiner quantifiers is an instance of the general approach to the
syntax/semantics throughout the paper: Just as modals with clausal complements
are treated as verbal quantifiers raising from the assignment argument of (e.g.) Cd,
which raises from the world argument of the clause’s main predicate (§§3–4), deter-
miners such as ‘every’ with clausal complements are treated as nominal quantifiers
raising from the assignment argument of (e.g.)Crel, which raises from the individual
gap position (DPs with reduced complements to follow). A generalized assignment-
variable-based syntax/semantics for individual quantification/binding may thus be
understood as contributing to the long tradition of linguistic work on parallels be-
tween nominal and verbal categories, and individual and modal domains (n. 45).
Treating determiner quantifiers as in general taking complements with struc-
ture analogous to that of a restrictive relative clause doesn’t require identifying
the complements as full CPs or representing all cases of restrictive modification as
modification by a (possibly reduced) syntactic relative clause. For instance, in the
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D+CP structure for (7.1) in (7.5), the constituent [Fcf-g baby] needn’t be identified
as a relative (or [+wh]) phrase (again ignoring worlds).
(7.5) a. [every⟨2,a⟩ [CP F2cf-g2 baby [C [C0⟨i,e⟩ C t2a] [IP tie [P1et g1]]]]]
b. J(7.1)K ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(baby) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g)))→ x(g) laughed
The complement of the quantifier needn’t even be a CP/SC. Compare (7.6) where
the relevant structure is integrated in an extended nominal projection (cf.Campbell
1996, Siloni 1997, Matthewson 1998, Bhattacharya 1999b, Zamparelli 2000,
Iatridou et al. 2001, Adger 2003, Aboh 2004, Svenonius 2004, Hiraiwa 2005,
Bhatt 2006, Megerdoomian 2008, Donati & Cecchetto 2015):
(7.6) a. [DP every⟨i,a⟩ [XP (YP) [X X0 [FP Fcf-tia baby]]]]
b. [DP every⟨i,a⟩ [FP Fcf-tia baby]]
In the LFs in (7.6) the quantifier raises for type reasons from the main nominal
constituent. The YP specifier of the nominal XP projection in (7.6a) may be under-
stood as a placeholder for other restrictive modifiers in the extended NP layer (more
on which shortly; Cinque 1995, Alexiadou 2001a, Giusti 2002, Lecarme 2004,
Alexiadou et al. 2007). (Hereafter I often refer to analyses such as those in (7.6)
jointly as “D+XP” analyses.)59
In our examples with headed restrictive relative clauses there was an overt basis
for positing the constituent with the choice-function pronoun: the relative phrase.
Positing such a constituent in quantifier phrases with non-relative complements, as
in (7.5)–(7.6), may seem surprising. The remainder of the section examines how
a generalized assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for determiner quanti-
fiers can help capture further linguistic shifting data. But first it is worth pausing to
consider independent morphosyntactic/semantic evidence for the relevant structure
in quantifier phrases more generally. This subsection focuses primarily on evidence
for a choice-function element in the complement of the quantifier; §7.2 suggests
that data with genitive constructions may favor an implementation for non-rela-
59For the moment I continue to label quantifiers such as ‘every’ as D; we will examine the nature
of the relevant extended projections of the head noun below and in §§7.2, 8. In both (7.6a)–(7.6b),
since the quantifier raises directly from the nominal constituent, there is no need for an additional
agreement mechanism (§§6.1.3, 10.3). It would be interesting to examine potential parallels of the
alternative D+XP/CP treatments of the syntax/semantics interface in the verbal domain, such as
with modals taking verbal vs. clausal complements.
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tivized quantifier phrases such as (7.6a), with a reduced XP complement, over a
fully generalized D+CP analysis.
First, generalizing our syntax/semantics along the lines in (7.5)–(7.6) may give
precise expression to common ideas about the “specificity” (Enç 1991) of quantifi-
cational DPs. Here is Enç (emphases mine; Enç’s NP corresponds to our DP).
“[Q]uantifiers in natural languages quantify over contextually given
sets… For example, [(7.7) entails] only that [Sally] danced with every
contextually relevant man…
[(7.7)] Sally danced with every man.
If universal quantification is over contextually relevant sets of individ-
uals, it follows that NPs that quantify universally are specific. This
account also ensures that universally quantifying NPs presuppose ex-
istence… [T]he specificity requirement is not restricted to universally
quantifying NPs … All quantifiers are specific.” (Enç 1991: 11)
Lecarme draws on Enç’s notion of specificity in her accounts of nominal tense and the
distribution of nominal tense morphemes in Somali. What marks the distinction be-
tween strong/presuppositional vs. weak/cardinal noun phrases (e.g. ‘every/most N’
vs. ‘many/three N’), according to Lecarme, is the “referentiality” of the Determiner
category (cf. e.g. Chomsky 2007: 25, Hartmann 2008: 111, 131, 139). The in-
herent “definiteness” of D (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002) is treated as capturing
differences in binding possibilities among pronouns (emphases mine):
“Assuming D to be the locus of specificity, DPs… are directly connected
to the discourse, given their intrinsic deictic properties.”
“[T]ense is the relevant feature underlying the interpretive effects
that are subsumed under the notion of specificity.”
“[T]he tense morpheme in Somali nominals… links the reference
of DP to a discourse-identified set of possible referents. Specificity is
thus understood as ‘D(iscourse)-linking’ (Pesetsky 1987).”
(Lecarme 1999a: 301, 1999b: 16, 1996: 16)
“The cardinal vs. presuppositional distinction is tense-related: if true D
(i.e., D+T) relates to referentiality in some sense, an indefinite nonspecific
nominal phrase… is temporally indefinite… [N]onreferential nominals…
are tenseless in Somali.” (Lecarme 2008: 204)
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“[I]ndexicality is a necessary feature of… D-pronouns, and has a par-
ticular structural locus, namely the D-position.”
“D, the locus of indexicality, is responsible for assigning reference.”
“Consequently, fake indexicals are analyzed as instantiatingϕ rather
than D.” (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2015: 24; 2017b: 68, 80n.10)
“This view [locates] DP’s specific/anaphoric reference and discourse
function directly in its head Determiner… Accordingly, determiners
may be described as discourse-linking functions.” (Luján 2004: 130)
It isn’t always manifest to what extent authors take the above notions (index-
icality, presuppositionality, specificity, familiarity, definiteness, deixis, D-linking,
strength) to be relevantly related (cf. Matthewson 1998, Cardinaletti & Starke
1999). Plainly understood, the appeal to notions such as referentiality or defi-
niteness can seem puzzling. One wouldn’t typically expect to find quantificational
determiners in a list of indexicals. On the face of it, quantifiers can also be bound,
as in (7.8). The weak/cardinal noun phrases in (7.9) would seem to be interpreted
with respect to “relevant sets of individuals” as much as ‘every man’ in Enç’s (7.7).
(7.9a) can be true even if Alice is satisfied with general cookie production; pointing
out in (7.9b) that lots of rival players were congratulating one another in other
games likely won’t earn one points with the tournament referee.
(7.8) In every music school, most guitar students wanted to play like the head
instructor. (cf. Heim 1991, von Fintel 1998b)
(7.9) a. Alice gave Timmy a brownie because she doubted there were many cookies.
b. I regret to inform you that your teams didn’t meet the required standards
for sportsmanship: The referee didn’t observe three players congratulate
three players, and so you won’t be advancing to the next round.
It is a substantive question to what extent the properties being homed in on track
one another — e.g., being unbindable, triggering an existence/salience/familiarity
presupposition, being associated with implicit domain restriction, being compatible
with existential ‘there’ constructions, being potentially modally/temporally inde-
pendent of a matrix modal/tense. It is important not to conflate the observed syn-
tactic/semantic effects — domain restriction, specificity, discourse-linking, existence
presuppositions — with notional definiteness (familiarity, maximality, uniqueness)
or indexicality (see Enç 1991, Szabolcsi 1994, Lecarme 1996, 1999b, Giusti
1997, Bhattacharya 1999a,b,Cardinaletti& Starke 1999,Danon 2001, Ihsane
& Puskás 2001,Kelepir 2001,Aboh 2004,Hartmann 2008,Matthewson 2013).
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Indeed Giusti (1992, 1997, 2002) has argued that the “definite” article — “probably…
the only category which occupies the head D position, uncontroversially and crosslin-
guistically” (Progovac 1998: 165–166) — is generally used for grammatical rea-
sons and needn’t have any semantic contribution, such as specificity, referentiality,
or notional definiteness (also e.g. Danon 2001, Hallman 2016; we will return to
these issues below and throughout §8).
The syntax/semantics in this section affords a locus for the putative specificity,
in Enç’s (1991) sense, of “true” (Lecarme 2008: 204) quantificational DPs. DPs
such as ‘every baby’ in (7.5)–(7.6) “presuppose existence” (Enç 1991: 11) insofar
as the choice-function pronoun sister to the main NP is undefined for empty sets of
individuals. A lexical entry for C/Crel such as in (7.11a) would make the connections
with presuppositionality even more explicit (more on which in §10); if there are
no babies, the semantic value of the quantifier’s restrictor argument in (7.12) is
undefined for any value for y. An analogous preliminary entry for the X head is in
(7.11b), as compared to (7.10) (more on which shortly).
(7.10) JXK = λxe.λPet.λye.λgg . y(g) = x(g) ∧ P(y)(g)
(7.11) Presuppositional CP/XP (alternative)
a. JC/CrelK = λaa.λPet.λxe.λye.λgg ∶ x(g) = y(g) .P(y)(g)
b. JXK = λxe.λPet.λye.λgg ∶ x(g) = y(g) .P(y)(g)
(7.12) a. ‘every baby’
b. JCP/XPK = λye.λgg ∶ y(g) = g(ia)(kcf)(baby) . . . . y(g) . . .
Our analyses of certain anaphoric pronouns and relative words as choice-function
pronouns will also be extended to other anaphoric proforms/demonstratives and
interrogative wh phrases in §§9–10. Indeed Pesetsky’s (1987) paradigm case of
D-linking (discourse linking) — Enç’s “specificity” — is ‘which N’ phrases. Though
including a functional element such as a choice-function pronoun in the syntax of
(non-relativized) quantificational DPs might have seemed surprising, it has prece-
dents in work on D-linking. For instance, Holmberg 1993 and Rullmann & Beck
1998 distinguish D-linked NPs in the syntax by positing a (possibly unpronounced)
determiner/demonstrative (cf. also Santelmann 1993, Bhattacharya 1999a,b,
Zamparelli 2000, Giusti 2002, Boeckx & Grohmann 2004). Treating the speci-
ficity determiner or determiner-like functional head as having an additional internal
argument (e.g. situation) which figures in determining the relevant domain, as in
(7.13), has precedents in various syntactic theories (cf. von Fintel 1994, Büring
2004, Elbourne 2005, 2013, Schwarz 2009, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017). As
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noted above, some accounts even treat the main operator as moving to its inter-
preted position from inside the complement of D (see (7.4), also §§3.2, 6.1).
(7.13) [DP (D) [FP [F0 def/specific s] NP]]
(adapting Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017: 261–262)
The choice-function pronoun posited in the extended NP layer in [Fcf-g NP] — and
the movement of the determiner/quantifier from the internal (assignment) argu-
ment of Fcf in (7.6) — may be understood in parallel to such moves.
Although some accounts which posit an additional DP-internal element iden-
tify it as a (weak) definite article or a deictic demonstrative,60 such identifications
should be regarded with caution. Our identifying the choice-function pronoun in
quantificational DPs with (say) a definite determiner would be no more warranted
for the general case than our identifying it with an implicit relative/wh word on the
basis of our examples with headed relative clauses.
The choice-function-based analyses developed here, and in greater detail in §8,
may provide a common basis for certain notions of “specificity” from the literature
with quantificational and non-quantificational DPs. Adopting the choice-function-
based analysis of names from §4.4, and extending the §6.2-analysis of donkey pro-
nouns, may help capture connections with treatments of definiteness/D-linking with
names and certain types of pronouns (cf. Sharvit 1999, Boeckx & Grohmann
2004, Lecarme 2008, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017). Alternative structural features
or additional constraints may be associated with different types of expressions —
e.g., a feature or implicit functional head restricting to choice functions defined only
for sets of individuals in the world of the discourse, or choice functions whose do-
main/range is restricted to individuals included in a particular discourse-determined
domain. Such lexical or construction-specific differences may yield a more refined
typology of the various effects.
To take one example, whereas the existence presupposition is captured in the
interaction between the choice-function pronoun and nominal head, the connection
to a contextually relevant set of individuals may be captured as a species of implicit
domain restriction (n. 26). The (possibly skolemized) domain variable in (7.5),
reproduced in (7.14), functions analogously to the restriction in a headed relative,
60E.g.: “Since both types of pronouns denote individuals, the most plausible assumption is that
both contain a definite determiner” (Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017: 272). See below.
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and restricts the quantification to a topical subdomain of babies. The lexical entry
for X from (7.10) derives the equivalent interpretation.61
(7.14) Every baby laughed.
a. [every⟨2,a⟩ [CP F2cf-g2 baby … [IP tie [P1et g1]]]]]
b. [every⟨2,a⟩ [XP P1et-g1 [X [F2cf-t2a baby]]]]
c. ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(baby) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g)))→ x(g) laughed
Although “D-linking” is commonly taken to be to a set of relevant individuals in the
discourse, we have seen that the element providing the restriction may be shifted in
certain modal environments (§1). The modified version of (1.14)/(1.33) in (7.15)
needn’t presuppose the existence of trolls or any contextually familiar set of trolls.
(7.15) [Context (cf. (1.14)): Alice thinks there are magical trolls. She thinks that
some groups of them aren’t legally permitted to vote (e.g., baby trolls), but
that no group with a moral right to vote is legally excluded from voting.]
a. Alice thinks every troll can vote.
b. ≈ Alice thinks there are trolls and that every troll in the groups she
considers relevant in matters of voting rights is legally permitted to vote
(local D-linking)
(A more precise analysis of the internal syntax and compositional semantics will
be given in §8. I return to weak quantifiers and differences among (expressions
represented here with) choice-function pronouns below and in §§8, 10.3.)
The previous discussion examined how positing our choice-function-based con-
stituent in quantificational DPs can be motivated by independent work on notions
of specificity (broadly construed). There is also direct morphological and mor-
phosyntactic evidence for the extra structure. It is crosslinguistically common for
quantifier words to be diachronically related to or composed from a relative/wh
form or determiner/demonstrative — e.g., German jeder ‘every’ as je ‘ever’ + der
‘that’/‘the’/‘which’, Romanian fiecare ‘every’ as fie ‘be’ + care ‘which’. As noted
above, choice-function pronouns will be exploited in our analyses of relative/wh
words and certain demonstrative proforms; synchronic and diachronic connections
between definite articles and demonstratives, and among demonstrative, relative,
and interrogative forms, are crosslinguistically robust (Haspelmath 1995, Diessel
61We will return to overt modifiers in §7.2. For purposes of the semantics we can leave open
the specific position in the XP area of the implicit domain pronoun in structures such as (7.14b)
(e.g., Spec,X or adjoined to X or XP).
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1999, Lyons 1999, Heine & Kuteva 2002, de Vries 2002, Bhat 2004, Thurgood
& LaPolla 2017; n. 52). In many languages quantified expressions are overtly
realized via a quantifier word and a distinct determiner phrase (Löbel 1989, Giusti
1991, 1992, 1997, Santelmann 1993, Dimitrova-Vulchanova & Giusti 1996,
Lecarme 1996, 2004,Matthewson 1998, 2008, 2013, Zamparelli 2000,Hiraiwa
2005, Julien 2005, Hanitramalala & Ileana 2012, Keenan & Paperno 2012,
Cardinaletti & Giusti 2017). The additional determiner is obligatory in (7.16)–
(7.20).62
(7.16) léxlex
intelligent
tákem
all
i=smelhmúlhats=a
det.pl=woman.pl=exis
‘All (the) women are intelligent.’
(Matthewson 2013: exs. 6–7; St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish))
(7.17) Namaky
past.at.read
ny
det
boky
book
roa
two
ny
det
mpianatra
student
tsirairay.
each
‘Each student read two books.’
(?: 323; Malagasy (Austronesian))
(7.18) rov
most
ha-sfarim
det-books
‘most books’ (Danon 1996: 25; Hebrew)
(7.19) ibn
ibn
xald￿ n
khaldun
istakšaf-a
explored-3ms
ʔakθar-/kull-a
most-/all-acc
l-žibāl-i
det-mountains-gen
‘Ibn Khaldun explored most/all mountains.’
(Hallman 2016: 2–3; Standard Arabic)
(7.20) ardáy-dii
students-det+past
kúlli-g-ood
whole-det+poss.3pl
wáy
decl.3pl
gudbeen.
succeeded
‘All (the) students succeeded.’ (Lecarme 1999b: ex. 35b; Somali)
62Matthewson (1998, 1999, 2013) shows that the determiners in St’át’imcets quantifier phrases
cannot be assimilated to a definite article on the model of explicit partitives (‘all of the women’). For
instance, the determiners can take a singular range ((i)), and they are unmarked for definiteness.
St’át’imcets has a distinct structure corresponding to English-style partitives ((ii)) (cf. Gillon 2013).
(i) qvlqvl-ts-mín-lhkan
badmouth-appl-1sg.sbj
[zí7zeg’
each
ta
det
sqáycw-a
man-exis
áts’x-en-an].
see-tr-1sg.conj
‘Each man I saw, I swore at.’
(ii) zí7zeg’
each
lhél=ki=smúlhats=a
from=det.pl=woman=exis
ít’-em.
sing-intr
‘Each of the women sang.’ (Matthewson 1998: 342, 2013: ex. 15; St’át’imcets)
106
In (7.19)–(7.20) each element of the more complex XP complement proposed in
(7.6a) is overt: the quantifier word, the choice-function pronoun via the article, the
X head via the genitive, and the nominal predicate.63 Expressing quantification via
a genitive construction is attested in various language families (e.g. Franks 1994,
Franks& Pereltsvaig 2004, Bošković 2006,Hartmann&Milićević 2009, Francez
& Goldring 2012, Bril 2013, Frajzyngier 2012, 2013). Notably, the article on
the head noun in (7.20) — the element realizing the choice-function pronoun in
the XP — is required not only in DP-like genitives, which arguably have an implicit
definite determiner in English (Partee 1983, McCawley 1988), but also in pred-
icative genitives ((7.21)). Possessives co-occurring with articles are well attested
crosslinguistically (e.g., Szabolcsi 1983, 1994, Abney 1987, Giusti 1997), as also
in e.g. (7.22) (thanks to Miklós Rédei). (We will return to the connections with
genitives in §7.2.)
(7.21) a. Búug-gan
book-det.dem
waa
decl
búug-g-áy-g-ii
book-m-poss.1s-det.pst
/ búug-gíi
book-det.pst
Maryan.
Mary
‘This book is my book / a book of Mary’s.’
b. *Búug-gan
book-det.dem
waa
decl
búug-g-áy
book-m-poss.1s
/ búug
book
Maryan.
Mary
(from Lecarme 2004: 459, 463; Somali)
(7.22) a. Mari-nak
Mari-dat
a
det
kalap-ja
hat-poss.3sg
‘Mary’s hat’
b. Ez
this
a
det
kalap
hat
Mari-nak
Mari-dat
a
det
kalap-ja.
hat-poss.3sg
‘This hat is Mary’s hat/a hat of Mary’s.’
(cf. Szabolcsi 1994: 188; Hungarian)
So the hypothesis goes, what is explicit in the morphosyntax of quantifier phrases in
(7.16)–(7.20), and reflected in the morphology or diachronic sources of quantifiers
such as (e.g.) fiecare ‘every’ in Romanian, may be implicit in “strong” (presupposi-
tional, specific, D-linked) quantifier phrases in other languages.
I want to reiterate that these structural elements and configurations may be re-
alized in different ways in different constructions, both across languages and within
63Like with the Somali genitive, the enclitic =a in St’át’imcets is obligatory in quantified expres-
sions. Since Matthewson (1998, 2001, 2013) treats the proclitic and enclitic portions as a circumfix
jointly constituting the Determiner, I leave open whether it should be regarded as specifying its own
projection such as X.
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a particular language. For instance, in the headed relative clauses in §§6.1–6.2 the
choice-function pronoun is realized via a [wh] relative word; in English quantifier
phrases such as ‘every baby’ it is implicit; in St’át’imcets quantifier phrases it is real-
ized via an overt determiner; in Somali quantifier phrases it is realized via a syntacti-
cally marked definite (see also §10.3). Even in the case of Somali, syntactic Definite
features needn’t correlate with semantic/pragmatic definiteness, as Lecarme (1996,
1999b) is careful to point out (see also Giusti 1997, 2002, Bhattacharya 1999a,b,
Danon 2001, Schwarz 2009). Similarly, though Etxeberria & Giannakidou
(2010) treat St’át’imcets determiners as definite, Matthewson (1999, 2013) ar-
gues that they can fail to exhibit notional definiteness phenomena (uniqueness,
maximality, familiarity); likewise for the relevant determiners in Skwuwú7mesh
(Squamish) Salish quantified expressions, which Gillon (2013) argues are un-
marked for definiteness/indefiniteness. As we have seen, expressions represented
with choice-function pronouns needn’t be syntactically/semantically definite or even
have intuitively specific readings (§§6.1.3, 6.2.2; cf. §8.8.3).
Likewise, for simplicity I have assumed that quantifier words project a DP; yet
the approach is compatible with treating them as occupying a distinct Quantifier
category — say, analogous to how a modal might be treated as heading ModP. For
instance, first, Chomsky 2007 and Bruening 2009 give syntactic arguments for
reviving the idea that the head of the noun phrase is a nominal, rather than a
functional determiner per the DP hypothesis (see also Satık 2017). Though specific
positive proposals aren’t given, Chomsky and Bruening briefly consider integrating
the relevant functional elements in (“little”) nP shells; in Chomsky’s version, def-
inite/specific nominals are treated as n∗Ps with a DP complement, roughly as in
(7.23) (cf. Bruening 2009: 33). The present account may afford a natural way of
developing such an approach. Our X is essentially a light nominal n∗, parallel to v∗ in
a verb phrase (cf. Kratzer 1996, Bhattacharya 1999b, Rackowski 2002, Adger
2003,Alexiadou 2003, Lecarme 2004, 2008,Alexiadou etal. 2006, Pylkkänen
2008, Harley 2009, 2013, Megerdoomian 2009, D'Alessandro et al. 2017,
Wood & Marantz 2017; more on this below). In quantificational expressions
(broadly construed), the choice-function pronoun would be treated as occupying the
lower D; the quantificational element raises to Spec,n∗ ((7.24a)), or heads its own
projection QP with an n∗P complement ((7.24b)). The quantifier ‘every’ in (7.24b)
raises from the internal assignment-argument position of D, parallel to how modal
elements raise from the internal assignment-argument position of C. Treating the
quantifier as having an internal (implicit, possibly skolemized) domain restriction
argument (=P in (7.24)) would bring the parallels with modals even closer, as in
the adapted version of the LF from (7.6a) in (7.24b).
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(7.23) [n∗P n∗ [DP def/specific nP]] (cf. Chomsky 2007: 25–26)
(7.24) a. n∗P: Qn∗ (alternative)
[n∗P every⟨i,a⟩ [n∗ X [DP Fcf-tia baby]]]
b. QP: Qn∗P (alternative)
[QP [Q0⟨i,a⟩ every (P-g)] [n∗P X [DP Fcf-tia baby]]]
Implementing the syntax in this way may thus provide a compositional semantic
framework for an nP analysis of noun phrases and a broader account of structural
parallels in nominal and verbal domains. Indeed the aim of §8 will be to further
develop our syntax/semantics in precisely this way.
Alternatively, the argument of the quantifier might be analyzed as a syntactic
DP, as in the adapted version of the LF from (7.6b) in (7.25) (cf. n. 74; see Löbel
1989, Giusti 1991, 1997, Giusti & Leko 1995, Matthewson 1998, 2001, 2013,
Zamparelli 2000, Alexiadou et al. 2007, Cardinaletti & Giusti 2017).
(7.25) QP: Q DP (alternative)
[QP Q0
⟨i,a⟩ [DP Fcf-tia NP]]
The Q+DP LF in (7.25) is effectively an assignment-quantificational analogue of
the analysis of St’át’imcets quantifier phrases proposed by Matthewson (1999,
2001, 2013): Matthewson treats the quantifier words as categorially Q, taking a
DP complement of type e; and treats the nominal predicate as complement of a
determiner, represented as a choice-function pronoun. The convergence in our
accounts from such different directions is striking; it provides additional support for
a quantifier + choice-function pronoun analysis of quantifier phrases. Matthewson’s
specific account of the lexical/compositional semantics does differ in certain critical
respects. For instance, Matthewson assimilates the contribution of the determiner
qua choice-function pronoun with contextual domain restriction: quantifier words
are treated as quantifying over the atomic parts of a selected plural individual.
The comparison with modals and overt forms of restrictive modification provide
independent bases for positing a distinct domain restriction argument. We will
see additional motivations for distinguishing the contribution of the choice-function
element from contextual domain restriction below in considering other forms of
restrictive modification. The account developed here is also compatible with al-
ternative analyses of the specific internal syntax of the relevant quantifier phrases.
The project of generalizing our assignment-quantificational account of quantifier
phrases with choice functions from §§6.1–6.2 can be motivated independently of a
specific Q DP syntax (more on the nominal XP projection in §7.2).
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To recap: This section has examine independent precedents in syntax for the
elements in the proposed generalized assignment-quantificational account of quan-
tifier phrases — notably, (i) the additional internal structure in the complement of
the quantifier, (ii) a specificity-like element F in the extended functional projection
of the NP; (iii) an internal argument of the F head, which figures in determining
the relevant domain; and (iv) movement of the main operator from within the
complement. Although accounts differ in their particular implementations and theo-
retical interpretations of the different elements, the convergence with such different
empirical phenomena in view is striking. Such precedents further motivate the gen-
eralized treatment of quantifier phrases pursued here. On the flip side, the present
assignment-variable-based implementation may provide new applications and lines
of inquiry on the internal structure of nominals/quantifiers and interactions among
the syntax, semantics, and theories of discourse.
7.2 Genitives and non-relative restrictive modification
The previous discussion focused primarily on independent morphological, syntactic,
and semantic evidence for including a choice-function element in quantifier phrases
generally. I speculated that the overt forms of quantifier phrases in other languages
may provide evidence for additional internal structure. The use of the genitive
construction in Somali quantified expressions is particularly interesting, as there
are independent grounds for treating genitives as introducing a distinct nominal or
functional projection. Building on these remarks, I will suggest that connections
with other forms of restrictive modification, such as in genitive constructions, may
provide additional support for the more complex complements such as in (say)
(7.5)/(7.6a) in contrast to (7.6b)/(7.25) — in particular, for a D+XP implemen-
tation such as (7.6a) over a fully generalized D+CP analysis of non-relativized
quantifier phrases. Extending the syntax/semantics for relative clauses from §6.1
in this way helps capture connections between quantificational determiners, speci-
ficity, and genitive modification, often ignored in compositional semantic accounts.
First, in (7.14) we saw how a generalized D+CP/XP analysis affords a locus for
implicit domain restriction. The approach may be extended to certain overt restric-
tive modifiers (more on which below; cf. Kayne 1994, Campbell 1996, Alexiadou
& Wilder 1998a, Alexiadou 2003, Koopman 2003, 2005, Luján 2004). The
nominal ‘girl’ in (7.26) is given its usual ⟨e, t⟩ meaning; a lifted type or composition
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rule such as Predicate Modification isn’t required (Partee 1995a, Heim & Kratzer
1998).64
(7.26) Every girl baby laughed.
64We will return to the syntax/semantics of different types of modifiers below and in §8. There
may of course be reasons for introducing an intersective modification rule, e.g. for noun phrases
with multiple modifiers. One way of maintaining the low-type+FA implementation would be
to follow Cinque 1995 and treat apparent modifier iteration as asyndetic coordination (cf. Gil
2013). Support for such a move may come from languages in which the coordination with multiple
restrictive modifiers is overt, as in (i). Alternatively, the effects of intersective modification could
be implemented via an iteration of specifiers or adjuncts in the XP layer (cf. Fukui & Speas 1986,
Cinque 1999, 2013, Alexiadou et al. 2007), and a corresponding type-flexible lexical entry for X
heads, as in (ii)–(iii).
(i) a. xaashí-díi
paper-def.f.past
yarayd
small.past.f
ée
and
caddayd
white.past.f
‘the small white sheet of paper’ (lit. ‘the sheet of paper small and white’)
b. búug
book
yar
small
oo
and
Máryan
Maryan
lédahay
has(it)
‘a small book of Maryan’ (lit. ‘a book small and Mary possesses it’)
(Lecarme 2008: ex. 6, 1999b: ex. 30c; Somali)
c. May
exist
malaki-ng
big-lnkr
disyerto-ng
desert-lnkr
nasa
pred.loc
Australya.
Australia
‘There is a big desert that is in Australia’ (Sabbagh 2009: 694; Tagalog (Austronesian))
(ii) a. Every freshman girl student aced the math test.
b. [DP every⟨2,a⟩ [XP [freshman [girl [X [Fcf-t2a student]]]]]]
(iii) Polymorphic X0JXK = λxe.λP1et . . . λPnet.λye.λgg . y(g) = x(g) ∧ P1(y)(g) ∧⋯ ∧ Pn(y)(g)
In D+XP structures I often represent the relevant restrictive modifiers in Spec,X; though, given a
lexical entry such as (iii) for X heads, the compositional semantics is compatible with representing
different restrictive modifiers as left- or right-adjoined to XP (see Alexiadou et al. 2007: Part III
and references therein on word-order differences crosslinguistically; see Cinque 2013: chs. 7, 13
on treating all modifiers of lexical heads (N, V) as being merged left of the head). We will revisit
applications to non-relative restrictive modifiers and restrictive relative clauses in a D+XP framework
in §§8.7–8.8. “True” modifiers, such as certain adjectives, may be represented adjacent to the
noun under the choice-function pronoun (whether as adjuncts or in an extended projection of the
noun phrase; more on this in §8). In many languages restrictive and non-restrictive modifiers have
distinct agreement properties and orders in overt syntax. For instance, in Somali adjectives such as
‘former’ ((iv)) don’t agree for any features (Tense, definiteness, ϕ-features), in contrast to restrictive
modifiers ((i)).
(iv) árday-gii hore
student-def.m.past before
‘the former student’ (Lecarme 2004: 450; Somali)
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a. [every⟨2,a⟩ [CP F2cf-g2 baby … [IP tie girl]]]]
b. [every⟨2,a⟩ [XP girl [X [F2cf-t2a baby]]]]
c. JCPK = JXPK = λye.λgg . y(g) = g(2a)(2cf)(baby) ∧ y(g) is a girl
d. ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(baby) ∧ x(g) is a girl)→ x(g) laughed
It is common following Partee 1983 to distinguish modifier readings vs. argu-
ment readings of genitives X’s Y. Informally put, in argument (“inherent R”) readings
the relevant relation for interpreting the genitive is linguistically supplied by the
head noun Y, whereas in modifier (“free R”) readings the relevant relation is con-
textually supplied (Partee 1978, 1983, Barker 1995, Partee & Borschev 2003,
Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2004, Badulescu & Moldovan 2008, Lichtenberk et al.
2011, van Rijn 2017, a.m.o.).65
(7.27) “Inherent R” (argument) reading
a. Alice’s mother
b. ≈ “the o such that o bears the is a mother of relation to Alice”
(7.28) “Free R” (restrictive modifier) reading
a. Alice’s cat
b. ≈ “the o such that o is a cat and o bears Rc (e.g. is a pet of) to Alice”
The approaches to restrictive modification in (7.14) afford a structural basis for the
contrast in readings — namely, in whether the possessor+relation is represented in
the head NP, with the relevant relation supplied by the overt noun, as in inherent R
readings; or in a position for restrictive modifiers, with the relevant relation supplied
by an implicit pronoun, as in free R readings. In various language families the pres-
ence of the further relation in free R readings is overtly marked, as in (7.29)–(7.30).
In the free R readings in (7.30c)/(7.30d) the additional possessive affix appears
on the possessor noun, in addition to the usual genitive suffix on the head noun
(cf. (7.30a)/(7.30b)). In some cases the additional element used in free R readings
65I will use ‘genitive (DP)’ for the complex phrase X’s Y. I use ‘possessor’ for X, though the
relevant relation needn’t be possession narrowly construed (more on which shortly). I sometimes use
‘structural possessor/possessee’ or scare quotes to highlight this point. I use ‘genitive morpheme’ for
functional heads such as ’s heading the genitive construction; this usage is neutral on the morpheme’s
specific category (more on which presently).
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is historically derived from a relational noun (e.g., ‘hand’, ‘home’) or preposition
(cf. (7.30e)), or an element expressing other thematic relations.66
(7.29) a. qatu-ku
head-1sg.gen
‘my head’
66See Dixon 1980: ch. 10, 2010: ch. 16, Lichtenberk 1985, 2002, Chappell & McGregor
1989, Heine et al. 1991: §6.1, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996, 2001, Heine 1997: chs. 2–3, Song 1997,
Aikhenvald 2000, 2013, Heine & Kuteva 2002: 55, 104, 167, 175, 245–246, 296–297, Sato 2009,
Frajzyngier 2013, van Rijn 2017. For instance, in (i) the first occurrence of la- is used to express
a general possession relation, the second occurrence to express a benefactive relation; the free R
marker a in (ii-b) introduces the agentive subject (more on this in §8.9). In languages with multiple
free R markers, different markers may be subspecialized for different sorts of relations, as with the
spectrum of possessive relation markers in Oceanic languages, e.g. in (iii). (Such elements aren’t
ordinary noun classifiers which specify the kind or other properties of the possessor/possessee (see
Lichtenberk 1983, 1985, 2009a,b, Aikhenvald 2000: chs. 3, 5). Their “crucial property” is rather
that “their use is determined … by the nature of the real-world relation between the possessed and
the possessor”; they “specif[y] more closely the type of the relation [between the possessed and the
possessor],” e.g. that the former “is food for” the latter, as in (iii-c), even (iii-d) (Lichtenberk 1983:
148, 157, 161, 2009a: 268, 286).)
(i) Sohn
John
el
3sg.sbj
mole-lah
buy-asp
[ik
fish
la-l
possfr-3sg.poss
Sepe
Sepe
ah]
det
[la-l
possfr-3sg.poss
Sru].
Sru
‘John has bought Sepe’s fish for Sru.’ (Song 1997: 33; Kusaiean (Austronesian))
(ii) a. nga
art
kur￿
dog
[a
possfr
Mere]
Mere
‘Mere’s dogs’
b. ka
t/a
whakamau
fasten
[a
possfr
Mere]
Mere
i
acc
te
art
taura.
rope
‘Mere is fastening the rope’ (Harlow 2007: 166, Chung 1973: 652, Maori
(Austronesian))
(iii) a. sina-gu
mother-my
‘my mother’
b. e-gu
possfr-my
udo
taro
‘my taro’
c. a-gu
possfr.edib-my
udo
taro
‘my taro (to eat)’
d. [Context: a man who contracts to eat parts of a motor-car in a sideshow says:]
a-gu
possfr.edib-my
motoka
car
‘my car (to eat)’ (Lynch 1973: 71, 87, 99n.18; Suau (Austronesian))
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b. no-ku
possfr-1sg.gen
qatu
head
‘my head (e.g. pig’s head)’
(Hyslop 2001: 170, 183; Lolovoli (Austronesian))
(7.30) a. (ŋaḷi-na)
f.nom-dis
ŋaḷa-jaya-ŋga
f.nom-daughter-2sg.gen
‘(she’s) your daughter’
b. ḷandi
tree
jurgjurg-ṇawu
leaf-3sg.m.gen
‘leaves of a tree’
c. ṇu-ṇyaŋ-gu
possfr+2pl
ṇa-muyg-ṇuṇya
m.nom-dog-2pl.gen
(ŋan-ḍaḷag)
3sg/1sg-bite.pastpunc
‘your dog (bit me)’
d. ṇa-bugbuŋ-gu
m.possfr-old.man
baṇam-ṇawu
camp-3sg.m.gen
‘the old man’s camp’
e. ṇa-bugbuŋ-gu
m.dat-old.man
baṇam-gaḷama
camp-all
ga-ŋa-yag
pres.realis-1sg-go
‘I am going to the camp for the old man.’
(Merlan 1982: 5, 66-67, 74, 102, 105; Mangarayi, Australia)
Suppose first that we treat the genitive morpheme ’s as the head determiner
and as having the same assignment-quantificational semantics as ‘the’, taking a CP
complement (we will reconsider these assumptions shortly). Preliminary LFs are
in (7.32)–(7.33). (For the moment I will ignore intensionality (an internal world-
argument) with the relation pronoun in free R readings (see §8.9); I use ‘Ri’/‘R’ in
pronouns/indices for type ⟨e, et⟩.)67
These patterns, in which the forms used in free R readings are at least as morphologically com-
plex/marked as the corresponding forms used in inherent R readings, are crosslinguistically robust.
For studies on particular languages or language families, see e.g. Mosel 1984: §2.4, Lichtenberk
1985, 2009a, Claudi & Heine 1989, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996, Song 1997, Stolz et al. 2008,
Aikhenvald 2012: §5.3, Helmbrecht 2016: §4; for general inventories see also Seiler 1983a,
Haiman 1985: 130–136, Nichols 1988: 564–566, 579, 1992: 117–118, Chappell & McGregor
1989, 1996b, Heine 1997: chs. 2–3, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2001, Dixon 2010: 286–290, 308–309,
Aikhenvald 2013, Haspelmath 2017, van Rijn 2017. (Of course not all markers of free R readings
need be realizations of the relation pronoun. In some cases the additional morphological content
may simply be a genitive morpheme, which is unpronounced in inherent R constructions.)
67As expected, free R possessives with saturated relational nouns are also attested, as in (i)
(cf. Lichtenberk 2009b: 396–397):
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(7.31) JtheK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶P+(a)(x)(g) ∧ ∀ye∶ (P+(a)(y)(g)→ y(g) = x(g))∧ Q+(a)(x)(g)= λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶ (x(g) = the o such that (↓P+)(a(g))(o))∧ Q+(a)(x)(g)≈ λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg . [ιx(g)∃a∶P+(a)(x)(g)] Q+(a)(x)(g)
(to be revised)
(7.32) D+CP “free R” (modifier) genitive LF
a. Bert’s TV is broken.
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ’s⟨2,a⟩ [CP F2cf-g2 TV [[C⟨1,e⟩ C t2a] t1e R1-g1 Bert]]]
c. ≈ λgg . [ιx(g)∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(TV)∧ g−(1R)(Bert)(x(g))] x(g) is broken
d. ≈ “the unique o such that there is a choice function that selects o from
among the TVs, and o bears the relevant relation R (=gc(1R)) to Bert,
is broken”
(7.33) D+CP “inherent R” (argument) genitive LF
a. Bert’s hand is broken.
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ’s⟨2,a⟩ [CP F2cf-g2 [hand Bert] [[C⟨1,e⟩ C t2a] t1e P1et-g1]]]
c. ≈ λgg . [ιxe(g)∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(hand-of-Bert) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g))]
x(g) is broken
d. ≈ “the unique o such that there is a choice function that selects o from
(i) a. Mamin
Mama.poss.m.sg
portret
portrait.m.sg
Ivana
Ivan.gen.m.sg
‘Mama’s portrait of Ivan(’s)’ (cf. Partee & Borschev 2003: 83, 100; Russian)
b. nək-k
possfr.edib-1sg
nelk-n
leg-3sg.gen
‘my leg of its (e.g., of chicken, to eat)’ (Lynch 1973: 91; Lenakel (Austronesian))
See Hoekstra 1994, denDikken 1995, Heine 1997, Larson & Cho 2003 for precedents in treating
possessor phrases in free R readings as having a predicative syntax/semantics. See Kayne 1994,
Alexiadou 2003 for D+CP analyses of free R readings. Uniform analyses of free/inherent R readings
are also possible — e.g., reducing inherentR readings to freeR readings in which the supplied relation
is identified with the relation expressed by the head noun (e.g. is a mother of), or reducing free R
readings to inherent R readings in which the head noun is coerced to a relational noun with a relevant
relational meaning (e.g. is a cat owned by) (Jensen & Vikner 1994; cf. von Prince 2016 on Daakaka,
Oceanic); Though the latter sort of coercion or shift in argument structure certainly occurs to some
extent, Partee & Borschev (2003) conclude that a uniform approach of either type is incorrect for
English. Note that X’s isn’t a constituent on either type of reading, e.g.:
(ii) a. *What boy’s were you rooting for a team of?
b. *What boy’s were you talking to a brother of?
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among the hands of Bert, and o is in the relevant set of entities (=gc(1et)),
is broken”
The domain pronoun [P1et g1] in (7.33) captures how the inherent R reading can
be felicitous even if Bert has more than one hand (cf. Jespersen 1924: 110–111).
Assuming that the supplied value for the pronoun restricts the domain to a set that
includes only one of Bert’s hands, the uniqueness condition is satisfied. Likewise
for the felicitous use of ‘Alice’s brother’ in (7.34), even if Alice has older brothers;
and for the free and inherent R readings of ‘Bert’s hand’ in (7.35), even if Bert is
ambidextrous and he and the other medical students have been keeping individual
inventories of their cadavers:
(7.34) [Context: Alice has two older brothers away at college, and one younger
brother. She wants to go to the movies with her friends, but since her
parents are away, she has to take her younger brother with them. Later
one of their other friends who couldn’t make it to the movie asks how it
was. You say:]
Be glad you didn’t come. Alice’s brother was pestering us the whole time.
(7.35) [Context: We’re medical students practicing on cadavers.]
a. Free R: Bert’s hand is broken. It’s obvious, but I bet he’ll miss it and get
the diagnosis wrong.
b. Inherent R: Bert’s hand is broken. There’s no way he’s going to be able
to pass the practice exam with his cast on.
The relevant value for the relation pronoun in (7.35a) associates Bert with the
cadaver hand he is currently practicing on.68
The analyses in (7.32)–(7.33) maintain a uniform overall syntax for the genitive
68Additional contextual domain restrictions with free R readings might also be represented via
an additional domain-pronoun modifier in the edge of the XP, as discussed in n. 64. I will ignore
any such additional structure in what follows. Iterated possessor modifiers are also possible, as in
stacked free R genitives such as (i)–(ii).
(i) il-kotba
def-books
[ta’
possfr
Pietru]
Peter
[ta’
possfr
l-awtur
def-author
favorit
favorite
[tieghi]]
my
‘Peter’s books by my favorite author’ (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996: 266; Maltese)
(ii) [le-ghu]
possfr-1sg.gen
[ghaja
pig
ai-a]
3sg.gen-possfr.pass
kaipu
punch
‘my punch to a pig (my hitting a pig)’ (lit. ‘my a-pig’s punch’)
(cf. Sato 2009: ex. 30, Lichtenberk 2009b: 397; Kove (Austronesian))
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construction, and a uniform semantics for the genitive morpheme ’s. The intu-
itive contrast between free vs. inherent R readings of prenominal genitives needn’t
require positing a lexical ambiguity in the genitive morpheme, type-shifting, or
coercion (as in e.g. Partee 1983, Jensen & Vikner 1994, Vikner & Jensen 2002,
Partee & Borschev 2003; cf. n. 67). The distinction between “possessors” as
arguments vs. restrictive modifiers can be captured in terms of general features of
the proposed structure for DPs.
The D+CP implementation in (7.32)–(7.33) captures the specificity of prenom-
inal genitives in the semantics of the genitive morpheme, treated as the head deter-
miner. Such an analysis is awkward for predicative uses and uses where the genitive
is the argument of a determiner, such as with the postnominal genitives in (7.36).
In some languages an overt determiner can co-occur with prenominal genitives as
well ((7.37)–(7.38)).
(7.36) a. every cat/sister of Alice’s
b. The winner was a cat/sister of Alice’s.
(7.37) (a)
the
Mari
Mary.nom
vendég-e
guest-poss.3sg
‘Mary’s guest’ (Szabolcsi 1983: 89; Hungarian)
(7.38) a. un
a
mio
my
amico
friend
‘a friend of mine’
b. il
the
mio
my
amico
friend
‘my friend’ (Jespersen 1924: 111; Italian)
A more promising approach is to distinguish the contribution of the genitive mor-
pheme from specificity effects. Following Partee 1983, among others, the prenom-
inal genitive may be treated along the lines of a postnominal genitive with a higher
definite determiner, implicit in English, explicit in languages such as Hungarian
(Italian, Portuguese, etc.) — roughly, A’s B ≈ the B of A(’s). Our D+XP syntax af-
fords a natural implementation: The genitive morpheme realizes the head of the
nominal XP. In the inherent R reading in (7.43) the possessor is an argument of
the head noun, which supplies the relation; in the free R reading in (7.42) the
possessor+relation is represented in the position suggested in (7.14b) for restrictive
modifiers (cf. Tellier 1991, Kayne 1993, Español-Echevarría 1997, Alexiadou
2003, van Rijn 2017; n. 66). It isn’t uncommon crosslinguistically for genitive
markers to be diachronically or synchronically related to markers of restrictive mod-
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ification, as in (7.39) with -ŋu or (7.40) with ge;69 the revised entry for ’s in (7.41)
directly implements such a function (cf. n. 64). (I use ‘ιo’ for the implicit determiner
in English prenominal genitives, where JιoK = JtheK from (7.31); for now I continue
to ignore intensionality.)
(7.39) a. yaṛa-ŋu
man-possfr-abs
guda
dog-abs
‘the man’s dog’
b. yibi
woman-abs
njalŋga-ŋgu
child-erg
djilwal-ŋa-ŋu
kick-antipass-rel-abs
‘the woman who had kicked the child’
(Dixon 1969: 36, 38; Dyirbal (Pama–Nyungan))
(7.40) a. a33-faay55
Ah Fai
ge33
assoc
piŋ11-guo35
apple
‘Ah Fai’s apple’
b. hooŋ11
red
ge33
assoc
piŋ11-guo35
apple
‘red apple’
c. a33-faay55
Ah Fai
maai13
buy
ge33
assoc
piŋ11-guo35
apple
‘apple that Ah Fai bought’ (Gil 2013: ex. 3; Cantonese)
(7.41) J’sK = λxe.λPet.λye.λgg . y(g) = x(g) ∧ P(y)(g)
(7.42) D+XP free R prenominal/postnominal genitive LFs
a. Alice’s cat / every cat of Alice’s (danced)
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ιo/every⟨2,a⟩ [XP [R1-g1 Alice] [X ’s [NP F2cf-t2a cat]]]]
c. JXPK ≈ λye.λgg . y(g) = g(2a)(2cf)(cat) ∧ g(1a)(1R)(Alice)(y(g))JSK ≈ λgg . [ιxe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(cat)∧ g−(1R)(Alice)(x(g))] x(g) danced
(7.43) D+XP inherent R prenominal/postnominal genitive LFs
a. Alice’s brother / every brother of Alice’s (danced)
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ιo/every⟨2,a⟩ [XP [P1et g1] [’s [NP F2cf t2a [brother Alice]]]]]
c. JXPK ≈ λye.λgg . y(g) = g(2a)(2cf)(bro-of-A) ∧ g(1a)(1et)(y(g))JSK ≈ λgg . [ιxe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(bro-of-A)∧ g−(1et)(x(g))] x(g) danced
69See Dixon 1969, 1972: 99–110, 179–184, 1980: ch. 10, Matisoff 1972, Heine 1997: 149–
150, Heine & Kuteva 2002, Lichtenberk 2009b, Aikhenvald 2013, Frajzyngier 2013, Gil 2013,
Nikolaeva & Spencer 2013, van Rijn 2017, Thurgood & LaPolla 2017: 151–152, 216, 220, 465,
passim. We will return to connections between possessive and relative clause markers in §8.7.
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The derived semantic values in (7.42c)/(7.43c) for the prenominal genitives are
equivalent to those in (7.32)/(7.33). No additional resources are required in the
compositional semantics of postnominal genitives.70
Like many other pronouns, the implicit relation pronoun R in free R readings
may receive local (shifted) readings. Suppose Bert and Ernie are former roommates,
and there is a dispute about who is to be responsible for which of their two pet
ducks, Ducky and Fluffy. Bert was the original owner of Fluffy, and Ernie was the
original owner of Ducky; but Bert’s lifestyle is more conducive to Ducky’s general
welfare, and Ernie’s lifestyle is more conducive to Fluffy’s general welfare (perhaps
Ducky dislikes the water). Suppose we all agree that the rightful owner is the one
who would be in the best interest of the pet (Bert and Ernie aren’t party to our
conversation). Talking about Chip, we can felicitously say (7.44) with a global
reading of R in ‘Ernie’s duck’, even if we know Chip isn’t acquainted with Ernie
and may have no idea about Ducky’s relation to Ernie. The value for the relation
pronoun determined by the discourse assignment maps ⟨Ernie,Fluffy⟩ to True, and⟨Ernie, y⟩, for all other ducks y, to False.
(7.44) Global “free R” reading
a. Chip thinks Ernie’si duck is brown, but that’s because it was really dirty
when he saw her.
b. ≈Chip thinks the o such that gc(1R)(Ernie)(o) ∧ duck(o) is brown
70See Taylor 1989: 682–683, Partee & Borschev 2003, Storto 2003, Dixon 2010: 295–296,
Payne& Berlage 2014 for discussion of apparent interpretive restrictions with postnominal genitives
in English of the form B of A’s. There are various ways that the pronounced forms of inherent R
readings might be derived in the narrow syntax and morpho-phonolological components. Perhaps
most straightforwardly, ’s and the “possessor” DP could fuse via Local Dislocation (Embick & Noyer
2001), yielding e.g. [[Alice+’s] brother] directly from [’s [NP [Alice] brother]]. (In English B of A’s
constructions the head noun may raise to Spec of a (semantically vacuous) higher functional head
(arguably realizing ‘of’).) On the flip side, morpheme orders in free R readings such as (i) could be
derived simply via head-movement of N to X if -e’ is a realization of X0 (≈ [1sg- [socks+e’…]]), or,
alternatively, if -e’ is treated as realizing the contextual relation pronoun, via head movement and
post-syntactic Local Dislocation (≈ [1sg- e’ [socks+(X)…]] → [1sg- [socks+(X)+e’…]]).
(i) se-tel-e’
1sg-socks-possfr
‘my socks’ (Thompson 1996: 654; Koyukon (Athabaskan))
We can put aside such morphosyntactic details. For relevant discussion see Szabolcsi 1983, Tellier
1991, Kayne 1993, 1994, den Dikken 1995, 1998, Barker 1995, Español-Echevarría 1997,
Siloni 1997, Alexiadou & Wilder 1998b, Bhattacharya 1999b, Alexiadou 2003, Kim et al.
2004, Lecarme 2004, Nunes 2004, Bernstein & Tortora 2005, Boneh & Sichel 2010.
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Alternatively, suppose we are talking about Bert and how wants to keep Fluffy for
himself. We might say (7.45a) or (7.45b), even if Bert’s belief is about a particular
individual and his desire isn’t for the Indiscernibility of Identicals to be false. If Bert
has been confused in his biology, incorrectly thinking Fluffy to be (say) a loon, the
world-pronoun associated with ‘duck’ in the genitive DP may receive a global reading
though R receives a local reading under the attitude verb, reflected in (7.45c) Sup-
pose Ernie is more altruistic, preferring to yield Ducky to Bert, yet mistaking Ducky
(though not Fluffy) for a loon. We might characterize the unfortunate state of affairs
with the quantified attitude ascription in (7.46). The relevant bound reading can
be derived analogously to the quantified modal attitude ascription from §4.3:
(7.45) Local “free R” reading (+global world-pronoun reading)
a. Bert wantsk hisk duck@ to be Fluffy (but hisi duck@ is really Ducky).
b. Bert thinksk hisi duck@ isn’t hisk duck@.
c. ≈ for all possibilities h compatible with Bert’s state of mind,
ιo[gc(1R)(Bert)(o) ∧ duck@(o)] ≠ ιo′[h(1R)(Bert)(o′) ∧ duck@(o)]
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(7.46) Everyone thinksk Bert’sk duck@ is a loonk.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
S
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
P1et g1 X
F1cf-t2a person-w1-g1
VP
⟨3,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t3a
S
DPgen
ι⟨4,a⟩o
R1-g3 Bert ’s
F2cf t4a duck w1-g1
VP
is a loon t2s
JDPgenK ≈ λPet.λgg . [ιxe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(duckg(1a)(1s))∧ g(3a)(1R)(Bert)(x(g))]
P(x)(g[a(g)/4a])JSK ≈ λgg .∀ye∀a′a∶ (y(g) = a′(g)(1cf)(persong−(1s)) ∧ g−(1et)(y(g)))→(∀a′′a ∶ a′′(g) is compatible with SOMy(g),@(g−) →([ιxe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(duckg−(1s)) ∧ a′′(g)(1R)(Bert)(x(g))]
x(g) is a loon in @(a′′(g))))
This says, roughly, that for every relevant o— every o ∈ gc(1et) selectable among the
persons — for every possibility h compatible with o’s state of mind, the o′ such that o′
bears h(1R) to Bert and o′ is identical to some actual duck or other (=a(g)(2cf)(duckgc(1s))),
is a loon in @(h). The domain pronoun [P1et g1] restricts the quantification to the
contextually relevant individuals, say gc(1et) = {Bert,Ernie}. In the embedded
genitive DP ‘Bert’s duck’ under the attitude verb, the relation-pronoun [R1 g3] re-
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ceives a local reading. Roughly put, the shifted value for the pronoun, h(1R), is
the relation relating (e.g.) Bert to individuals which the quantificational subject
regards as properly being in Bert’s charge (pedantically, the subject’s epistemic
counterpart of the function that would be determined by the discourse assignment
gc(1R) (§§3.4, 4.3.3, 4.4)). For every possibility h′ compatible with Bert’s state of
mind, Fluffy ∈ h′(1R)(Bert); and for every possibility h′′ compatible with Ernie’s
state of mind, Ducky ∈ h′′(1R)(Bert). By contrast, the world-pronoun [w1 g1] re-
ceives a global reading, requiring that the relevant selected individual is a duck
in the world of the discourse. The truth of (7.46) requires that Fluffy and Ducky
are each potentially selectable from among the actual ducks, and that Bert thinks
Fluffy is a loon and Ernie thinks Ducky is a loon. Hence the quantified attitude
ascription on the relevant reading — with a shifted reading of the relation-pronoun
and unshifted reading of the world-pronoun in the genitive DP embedded under the
attitude verb — is correctly derived to be true.
As the reader may have noticed, the semantics for the genitive morpheme in
(7.41) is equivalent to the semantics for X in (7.10). An attractive hypothesis is that
the posited nominal XP projection just is the projection headed by the genitive mor-
pheme in genitive constructions. Above we noted various diachronic and synchronic
connections between quantificational DPs and specificity. The crosslinguistic con-
nections with genitives may provide additional support for the D+XP analysis. As
discussed in §7.1, in various languages individual quantification is expressed via a
structural genitive (e.g. (7.19)–(7.20)). Our X head arguably corresponds to the
head posited for assigning genitive Case to quantifier complements in certain Slavic
languages, as in (7.47) for Serbian (cf. e.g. Franks & Pereltsvaig 2004, Bošković
2006, Hartmann & Milićević 2008).
(7.47) a. Mnogo
many
[ljudi]
people.gen
želi
want
pravdu.
justice
‘Many people want justice.’
b. Mnogo
many
[nekih
some.gen
ljudi]
people.gen
želi
want
pravdu.
justice
‘Many different people want justice.’
(Hartmann & Milićević 2009: exs. 14, 23; Serbian)
In light of her extensive work on nominal tense in genitives, Lecarme even concludes
that “genitive constructions universally involve a form of quantification” (2004: 17;
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cf. Postma 1997, Borschev et al. 2008, Hartmann & Milićević 2009, Peters &
Westerståhl 2013).71
71Lecarme notes that in genitives with quantifiers and kinship and body-part nouns, tense
morphemes cannot appear on the head nominal, as occurs in other genitives. Analogous patterns
are observed in certain other languages with nominal tense, as reflected in (i)–(ii).
(i) a. [ardáy-dii
students-det+past
kúlli-g-ood]
whole-det+poss.3pl
wáy
decl.3pl
gudbeen.
succeeded
‘All (the) students succeeded.’
b. ardáy-da
students-det
macállin-k-ood-ii
teacher-det-poss.3p-past
wúu
decl.3ms
baxay.
left
‘The students’ teacher left.’ (Lecarme 1999b: exs. 35b, 28b; Somali)
(ii) a. [’moj-et
my-def.past
bu’bajko]
father
’beše
was
mih’tar
mihtar
‘My father was mihtar (in charge of the community’s relations with outsiders).’
b. la’ni
last.year
[de’ti-te
children-def.past
mi]
1sg.dat
’beha
were.3pl
ja’vaʃ
quiet
‘Last year, my students were easy going.’ (Adamou 2011: exs. 14c, 8a; Pomak (Slavic))
For genitives such as in (i-b) with non-relational nouns, Lecarme posits an independent “syntactic
rule that serves to delete the [+past] tense morpheme on a locally dependent DP” (1999b: 12). For
quantified phrases and kinship/body-part nouns Lecarme suggests distinct semantic explanations:
“Universal quantifiers in natural language quantify over contextually given sets of individuals… [T]he
genitive complement refers to the ‘familiar’ set… Such examples, then, provide further evidence
that nominal tense is linked to the notion of specificity (1999b: 15–16). Kinship/body-part nouns
“are not compatible with tense features, even in the syntactic contexts where they are normally
required,” on the ground that they “lack autonomous reference” and express essentially “atemporal
relations” (1996: 9; also 1999b, 2004). One might wonder why relations such as being a part of,
being a sister of, being a hand of, etc. would necessarily be conceptualized as failing to hold at a
time (cf. von Prince 2016: 83). Independent worries aside, such informal semantic explanations
are surprising given Lecarme’s emphasis on the “purely structural meaning” (2004: 15) of genitive
case. The contrasting analyses for free/inherent R genitives in the main text may afford a “purely
structural” (Lecarme 2004) basis for the relevant distribution of tense morphemes without requiring
questionable semantic or metaphysical assumptions about the (a)temporality of certain relations or
fundamental appeals to notions of “alienable” vs. “inalienable” possession (cf. Seiler 1983a,Nichols
1988, 1992: §4.1, Chappell & McGregor 1996b, Heine 1997: §3.4, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2001:
§§3–4, van Rijn 2017). Data such as (iii) in Pomak, corresponding to (7.35), provides preliminary
evidence that the distribution of tense features correlates with the distinction between free R and
inherent R readings. The body-part noun in the free R reading in (iii-a) bears interpretable tense
features. (Thanks to Evangelia Adamou.)
(iii) [Context: we’re medical students practicing on cadavers (=(7.35))]
a. ören’ciete
student-def.past
ra’kota
hand-def.past
‘the student’s hand (was broken)’ (free R reading, ≈ (7.35a): tense on head noun)
b. ören’civata
student-def.past
’roka
hand
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The genitive morpheme ’s, on this line, is an overt (semantically equivalent,
+EPP) analogue of the implicit X in (7.6a)/(7.14b)/(7.26b), licensing (indeed mor-
phosyntactically requiring) the overt specifier characteristic to genitives. The nom-
inal X category in the DP might be understood as analogous to (say) v∗ in a clause.
As Partee & Borschev put it in the case of genitives, “an argument genitive is
most like a direct object, an ‘internal argument’… A ‘possessor’ genitive, on the
other hand, is most subject-like, agent-like, less like an internal argument, more
independent” (2003: 100; cf. Seiler 1983b, Haiman 1985: 130–136, Nichols
1988, 1992: 116–122, Heine 1997: §3.4, Alexiadou 2003, Myler 2016: §2.1.2,
van Rijn 2017: 99, 163). In various language families, this distinction is reflected
in the morphology. Structural possessors in inherent R readings are typically in-
troduced like nominal complements generally, as in (7.48) (unmarked) or (7.50)
(following the transitivizing suffix). The possessors of free-R-marked possessives
such as in (7.49)/(7.51), in contrast, are “constructed in exactly the same way
as” “the agent of nominalised active verbs” (Mosel 1984: 35–36). The contrasting
readings of ‘my story’ in (7.50a)–(7.51a) are reflected in constructions introducing
the possessor on the model of an object (cf. (7.50b)) vs. an agentive subject of the
deverbal (cf. (7.51b)). In (7.52), only in the free R reading can the possessor
be introduced with the transitive-subject marker ((7.52b) vs. (7.52c)) (see also
Chung 1973, Seiler 1983a,b, Lichtenberk 1985, 2009a,b, Chappell & McGre-
‘the student’s hand (was broken)’ (inherent R reading, ≈ (7.35b): tense on possessor)
(Evangelia Adamou, p.c.; Pomak (Slavic))
It is worth exploring whether the alternative structures in (e.g.) (7.42)–(7.43) might provide insight
into the distribution of tense morphemes in different nominal tense languages. (For instance, very
roughly, for purposes of illustration: Following Lecarme (2004, 2008), suppose that in Somali N
undergoes syntactic N-to-D movement, which yields the overt N-D order; and that uninterpretable
tense on D is valued under a local relation with interpretable tense features on T (the D-T connection),
say via Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001). In inherent R readings such as (i-a) the possessor DP (‘the
students) originates as an argument of the relational noun, and raises successive cyclically from
Spec,N to its pronounced position in Spec,D — i.e., yielding [DP DPposs [D [D0 N0+D0] …]]. Given
that interpretable tense may only be realized once per DP in Somali, the tense feature in T is deleted
via Feature Deletion (von Stechow 2003) by the c-commanding tensed possessor DP. In free R
readings such as (i-b), by contrast, the possessor DP originates inside a ZP modifier, which raises from
Spec,X to Spec,D — i.e., yielding [DP [ZP DPposs Z0] [D [D0 N0+D0] …]]. At no point in the derivation
is the tensed possessor DP in a position to mark the main tense feature in T for deletion. The D-
proposs-T order in prenominal genitives such as (i-b) can be captured via postsyntactic Lowering
(in the sense of Embick & Noyer 2001) of T0 — i.e., whereby T0 right-adjoins to the X0 head of
its XP complement, which hosts the clitic possessive pronoun. The proposs+T complex cliticizes to
D, yielding the observed Poss N-D-proposs-T order, with tense morphology on the complex with the
nominal head (‘teacher’).)
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gor 1989, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996, Palmer 2008, Sato 2009, Dixon 2010:
ch. 16, Aikhenvald 2013, von Prince 2016, Haspelmath 2017, van Rijn 2017;
cf. n. 66).
(7.48) a. tura-na
brother-3sg
‘his brother’
b. a
art
nilul
asking
upi
for
ra
art
nian
food
‘the asking for food’
c. ta-na
to-3sg
‘to him’
(7.49) a. ka-na
poss-3sg
pal
house
‘his house’
b. a
art
vinavana
going
ka-i
possfr-mrk
ra
art
tutana
man
‘the going of the man’
(Mosel 1984: 29–32, 36, 39; Tolai (Austronesian))
(7.50) a. nounage
story
ín
trans
Titoga
Titoga
‘Titoga’s story (i.e. the story about Titoga)’
b. i-ak-am-ɨgn-ín
1excl-concurr-cont-afraid-trans
uus
man
aan
that
‘I am afraid of that man.’
(7.51) a. nounage
story
taha
possfr
Titoga
Titoga
‘Titoga’s story (i.e. the one he told)’
b. n-arɨk-aan
nomz-stay-nomz
taha-mar
possfr-1excl.pl
le
loc
nauanu
village
uk
this
‘our staying in this village’
(Lynch 1978: 31, 86, 111; Lenakel (Austronesian))
(7.52) a. Deveni
Deveni
na
trans.sbj
Vagi
Vagi
e-ia.
3sg.sbj.nonfut-see
‘Deveni saw Vagi.’
b. thau
I
na
trans.sbj
vanua
village
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‘my village’
c. *thau
I
na
trans.sbj
ama(-ku)
father-my
d. (thau)
I
ama-ku
father-my
‘my father’ (Lynch 1973: 71, 74, 86; Aroma (Austronesian))
The LFs in (7.42)–(7.43) reflect these ideas. In inherent R readings the structural
“possessor” originates as the object argument of the (possibly coerced) relational
noun; in free R readings the possessor originates in Spec,X and is related to the
selected individual by the possession-like relation supplied by the relation pronoun.
As in the verbal case, one may expect different features to be associated with
different X heads. For instance, first, there may be differences with respect to syn-
tactic features, as we have seen with Case and EPP properties. In (7.14)/(7.53a) X is
implicit, and the semantic “possessor” is in effect the plural individual representing
the contextually relevant subdomain. Likewise for explicit partitives, as reflected
in (7.53b). The definite article spells out the choice-function pronoun, and a Case-
assigning element may be overt. Differences in number features and semantic def-
initeness aside, the analysis in (7.53b) is equivalent to (7.14b)–(7.14c)/(7.53a).72
An analysis of the partitive falls out of the general D+XP structure for presupposi-
tional quantifier phrases; special semantic operations such as type shifting (Ladusaw
1982, Giannakidou 2004) needn’t be required. In some languages partitives can
also be realized with a genitive construction, as in (7.54) (cf. e.g. Harris & Camp-
bell 1995: 55–56, 339–341).
(7.53) a. All babies laughed.
[DP⟨2,a⟩ all⟨2,a⟩ [XP P1et-g1 [X [F2cf-t2a babies]]]]
b. All of the babies laughed.
[DP⟨2,a⟩ all⟨2,a⟩ [XP P1et-g1 [X(of) [the2cf-t2a babies]]]]
(7.54) a. Ali
Ali
kadɨn-lar-ɨn
woman-pl-gen
iki-sin-i
two-agr-acc
tanɨyordu.
knew
‘Ali knew two of the women.’ (Enç 1991: ex. 28a; Turkish)
b. ibn
ibn
xald￿ n
khaldun
istakšaf-a
explored-3ms
kull-a
kull-acc
l-žibāl-i.
det-mountains-gen
‘Ibn Khaldun explored all of the mountains.’
(Hallman 2016: ex. 3; Standard Arabic)
72We will return to number in §§8.1–8.2. Roughly put, the singular feature constrains the
selection to atomic individuals in the domain; no such constraint is associated with the plural.
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c. bàdəḿm
all
ir-á-tàrè
head-gen-3pl
‘all of them’ (Frajzyngier 2012: 138; Wandala (Chadic))
d. macallimíntii
professors-det+past
qaar-k-óod
part-det+poss.3pl
baa
decl
la
one
xeray.
put-in-jail
‘Some of the professors have been put in jail.’
(Lecarme 1999b: ex. 35d; Somali)
As we have seen, languages such as St’át’imcets overtly realize the choice-function
pronoun in quantifier phrases generally; however, like English, St’át’imcets also has
a distinct structure corresponding to English-style partitives (Matthewson 1998,
2013) — a Case-assigning X head, and (semantically definite) choice-function pro-
noun, as in (7.55) (n. 62).
(7.55) zí7zeg’
each
lhél=ki=smúlhats=a
from=det.pl=woman=exis
ít’-em.
sing-intr
‘Each of the women sang.’ (Matthewson 2013: ex. 15; St’át’imcets)
On the flip side, in addition to the prenominal strategy in (7.54d), genitives in So-
mali can also be realized via a “construct state” construction, as in (7.56) (cf. (7.19)/(7.54b)).
Somali genitives/partitives of the (7.56)-form require linear adjacency without prepo-
sition or case; however, the article on the head noun is obligatory (Lecarme 1996,
1999b, 2004).
(7.56) a. qáar
part
macállimín-tii
professors-det+past
ká
one
mid
from
ah
be
(baa
decl
la
one
xeray).
put-in-jail
‘Some of the professors (have been put in jail)’
b. Dhibaatá-dii
problem-det+past
Khalíj-ku
Gulf-det+nom
wáy
decl.3fs
dhammaatay.
ended
‘The Gulf crisis ended.’ (Lecarme 1999b: ex. 35c, 2004: ex. 4; Somali)
In terms of the present analysis, in both types of Somali genitives/partitives the X
head has EPP properties and an overt syntactic/semantic possessor, and the choice-
function pronoun is realized with a syntactic definite marker. In the prenominal
constructions, the X head is overt; in constructions of the (7.56)-form, it is implicit.
Second, X heads may also differ with respect to other semantic features such as
thematic roles. Unlike inherent R readings, free R readings of genitives are often
associated with a “default preference… for a genitive relation in the family of ‘owns’,
‘possesses’, ‘controls’ ” (Partee& Borschev 2003: 70). In some languages, modifier
genitives obligatorily receive possession readings, as in Russian prenominal posses-
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sives such as (7.57). Although the range of relations under the heading of “posses-
sion” can be broad, it is more constrained than the range of relations potentially
associated with genitives generally (see Seiler 1983a, Nichols 1988, Chappell &
McGregor 1989, 1996b, Taylor 1989, Nikiforidou 1991, Barker 1995: ch. 2,
Langacker 1995, Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1996, 2004, Heine 1997, Marantz 1997,
Partee & Borschev 2003, Storto 2003, Lee-Schoenfeld 2006, Badulescu &
Moldovan 2008, Payne 2009, Dixon 2010: ch. 16, Lichtenberk et al. 2011,
Aikhenvald 2013).
(7.57) Petin
Petja-poss-m.sg
ubijca
murderer-m.sg
a.#‘Petja’s murderer’ / ‘the murderer of Petja’
b. ‘a murderer Petja has hired’ (Partee & Borschev 2003: ex. 25b)
The LFs in (7.42)–(7.43) suggest a partly structural diagnosis. The “possessor” in
free R readings is directly generated in the specifier of the genitive morpheme —
drawing on the analogy with v∗, a position analogous to the position of a clausal
subject. Indeed, as noted above from Mosel 1984, the “very same” range of rela-
tions expressed in free-R marked possessives such as (7.51) — “relationships which
presuppose activity, control or voluntariness on [the] part of the possessor” — “is
expressed by the agent noun phrase and the verb in active… clauses” (1984: 36–37;
cf. (7.49) and Harlow 2007: 163–170). The genitive morpheme can be treated
as assigning a broadly possessional θ-role — optionally in English, obligatorily in
certain genitive constructions in other languages (cf. n. 66). In inherent R readings,
though the structural possessor may receive its (genitive) case assignment from
the X head, its θ-role may be assigned in its base position by the relational noun
(cf. (7.48)/(7.50), n. 67).73,74
Understanding the nominal XP projection in this way affords an independent
73It might be tempting to compare the checking of genitive case on the object of the relational
noun by n∗ with the checking of accusative case on the direct object of an active transitive verb by
v∗, e.g. via Agree (Chomsky 2000, 2001). Like how active v∗ assigns an agent θ-role to the external
argument generated in its specifier, the possessive n∗ in (i) (like (7.57)) also assigns a possessor
θ-role. See n. 127 on extensions of the present approach to the free/inherent R reading distinction in
noun phrases to contrasting readings of certain possessive sentences and double object constructions.
74A D+XP analysis may also be in a better position to capture contrasts between relative and
non-relative modification. For instance, Somali, which has a rich overt nominal tense morphology,
structurally distinguishes between inflected adjectival/nominal modification and modification by a
restrictive relative clause. Whereas modifiers must agree with the head noun in features such as
definiteness, gender, tense, the tense features in a relative clause are independent and semantically
interpreted (cf. Culy 1990 on independency properties with circumnominal relatives):
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basis for the posited additional layer of structure in ordinary (non-genitive, non-
relative) quantificational DPs such as in (7.6)/(7.14)/(7.26). The structure we have
arrived at for nominals, though motivated on largely semantic grounds, parallels
implementations of syntactic symmetries in noun and verb phrases. As we have
seen, the account is compatible with different ways of filling out the specific syntactic
details. In (7.24) we briefly considered a Q+n∗P/n∗ implementation, as part of a
possible general nP analysis of noun phrases (Chomsky 2007). Two additional
noteworthy connections are the layered DP syntax developed in Bhattacharya
1999a,b and Hiraiwa 2005. Notably, Bhattacharya and Hiraiwa identify distinct
heads for Case/agreement and a specificity element under the determiner (see §7.1),
as reflected in (7.58); the former corresponds to our X, and the latter is explic-
itly identified as a position for certain specific indefinites, elements treated here
with choice-function pronouns (Bhattacharya 1999a, 1999b: 85–98, Hiraiwa
2005: 201, 213–214; see also Zamparelli 2000, Megerdoomian 2008, 2009).
Bhattacharya’s and Hiraiwa’s nominal shell under the determiner is essentially the
same XP structure posited in this section for genitives ((7.43)–(7.42)) and the com-
(i) a. ardayád
student
soomaalí
Somali
ah/∗ahayd
is/∗was.past [CPrel ooand telefóontelephone kúuyou-to sootowards dirtay]sent.past
‘A Somali student who phoned you’
b. ardayád-dii
student-def.past
soomaalí-da
Somali-def
ahayd
was.past
[CPrel oo
and
telefóon
telephone
kúu
you-to
soo
towards
dirtay]
sent.past
‘The Somali student who phoned you’
(Lecarme 2004: ex. 20; structure markings in original)
The tense domain of the head noun includes adjectival/nominal modifiers but not the relative clause
(Lecarme 1996, 1999b, 2004). Such properties of tense agreement, overtly marked in Somali,
arguably extend to worlds as well: A “mixed” de re/de dicto reading is perhaps more easily available
with the embedded restrictive relative in (iii) than with the modifier in (ii).
(ii) Bert thinks every freshman girl is smart.
a. De dicto ≈ there are no freshman girls but Bert thinks there are; he thinks all of them are
smart (e.g., Bert thinks the actual sophomore boys are the freshman girls)
b. De re ≈ for G the set of freshmen and G′ the set of girls: Bert thinks every o ∈ G∩G′ is smart
(compatible with Bert thinking some of the o’s are sophomores or boys)
c.#Mixed ≈ for G the set of actual freshmen: Bert thinks every o′ ∈ G such that o′ is a girl
is smart (compatible with some of the Gs being boys, and Bert thinking some of them are
sophomores)
(iii) [Context: Stan doesn’t realize that the Smiths are Russian spies. He thinks they live across the
street from him, but the house is actually a Russian safe house.]
??Mixed ≈ Stan thinksi every spy@ who livesi across the street from him is a loyal American.
We will return to possibilities for modally independent readings for different types of noun phrases
in §§8.5–8.9.
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plements of quantifier phrases ((7.6a)): the (implicit) choice-function pronoun in-
stantiates F2, and X corresponds to F1. (I use neutral category labels F1, F2 for
consistency.)
(7.58) … D [F1P F1 [F2P F2 nP]]
(cf. Bhattacharya 1999b, Hiraiwa 2005; labels adapted)
Though I have been ignoring events and categories such as v, Asp, T, perhaps a more
refined syntax for the verbal domain could afford a parallel assignment-variable-
based treatment of the semantics (more on which in §8.9; cf. §3.2, nn. 45, 118, 127).
Let’s recap. This section has examined several ways of extending the assignment-
quantificational treatment of determiner quantifiers from §§6.1–6.2 to quantifier
phrases with non-relative complements. I argued that a generalized D+CP/XP ac-
count is motivated by diachronic, morphological, syntactic, and semantic connec-
tions between individual quantifier phrases and expressions often associated with
notions of “specificity” (broadly construed); and helps capture a range of inde-
pendent linguistic phenomena, including implicit domain restriction, non-relative
restrictive modification, the distinction between free R (modifier) and inherent R
readings of genitives. Although the assignment-quantificational semantics is com-
patible with alternative analyses of the internal syntax, I speculated that a D+XP
implementation for non-relative quantificational DPs may have advantages over a
D+CP implementation. The posited nominal XP projection is independently mo-
tivated by accounts of genitive constructions and parallels in the verbal domain.
The D+XP analyses in (7.42)–(7.43) yield a common structure in the interpreta-
tion of prenominal and postnominal genitives, and capture the distinction between
free R and inherent R readings in terms of a more general treatment of restrictive
modification, as in (7.26b) (also nn. 64, 74). Such syntactic and semantic features
may be of broader theoretical interest independent of the particular assignment-
variable implementation developed here. It is worth examining to what extent
the proposals might be adapted to other types of quantificational, genitive, and
specific/non-specific expressions, and in English and in other languages. The issues
regarding the internal syntax, and comparisons among different notions associated
with “specificity” warrant more careful independent investigation. (We will return
to these issues below and in greater detail throughout §8.)
The syntactic speculations in this section, though not essential to the overall
account, haven’t been a mere detour; they highlight an important methodological
point (cf. §§1, 3.1, 5). Critical to any compositional semantic theory is that the
semantic derivations proceed from plausible syntactic structures. The independent
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features of the D+CP and D+XP (Q+DP, Q+n∗P) analyses provide further moti-
vation for the LFs used in capturing the linguistic shifting data which constitute
the project’s primary focus. The remainder of the section applies our generalized
assignment-variable syntax/semantics of quantifier phrases to several additional
phenomena with pronominal anaphora and binding.
7.3 Bound pronouns
Accounts of semantic binding following e.g.Heim&Kratzer 1998 require all bound
readings to be captured via A-movement such as QR (cf. May 1985, Kayne 2002).
Although the subject-position quantifier in examples such as (7.59) needn’t raise
for type reasons, it still must undergo QR in order to generate the binder index
which binds the pronoun. (Assume a simplified ad hoc “the-N-of-o” analysis of the
possessive pronoun.)75
(7.59) Pronoun-binding via A-movement (cf. Heim & Kratzer 1998: 262-264)
a. Every cat likes its owner.
LF ≈ [S every cat [2 [S t2 likes the-owner-of-o2]]]
b. Every cat thinks that it is smarter than its owner.
LF ≈ [S every cat [2 [S t2 thinks [S it2 is smarter than the-owner-of-it2]]]]
I haven’t assumed that individual pronouns constitute a unified syntactic or semantic
class crosslinguistically, or that all instances of linguistic anaphora are to be an-
alyzed as copies of a linguistic antecedent (§§6.2.1, 10.3.1; nn. 51, 77). Yet the
assignment-binding introduced by the determiner may also capture other bound
readings of pronouns without needing to posit such non-type-driven QR of the sub-
ject quantifier (cf. §4.3). The pronoun may be represented as a copy of the an-
tecedent [Fcf-g NP] internal to the quantificational subject DP, roughly as in (7.60)
for (7.59a) (again ignoring worlds and assuming a simplified analysis of the posses-
sive).
(7.60) a. [[DP⟨2,a⟩ every⟨2,a⟩ [XP … F2cf-g2 cat] [VP likes [the-owner-of-it2-g2 cat]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(cat) ∧ . . .→ x(g) likes the-owner-of-a(g)(2cf)(cat)
Additional support for such an approach may come from languages in which a bound
pronoun can be overtly realized as a copy of its antecedent, as in (7.61).
75Following Heim & Kratzer’s account of movement, the binder index occupies its own node.
They posit that the embedded subject pronoun also QRs; I ignore this additional movement.
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(7.61) a. Aajarni
teacher
khit
think
waa
that
puak
all
rua
we
chob
like
aajarni.
teacher
‘The teacheri thinks we like himi.’ (Lee 2003; Thai)
b. A
already
w-nalààa’z
remembered
bxuuhahzi
priest
g-uhcnèe
helped
Lia Paamm
Pam
bxuuhahzi
priest
‘The priesti remembered that Pam helped himi.’ (Lee 2003; Zapotec)
Interestingly, bound copies with morphologically complex antecedents are gener-
ally excluded in such languages for independent morphosyntactic or phonological
reasons (Lee 2003, Mortensen 2003, Nunes 2004, Boeckx et al. 2007), as in
(7.62), and an alternative device must be used such as a (possibly covert) simple
pronoun.
(7.62) a. *Thuk
every
khoni
person
bok
say
waa
that
rua
we
chob
like
thuk
every
khoni.
person
‘Everyonei said we like themi.’
b. *Yra’ta’
every
zhyàa’pi
girl
r-ralloh
think
nsinnyi’cy
smart
yra’ta’
every
zhyàa’pi.
girl
‘Every girli thinks shei is smart.’ (Lee 2003)
Indeed this restriction at PF is mirrored at LF on the present analysis: the bound
pronoun in examples such as (7.60)76 is represented at LF as a reduced copy of the
c-commanding quantificational DP. The quantificational subject is represented with
76I include the qualification to make room for alternative analyses of names and apparent binding
of pronouns by names. As discussed in §4.4 simple names pattern with examples such as (7.61) in
explicit copy languages.
(i) a. Povi
Pao
yeej
always
qhuas
praise
Povi.
Pao
‘Pao always praises himself.’
b. Povi
Pao
has
say
tas
that
Maiv
May
nyam
like
Povi.
Pao
‘Paoi said that May likes himi.’ (Mortensen 2003; Hmong)
In accounts of names as variables or constants, a pronoun bound by a name may be represented as
an identical complete copy at LF. In accounts of names as predicates or definites (as in §4.4), the
pronoun may be represented as a reduced copy parallel to the cases with quantificational DPs. I
continue to focus on examples with quantificational or indefinite antecedents.
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the more richly articulated internal structure, in contrast to the reduced syntax of
the bound pronoun.77
A treatment of bound pronouns along these lines may shed light on contrasts
with other types of pronouns. Consider reflexives. A prominent implementation
among movement theories of reflexivization is to analyze the reflexive as a pro-
nounced copy of movement (Lidz& Idsardi 1998, Hornstein 2001, 2007, Boeckx
et al. 2007, Bošković & Nunes 2007, Drummond et al. 2011; cf. Lebeaux 1983,
77There are of course independent differences in the degree of internal syntactic complex-
ity among different types of pronouns and (non-)quantificational DPs across languages (e.g.
Giusti 1991, 1992, 2002, Cardinaletti & Starke 1999, Zamparelli 2000, Bernstein 2001,
Matthewson 2001, 2013, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, 2015, 2017b, Aboh 2004, Bhat 2004,
Lecarme 2004, 2012, Borer 2005a, Julien 2005, Watanabe 2006, Alexiadou et al. 2007,
Tănase-Dogaru 2007, von Fintel & Matthewson 2008, Leu 2008, Mavrogiorgos 2010, Gil
et al. 2013, Gillon 2013, Grosz& Patel-Grosz 2016, Patel-Grosz&Grosz 2017, Cardinaletti
& Giusti 2017; see also n. 51). We have already observed as much in the distinction between D CP
quantifier phrases and indefinites which take an NP complement. Likewise capturing the anaphoric
potential of bound pronouns and donkey pronouns in the above ways is compatible with there
being other syntactic differences among them (§§6.2.1, 8.8). For instance, given our purposes I
have left open how exactly the non-movement copies (informally understood) enter the syntactic
derivation — e.g., whether they are the product of some sequence of syntactic operations involving
Copy, or the lexical material is duplicated in the numeration. Different types of anaphoric pronouns
and expressions may differ in this respect, both crosslinguistically and within a particular language.
On one approach (Nunes 2004, Bošković & Nunes 2007, Kandybowicz 2007), multiple Copies
(products of Copy) can be pronounced only if some Copy can be morpho-phonologically fused with
another element, thereby avoiding a violation of the Linear Correspondence Axiom (Kayne 1994);
roughly put, if multiple identical Copies are pronounced, the lexical items in the numeration won’t
be able to be consistently linearized, since some items are assigned to more than one position
(contrast e.g. Kandybowicz 2008, Nasu 2010 for non-fusion-based approaches). So, insofar as
complex elements are less susceptible to morpho-phonological reanalyzation, structures with multi-
ple pronounced Copies are generally excluded at PF. Interestingly, whereas morphologically complex
bound pronoun copies are (to my knowledge) unattested (see also (7.61)–(7.62) above), individual
correlates in correlative constructions can be overtly realized as syntactically and morphologically
complex (§9.7); complex donkey-anaphoric expressions are also possible in some languages ((6.40),
below; cf. (6.45)).
(i) a. *Ob
two
tug
clf
dlevi
dog
yeej
always
tum
bite
ob
two
tug
clf
dlevi.
dog
‘The two dogs bite themselves/each other.’ (Mortensen 2003; Hmong complex reflexive)
b. Tug
clf
twgi
which
pum
see
(proj) los
top
tug
clf
twgi
which
yeej
always
nyam
like
(proj).
‘Whoever sees him will surely like him.’ (Mortensen 2003; Hmong donkey sentence)
c. [jo
rel
(larkii)
(girl)
kharii
standing
hai]
is
vo
dem
laRkii
girl
lambii
tall
hai.
is
‘Which girl is standing, that girl is tall.’ (Srivastav 1991; Hindi complex correlate)
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Chomsky 1993, Kratzer 2009). A sentence such as (7.63a) is represented roughly
as in (7.63b). In languages such as English the lower copy is converted to a re-
flexive pronoun in the morpho-phonological components. In explicit copy reflex-
ive languages the lower copy can be pronounced itself (Lasnik 1989, Lee 2003,
Mortensen 2003, Boeckx et al. 2007).
(7.63) a. Everyone likes herself.
b. [v∗P everyonei [VP likes everyonei-self]]
(7.64) a. Povi
Pao
yeej
always
qhuas
praise
Povi
Pao
‘Pao always praises himself.’
b. Quas-dlevi
ind-dog
pum
see
quas-dlevi.
ind-dog
‘The/a dog sees itself.’ (Mortensen 2003; Hmong)
A straightforward way of implementing such an approach in the present frame-
work would be to represent reflexives in examples such as (7.63)–(7.64) — dedicated
local-domain forms/devices for expressing reflexive relations78 — as identical (in
some cases reduced; n. 76) copies of their antecedent at LF. The account in this sec-
tion analyzes certain anaphoric pronouns as non-movement copies of an antecedent
choice-function pronoun and elided NP. Whereas certain internal differences may
be possible in the representation of a donkey pronoun or bound pronoun and its
antecedent (§6.2), no such differences would be possible with reflexives qua copies
of movement. The contrast between derivations of examples with QR and reflexives
might be reflected roughly as in (7.65)–(7.66). (For simplicity I ignore worlds,
One way of reflecting these contrasts might be to distinguish the representations of bound pronouns
(like reflexives) as products of a Copy operation. It would be interesting to examine whether
there may be crosslinguistic differences in this respect, and to what extent such differences may
come apart from differences such as in e.g. morphology and possibilities for morpho-phonological
reanalysis, zero anaphora, anaphoric devices, etc. (We will return to these issues and comparisons
with correlatives in §§9–10; for broader general discussion see also Hornstein 2001, Elbourne
2005, Corver & Nunes 2007, Kratzer 2009, Leung 2009.)
78Hereafter I will omit the qualification limiting to dedicated local-domain forms/devices, but it
should be understood (see e.g. Zribi-Hertz 2008, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2017b).
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additional structure in the quantifier phrases, intermediate copies, and any semantic
contribution of the ‘-self’ morpheme.)79
(7.65) a. ‘Everyone likes everyone.’
b. LF ≈ [everyone{⟨2,a⟩,⟨2,e⟩} [everyone⟨1,a⟩ [VP likes t2e]]]
(7.66) ‘Everyone likes herself.’
a. [VP likes everyone⟨3,a⟩]
[v∗P everyone⟨3,a⟩ [VP likes everyone⟨3,a⟩]]
[[DP⟨3,a⟩ every⟨3,a⟩ … F2cf-g3 pers] [VP likes [every⟨3,a⟩ … F2cf-g3 pers]]]
b. LF ≈ [[DP⟨3,a⟩ every⟨3,a⟩ … F2cf-g3 pers] [VP likes [F2cf-g3 pers]]]
c. J(7.66b)K ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(pers) ∧ . . .→ x(g) likes a(g)(2cf)(pers)≈ for all o selectable among the relevant persons, o likes o
In (7.66) the higher complete copy is pronounced and interpreted, and the lower
copy is reduced prior to LF (indicated by the strikethrough).80 The reflexive pronoun
in (7.66) is the overt realization of an identical (here reduced) copy of movement
in an A-chain (specifically, a chain spanning multiple θ-positions). As with bound
pronoun examples such as (7.59)–(7.60), the account captures the bound reading
of the reflexive without requiring non-type-driven movement of the antecedent, a
special abstraction principle, or an ad hoc binder index (Heim & Kratzer 1998,
Büring 2005, Kratzer 2009).
One argument for movement analyses of reflexives is that they afford a means
of deriving Principle A, that dedicated reflexive forms have local antecedents; the
local relation with the antecedent is derived from the local nature of the kind of
A-movement. A live issue is whether Principle B — that bound pronouns have a non-
local antecedent, that bound pronouns be free in the domain in which reflexives are
bound (cf. (7.67)) — may also be explained in more fundamental terms.81
79In a trace theory, the attachment of the binder-index feature would be built into the definition
of QR. Alternatively, if the object DP enters the derivation with its individual binder-index feature,
an LF where the lower copy is replaced by t2a could be filtered out for type reasons, or which variable
the lower copy is replaced by could be determined by which binder-index feature is unchecked in
that position, here determining replacement with the individual-variable (see nn. 13, 22). We will
return to object-position quantifiers in §7.4.
80Contrast e.g. Hornstein 2001, 2007, Boeckx et al. 2007, Bošković & Nunes 2007, in which
the chain link phonetically realized as the reflexive pronoun is treated as a complete copy.
81Cf. e.g. Richards 1996, Hornstein 2001, Reuland 2001, Drummond et al. 2011, Déchaine
& Wiltschko 2015, 2017b. See Reuland & Koster 1991 for an overview on non-complementary
distributions of reflexives and bound pronouns (long-distance reflexives, locally bound pronouns)
crosslinguistically (n. 78). Cf. Schlenker 2005, Cecchetto & Donati 2010 on Condition C.
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(7.67) a. Percyi likes himselfi/∗himi.
b. Percyi thinks Penny likes himi/∗himselfi.
As Hornstein puts it, “Why should anaphors, whose properties follow from the
theory of movement, block the the presence of pronouns, whose distribution and
interpretive properties follow from the theory of binding? The big fact [that bound
pronouns are in complementary distribution with reflexives] is rendered capricious,
a colossal grammatical accident” (2007: 354). In response Hornstein (2001, 2007)
argues that what explains the complementarity of reflexives and bound pronouns is
an economy principle which favors the use of reflexives, qua copies of movement:
“what makes for economy in such cases is Movement. In particular, if a derivation
can converge without the use of pronouns, it must so converge. In short, Move
trumps Pronominalize… [Pronouns are] what the system uses when movement
fails” (2007: 383). So, the thought goes, the use of a bound pronoun is avail-
able in (7.67) when, and only when, ‘Percy’ cannot be linked to its lower copy via
(A-)movement.
Movement-based theories of construal have been supported by diverse crosslin-
guistic examples in which the use of pronouns — not simply bound pronouns —
anticorrelates with the possibility of movement rather than with the use of reflexives
as such. A critical issue for derivational economy accounts such as Hornstein’s is
whether the core economy assumption — e.g., that syntactic derivations resorting to
movement are preferred as more economical than derivations resorting to pronoun
use — can be sufficiently motivated to bear the relevant explanatory weight. It is
well established that various types of even local A-/A-movements incur non-trivial
processing costs (Felser 2015, Wurmbrand 2018). It may seem surprising that the
relevant local movement operations (even understood in terms of copying) would
be systematically less costly than inserting a bundle of (possibly uninterpreted)
ϕ-features.82
Economy-based movement accounts aren’t silent on this issue (e.g. Hornstein
2001). This isn’t the place to critically assess movement analyses of reflexivization or
particular explanations of binding-theoretic principles such as Hornstein’s. Suffice
it to say that a generalized assignment-variable analysis, such as considered above,
may provide a basis for an economy-based account of the distribution of reflexives
82See Richards 1999 for developments of a syntactic theory that assumes a general preference
for Move over Merge. In order to treat the alternative versions of sentences such as in (7.67) as
competing, Hornstein must assume that the reflexive and bound pronouns are “semantically inert”
and hence that their ϕ-features are uninterpreted — not only in “fake indexical” examples but in
general, contrary to standard theories (see n. 51).
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and pronouns. Unlike bound pronouns, on the above line, reflexives are systemat-
ically represented from identical copies of movement. The relevant economy prin-
ciple needn’t be construed fundamentally as “Avoid Pronouns” (Chomsky 1981),
or “Move (=Copy-and-Merge) trumps Pronominalize” (Hornstein 2001, 2007),
but, suggestively, “Copy-and-Merge trumps Find and (at least for the most part)
Repeat” — or, less syntactically put, “Using a form marked as a local identical copy of
movement trumps using a form variably interpreted as non-anaphoric or a possibly
non-identical copy of some possibly non-commanding local or non-local antecedent
or other.” An account along these lines might not treat the starred and unstarred
versions of (7.67) as strictly “competing” in the sense relevant in Chomsky 1993.
Yet one needn’t assume that all syntactic principles are fundamentally explained
by purely non-lexical properties (cf. Reinhart 1983a,b, 2006, Richards 1996,
Grimshaw 1997, Barbosa et al. 1998, Fox 2000, Reuland 2001, Schlenker
2005, Broekhuis 2008, Zribi-Hertz 2008).83
The extensions in this section to other types of pronominal anaphora have been
speculative. There are interesting crosslinguistic differences among bound pronouns
and reflexives — e.g., in their relative distributions, internal and external syntax, and
binding-theoretic properties (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, 2015, 2017b, Bhat
2004, Zribi-Hertz 2008; see nn. 51, 77, §10.3.1). Investigation of other more ar-
ticulated structures for certain types of pronouns, and comparisons with movement
analyses of other anaphoric expressions may provide fruitful avenues to explore
(e.g., resumptive pronouns or doubled clitic pronouns, cf. Cinque 1977, Pesetsky
1998, Boeckx 2003, Mavrogiorgos 2010, Rouveret 2011; see Kayne 2002 for a
general movement theory of pronouns). We will return to these issues throughout
the following sections.
83Movement analyses provide one approach to capturing how certain reflexives get their status
as specialized local-domain forms/devices, and thereby block the use of less specialized forms
(Williams 1997; nn. 78, 81). Déchaine & Wiltschko (2015, 2017b) treat the obligatory local
binding with morphemes such as ‘self’ as “forced by” the signal of “inalienable possession” associated
with body-part nouns (see also Vergnaud & Zubizarreta 1992, Bhat 2004). Though it is true that
reflexives are often formed using body-part nouns crosslinguistically, a challenge is to explain why
the “inalienable possession” couldn’t be associated with some non-local subject, as indeed it is in some
languages (e.g., Chinese zìji ‘self’). Such accounts also leave open what (possibly covert) features
force the local binding in other types of reflexive forms (e.g., French se ‘3.refl’). See Drummond
et al. 2011 for a critical overview of other movement- and non-movement-based economy accounts
of reflexivization as blocking pronoun binding.
137
7.4 Donkey crossings: Weak crossover, inverse linking, genitive binding
Our discussion in these sections has focused on examples with subject-position quan-
tifiers. A critical issue concerns examples with QR’d quantifier phrases. In (7.68) the
determiner ‘every’ raises from CPrel as a quantifier over assignments to take its type⟨e, t⟩ restrictor argument, and the object-position DP QRs, binding an individual-
trace (again ignoring worlds).84
(7.68) Alice likes every baby which laughed.
S⋮
DP{⟨2,a⟩,⟨2,e⟩}
every⟨2,a⟩ CPrel
wh2-g2 baby ⟨1,e⟩
Crel t2a
t1e laughed
Alice likes t2e
In principle one could treat the determiner’s scope argument in such examples fun-
damentally as type ⟨e, t⟩. Yet such a move has an air of “multiplying senses beyond
necessity.” One would also need to stipulate that the assignment binder-index
feature on D doesn’t project to the DP. A more attractive approach is to maintain
the uniform type ⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩ for ‘every’. As in the subject-position examples, the
assignment binder-index feature on D projects to the DP, and an individual binder-
index attaches to the QR’d DP, as reflected in the feature set on the DP in (7.68).
However, a prima facie worry may come from crossover.
Following Reinhart (1983a) a prominent generalization of weak crossover is
that an expression β can bind a pronoun only if β is in an A-position (argument
position) that c-commands the pronoun at LF. This generalization allows trace-
84If Kennedy’s (2014) approach to Antecedent Contained Deletion is right, there may be reasons
for requiring coindexing between the individual binder features on the quantificational DP and its
relative complement CPrel, e.g. via agreement. I will ignore such a requirement in what follows.
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binding but excludes pronoun-binding from A-positions (non-argument positions),
such as positions derived from QR or wh-movement, as in (7.69)–(7.70).
(7.69) a. Every cati likes itsi owner.
b. *Itsi owner likes every cati. (≠ ‘Every cat is liked by its owner’)
(7.70) a. Whoi (ti) likes heri child?
b. *Whoi does heri child like ti?
Reinhart’s generalization has also been applied to donkey pronouns in cases of “don-
key crossover” (Haïk 1984, Reinhart 1987, Büring 2004), reflected in (7.71)–(7.72).
(7.71) a. Every farmer who beat a donkeyi killed itsi lawyer.
b. ≈ “every farmer x who beat a donkey killed the lawyer of the donkey
beaten by x”
(7.72) a. *Itsi lawyer sued every farmer who beat a donkeyi. (Büring 2004: ex.
8b)
b. ≉ “every farmer x who beat a donkey is such that the lawyer of the
donkey beaten by x sued x”
The object DP ‘every farmer who beat a donkey’ in (7.72) can bind its trace but,
unlike the subject DP in (7.71), it cannot provide an antecedent for the donkey
pronoun ‘it’.
Absent additional constraints, nothing would seem to exclude the rough LF and
semantic value for (7.72) in (7.73). This represents the unattested bound reading
where the interpretation of the donkey pronoun covaries with the raised DP. (I will
simplify by ignoring the internal structure in C0rel = [C0 Crel t2a]; I continue to ignore
worlds.)
(7.73) ‘Its lawyer sued every farmer who beat a donkey’
a. … [[DP{⟨2,a⟩,⟨3,e⟩} every⟨2,a⟩ [CP wh2cf-g2-farmerC0⟨1,e⟩rel [t1e beat a3-g2-donkey]]]
[the-lawyer-of-it3-g2-donkey sued t3e]]
b. ≈ λgg.∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(farmer)∧ x(g) beat a(g)(3cf)(donkey)→ the-lawyer-of-a(g)(3cf)(donkey) sued x(g)
One could treat Reinhart’s generalization as a basic principle in the grammar.85 LFs
such as (7.73a) would be excluded because they violate Reinhart’s generalization:
85Cf. Safir’s (2004) Quantifier Dependency Condition, which essentially reformulates Reinhart’s
generalization that pronouns can only be bound from A-positions.
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the assignment-variable in the pronoun [it3cf g2] (underlined in (7.73a)) is bound
by the assignment-binder from the A-position DP.
It would be theoretically preferable to derive generalizations such as Reinhart’s
from more basic features of the syntax/semantics. A more explanatory approach
might be to allow expressions to have multiple binder-indices, but include a con-
straint that no expression may bind distinct variables, in some relevant sense of
binding — call it “s-binding.” A first approximation is as follows. (I will often be
sloppy about distinguishing expressions/variables (qua types) from occurrences.)
(7.74) Variable Binding Constraint: An occurrence of an expression in a tree γ may
s-bind occurrences of at most one variable at LF.
a. An occurrence of an expression β s-binds an occurrence of a variable viσ
in γ iff the sister of β is the largest subtree of γ in which viσ is s-free.
b. viσ is s-free in γ iff there is no occurrence in γ of an expression with
binder-index feature ⟨i,σ⟩ that c-commands viσ.
An explanation of donkey crossover falls out directly: The raised object DP in (7.73a)
has the set of binder-index features {⟨2,a⟩,⟨3,e⟩}. Like all movement, QR leaves a
coindexed trace. On the unattested reading, the assignment binder-index binds the
assignment-variable in [it3 g2] and the individual binder-index binding the trace t3e.
This violates the constraint in (7.74). The donkey pronoun cannot be bound by the
raised DP because the DP’s binding capacities are exhausted from binding the trace
derived from QR. Hence a string such as in (7.73) can have an acceptable reading
but only with an intuitively free reading of ‘its’. No analogous constraint excludes
an intuitively bound reading of ‘its’ in (7.71) where the DP is in an A-position: the
subject DP doesn’t bind a trace and is free to bind the donkey pronoun.
Adopting a general type-⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩ syntax/semantics of determiner quanti-
fiers provides a means of generalizing the above approach to weak crossover to
examples with non-relative complements, as reflected schematically in (7.75).
(7.75) a. Every dogi likes itsi owner.
… [[DP⟨2,a⟩ every⟨2,a⟩ … F2cf-t2a-dog] [VP likes the-owner-of-it2-g2a-dog]
b. *Itsi owner likes every dogi.
… [[DP{⟨2,a⟩,⟨3,e⟩} every⟨2,a⟩ … F2cf-g2-dog] [the-owner-of-it2-g2-dog likes t3e]]
The anaphoric pronouns are represented as copies of their linguistic antecedents
(§7.3). In (7.75b) the trace t3e must be bound by the individual binder-index on the
QR’d DP. This excludes the assignment-variable in the representation of the pronoun
‘its’ from being bound by the assignment binder-index projecting from D to the DP.
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The foregoing approach carries over to other recalcitrant cases of apparent bind-
ing out of DPs (see esp. Büring 2004). The remainder of the section considers two
such cases: genitive binding and inverse linking.
Consider donkey-style anaphora and crossover with genitives:
(7.76) a. Every boyi’s cat likes himi.
b. ≈ “for every boy b, the cat owned by b likes b”
(7.77) a. Every boyi’s sisterj’s cat likes himi/herj
b. ≈ “for every boy b, the cat of the s such that s is the sister of b likes b/s”
(7.78) a. *Hisi dog likes every boyi’s cat.
b. ≉ “for every boy b, the cat owned by b is liked by the dog owned by b”
In (7.76) the embedded DP ‘every boy’ can provide an antecedent for ‘him’ even
though it doesn’t c-command the pronoun at LF. In (7.77) the pronoun can be linked
either to the embedded DP ‘every boy’s sister’ or to the DP ‘every boy’ embedded in
it. Yet the interpretation of the pronoun cannot vary when the main genitive DP
QRs in (7.78).
For present purposes we can put aside many controversial issues about the
syntax of different types of genitive constructions, in English and crosslinguistically.
For concreteness let’s assume the D+XP implementation of “free R” readings of
prenominal genitives X’s Y from (7.42) — where the relevant relation is supplied
by an implicit pronoun R, the “possessor” X+relation R originate as modifiers in the
nominal XP headed by the genitive morpheme, and the XP is the complement of an
implicit definite-like determiner (cf. Partee 1983), as reflected in (7.79) (n. 65).
(I continue to ignore intensionality (an internal world-argument) with the relation
pronoun, and use ‘Ri’/‘R’ in pronouns/indices of type ⟨e, et⟩.)
(7.79) a. ‘Alice’s cat’
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ι⟨2,a⟩o [XP [R1-g1 Alice] [’s [F2cf-t2a cat]]]]
In (7.76) the quantificational possessor ‘every boy’ must QR for type reasons (cf. e.g.
May 1985). Thus far our compositional semantics has proceeded solely via function
application; however, adapting the treatment of inverse linking in Kobele 2010,
suppose that we allow a role for function composition in deriving the semantic val-
ues of certain adjunction structures, such as complex DPs formed from DP-internal
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QR/movement.86 Combining DP∗ of type ⟨et, t⟩ and the raised DP∗∗ of type ⟨t, t⟩ by
function composition yields the complex subject DP of generalized quantifier type⟨et, t⟩, as shown in (7.80). The assignment binder-index feature projected to the DP
binds the donkey pronoun, again represented as a copy of the antecedent choice-
function pronoun and NP (here internal to the complex quantificational DP∗∗). (For
simplicity assume that the implicit domain restriction in DP∗∗ is trivial, where the
property pronoun is contextually identified with E.)87
(7.80) Every boyi’s cat likes himi.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP{...⟨2,a⟩...} ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩} ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-t2a boy-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩ ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
ι⟨3,a⟩o XP
R1-g1 t2e ’s
F3cf-t3a cat-w1-g1
VP
likes t1s
him2-g2 boy-w1-g1
JDPK = JDP∗∗K ○ JDP∗K = λPet.JDP∗∗K(JDP∗K(P))≈ λPet.[λTt.[λgg.∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(boyg(1a)(1s))→ T(g[x(g)/2e][a(g)/2a])]](λgg.[ιy(g)∃a′a∶ y(g) = a′(g)(3cf)(catg(1a)(1s)))∧ g(1a)(1R)(g(2e))(y(g))]
P(y)(g[a′(g)/3a]))
86Kobele (2010) also introduces assignments into the model and type system. He doesn’t go the
further step of incorporating assignment-variables into the syntax, or consider assignments or binder
indices for variables of types other than e. I consider additional applications of function composition
with ‘if’-clauses in §9; more on inverse linking shortly.
87I assume that, like [wh] features, binder-index features on/c-commanding a head X in an XP
project/percolate to the XP.
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≈ λPet.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(boyg(1a)(1s))→[ιy(g)∃a′a∶ y(g) = a′(g)(3cf)(catg(1a)(1s)) ∧ g(1a)(1R)(x(g))(y(g))]
P(y)(g[x(g)/2e][a(g)/2a][a′(g)/3a])JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(boyg−(1s))→[ιye(g)∃a′a∶ y(g) = a′(g)(3cf)(catg−(1s)) ∧ g(1R)(x(g))(y(g))]
y(g) likes a(g)(2cf)(boyg−(1s)) in @(g−)
This says, roughly, that for every o ∈ E such that there is a choice function that selects
o from among the boys, the unique o′ ∈ E such that o′ is selected by some choice
function from among the cats and bears the relevant relation gc(1R) (“is owned by,”
“is a pet of”) o, is such that o′ likes o— i.e., for every o in the set of boys, the unique
o′ among the cats which bears gc(1R) to o likes o.
The above account of weak crossover/“donkey crossover” carries over to “gen-
itive crossover” violations such as (7.78). (I use ’s both for the morpheme in the
genitive phrase and in the spell-out of the possessive pronoun.)
(7.81) *His dogi likes every boyi’s cat.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP{⟨4,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩...}
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩}
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-t2a boy-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩
ι⟨3,a⟩o XP
R1-g1 t2e ’s
F3cf-t3a cat-w1-g1
DP⟨4,a⟩
ι⟨4,a⟩o XP
R2 g2
him2-g2 boy-w1-g1
’s
F4cf-t4a dog-w1-g1
likes t1s t4e
The object-position quantifier ‘every boy’s cat’ has a set of binder-index features
including an individual binder-index resulting from QR, and an assignment binder-
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index projecting from DP∗∗. The individual binder-index binds the DP’s coindexed
trace t4e. In order for the interpretation of the pronoun to covary with the DP,
the assignment binder-index must bind the assignment-variable in [him2 g2]. This
violates the binding constraint in (7.74) which excludes a single expression from
binding distinct variables.
Inverse linking readings, as in (7.82), raise well-known challenges for compo-
sitional semantics. The embedded DP ‘every parent’ in (7.82) is a constituent of the
subject DP (e.g. May 1985, Heim & Kratzer 1998). So, first, ‘every parent’ must
be able to combine with its sister ‘some child of t’ to form the subject DP. Second,
the interpretation of ‘her’ covaries with the quantificational subject even though
the pronoun isn’t c-commanded by ‘every parent’. Third, as with donkey pronouns,
pronouns in inverse linking examples exhibit weak crossover effects:
(7.82) a. Some child of every parent loves her.≈ “for every parent o, some child o′ of o loves o”
b. *Her book is loved by some child of every parent.≉ “for every parent o, there is a child o′ of o such that o’s book is loved by o′”
The raised ‘every parent’ can bind its trace in (7.82a)–(7.82b); but it can provide a
linguistic antecedent for the pronoun only in (7.82a) when embedded in the subject
DP, and not in (7.82b) when embedded in the QR’d object DP.
The compositional semantics proceeds analogously to examples with complex
genitives, as reflected in (7.83). DP∗∗ and D∗ of types of types ⟨t, t⟩ and ⟨et, t⟩,
respectively, combine by function composition to yield the main DP of type ⟨et, t⟩.
The assignment binder-index feature projected from DP∗∗ to the DP binds the don-
key pronoun. (As previously, assume that the property-type pronouns in Spec,X are
contextually identified with E.)
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(7.83) Some friend of every baby hugged her.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP {...⟨2,a⟩...} ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩} ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-t2a baby-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩ ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
some⟨3,a⟩ XP⋮
F3cf t3a
friend-w1-g1
t2e
VP
loves t1s
her2-g2 baby-w1-g1
JsomeK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶P+(a)(x)(g) ∧Q+(a)(x)(g)JDPK = JDP∗∗K ○ JDP∗K≈ λPet.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))→(∃ye∃a′a∶ y(g) = a′(g)(3cf)(friend-of-x(g)g(1a)(1s))∧ P(y)(g[x(g)/2e][a(g)/2a][a′(g)/3a]))JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s))→(∃ye∃a′a∶ y(g) = a′(g)(3cf)(friend-of-x(g)g−(1s))∧ y(g) loves a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s)) in @(g−))
The derived semantic value captures the inverse linking reading: (7.83) says that
for every o ∈ E selectable from among the babies, there is an o′ ∈ E selected by some
choice function from among o’s friends such that o′ loves o— i.e., for every baby o,
there is an o′ among the friends of o such that o′ loves o.
The above account of weak crossover carries over to “inverse crossover” cases
such as (7.82b)/(7.84):
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(7.84) *Her cati likes some friend of every childi.≉ “for every child o, there is some friend of o that is liked by o’s cat”
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP{⟨4,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩...}
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩}
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-t2a child-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩ ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
some⟨3,a⟩ XP⋮
F3cf t3a
friend-w1-g1
t2e
DP⟨4,a⟩
ι⟨4,a⟩o XP
R2 g2
her2-g2 child-w1-g1
’s
F4cf-t4a cat-w1-g1
likes t1s t4e
The QR’d object DP binds its coindexed trace t4e. Given the constraint that an
expression cannot semantically bind distinct variables, g2 in the representation of
‘her’ cannot be bound by the DP, and the intuitively bound reading is excluded.
Let’s recap. This section has speculated about how the assignment-quantificational
approach to donkey anaphora from §6.2 might be extended to other recalcitrant
phenomena with pronominal anaphora — e.g., regarding weak crossover effects
and apparent binding out of DPs with inverse linking and genitive binding. The
D+XP syntax for inverse linking and genitives captures how expressions such as
‘some child of every parent’ and ‘every boy’s cat’ form constituent DPs (contrast
Hornstein 1995). The intuitively bound readings of pronouns in the DPs’ scope
follow from (i) the treatment of anaphoric pronouns as copies of their linguistic
antecedents, (ii) the generalized assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for
determiner quantifiers, and (iii) the use of function composition in the composi-
tional semantics of (e.g.) complex DPs formed from DP-internal movement. I sug-
gested potentially explaining weak crossover data such as Reinhart’s generalization
via a general principle that no expression can bind distinct variables. Since a moved
expression must bind its trace, the assignment-variable in a subject pronoun cannot
146
be bound by a QR’d object DP — in examples with simple DPs ((7.75b)), donkey
sentences ((7.72)–(7.73)), inverse linking ((7.82b)/(7.84)), and genitive binding
((7.78)/(7.81)) alike. There is no analogous obstacle to bound readings when the
DP is in subject position — hence Reinhart’s generalization that bound pronouns,
unlike traces, must be bound from A-positions.88
A worry with many accounts of (donkey) crossover is that they end up for-
malizing what needs to be explained — the distinction between trace-binding and
pronoun-binding. Contrasts such as in (7.71)–(7.72) may be captured via stipula-
tions on admissible indexings (e.g. Haïk 1984, Safir 1984, Reinhart 1987), or
ad hoc syntactic/semantic distinctions between traces and pronouns (e.g. Büring
2004, Safir 2004, Elbourne 2005). For instance, Büring 2004 — arguably the
most extensively developed account — introduces distinct syntactic categories for
traces and pronouns (including, crucially, individual-variables in E-type representa-
tions), distinct binding operators and domains for assignments corresponding to the
two categories, and distinct principles regarding admissible LFs for traces/pronouns
and their respective binding operators. At minimum the present assignment-variable-
based framework offers independent grounds for formally distinguishing pronouns
and traces (§§2, 4.3). Pronouns [viτ gj] include an assignment-variable from which
the element receives its interpretation; no assignment-variable is included in the
representation of a trace tiτ since the binder-index attaching to the moved expres-
sion binds the variable directly. This independent distinction may be exploited in
an account of weak crossover. No additional binder operators or constraints on
admissible indexings are required. Assignment functions and the generalized binder
index make no distinction between traces and pronouns as such.
I hope the preliminary discussion in this section may provide a basis for a more
explanatory treatment of weak crossover. The prospects for the specific assignment-
variable-based approaches in this section to determiner quantification, relativiza-
tion, and trace-/pronoun-binding remain to be seen. Ellipsis, “sloppy identity” read-
ings, and discourse anaphora may offer fruitful additional applications to explore.
88Yes, the last inference was too quick. The above discussion applied specifically to DPs with
assignment binder-indices. Nothing has been said about weak crossover effects with wh interrog-
atives, as in (7.70). There are independently attested contrasts between wh-chains and QR-chains
regarding the interpretation of traces/pronouns (e.g. Safir 1999, Cecchetto 2004). How to extend
the approach to weak crossover in this section will depend on one’s views on the syntactic/semantic
status of wh movement, reconstruction, pied piping, etc. A more general binding theory is certainly
needed. I return to wh interrogatives in §10.3.
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8 Noun phrases
Our discussion in §§6–7 focused primarily on strong quantifiers such as ‘every’. In
§7.1 we saw how the proposed choice-function based analysis can help capture
certain effects associated with “specificity” (Enç 1991), such as existence presup-
positions and contextual domain restrictions. Not all quantifier words exhibit these
effects, in general or in particular uses; and some words exhibit some effects but
not others. A critical question is how the proposed assignment-quantificational
syntax/semantics of strong quantifiers relates to the syntax/semantics for other
types of (non-)quantified noun phrases, such as weak quantifiers and indefinites —
to a first approximation, those compatible with existential ‘there’ sentences, as in
(8.1) (‘sm’ for unstressed ‘some’).89 In some languages the difference between
89All examples with ‘there’ sentences will be with existential ‘there’, not locative or presentational
‘there’ (cf. (i)). See McNally 1997, 1998, Zamparelli 1998, 2000, Francez 2007 on uses of
strong quantifiers with kind/amount nominals (cf. Carlson 1977, Grosu 2002, Beaver et al.
2005, Hartmann 2008, Hallman 2016 for relevant discussion). There is substantial variation in
acceptability with different quantifiers, noun phrases, and modifiers, cf. (ii)–(x):
(i) a. There was/wasn’t a book on the table.
b. There was/∗wasn’t a certain book on the table.
c. There appeared/∗didn’t appear a ghost.
(ii) a. There is every/??each kind of ice cream (on sale/available/in the store).
b. There are all/??most kinds of ice cream (on sale/available/in the store).
(iii) a. There was every flavor/#tub of ice cream (on sale/available/in the store).
b. There were all flavors/#tubs of ice cream (on sale/available/in the store).
(iv) There are ??all/#most of the kinds of ice cream (on sale/available/in the store).
(v) a.#There was every/each kind of ice cream being eaten (/put on the shelf).
b. There were all/#most kinds of ice cream being eaten (/put on the shelf).
(vi) a. There was everything we wanted on the menu.
b.#There all/most things we wanted on the menu.
c. There were ??all/?#most of the things we wanted on the menu.
(vii) a. There is every/#all/#most reason to believe that Alice will win.
b.#There are all/most reasons to believe that Alice will win.
(viii) a. There is ?every/#all/#most chance that Alice will win.
b. There is ??every/#all/#most probability/possibility that Alice will win.
c.#There are all/most chances/probabilities/possibilities that Alice will win.
(ix) a. There was every [kind of pie and flavor of ice cream] at the party.
b. There were all [kinds of pie and flavors of ice cream] at the party.
c. There were cars of [all styles and most colors] on display.
(x) a. ?There are most kinds of movies available on every channel. (every > most)
b. Most kinds of movies are available on every channel. (every > most, most > every)
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presuppositional and nonpresuppositional uses ((8.1)–(8.2)) can be lexicalized or
otherwise marked, as in (8.3)–(8.4) in Turkish (cf. Enç 1991, Zamparelli 2000,
Kelepir 2001).
(8.1) Existential ‘there’ sentences (Milsark 1974)
a. There is a/∗every/∗the book on the table.
b. There are no/sm/many/three/∗most/∗both books on the table.
(8.2) I’m not sure yet whether there are any mistakes at all in this book manuscript,
but we can definitely not publish it…
a. if some mistakes are found.
b.#if some mistakes are major. (von Fintel 1998a: ex. 9)
(8.3) a. *Bahçe-de
garden-loc
bazɨ
some
çocuk-lar
child-pl
var.
exist
b. Bahçe-de
garden-loc
birkaç
some
çocuk
child-pl
var.
exist
‘There are some children in the garden.’ (Enç 1991: 15; Turkish)
(8.4) … editör
editor
bazı
some
hatalar(#-ı)
mistakes(#-acc)
gör-ürse,
see-aor-cond
kitabı
book-acc
kesinlikle
definitely
basamayız.
print-abil-neg-aor.1pl
‘if the editor sees some mistakes, we can definitely not publish the book.’
(#mistakes presupposed) (Özge 2012: 401n.6; Turkish)
It is worth considering more carefully how the different specificity-related effects
are to be delineated and systematically derived. This section explores how we might
approach varieties of quantified expressions and uses in a more general assignment-
variable-based syntax/semantics for noun phrases.
(Terminology in discussions of these issues is fraught. To a first approximation
I will use ‘weak quantifier’ for quantifiers that can possibly be used in an existential
‘there’-sentence, and ‘strong quantifier’ for quantifiers that can’t; and I will talk
of “(non-)presuppositional uses” of weak quantifiers, where by ‘presuppositional
uses’ I mean uses prototypically associated with existence implications, proportional
readings, and contextual domain restrictions; uses of “strong” quantifiers are in
general “presuppositional” in this sense, though this is something to be explained
rather than definitional. We will revisit the utility of these classifications below.
I use ‘quantifier word’ as an informal descriptive label for words/strings that may
be used to express quantification, including ‘every’, ‘no’, etc. as well as numerals
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(‘three’) and articles (‘the’). I inevitably use ‘quantifier’ multiply for quantified ex-
pressions, quantifier words/strings as types, and for particular tokens. Crucially, my
usage doesn’t presuppose that the item has the syntax or semantics of a generalized
quantifier, either in general or in particular occurrences.)
8.1 A layered n analysis of noun phrases
Thus far we have been able to bracket many details regarding the internal structure
of noun phrases. Following the suggestions from Chomsky (2007) in §7.1, I will
propose that we capture contrasts between presuppositional and nonpresupposi-
tional uses in terms of the complexity of extended projections of the head noun. I
assume the basic syntax for nominals in (8.5).
(8.5) nP
n NumP
Num N
As usual, NumP is an independent projection for number and certain uses of numer-
als and non-definite determiners; it provides the locus of cardinal and “specified
quantity” interpretations, e.g. distinguishing ‘a/two/several book(s)’ from a mass
noun such as ‘water’ (Ritter 1991, Bernstein 2001, Longobardi 2001, Rijkhoff
2002, Borer 2005a, Tănase-Dogaru 2007, Megerdoomian 2008).90 n is a light
noun parallel to v in a verb phrase (e.g. ‘do’). Following Marantz 1997 it is com-
mon to treat “little” n and v as present for purposes such as distinguishing nominal
and verbal environments. In some languages the nominalizers and verbalizers with
lexical roots are morphologically overt, as in (8.6)–(8.7) (Nishayama 1998, Heine
& Kuteva 2002, Rackowski 2002, Levinson 2007, Pylkkänen 2008, Harley
2009, 2013, Julien 2015, D'Alessandro et al. 2017).
(8.6) a. Finnish: katse (‘look’ (n.)), katso (‘look’ (v.))
(i) [nP [n /e/] √kats]
(ii) [vP [v /o/] √kats] (cf. Pylkkänen 2008: 94)
b. North Sámi (Uralic): bargu (‘work’ (n.)), bargat (‘work’ (v.))
(i) [nP [n /u/] ￿ barg]
90The specific relative positions of number words and features in the number phrase is inessential
for our purposes. I leave open whether features for singular/plural marking are realized in Num or
in an independent head between Num and N (cf. e.g. Rijkhoff 2002, Borer 2005a). Though I
often represent number words in Spec,Num (alternatively, Num), in some languages numerals may
occupy an adjectival position in NP (e.g. Franks 1994, Aboh 2004, Tănase-Dogaru 2007).
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(ii) [vP [v /ɑ/] √barg] (cf. Julien 2015: 6)
(8.7) a. Santos
Santos
kari-te.
house-v0
‘Santos is building a house.’
b. Aman
there
kari-te-wa.
house-v0-pass
‘Houses are being built there.’
(Harley 2013: 42–43, 53; Hiaki (Uto-Aztecan))
I propose that we treat n0 and v0 as the locus of world variables.91 The ar-
gument structure for verbs can be adapted accordingly so that the verb combines
first with its object(s)/complement — e.g. treating ‘like’ as type ⟨e, ⟨s, et⟩⟩, ‘think’
as type ⟨at, ⟨s, et⟩⟩, etc. ((8.9)) — yielding the VP complement of v0. In clauses
such as the complement of ‘think’ in (8.8a), the world variable in v0 of the main
predicate is determined by the type-driven movement of the complementizer. A
simple predicative sentence may be represented roughly as in (8.8b).92 Number
features can be treated semantically as modifiers (cf. Ionin & Matushansky 2006)
91We will examine constraints on world variables in the nP area and substantive lexical entries for
certain n0/v0 heads in §§8.5–8.9. Adapting ideas from the “supercategorial theory” inHiraiwa 2005,
n and v might be treated as different manifestations of a single “supercategory,” call it ‘w’ (cf. n. 93).
(Compare Bowers’s (2001) Pr(ed) category, which takes as its complement the maximal projection
of any lexical category (VP, NP), and is present even with non-relational nouns/verbs (hence distinct
from n∗/v∗); however, other roles posited for Pr, such as projecting an external argument, correspond
to v∗ (cf. (8.7b)).) I leave open where classifiers and other ϕ-features may be located.
92For now I continue to ignore v∗ for introducing external arguments, I ignore any additional
semantic contribution that ‘be’ may make in sentences such as (8.8b), and I put aside issues regarding
the category of the copula in different languages (see Partee 1986a, den Dikken 1995, 1998,
Harley 1995, Rothstein 1997, Dixon 2002, Folli & Harley 2007, Mikkelsen 2011, Moro
2017); we will return to these issues in §8.9. For instance, ‘be’ could be analyzed as a main verb V or
as phonetically realizing v, as in (i). In (ii) lea ‘be’ is realized with the verbal marker /ɑ/ from (8.6).
Sabbagh 2009 argues that both v and V have morphological content in certain Tagalog existential
sentences ((iii)).
(i) a. [vP [v be] nP/n∗P]
b. [vP [v be] [VP e nP/n∗P]]
c. [vP v [VP be nP/n∗P]]
(ii) Mu
my(n)
bohtal
bottle
lea
is(v)
guoros.
empty (Julien 2005: 318; North Sámi (Uralic))
(iii) a. May-roon
exist.there
sa
loc
bahay
house
na
lk
manok.
chicken
‘There’s a chicken in the house.’
b. [vP may [VP roon …]] (Sabbagh 2009: exs. 4c, 21; Tagalog (Austronesian))
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of type ⟨⟨s, et⟩, ⟨s, et⟩⟩, as in (8.10). (An atomic individual o is an individual with
no proper parts, i.e. no o′ such that o′ ⊏ o, where ‘a ⊑ b’ says that a is a (possibly
improper) part of b (Link 1983). I use ‘count’ for whatever the relevant properties
are for being in a plural or count denotation, where ‘count(o)’ implies at least that
o has atomic parts; hence ‘atom(o)’ implies ‘count(o)’.)
(8.8) a. [vP tis [VP think⟨2,a⟩ [CP [Cd t2a]⟨2,s⟩ [Percy [vP t2s [VP likes Colin]]]]]]
b. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [Fluffy [t1s [a-[sg] cat]]]]] (preliminary)
(8.9) a. JlikeK = λxe.λws.λye.λgg . y(g) likes x(g) in w(g)
b. JthinkK = λA⟨a,t⟩.λws.λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with x(g)’s state
of mind in w(g)→ A(a)(g)
(8.10) a. J[sg]K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg ∶ atom(y(g)) .P(w)(y)(g)
b. J[pl]K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg ∶ count(y(g)) .P(w)(y)(g)
The structure in (8.5) may be integrated in a quantifier phrase roughly as in
(8.11). n∗ is again the category of elements such as X or the genitive morpheme,
parallel to v∗ in a verb phrase (the verbal functional head which projects an external
argument; §§7.1–7.2); and F is the position for specificity elements such as specific
indefinites.93
I will ignore issues regarding the base position of direct objects (e.g., Comp of V, or Spec of an
intermediate functional head such as Asp(ect); see Verkuyl 1993, Bowers 2002, Borer 2005b,
Hiraiwa 2005). In the definition of the binder index (§3.5), now for ‘think’: τ = a, σ = ⟨s, et⟩.
93The present layered analyses of noun/verb phrases build on developments (focusing primarily
on the verbal case) in delineating categories for N/V (the root or head noun/verb), n/v (a functional
projection identifying nominal/verbal environments), and n∗/v∗ (a functional projection closing off
complete noun/verb phrases) (Rackowski 2002, Lecarme 2004, 2008, Alexiadou et al. 2006,
Levinson 2007, Megerdoomian 2008, Pylkkänen 2008, Harley 2009, 2013, 2017, Julien 2015,
D'Alessandro et al. 2017, Wood & Marantz 2017; cf. (8.6)–(8.7)). Phasal properties of n∗, v∗
are examined in §8.5. I will continue to use (bold) X for the implicit lexical item, now identifying
n∗ as the general category. (I leave open whether v∗ is to be equated with Voice (Kratzer
1996; see Ramchand 2017 for critical discussion). We will examine the semantics of verbalizing
elements in an event semantics briefly in §8.9.) See §§7.1–7.2 on comparisons between our F and
the functional head for certain specificity elements in Bhattacharya 1999b, Hiraiwa 2005: 16,
212–217, Chomsky 2007: 25; cf. nn. 110, 127. We will consider an alternative F position under n
in §§8.7–8.9. I represent at least some quantifier words as projecting a QP, but, as discussed in §7.1,
this is inessential; we will return to this.
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(8.11) Layered n structure for noun phrases (preliminary)
QP
Q n∗P
n∗ FP
F nP
n NumP
Num N
8.2 Presuppositional and nonpresuppositional uses
Quantifiers with genitive complements provide key data on the source of presuppo-
sitional vs. nonpresuppositional readings. Although quantifiers such as ‘no’, ‘few’,
‘many’, etc. are generally compatible with nonpresuppositional readings, they seem
to become presuppositional with postnominal genitive complements. It is hard to
hear uses of ‘Qwk Ns of X’s’ as failing to imply that there Ns; continuations such as
in (8.12) with inherent R genitives are particularly odd.
(8.12) There are no friends of Bert’s in the audience (??because he doesn’t have
any friends).
(8.13) Alice found no/few mistakes of the author’s…
a. So she’s going to get fired.
b.??So the author must have been super careful.
Supplying modifiers doesn’t in general produce such an effect. The continuations in
the (b)-examples in (8.14)–(8.15) are felicitous.
(8.14) a. Alice found no mistakes (…because there aren’t any)
b. Alice found no mistakes in the manuscript (…because there aren’t any)
(8.15) a. There are no monsters.
b. There are no monsters under Timmy’s bed (…because there’s no such
thing as monsters)
Indeed adding the additional modifiers in (8.16b)–(8.18b) improves the (a)-exam-
ples with postnominal genitives. In a null context, existential ‘There are Qwk Ns of
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X’s’ is generally marked (other things equal) in comparison to ‘There are Qwk Ns
(ZP)’ or ‘There are Qwk N’s of X’s ZP’.
(8.16) a.??There are no friends of Bert’s.
b. There are no friends of Bert’s in the audience.
(8.17) a.??There are no medals of Alice’s.
b. There are no medals of Alice’s on the wall.
(8.18) a.??There are no monsters of mine.
b. There are no monsters of mine under your bed.
((b)-examples ok only if Bert has friends, Alice has medals, there are
monsters)
One could imagine saying (8.18b) as a way of allaying a child’s fears before bed
while accommodating an assumption that there are monsters in one’s charge. The
presuppositional effects of the genitive complements are prima facie puzzling. There
is nothing incoherent with truth conditions such as, say, that ¬∃o[friend(Bert)(o)],
or that ¬∃o[won(o)(Alice) ∧ medal(o)]. The condition that ¬∃o[mistake(o) ∧
wrote(o)(the-author) ∧ found(o)(Alice)] could be satisfied because the author
made no mistakes.
There is an important correlation between the possibility of nonpresuppositional
readings and the structure of the complement. We saw in §7.1 that it is common to
treat (definite) D as the locus of “specificity” phenomena such as existence presup-
positions, D-linking. Data such as (8.17) suggest that the key element is rather the
position occupied by a genitive morpheme (§7.2), regardless of whether it appears
with a definite determiner (implicit with prenominal genitives) or strong quantifier.
To a first approximation, the relevance of an overt genitive in (8.12)–(8.18) is that it
motivates an interpretation in which the quantifier is interpreted above n∗— above
the position occupied by ’s and implicitly realized by X in non-genitive quantifier
phrases (§§7.1–7.2). The contrasts in (8.16)–(8.18) are analogous in this respect to
contrasts with overt partitives in existential ‘there’ sentences with/without a coda,
as in (8.19) (see also Hoeksema 1996a).
(8.19) a. *There are two of the Beethoven sonatas.
b. There are two of the Beethoven sonatas on the program.
(cf. Reed 1996: 161)
Presuppositional interpretations can thus be treated as in the previous sections.
Specific indefinites are still choice-function pronouns — now identified in F0, the
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structural specificity position above n — and select an individual from the given
world. And presuppositional uses of quantifiers raise from the internal assignment
position to a position above n∗. The presuppositional readings of weak quantifiers
in (8.21) with a postnominal genitive (cf. (7.42)–(7.43)) and (8.22) with (non-re-
duced) ‘some’ may be derived parallel to (8.20) with ‘every’ (scope ¬ > ∀).94 In
(8.20) the choice-function pronoun takes the world-indexed nP as argument, and
thus selects an entity that is a mistake in the world of the discourse (=gc(1s)). So, as
in §7.1, the quantification presupposes that there are mistakes in the manuscript —
hence the infelicity of continuations implying that there weren’t any mistakes.
(8.20) The editor didn’t find every mistake. (#…because there weren’t any)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ -n’t
94Unless otherwise indicated I will ignore the specific contributions of number features from
(8.10). Note that our assignment-quantificational syntax/semantics for presuppositional uses is
compatible with quantifiers taking singular or plural noun phrases. For instance, what differentiates
(i) and (ii) is whether the possible witnesses for the quantifier include pluralities of babies. In (i) the
quantification is over individuals selectable among the set of atomic babies denoted by the singular
nP (=babyu, i.e. the set of o such that o is an atom and o is a baby); in (ii), where the nP is plural, the
choice function selects from a set that includes pluralities (=babiesu, i.e. the closure of babyu under
sum formation).
(i) a. Some/No baby laughed.
b. … [nP w1-g1 [sg]-baby] …
c. ≈ λgg . (¬)∃xe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s)) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g))∧ x(g) laughed in @(g−)
(ii) a. Some/No babies laughed.
b. … [nP w1-g1 [pl]-baby] …
c. ≈ λgg . (¬)∃xe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babiesg−(1s)) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g))∧ x(g) laughed in @(g−)
Interesting issues in crosslinguistic work on the syntax and semantics of quantifiers include differ-
ences between quantifier words that obligatorily take singular vs. plural complements, differences in
distributivity, and differences between partitive complements with definite plural vs. singular noun
phrases, as in (iii)–(v). (where the relevant reading of ‘different N’ in (iv) is the bound, non-deictic
reading). I won’t consider such issues here.
(iii) a. Every {baby is, ∗babies are} cute.
b. All {babies are, ∗baby is} cute.
(iv) a. Every/Each baby got a different toy.
b. Each of the babies got a different toy.
c. *All/Three/Most babies got a different toy. (cf. Beghelli & Stowell 1997: ex. 20)
(v) a. All/Most of the babies are dirty.
b. All/Most of the baby is dirty.
c. *All/Most baby is dirty.
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[[QP{⟨2,a⟩,⟨2,e⟩} every⟨2,a⟩ [n∗P P1et-g1 X [FP F2cf-t2a [nP w1-g1 mistake]]]]
the-editor (v∗) [vP t1s(did) find t2e]]]]
b. JnPK = λxe.λgg . x(g) is a mistake in g(1a)(1s)JSK ≈ λgg .¬(∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(mistakeg−(1s))∧ g−(1et)(x(g)))→
the-editor found x(g) in @(g−))
(8.21) No friend of Bert’s is in the audience.
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩
[[no⟨2,a⟩ [P1et-g1 [n∗ ’s [FP F2cf-t2a [nP w1 g1 [friend Bert]]]]]]
(v∗) [vP t1s (is) in-the-audience]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .¬∃xe∃aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(friend-of-Bg−(1s))∧ g−(1et)(x(g)))∧ x(g) is in-the-audience in @(g−)
(8.22) Some (#sm) people are jackasses. (Milsark 1977: 54–55)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩
[[some⟨2,a⟩ [P1et-g1 [n∗ X [FP F2cf-t2a [nP w1-g1 people]]]]]
(v∗) [vP t1s (are) jackasses]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∃xe∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(peopleg−(1s)) ∧ g−(1et)(x(g))∧ x(g) are jackasses in @(g−)
As Milsark puts it, “the only sense of some which can be understood felicitously in
[(8.22)] is the… ‘some’ sense…, that some members of the human race, as opposed,
presumably, to others, are jackasses. Substitution of destressed sm and its reading of
an indefinite number of people, nothing more, yields nonsense” (1977: 55). Indeed,
as in (8.20), the choice-function pronoun selects a (plural) person in the actual
world, and the domain pronoun in Spec,n∗ restricts the quantification to people in
the contextually relevant domain (=gc(1et)). The quantifier existentially quantifies
over those individuals o who are potentially selectable among actual people and in
the given domain. The sentence is true iff some such o are jackasses.
I suggest that what distinguishes nonpresuppositional uses of weak quantifiers
(indefinites, etc.) is that they are interpreted below n in NumP, the position asso-
ciated with number and specified quantity. A key feature of nonpresuppositional
quantifiers is that their meanings can be given in cardinal terms ((8.23)). Treating
number words as type ⟨⟨s, et⟩, ⟨s, et⟩⟩, yielding type ⟨e, t⟩ denotations for the relevant
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nPs, coheres with common ideas in syntax about the predicative status of weak
quantifiers.95 A derivation for a predicative use is in (8.24) (see nn. 90, 92).
(8.23) Cardinal lexical entries:Jδ#K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[P(w)(x)(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] Rδ nδ
● #o[ . . . o . . . ] ∶= the cardinality of the set of atoms o s.t. . . . o . . .● Jthree#K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[P(w)(x)(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] ≥ 3Jmany#K(n) = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[P(w)(x)(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] ≥ n(g)
(8.24) The winners were three women.
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[C0⟨1,s⟩ Cd t1a] [the-winners [t1s [NumP three# [[pl] woman]]]]]]
b. JNumPK = λws.λye.λgg ∶ count(y(g)) .
#x(g)[x(g) is a woman in w(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] ≥ 3
c. JSK ≈ λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a woman in @(g−) ∧ x(g) ⊑ the-winners] ≥ 3≈ ∣{o ∶ atom(o) ∧woman@(o) ∧ o ⊑ the-winners}∣ ≥ 3
The entry in (8.23) treats ‘three’ as taking a property P and returning the property
true of (plural) individuals with at least three P-atoms. The sentence is true iff the
cardinality of the set of atomic individuals o such that o is a woman and o is in the
group of winners is 3, i.e. iff there are three women among the winners.
The denotations in predicative vs. non-predicative environments can be sys-
tematically related via a general lexical rule for number words or an analogous
general type shifting mechanism (Partee 1986b, 1989b). A first approximation is in
(8.26)–(8.27), adapting a Partee-style ⟨e, t⟩-to-⟨et, t⟩ type shift for a plural domain.
To simplify the definitions, (8.25) defines a metalanguage operator max, which
(roughly put) maps a set of individuals to the singleton set of its maximal element,
if any.
(8.25) For any xe,Fet, gg: max(F(x))(g) ∶= F(x)(g)∧∀x′e∶F(x′)(g)→ x′(g) ⊑ x(g)
(8.26) Type shift option (σ): For any F′et,
sigma(F′) = λFet.λgg .∀z∶ (F(z)(g) ∧ ∀z′e∶F(z′)(g)→ z′(g) ⊑ z(g))→ F′(z)(g)= λFet.λgg .∀ze∶max(F(z))(g)→ F′(z)(g)
95See Partee 1986b, Higginbotham 1987, Hudson 1989, Giusti 1991, 1992, 1997, Diesing
1992, Mandelbaum 1994, Cinque 1995, Giusti & Leko 1995, Dimitrova-Vulchanova & Giusti
1996, Zamparelli 2000, Carlson 2003, Landman 2003; see also Bartsch 1973, Verkuyl 1993,
Ionin & Matushansky 2006 on numerals as modifiers. Hereafter I will often leave the number
features implicit; see n. 90.
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(8.27) Lexical rule option: For Num Jδ#K ∈ D⟨⟨s,et⟩,⟨s,et⟩⟩,JδK = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λFet.λgg .∀ze∶ (F(z)(g) ∧ ∀z′e∶F(z′)(g)→ z′(g) ⊑ z(g))→ Jδ#K(P)(w)(z)(g)= λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λFet.λgg .∀ze∶max(F(z))(g)→ Jδ#K(P)(w)(z)(g)
In both options, the upshot at the level of the nP is a mapping from a set of indi-
viduals S′ to the set of sets whose maximal element is in S′. Contrast (8.20) with
‘every’ with the derivations of (8.28) in (8.29)–(8.30) with (nonpresuppositional)
‘no’/‘three’. (In (8.29), for clarity I represent the type shift with an element in
Spec,n, though there are plausibly syntactic and semantic reasons for treating it
as a semantic type-shifter that applies on demand; see Partee 1986a,b, Chierchia
1998, Landman 2003. In the lexical rule option in (8.30), LFs with the basic δ#
entry would be filtered out for type reasons. I won’t distinguish singular and plural
predicates; we can understand our metalanguage in such a way that a condition
such as (e.g.) that o laughed is satisfied iff every atomic part of o laughed.)
(8.28) a. Bert found no unicorns. (…because there aren’t any)
b. [Context: Alice will pass the class only if there aren’t many/more than
three mistakes in her final exam. After the exam, the teacher says:]
Good news – I didn’t find many/three mistakes. In fact, I found none.
(8.29) Nonpresuppositional quantifier (type shift option; (8.26))
‘Bert found no unicorns’ (=(8.28a))
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a nP⟨2,e⟩
(σ)
w1 g1 NumP
no# unicorns
Bert vP
t1s found t2e
JNumPK = λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a unicorn in w(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] = 0
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sigma(JNumPK(Jw1 g1K)) = λFet.λgg .∀ze∶max(F(z))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a unicorn in g(1a)(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] = 0JSK ≈ λgg .∀ze∶max(λgg.Bert found z(g) in @(g−))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a unicorn in g−(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] = 0≈ λgg .∀ze∶ (Bert found z(g) in @(g−)∧ ∀ye∶Bert found y(g) in @(g−)→ y(g) ⊑ z(g))→
#x(g)[x(g) is a unicorn in g−(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] = 0
(8.30) Non-presuppositional quantifier (lexical rule option; (8.27))
‘Sofia didn’t find three mistakes’ (=(8.28b))
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ -n’t [[nP⟨2,e⟩ w1 g1 [NumP three mistakes]]
Sofia (v∗) [vP t1s(did) find t2e]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .¬(∀ze∶max(λgg.Sofia found z(g) in @(g−))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a mistake in g−(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] ≥ 3)
In (8.29) the NumP ‘no unicorns’ denotes the property of having no unicorn as a part,
which is shifted by sigma to a generalized quantifier at the level of the nP. Roughly
put, the sentence is true iff for any o, if Bert found o and o includes everything
Bert found as a part, then the number of o′ such that o′ is a unicorn and o′ is a
part of o is zero — i.e., iff there is no o′ such that o′ is a unicorn among the things,
if any, that Bert found. The derived truth condition can be satisfied even if there
are no unicorns; indeed (8.29) is guaranteed to be true on the intended reading
if there are no unicorns. Similarly, (8.30) is true iff it’s not the case that for any
o, if o corresponds to the maximal set of things that Sofia found, then the number
of things that are mistakes and part of o is at least three — i.e., iff there are fewer
than three o′ such that o′ is a mistake and o′ is included among what, if anything,
Sofia found. These truth conditions can be satisfied even if there are no unicorns
or no mistakes, respectively; (8.29)–(8.30) on the intended readings would be true.
Note that the rules in (8.26)–(8.27) also capture the coherence of sentences such
as (8.31). If Bert didn’t find anything, the restrictor set is the empty set and the
universal quantification is vacuously satisfied.96
(8.31) a. Bert found nothing.
96The operation in (8.26) is in this respect like a total version of the composition of iota and
lift adapted for pluralities. (Alternatively, compare a combination of Chung & Ladusaw’s (2004: 5)
Restrict rule for combining V and nP plus vP-level existential closure (Diesing 1992).)
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b. ≈ λgg.∀ze∶Bert found z(g) in @(g−) ∧ . . .→
#x(g)[x(g) is a thing in g−(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] = 0
Non-predicative uses of cardinal expressions needn’t imply the existence of anything
satisfying their restriction or the existence of anything satisfying their scope.
(8.26)–(8.27) derive the denotations of nonpresuppositional uses from pred-
icative cardinal lexical entries. The account derives the following correspondence:
The only “true” quantifiers — occurrences of quantifiers with the syntax/semantics
of a restricted quantifier — are quantifiers introducing assignment quantification
((8.32)); and all true quantifiers are presuppositional ((8.20)–(8.22)).
(I will continue to use ‘quantifier word’ informally for strings that may be used
to express quantification, and I occasionally use small caps q for the abstract quan-
tificational concept, whether or not the item expressing that concept has a quan-
tificational semantics in general or in a particular occurrence. So, e.g., talk of “the
quantifier word ‘three’” or “the quantifier three” in (8.24)/(8.30) is compatible with
‘three’ having associated lexical entries, some of which are as modifiers. Hopefully
the intended meaning will be clear, though occasional ambiguity is likely inevitable.)
Treating nonpresuppositional uses in the above way doesn’t give up the fea-
tures of our assignment-quantificational account of complex quantifier phrases from
§6. Headed relative clauses still require generating the matrix quantifier in the
assignment-argument position of the relative word, and hence require a (possibly
weak) quantifier word with an assignment-quantificational lexical entry, as in (8.32)
for donkey sentences such as (8.33) (n(g) a fraction or percentage; see Partee
1989b).
(8.32) JnoK = λP⟨a,et⟩.λP′⟨a,et⟩.λgg .¬∃xe∃aa∶P(a)(x)(g) ∧ P′(a)(x)(g)JmanyK(n) = λP⟨a,et⟩.λP′⟨a,et⟩.λgg .#o[∃aa∶P(a)(λgg.o)(g)∧P′(a)(λgg.o)(g)]÷ #o′[∃a′a∶P(a′)(λgg.o′)(g)] ≥ n(g)
(8.33) Many/No/Three babies who got a toy liked it.
The treatment of the donkey pronouns proceeds as in §6.2.
However, the account does predict that nonpresuppositional nPs shouldn’t be
able to license donkey-anaphoric pronouns in other “binding out of DP” configura-
tions such as those from §7.4. The account of inverse linking and genitive binding
exploited the assignment-quantification of the non-c-commanding quantifier to cap-
ture the anaphoric reading of the donkey pronoun. Given that nPs don’t introduce
assignment-quantification, we would expect genitive binding binding and inverse
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linking readings to be generally unavailable with nonpresuppositional uses. This
prediction can be delicate to test since most quantifier words and numerals can be
used presuppositionally, but examples with unstressed ‘sm’ may provide preliminary
support. Contrast (7.76)/(7.82a) with the (a)-examples in (8.34)–(8.35).
(8.34) [“My cat doesn’t like me because no cats like their owners.” / “No, it’s you; …]
a.#sm boysi’ cats like themi.
b. Some/SOME boysi’ cats like themi.
c. Most boysi’ cats likes themi.
(8.35) [“My students don’t like me because no teachers are popular with their
students.” / “No, it’s you; …]
a.#Most students of sm teachersi like themi.
b. Most students of some/SOME teachersi like themi.
c. Some students of most teachersi like themi.
The nP in (8.34a)/(8.35a) fails to introduce an (assignment) binder-index project-
ing to the main noun phrase, as reflected in (8.36); hence the anaphoric reading
of the donkey pronoun is unavailable. Indeed, the donkey pronoun couldn’t be
represented along the lines in §§6.2, 7.4 as a copy of an antecedent [Fcf-g nP] since
there isn’t one.
(8.36) a. [QP⟨3,a⟩ [nP⟨2,e⟩ (σ) w-g sm boys] [ι⟨3,a⟩o [n∗P . . . t2e . . . ]]] like ???
b. [QP⟨3,a⟩ [nP⟨2,e⟩ (σ) w-g sm teachers] most⟨3,a⟩ [n∗P . . . t2e . . . ]] like ???
Note that the anomalousness of (8.34a)/(8.35a) on the intended readings isn’t due
to some general incompatibility between ‘sm’ and (noun-phrase-internal) posses-
sor/object positions. Examples such as (8.37) can be felicitous with either stressed
or unstressed ‘some’.
(8.37) a. Alice likes sm countries’ presidents.
b. Timmy got sm costumes for sm parties.
(We will return to the syntax/semantics of donkey pronouns in light of the analyses
of noun phrases in this section in §8.8.3.)
8.3 Sources of “specificity” and the nominal spine
To recap: This section has examined how our account of strong quantifiers might
be integrated in a more detailed assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for
noun phrases. The analysis distinguishes the following key ingredients, outlined in
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(8.38): (i) Num (or Spec,Num), which modifies the head noun by specifying number
or cardinality, mapping a property P to the property of having nδ P-individuals as
atomic parts; (ii) little n, analogous to little v in a verb phrase, which may supply the
world-variable for the nP; (iii) F, which provides the locus for specific readings and
existence implications, by selecting an individual from the (possibly singleton) set
denoted by the NumP in the world supplied by little n; (iv) n∗, which provides the
locus of domain restriction; and (v) “true” quantifiers, which raise for type reasons
from inside the noun phrase, and provide the locus of proportional readings and
assignment-quantification.
(8.38) Prototypical properties:
a. NumPs (‘…(three#) babies’)● nonspecific, cardinal
b. FPs (‘a (certain) baby’)● specific, existence implication (possibly local)
c. n∗Ps (‘toy of Timmy’s’) /Q+n∗Ps/n∗s (‘every/noQ baby’, ‘all of the babies’)● existence implication, contextual domain restriction (possibly local)● + Q: assignment-quantification, proportional
Delineating the sources of various “specificity”-related phenomena from the litera-
ture in this way has various additional features.
First, note that the account makes no essential reference to definiteness or defi-
nite Determiners. As we have seen, there is variation within and across languages in
how syntactic and semantic definiteness may be represented in the noun phrase. For
instance, in St’át’imcets quantifier phrases the choice-function pronoun in F (on our
analysis) is realized by an overt determiner, though the determiner needn’t be asso-
ciated with notional definiteness phenomena (maximality, uniqueness, familiarity)
(see also Faller & Hastings 2008 on Cuzco Quechua); and in Somali, genitive
constructions and quantified expressions are in general marked as syntactically def-
inite, though not all uses are notionally specific or referential (§7.1). Although I
treated F as a position for certain specific indefinites, following Hiraiwa 2005, I
suggested that the position may also be realized by the definite article in partitives
such as ‘all (of) the babies’. In some languages the distinction between definite and
indefinite specificity markers is lexicalized, as reflected in (8.39) with Gungbe lɔ́ and
ɖé, respectively. As indicated in (8.39c), lɔ́ and ɖé compete for the same category.
The definite specificity marker lɔ́ is a [+def] version of ɖé in F.
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(8.39) a. Kɔḱú
Koku
xɔ̀
bought
távò
table
lɔ́
spfc[+def]
lɛ.́
pl
‘Koku bought the specific tables.’
b. Kɔḱú
Koku
xɔ̀
bought
távò
table
ɖé
spfc[–def]
lɛ.́
pl
‘Koku bought some specific tables.’
c. *Kɔḱú
Koku
xɔ̀
buy.perf
távò
table
ɖé
spfc[–def]
lɔ́
spfc[+def]
lɛ.́
pl
(Aboh 2004: 76–77; Gungbe (Niger-Congo))
English quantifier phrases such as ‘every baby’ are “presuppositional” in the sense of
implying the existence of babies and a contextually relevant domain. Yet whereas
the contextual domain restriction with anaphoric ‘both’ (‘both babies’) or an ex-
plicit partitive is to a set of previously introduced individuals in the context, no
such “familiarity” presupposition need be associated with ‘every baby’. Additional
implications may of course be associated with particular expressions or occurrences,
though I don’t assume that syntactic or semantic definiteness is criterial of any of
the relevant positions.97
Likewise the structure in (8.11) may apply to languages without articles or
(definite) determiners. Certain quantifier words or choice-function elements might
be treated as instantiating a D(eterminer) position, yet the account is compatible
with alternative categories for quantifier phrases (§7.1). We may expect differences
within and across languages — say, with different quantifier words instantiating D,
a Q(uantifier) category, or a Top(ic) position, and some projecting while others not,
as in e.g. (8.40).
(8.40) Alternative “nominal left periphery”
a. [QP Q [TopP Top n∗P]]
b. [QP Q [n∗P [(Top) n∗]]]
c. [n∗P Q n∗P]⋮
What is essential are the general functional heads n, n∗, criterial of noun phrases;
a position for specificity elements such as certain specific indefinites (relative/wh
words, etc.); and a position for number.
Although an FP may pick out an individual in the world supplied by the nP, not
all uses of expressions with at least the structure of an FP need have intuitively spe-
97We will return to issues regarding choice-function elements within the nP in §§8.7–8.9.
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cific readings or imply existence in the world of the discourse. Higher assignment-
binders internal or external to the noun phrase may generate local readings of a
choice-function pronoun, domain pronoun, or world pronoun (§§1, 7.1, 8.8.3).
In §§8.7.2, 8.8.3 we will see how local readings in choice-functional expressions
can generate nonspecific interpretations in intensional contexts. Specific indefinites
which are used as relative words, such as in various Gur languages, needn’t have
‘certain’-like readings when bound by the higher operator in a relative clause (§6.1;
Hiraiwa 2005). In (non-cardinal) quantifier phrases the selected individual varies
with the assignment-quantification introduced by the quantifier. I don’t see a useful
sense in which a postnominal genitive such as ‘cat of Alice’s’ in ‘some cat of Alice’s
or other’, or non-partitive quantifier phrases such as ‘every cat’ or ‘no one’, are
specific. (For this reason in what follows I will avoid Enç-style talk of “specificity,”
and reserve ‘specific’ for characterizing readings about a specific individual or group
of individuals.)
8.4 Sources of specificity II. Crosslinguistic (in)variation: “weak” vs. “strong”
quantifiers and existential ‘there’ sentences
The proposed account derives the contrast between nonpresuppositional and pre-
suppositional readings of a string Q N as a difference between nPs, where Q has
the syntax/semantics of a cardinality modifier in NumP, and QPs, where Q has the
syntax/semantics of an individual/assignment quantifier in a complete n∗P. Logical
properties such as being symmetric or intersective haven’t played a fundamental
explanatory role (e.g. (8.22); contrast Keenan 1987). However, we may still ex-
pect there to be interesting connections between the presuppositional properties of
quantifier words and the kinds of quantification intuitively expressed. Notably, the
account predicts that quantifier words expressing quantificational concepts q that
cannot be defined in cardinal terms — quantifiers which cannot be analyzed as mod-
ifiers in NumP à la (8.23) — to be generally incompatible with nonpresuppositional
readings. Given that such quantifiers can only have quantificational lexical entries
of the form in (8.32), they can only be generated as Q in structures of the form
in (8.11), the structures which generate (e.g.) existence implications as derived in
(8.20)–(8.22). That is, we expect the class of “strong” quantifiers across languages
to minimally include quantifier words expressing concepts with an inherently re-
lational or proportional semantics — quantifiers whose abstract semantics can only
be given in terms of a relation between a restriction and scope — such as positive
universal quantifiers (‘all’, ‘every’, ‘each’) and proportional quantifiers such as ‘most’
(cf. Partee 1995b, Keenan 2002). To the best of my knowledge this prediction is
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borne out. I am not aware of languages with quantifier words for ‘all’, ‘most’, etc.
that can be used nonpresuppositionally.98
What relevantly distinguishes quantifier words such as ‘no’, ‘many’, etc. is that
they can also be associated with denotations of the form in (8.23) and given the syn-
tax/semantics of a modifier in NumP. As we have seen, uses of δ# in such environ-
ments aren’t associated with “contextually given sets” (Enç 1991: 11) and needn’t
carry existential implications. Although their abstract semantics renders them com-
patible with both cardinal/modifier uses and quantificational uses, we should expect
there to be languages with words for some, many, etc. which lexically specify a
particular type of use. That is, we should expect there to be quantifier words for
such concepts which only have the type ⟨⟨s, et⟩, ⟨s, et⟩⟩ cardinal denotation — hence
can only be modifiers in structures of the form in (8.24)/(8.29)–(8.29) and be used
nonpresuppositionally — or only have the type ⟨⟨a, et⟩, ⟨⟨a, et⟩, t⟩⟩ quantificational
denotation — hence can only be assignment quantifiers in structures of the form in
(8.20)–(8.22) and be used presuppositionally. This prediction is also borne out.
As we saw in (8.22) from Milsark, unstressed ‘sm’ is of the former kind; ‘sm’ can
receive only the nonpresuppositional “reading of an indefinite number of people,”
hence its “nonsense” in (8.22) (Milsark 1977: 55). On the account in this section,
whereas ‘some’ can be interpreted as (8.41a), as in the Q+n∗P structure in (8.22),
‘sm’ is associated exclusively with the cardinal modifier entry, as reflected in (8.42)
(assuming the sigma type-shift option). (The particular modificational entry for
unstressed ‘some’ needn’t concern us here. ‘sm N’ doesn’t in general yield a count
98I think it is sometimes underappreciated just how surprising this crosslinguistic tendency (if
not generalization) is. Enç’s response is representative (§7.1; Enç’s NP corresponds to our DP):
Why should universally quantifying NPs be specific? … It has often been noted that
universal quantifiers in natural languages quantify over contextually given sets…
If universal quantification is over contextually relevant sets of individuals, it follows
that NPs that quantify universally are specific… The characterization of universally
quantifying NPs as specific guarantees [that they presuppose existence].
(Enç 1991: 11; emphasis added)
There are reasons to be dissatisfied here. It might be one thing if all quantifier words were always
used presuppositionally with existence implications; but they aren’t. Prima facie, ‘no’ quantifications
would also seem to quantify over “contextually given sets”; yet ‘no’ patterns with positive existentials
in allowing nonpresuppositional uses. It would be striking if no language lexicalized a nonpresuppo-
sitional universal quantifier every∗/all∗ (≈ ‘all if any’) for which uses such as (i) would be felicitous.
(i) a. I have no idea whether there are aliens, but if many/all∗ aliens attack us, it will be a bad day.
b. Intended: ≈ “…if many/all aliens, if there are any, attack us …”
The general absence of such quantifiers follows from the proposed general structure of noun phrases
and syntax/semantics of quantifier words.
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meaning in the manner suggested by (8.41b) (e.g. ‘sm water’); but for present
purposes I treat the modificational entry for ‘sm’ along the lines of the schema for
δ# in (8.23).)
(8.22) Some (#sm) people are jackasses. (Milsark 1977: 54–55)
(8.41) a. JsomeQK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶P+(a)(x)(g) ∧Q+(a)(x)(g)
b. Jsome#K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[P(w)(x)(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] ≥ 1
(8.42) sm people are jackasses. (cf. (8.22))
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [[nP (σ) w1-g1 sm people] [t1s jackasses]]]]
b. JsmK = Jsome#K
c. JnPK = λFet.λgg .∀ze∶max(F(z))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a person in g(1a)(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] ≥ 1JSK ≈ λgg .∀ze∶max(λgg.z(g) is a jackass in @(g−))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a person in g−(1s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] ≥ 1≈ ∣{o ∶ atom(o) ∧ person@(o) ∧ o ⊑ the-maximal-jackass@}∣ ≥ 1
“Nonsense” indeed.
On the flip side, quantifier words which correspond to paradigmatic “weak”
quantifiers in English, yet can only be used with existence implications, are attested
in various languages. In (8.3) from Enç 1991, we saw how Turkish bazɨ ‘some’ con-
trasts with English ‘some’ in being incompatible with existential ‘there’ constructions.
Faller & Hastings (2008) show that wakin in Cuzco Quechua functions essentially
as a strong quantifier; it cannot be used in existential ‘there’ sentences, in predicative
environments, or nonpresuppositionally, as in e.g. (8.43). Matthewson (1998,
2009) observes similar phenomena with St’át’imcets nukw, as in (8.44).
(8.43) Tari-sqa-ku-raq
find-nx.past-pl-cont
(#wakin)
(some)
dodo-kuna-ta.
dodo-pl-acc
‘They found some dodos.’ (Surprisingly, given we had believed them extinct.)
(Faller & Hastings 2008: 308; Cuzco Quechua)
(8.44) [∗Nukw/Cw7it/∗Tákem
some/many/all
sk’wemk’úk’wmi7t]pred
children
[i
det.pl
wa7
impf
tayt].
hungry
‘The ones who are hungry are some/many/all children.’
(Matthewson 2009: ex. 8; St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish))
The words for some in such languages can be treated as the counterpart of ‘sm’ in
(8.42): ‘sm’ lexically specifies the modifier entry in (8.41b); expressions such as
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wakin lexically specify an assignment-quantificational relational/proportional entry
such as (8.41a). The predicative use in (8.44) is ungrammatical since nukw lacks the
type-⟨set, set⟩ entry that would allow it to combine with type-⟨s, et⟩ ‘children’. (8.43)
with wakin can only be represented with a Q+n∗P structure such as (8.47), leading
to the (anomalous) presuppositional interpretation parallel to (8.20)–(8.22).
(8.45) JwakinK = JnukwK = JsomeQK
(8.46) a. [nP w-g [NumP wakin/nukw/someQ dodos/children]]
b. NumP ∉ J K
(8.47) [wakin⟨2,a⟩ [n∗P P1et-g1 X [FP F2cf-t2a [nP w1-g1 dodo]]]]
Unlike in previous accounts, no special semantic conditions or primitive “specificity
markers” are required to capture the properties of wakin, etc. characteristic of strong
quantifiers. The presuppositional properties follow from our general assignment-
variable-based syntax/semantics for quantifiers. Quantifier words such as ‘every’
or ‘most’ are incompatible with a modificational syntax/semantics in NumP (hence
nonpresuppositional uses) by virtue of the kind of quantificational concepts they
express. Expressions such as wakin/nukw pattern in this way as a quirk of their
lexical semantics. Unlike English ‘some’ they simply fail to be associated with the
cardinal modifier entry corresponding to (8.41b).
So, our syntax/semantics predicts an asymmetry in the possibilities for weak vs.
strong quantifiers across languages (at least to the extent that the general structure
of noun phrases are relevantly uniform). On the one hand, the account predicts
that we should find languages which lexicalize strong quantifier words — words
incompatible with nonpresuppositional or predicative uses — that express intuitively
non-proportional quantificational concepts. This prediction is confirmed across var-
ious language families. However, the account predicts that we should not expect to
find languages which lexicalize weak quantifier words — quantifier words which are
compatible with nonpresuppositional or predicative uses — that express inherently
relational/proportional quantificational concepts. If only crosslinguistic generaliza-
tions weren’t so dangerous.
Call quantifier words corresponding to ‘some’, ‘few’, etc. which can only be used
with existential implications lexicalized presuppositional quantifiers. Languages with
lexicalized presuppositional quantifiers provide a key insight into the distinction be-
tween weak/strong quantifiers, in the sense of quantifiers which can/cannot be used
in existential sentences. As noted above, examples such as (8.48) with lexicalized
presuppositional some-words are ungrammatical.
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(8.48) a. *Wakin(/Askha/∗Llapan)
some(/many/all)
llama-kuna
llama-pl
chakra-pi
field-loc
ka-n.
be-3
‘There are some llamas in the field.’
(Faller & Hastings 2008: 283; Cuzco Quechua)
b. *Bahçe-de
garden-loc
bazɨ(/okbirkaç)
some(/some)
çocuk-lar
child-pl
var.
exist
‘There are some children in the garden.’ (Enç 1991: 15; Turkish)
c. *Er
there
zijn
are
sommige(/okenkele)
some(/some)
eenhoorns
unicorns
in
in
dit
this
bos.
forest
‘There are some unicorns in this forest.’ (de Hoop 1995: 424; Dutch)
A prominent approach is to explain felicity/infelicity in existential ‘there’ sentences
as due, in some sense, to presuppositionality (e.g. Enç 1991, Diesing 1992, Zucchi
1995, Faller&Hastings 2008). In light of data such as (8.48), Faller&Hastings
conclude by
identifying presuppositionality as the key factor which excludes strongly
quantified noun phrases from existential environments. That is, univer-
sal quantifiers … as well as other strong quantifiers like wakin ‘SOME’
… are felicitous only when it is understood that their restrictions are
non-empty. (Faller & Hastings 2008: 285–286)
The account in this section suggests, rather, a common cause underlying the con-
nection between presuppositional uses of quantifiers and incompatibility with exis-
tential ‘there’: the non-predicative QP syntax/semantics of the Q N phrase.
The syntax and semantics of existential ‘there’ sentences are controversial. Fo-
cusing just on bare existentials ‘There be Q N’, suppose that the syntax is sim-
ply as the surface form suggests — namely, where ‘there’ (if present) is the gram-
matical subject and ‘(be) Q N’ is the main predicate, [vP (be) [Q N]] (cf. Jenkins
1975, Williams 1984, Chung 1987, Hazout 2004, Francez 2007, Sabbagh 2009,
Villalba 2013, Creissels 2014). The distribution of quantifier words falls out:
‘Q N’ can be used in existential ‘There be Q N’ only if ‘Q N’ is predicative. Lexicalized
presuppositional quantifiers such as those in (8.48) are excluded for the same reason
that quantifier words expressing inherently relational quantificational concepts are
excluded, and for the same reason that both types of quantifier words are excluded
from predicative environments generally: they lack the cardinal entry that would
allow them to be used as modifiers within the nP (cf. also Milsark 1974). The
structure in (8.49) is uninterpretable.
(8.49) a. [vP (tis) [nP every/most/wakin llama(s)]]
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b. vP ∉ J K
The “key factor” excluding existential sentences such as those in (8.1)/(8.48) isn’t
presuppositionality per se but the structure of the noun phrase. The problem of
quantifier words in existential ‘there’ sentences is fundamentally a problem not of
logic (Keenan 1987, 2003), syntax (Safir 1985, Law 2011), or presupposition, but
of compositional semantics.
A sample derivation for a felicitous existential ‘There be Q N’ sentence is in
(8.50) (to be revised in §8.9). Suppose, following work by Partee & Borschev and
Francez, that existential ‘there’ sentences include a (possibly locational) pronoun
representing a relevant domain (Borschev & Partee 2002, Partee & Borschev
2007, Francez 2007, 2009, 2010; also Hartmann 2008, McCloskey 2014, Irwin
2018). The type-⟨e, t⟩ main predicate combines with the plural/locational pronoun
(cf. (8.8b), (8.24), n. 92).99
99We will consider existential sentences with codas and revisit the syntax/semantics of nominal
pivots, the copula, and contextual domain element in §8.9 (see also nn. 89, 92). (In ‘There be YP
(ZP)’, the nominal YP is often called the “pivot,” and the ZP, if present, the “coda.”) See Francez
2007, 2009, 2010 for possible additional implicit structure in the element(s) determining the relevant
domain restriction. Given our purposes I bracket questions about the relation between the interpreted
plural/locational pronoun and overt grammatical subjects such as existential ‘there’ (see Hazout
2004, Hartmann 2008: §§2.2, 3.2, Tortora 2014: ch. 2 on comparisons between existential and
verbal ‘there’ sentences; cf. Moro 1997: 278n.14, Cresti & Tortora 2000: 71); and I ignore any
potential complications from distinguishing sorted variables for locations (see e.g. Kracht 2002).
Interestingly, whereas standard English exploits the otherwise-locative marker ‘there’, Appalachian
English uses the plural pronoun ‘they’ for the grammatical subject in existential sentences:
(i) They is something bad wrong with her.
(Montgomery & Hall 2004: lxii; Appalachian English)
Distinguishing the grammatical subject and the type-e pronoun may afford an analysis of existential
constructions in languages that use both an expletive subject and locative marker, as in (ii) with
French il y a. Another potential candidate might be the German locative da in existential construc-
tions with sein ‘be’ ((iii)). In existentials such as (iv) with a coda, the coda phrase is available to
serve as the V2-licenser, yielding the sein da order (the verb moved to C); in bare existentials such
as (iii)/(vii), V2 is licensed by da, yielding the da sein order. So, unlike es, which cannot follow
the tensed verb in existentials with ‘be’ ((iv)), da isn’t merely a syntactic expletive merged in Spec,C
to license V2 (Czinglar 2000, 2002, Hartmann 2008). As may be expected, in V-final clauses
da follows the complementizer and precedes middle-field elements such as the nominal pivot ((v)).
Existentials with ‘be’ in which da and the expletive es co-occur are also possible ((vi)); es is obligatorily
merged in Spec,C, and da remains in situ. Semantically, Hartmann (2008) reports that although
da’s locative meaning is largely bleached in existential sentences (cf. (vii)), da still makes a semantic
contribution. Unlike in languages such as French, an alternative impersonal existential construction
(es gibt) is available, and da retains a broadly locational flavor. (Thanks to Maja Spener and Merten
Reglitz for assistance with the data.)
169
(8.50) ‘There are three pillows’
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [vP o3e g1 [t1s [three# pillows]]]]]
(ii) Il
it
y
loc
a
has
trois
three
enfants.
children
‘There are three children.’
(iii) Da
da
sind
are
viele
many
Elefanten.
elephants
‘There are many elephants.’
(iv) Im
in.the
Zoo
zoo
sind
are
da/∗es
da/it
viele
many
Elefanten.
elephants
‘There are many elephants in the zoo.’
(v) Fritz
Fritz
denkt,
thinks
dass
that
da
da
viele
many
Elefanten
elefants
sind.
are
‘Fritz thinks there are many elephants.’
(vi) a. Es
it
sind
are
da
da
bewährte
proven
Strategen
strategist
am
at.the
Werk,
work
mit
with
denen
whom
Merkel
Merkel
sich
herself
umgibt.
surrounds
‘There are proven strategists at work with whom Merkel surrounds herself.’
(www.heise.de/tp/features/Die-Bundeskuemmerin-4116705.html)
b. Es
it
war
are
da
da
ein
a
Verdacht
suspicion
(aber
but
seien
be.con
wir
we
froh,
happy
dass
that
der
that
ausgeräumt
put-aside
ist)
is
‘There was some suspicion (but let’s be glad that it didn’t prove true)’ (cf. (vii))
(vii) Da
da
(/?Dort/?Hier)
there/here
war
was
ein
a
Verdacht
suspicion
‘There was some suspicion’ (/‘A suspicion was there/here’) (Hartmann 2008: 207)
(viii) ??Da
da
ist
is
(/okEs
it
gibt)
gives
genau
only
eine
one
gerade
even
Primzahl.
prime-number
‘There is only one even prime number.’ (Hartmann 2008: 208, Czinglar 2000: 57)
It would be interesting to examine whether certain other (object) locative clitics in Romance
existentials might also be analyzed as realizations of the type-e pronoun (e.g., Italian ci, Catalan hi,
Borgomanerese ghi); see also n. 120 on Irish ann ‘in it’. We will consider additional motivations for
and analyses of the contextual domain element(s) in §8.9 in the context of crosslinguistic connections
between existential and possessive sentences.
The proposed analysis of existential ‘there’ sentences might be compared to Hartmann’s (2008)
PredEXP analysis, which treats the pivot nominal as the complement of a special functional head
PredEX with a situation pronoun as subject — roughly, [PredEX theresit [[PredEX be] DP]]. ‘There’ and
da are treated as instantiating the situation pronoun, and the pivot nominal is treated as a DP with
an empty D-layer. Unlike v∗ or the Pred(ication) category in Bowers 2001, Hartmann’s PredEX
(necessarily) selects for a DP complement. If the analysis in the main text is on the right track,
positing a distinctive PredEX head specific to existential constructions needn’t be required. The syntax
and compositional semantics for existential ‘there’ sentences falls out of the general layered v/n
architecture for verb/noun phrases. We will return to these issues in §8.9.
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b. JSK ≈ λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a pillow in @(g−) ∧ x(g) ⊑ g−(3e)] ≥ 3
(preliminary)
Roughly put, the existential ‘there’ sentence in (8.50) with ‘three’ is true iff the
number of pillows in the relevant domain — pillows that are part of (the plural-
ity/location) gc(3e)— is at least three.
As is evident, there is nothing distinctly “existential” about so-called existen-
tial ‘there’ sentences on the above analysis (cf. Creissels 2014). (be) Q N is given
the syntax/semantics of a main predicate; the property expressed is predicated of
the pronoun which represents the relevant domain. The derived truth-condition in
(8.50) is equivalent to the intuitive quantificational condition that there is an o such
that o is a pillow ∧ . . . Yet there is no (implicit or explicit) existential quantification,
no “existence predicate,” no implication of property-instantiation, etc. (contrast e.g.
Milsark 1974, McNally 1997, 1998, 2009, Chung & Ladusaw 2004, Hartmann
2008, Sabbagh 2009, Law 2011, McCloskey 2014, Irwin 2018). This is for the
better. No innovations are required for existential ‘there’ sentences with nominals
expressing downward entailing (‘no/few Ns’) or non-monotone (‘exactly three Ns’)
quantificational concepts. The compositional semantics of (8.51) with ‘no’ is the
same as that of (8.50) with ‘three’.100
(8.51) There are no pillows (…so we should go buy some)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [vP o2e g1 [t1s [no# pillows]]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a pillow in @(g−) ∧ x(g) ⊑ g−(2e)] = 0
Roughly put, (8.51) is true iff the number of individuals o such that o is a pillow in
@(gc) and o is part of the plurality gc(2e) representing the relevant domain is zero.
In (8.51) the relevant domain is contextually restricted — hence the coherence of
continuations such as ‘so we should go buy some’. Compare (8.52) where the rele-
vant domain gc(4e) corresponds to the domain of entities E. The derived semantic
value is contextually equivalent to the condition that no o′ ∈ E is a unicorn in@(gc).
E might even be empty (cf. ‘There are no unicorns, because nothing exists’, possibly
true, never truly uttered).
100Contrast the common talk of the “existential predicate” and “existential proposition”
(e.g. McNally 1997, 2011, 2016, Francez 2007, McCloskey 2014, Irwin 2018). E.g.: “the
assertion of an existential sentence has the effect of introducing an additional discourse referent
instantiating the argument of the existential predicate”; an existential “construction … does little
more than allow speakers to introduce a new individual into the discourse” (McNally 1997: 6, 2016:
212; cf. Kimball 1973: 265, Ward & Birner 1995, Payne 2009: 120, a.m.o.). (See Creissels 2014:
§2 for a helpful corrective.)
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(8.52) There are no unicorns.
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [vP o4e g1 [t1s [no# unicorns]]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a unicorn in @(g−) ∧ x(g) ⊑ g−(4e)] = 0
The derived semantic values for existential ‘There be no N’ sentences imply existence
of Ns no more than the semantic values for nonpresuppositional uses such as (8.29).
The account of nonpresuppositional uses proposed in this section treats the
type-⟨⟨s, et⟩, ⟨s, et⟩⟩ modifier δ# as basic, and derives the non-predicative meaning
for the nP from a general lexical rule or semantic type shift, as in (8.26)–(8.27).
Although type shifts are sometimes assumed to be universal, Partee herself was
careful not to make such an assumption (cf. Partee 1986b: 208). A natural question
is whether there are languages which lack the type-shifting operations in (8.26)–
(8.27). In such languages uses of quantifier words in non-predicative environments
would have exclusively non-cardinal readings. Interestingly, Matthewson reports
that quantifier words in St’át’imcets have obligatory cardinal readings in predicative
uses, and obligatory proportional readings in non-predicative uses, as reflected in
(8.53) (Matthewson 1998).
(8.53) a. [cw7it
many
plísmen]pred
policemen
[i=úxwal’=a]
det.pl=go.home=exis
‘The ones who went home were many policemen.’
(predicative; cardinal reading obligatory)
b. [cw7it
many
i=plísmen=a]
det.pl=policeman=exis
úxwal’
go.home
‘Many policemen went home.’
(nonpredicative; proportional reading obligatory)
(Matthewson 1998: 329, 137; St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish))
The proposed syntax/semantics provides a diagnosis. If a language lacks the type-
shifting operations in (8.26)–(8.27), then nPs like those in (8.29)–(8.31) which give
rise to nonpresuppositional cardinal readings will be underivable or uninterpretable.
There is no lexical rule deriving a type ⟨⟨s, et⟩, ⟨s, ⟨et, t⟩⟩⟩ entry analogous to the
derived entry for ‘three’ in (8.30); or no sigma type shift to convert the predicative
cardinal nP to type ⟨et, t⟩. So, the only structure in which a cardinal use of a quan-
tifier word can appear is an nP of type ⟨e, t⟩— hence the unavailability of cardinal
readings in non-predicative environments, as reflected in (8.54) for (8.53b). (ni a
number-variable supplying the relevant threshold n for what counts as “many”). The
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only available structure for (8.53b) is the structure with the complete n∗P, i.e. the
structure with the quantificational proportional entry for ‘many’, as in (8.55).101
(8.54) a. [NumP [cw7it# n1-g1] policemen]
b. Jcw7it#K = Jmany#K ((8.23))JNumPK = λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[x(g) is a policeman in w(g) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)]≥ g(1a)(1n)
c. [[nP w1-g1 NumP] [vP t1s went-home]] ∉ JK
(8.55) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩
[[[cw7itQ n1-g1]⟨2,a⟩ [P1et-g1 [n∗ X [FP F2cf-t2a [nP w1-g1 policemen]]]]]
[vP t1s went-home]]]]
b. Jcw7itQK = JmanyQK ((8.32))
Recall that our account distinguishes the existence implications derived with Q+n∗P
quantifier phrases generally from intuitively “specific” interpretations and semantic
definiteness. As discussed above, the determiner (here choice-function pronoun)
in St’át’imcets needn’t be notionally definite in the sense of presupposing that the
selected individuals in the relevant domain have been previously introduced in the
discourse (Matthewson 1998, 2009, 2013). However, given that St’át’imcets quan-
tifier words in non-predicative uses can only appear in complete Q+n∗P quantifier
phrases, our account does predict that all non-predicative uses will carry an existence
101See Matthewson 1998: 353–358 on the specific proportional conditions associated with
quantificational cw7it; see Partee 1989b on proportional ‘many’ in English. In Tagalog, nonpre-
suppositional quantifiers cannot function as subjects in active transitive sentences, as reflected in
(i) with kaunti ‘few’; yet other types of argument-position uses are possible, as in the antipassive
construction in (ii).
(i) a. [kaunti]pred
few
ang
sbj
tao-ng
person-lnk
uminon
agr.asp.drink
ng
nonsbj
kape.
coffee
lit. ‘The people who drank coffee were few’ (‘Few people drank coffee’)
b. Uminom
agr.asp.drink
ng
nonsbj
kape
coffee
[ang
sbj
bawa’t/∗kaunti-ng
each/∗few-lnk tao].person
‘Each person/Few people drank coffee.’ (Sabbagh 2009: 707; Tagalog (Austronesian))
(ii) Nakakita
perf.intr.see
ako
1sg.sbj
roon
there
ng
nonsbj
marami-ng
many-lnk
tao
person
‘I saw many people there’ (Sabbagh 2016: 655; Tagalog (Austronesian))
It would be interesting to check whether proportional readings of e.g. kaunti/maraming ‘few’/‘many’
in Tagalog are also unavailable in subject uses such as (i-b). If so, Tagalog would contrast with
St’át’imcets in lacking associated proportional/non-proportional entries for quantifier words/strings
expressing few, many, etc.
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implication; as in examples such as (8.20), the (obligatory) determiner qua choice-
function pronoun in F above the nP selects an individual in the given world. Indeed
Matthewson 1998 glosses the enclitic portion …a of the determiner as encoding
“assertion of existence.”
8.5 Sources of specificity III. Modal (in)dependence
The syntax/semantics in this section delineates phenomena often associated in the
literature with “specificity,” such as existence implications, cardinal/proportional
readings, definiteness, and compatibility with existential ‘there’ sentences. In clos-
ing I would like to briefly consider one final connection regarding the modal/temporal
independence of different types of noun phrases.
Much of the paper has focused on capturing alternative local and global read-
ings of broadly context-dependent elements. Yet, as discussed in §§3, 4.3, just as
important for an overall theory is an account of local/global readings which are
obligatory. A key advance came from Musan (1995), who observed that tempo-
rally independent readings are generally unavailable with cardinal noun phrases —
readings in which the temporal interpretation of the noun phrase is independent of
the temporal interpretation of the clause’s main predicate. (8.56) needn’t have the
perhaps surprising implication that (8.57) has.
(8.56) In the sixties, every senator was a child.
a. ≈ “in the sixties, everyone who was a senator at that time was a child”
(temporally dependent reading)
b. ≈ “in the sixties, everyone who is now a senator was then a child”
(temporally independent reading)
(8.57) In the sixties, (sm) senators were children.
a. ≈ “in the sixties, some senators at that time were children”
(temporally dependent reading)
b. ≉ “in the sixties, some people who are now senators were then children”
(temporally independent reading)
(cf. Musan 1995: 74–76)
Although Musan, following Enç (1981, 1987), focused primarily on tense and possi-
bilities for independent temporal interpretations, she notes that contrasts analogous
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to those in (8.56)–(8.57) may be observed with worlds (Musan 1995: 219–220).102
Examples such as (8.58)–(8.59) support Musan’s generalization. (8.58), unlike
(8.59), is compatible with the non-sadistic (modally independent) reading — the
reading in which the world of the noun phrase is independent of the world of the
clause’s main predicate. In (8.60) Alice has a superior tactical strategy; Bert is
confused.
(8.58) It would be better if every murderer was a priest.
a. ≈ “for all worlds u in which every murderer in u is a priest in u, things
are better in u” (modally dependent reading)
b. ≈ “it would be better if everyone who is actually a murderer was a priest”
(modally independent reading)
(8.59) It would be better if sm murderers were priests.
a. ≈ “for all worlds u in which some murderers in u are priests in u, things
are better in u” (modally dependent reading)
b. ≉ “it would be better if some people who are actually murderers were
priests” (modally independent reading)
(8.60) [Context: Alice and Bert are watching their team in a match. Players are
assigned either an offensive position or a defensive position.]
a. Alice: The team would play better if everyone on offense was on defense.
b. Bert: The team would play better if there were (sm) players on offense
on defense.
In (8.60a) the world relevant for interpreting ‘everyone on offense’ is the world of
102Lecarme (1996, 1999b, 2004, 2008) shows that in nominal tense languages such as Somali
these interpretive possibilities are reflected in the morphology (§§7.1–7.2); indefinite noun phrases
in Somali are incompatible with interpreted tense morphemes, which would supply an independent
temporal interpretation. In some languages modally independent readings of noun phrases can also
be overtly marked, as in (i-b).
(i) a. [mee
3nonsg
tabori
home.f
-mete
far.past.nonwit.f
-mone
rep.f
jokana]
real
clearing
clearing(f)
joro
sit(du.sbj)
ni-kimi-ne-ke
aux-two-contin.f-decl.f
‘The two clearings of their reported past villages are there.’
b. [oko
1sg.poss
jibotee-ne]
spouse-irr.f
o-katomi-ne
1sg.ag-fight.with-contin.f
‘I fight with (and kill) one who could have been my wife.’
(Dixon 2004: exs. 10.67–10.68; Jarawara (Arawan))
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the discourse; Alice is saying that the team would play better if all of the players
actually playing on offense played defense instead. (8.60b) can only be interpreted
as saying that the relevant better worlds u are worlds in which some offensive players
in u are on defense in u; the world for ‘players on offense’ can only be the world of
the counterfactual possibility.
Like the distribution of (non)presuppositional readings, the distribution of modally
(temporally) (in)dependent noun phrases cannot be characterized simply at the
level of quantifier words/strings. The distinction between modally dependent and
modally independent interpretations isn’t equivalent to, say, the distinction between
weak and strong quantifiers. Whereas (8.61a) can receive the coherent reading
corresponding to Alice’s utterance in (8.60a), (8.61b) with the existential ‘there’
construction is incoherent.
(8.61) The team would play better…
a. if no one on offense was on offense. (≈ (8.60a))
b.#if there was no one on offense on offense. (≉ (8.60a))
What relevantly distinguishes (8.61b) (and (8.60b)) is that the existential ‘there’
construction forces the nonpresuppositional reading — on the analysis in this sec-
tion, the reading in which the quantifier word is in NumP and the noun phrase is
an nP. Examples such as (8.58)–(8.61) thus suggest that the possibility of receiving
a modally independent reading depends on having at least the structure of an FP
(cf. §6.1.3). The distinction between uses of quantifier words that can have modally
independent interpretations vs. those that cannot corresponds to the distinction
between structurally non-defective and defective noun phrases.
§4.2 applied our assignment-variable syntax/semantics to classic de re vs. de dicto
ambiguities in attitude ascriptions. The distinction between de re vs. de dicto read-
ings was diagnosed as a distinction between global vs. local readings of world-
pronouns, i.e. world-pronouns bound by T vs. the local assignment binder-index.
However, we can now see that not all embedded noun phrases can receive de re
(unshifted) readings in this sense. The world variables with nPs have obligatory
local (de dicto) readings. One strategy might be to revise our syntax/semantics
so that nPs lack a world-pronoun and receive their world-argument directly from
the main predicate; in an n∗P the world argument might be supplied by one of the
higher functional elements such as n∗. However, such an approach would require
treating verbal elements as systematically ambiguous with respect to the types of
their individual arguments — namely, depending on whether the argument is or is
not world-dependent; verbs can combine with both nPs and (Q+)n∗Ps. The treat-
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ment of the relevant type-shifting operations for non-predicative uses of nPs would
also need to be revised to cohere with the revised entries for verbs.
A more promising approach is to explain the world-dependency of nPs as the
result of a purely syntactic process. The relevant generalization is that the world-
variable (if any) occupying n in an nP must be coindexed with the world-variable in
the closest v (cf. Rizzi 1990). No such constraint applies if the nP is embedded in a
larger noun phrase, i.e. if n doesn’t head the maximal projection of the noun. Given
that indices are features, the generalization amounts to the claim that the (subscript)
index-feature in n must agree with the (subscript) index-feature in the closest v
unless n is “blocked off” (in some sense to be made precise) by an intervening head,
such as n∗. These generalizations can be derived from the general architecture of
the current theory and agreement mechanisms in contemporary syntax.
For purposes of illustration consider a general phase-based framework, follow-
ing Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2008), in which syntactic derivations take place in small
chunks, phases, which provide the window for syntactic operations, such as fea-
ture matching/transmission (also e.g. Cecchetto 2004, Hiraiwa 2005, Kratzer
2009). Phases are characterized by various types of syntactic, semantic, and mor-
phophonological independence. In the clausal case the phases have been argued to
be (at least) v∗P and CP. Putting aside issues regarding possibilities for modal/temporal
independence, it is evident that any nominal phases are above nP. Arguments from
the literature for treating DP as a phase, such as regarding island constraints, may be
reframed as applying to the spread of functional projections above nP (see e.g.Adger
2003: ch. 10, Svenonius 2004,Hiraiwa 2005, Lee-Schoenfeld 2007; cf.Chomsky
2007: 26). Extraction is degraded from the specific indefinites, definites, and pre-
suppositional quantifier phrases in (8.62).
(8.62) a. Who did Alice say you saw a/sm/more than three picture(s) of?
b.*?Who did Alice say you saw the/a certain of?
c. *Who did Alice say you saw Bert’s/most picture(s) of?
(cf. Diesing 1992: 97–98)
As we saw in §6.1.3, specific indefinites can also receive world-independent (de re)
readings.103 The apparent gradation in unacceptability in (8.62b)–(8.62c) may
103As Diesing puts it: “Thus, the ‘specificity’ effect is not due to a contrast between the definite and
indefinite determiners, or even between strong and weak determiners. Although extraction from an
NP with a strong determiner is generally bad, the acceptability of extraction from an NP with a weak
determiner hinges on their being no presuppositional reading available (or required) in the given
context” (Diesing 1992: 98).
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support positing multiple nominal phases (cf. Kluender 1992, Svenonius 2004,
Kazuhiro 2010, Jiménez-Fernández 2012, Haegeman et al. 2014). Adjudicating
among such options needn’t concern us here; but for present purposes let’s assume
that at least FP is a phase.
(The relevant minimal nominal phase could also be treated as n∗P, where the
apparent phasal status of FP noun phrases such as specific indefinites is due to an
n∗P shell, i.e. [n∗P n∗ [FP F nP]]. The embedding n∗ would play its usual syntactic
functions, e.g. marking the FP as a noun phrase; nP is attracted to Spec,F, and
F raises to n∗ in the narrow syntax. Yet, unlike in genitive constructions, quan-
tifier phrases, etc., the n∗ head would be semantically empty (thus maintaining
the contrast between specific indefinites of type e and n∗Ps of type ⟨e, t⟩ in e.g.
postnominal genitives). Such an analysis would make the parallels between noun
phrases and verb phrases even more transparent: nP/vP are defective noun/verb
phrases, and n∗P/v∗P are nominal/verbal phases (cf.Chomsky 2007: 25–26). Given
our purposes I will ignore such potential semantically vacuous structure, and I will
speak of FP in [F nP] noun phrases as a nominal phase. The talk of “FP noun
phrases” and “FP phases” in what follows can be understood as short for [n∗P n∗
[FP F nP]] structures with a semantically vacuous n∗. We will return to these issues
in §§8.7–8.9.)
The modal dependence of nPs on the closest v, and modal independence of noun
phrases larger than nP, can be derived from feature transmission and the locality of
phases. There are various ways of formalizing the relevant syntactic notions that
would fit the bill. The definitions in (8.63)–(8.64) will suffice for our purposes
(see e.g. Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2007, Richards 2007, Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009,
Gallego 2010).
(8.63) Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC)
In phase HP with head H, the domain [i.e. complement] of H is not accessi-
ble to operations outside HP; only H and its edge [i.e. specifier(s)/adjunct(s)]
are accessible to such operations. (Chomsky 2000: 108)
(8.64) Feature Checking (FC) (application to worlds)
The features of a world argument w[s] agree with (match, unify with) the
features of the verbal functional head W[s], if any, that it is in the domain of.
The Phase Impenetrability Condition encodes the idea that the complement of a
phase is only accessible to syntactic operations such as agreement from positions
inside the phase. Feature Checking (FC) says, roughly, that world-index features
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in a verbal domain agree, where “verbal domains” are understood broadly as those
headed by elements with world features.104
The possibility for modally independent readings with FPs (n∗Ps, QPs) follows
straightway from PIC. The world-pronoun in n is inside the complement of the
nominal phase and thus inaccessible to feature-matching operations outside it, as
reflected in (8.65) (where H is the relevant nominal phase head in (8.65), and the
grayed-out nP complement indicates inaccessibility at a higher phase ZP, such as
v∗P or CP).
(8.65) [ZP Z … [HP H … [nP [n wk gj] …
So, n can — and for compositional semantic purposes, must — enter the syntactic
derivation as a world-pronoun [wk gj] with its own set of index-features. The world-
pronoun might end up being interpreted as identical to the local v, i.e. the world-
variable of the clause’s main predicate. Yet since the nominal phase head renders
n invisible from the positions of higher verbal functional heads, no coindexing or
interpretive equivalence is required.
Turning to nPs, there are two relevant positions to consider. If the nP originates
inside the vP, the agreement in world-index features is ensured by v in the v∗P phase
via Feature Checking (FC), as illustrated in (8.66) (where underlining indicates the
results of FC). The world-variable in n is c-commanded by v; and, since n and v are
in the same v∗P phase, n is visible for syntactic operations to v; hence the feature
sets agree by FC yielding the coindexed variables representing the feature-set with[i], [s].
(8.66) [v∗P … [vP v0is … [nP n0is … ]]]
If the nP is generated as an external argument in Spec,v∗, then the agreement in
world-index features is ensured (at minimum) by the complementizer C in the CP
phase. This follows from PIC and the general syntax/semantics for clauses from
§3. Since the complementizer raises for type reasons from v, the local C0⟨i,s⟩ and
vis are necessarily coindexed due to the nature of type-driven movement. By the
104A syntactic constraint such as PIC needn’t raise concerns for the familiar top-down compo-
sitional semantic derivations or LF representations we have been assuming thus far. Although
the complements of phases are often assumed to be shipped to the phonological and semantic
components simultaneously, a phase-based theory with local (morphophonological) spell-out is
compatible with treating the semantic component as accessed one-off when the syntactic derivation
completes (see Fox & Nissenbaum 1999, Nissenbaum 2001, Cecchetto 2004, Tanaka 2015 for
relevant discussion; contrast e.g. McGinnis 2003).
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definition of PIC, the nP in the edge (specifier) of the v∗P phase is visible from
the local C position and accessible to operations such as FC. So, the world-variable
in n is in the domain of the local C; since n is in Spec,v∗, n is visible for syntactic
operations from C; and C has feature s; hence, by FC, the feature sets agree, yielding
the coindexed variable with the feature-set with [i], [s], as in (8.67) (the grayed-out
vP complement of v∗ again indicating inaccessibility at the CP phase).
(8.67) [CP C0⟨i,s⟩ … [v∗P [nP n0is … ] [v∗ vP]]]
In either case, since feature checking applies only at the phase-level, n’s index cannot
be determined via agreement with a v or C in a higher clause, as reflected in (8.68)
(order of the embedded n and v irrelevant).
(8.68) [v∗P … v0ks … [CP C0⟨i,s⟩ … n0is … v0is … ]]
The locality of phases ensures that the world-variable in n is coindexed with the
closest v.
An agreement-based account of modally dependent readings of nPs along these
lines is compatible with alternative theories of agreement. Understanding agree-
ment in terms of feature-matching might be most natural, yet theories with feature
copying or feature merging/unification (Barlow 1992, Kratzer 2009) are also
possible. Although feature agreement construed as unification is in principle neutral
with respect to the direction of feature transmission, our compositional semantics
severely constrains the possible n’s that can enter the syntactic derivation in nP noun
phrases. Insofar as the complementizer raises for type reasons from v, v will be a
fully specified variable, say tis, and thus won’t be able to receive index features from
n. If n enters the derivation with a feature-set including [d], for some number d ≠ i
or type d ≠ s, then at minimum n won’t be interpretable after FC since variables with
multiple numerical or type indices aren’t interpretable (§2). The only possibilities
in our current system are (i) for n to enter the structure with a matching feature-set,
n0is; (ii) for n to be empty (ignoring other elements such as category features); and
perhaps, depending on how exactly numerical and type features are delineated,
(iii) for n to enter the structure minimally specified for type, n0s . In case (i), FC
amounts to checking. In case (iii) (if possible), n receives v or C’s numerical index
and becomes an interpretable variable syntactically/semantically bound by C. And
in case (ii), n lacks a world feature and thus isn’t recognised as a target for FC.105
105Case (ii) might be understood as applying to examples such as (8.8b), (8.24), (8.50)–(8.52)
where the nominal provides the clause’s main predicate, as reflected in (i). Alternatively, the
complementizer might be treated as raising directly from n0, as in (ii).
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A derivation with a modally dependent nP in an attitude ascription is in (8.69).
The boxes indicate the result of agreement from FC in the lower CP phase. (I
continue to ignore v∗ for purposes of the semantics; I assume the simplified cardinal
entry for ‘sm’ from (8.41b); and I leave ‘friends-of-mine’ unanalyzed.)
(i) C0
⟨i,s⟩
… [vP v0is [nP n∅ NumP]]
(ii) C0
⟨i,s⟩
… [vP v [nP [n0 tis] NumP]]
In (ii) the predicate nominal is “nominal” in having the category of the root determined by n (and
having interpretable ϕ-features), and “predicative” in having its world-features determined directly
by the (type-driven) movement of the complementizer. The sort of upward ϕ-feature propagation to
the verbal/clausal domain discussed in Hazout 2004 follows straightway (see also nn. 91, 92).)
In either configuration, note that the overt movement of the complementizer from inside the
vP is consistent with the phase-based model. Following Chomsky (e.g. 2001: 13–14), the com-
plement of a phase becomes inaccessible to further syntactic operations when the next higher
phase is assembled. Hence a vP undergoes spell-out only after the complementizer raises and is
(re)merged to the structure, forming the CP, [CP C0
⟨i,s⟩
… [v∗P v∗ … tis … ]]. (We will reconsider
world-agreement with other types of predicative uses and with relative clauses in §§8.7–8.9. In-
terestingly, the above sorts of v+nP analyses of predicate nominals are effectively a mirror image
of the n+vP analysis of nominal ‘of-ing’ nominalizations in Harley 2009: 337. Comparisons with
other types of nominalizations may provide interesting avenues to explore (cf. also Marantz 1997,
Alexiadou 2001b, Hiraiwa 2005).)
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(8.69) ‘Bert thinks sm friends of mine smoke.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
Bert
t1s
thinks⟨2,a⟩ CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
v∗P
nP
(σ)
u2s NumP
sm F-o-M
(v∗) vP
t2s smoke
Jv∗PK ≈ λgg .∀ze∶max(λgg.z(g) smokes in g(2s))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a friend-of-mine in g(2s) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] ≥ 1JSK ≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with Bert’s state of mind in @(g−)→(∀ze∶max(λgg.z(g) smokes in @(a(g)))(g)→
#x(g)[x(g) is a friend-of-mine in @(a(g)) ∧ x(g) ⊑ z(g)] ≥ 1)
This says, roughly, that for all possibilities h compatible with Bert’s state of mind,
the number of o that are friends of mine in @(h) and included among the smokers
in @(h) is at least one. The embedded subject nP ‘sm friends-of-mind’ is in the
edge position of the lower v∗P phase. The n0 with feature [s] is thus visible from
the position of the embedding complementizer and accessible for operations such
as FC. The nominal predicate’s world-variable is coindexed with C’s binder-index
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by agreement, and so, by extension, with the world-trace left from the type-driven
movement of the complementizer from v of the clause’s main predicate.106
The account of modally (in)dependent readings of noun phrases in this section
highlights a crucial feature of our general syntactic/semantic architecture from §3.
The above account offers a purely syntactic basis for the obligatory local (modally
dependent) readings of certain uses of noun phrases, those with the structure of
an nP. One might wonder whether the obligatory local reading of the clause’s main
predicate might be captured by the same sort of general agreement mechanism,
and thus whether we could do away with the type-driven movement of the com-
plementizer. The answer is “no.” In clauses with complete verb phrases, v∗P, the
verb’s world-argument position inside the vP is invisible from the position of the
complementizer or an embedding modal, as reflected in (8.70). Regardless of how
exactly the compositional semantics would proceed, the world variable wi inside the
complement of the v∗P phase is inaccessible for feature agreement with the higher
C or mod.
106The LF and derived truth conditions in (8.69) represent a “nonspecific de dicto” reading in the
sense of §4.2; (8.69) ascribes to Bert a belief that I have friends and some or other of them smoke.
Since ‘think’ isn’t a scope island (unlike ‘if’ in (8.58)–(8.61)), one might expect the noun phrase to
be able to take wide scope with respect to the attitude verb. In such a case, the nP’s world variable
is coindexed with the matrix complementizer by FC in the higher CP phase; the attitude ascription
would be true iff the number of actual friends of mine o′ such that, for all possibilities h′ compatible
with Bert’s state of mind, o′ is included among the smokers in @(h′), is at least one. In §4.2 we saw
that certain noun phrases, such as those with indefinite ‘a’, can also receive so-called “nonspecific
de re” readings — readings in which the noun phrase takes narrow scope and its world argument
receives a global reading, as in (4.7), reproduced below:
(i) Alice thinks a friend of mine will win.● nonspecific de re ≈ “there is some group of individuals who are friends of mine (say, the
Sharks) such that Alice thinks some or other of them will win”
Unlike noun phrases with ‘a’, noun phrases with ‘sm’ are exclusively nPs. So, we should expect
nonspecific de re readings to be generally unavailable with ‘sm’ and other nonpresuppositional uses
of weak quantifiers. This seems to be borne out. Nonspecific de re readings in (8.58)–(8.61) (where
nonspecificity is forced by the scope island) are apparently unavailable. Examples such as (ii) with
attitude ascriptions are similarly strained.
(ii) [Context: There’s a group of friends of mine, the Sharks, and Bert thinks some or other of them
are after him, but he doesn’t know who. Bert doesn’t think I have any friends.]
#Bert thinks there are sm friends of mine after him.
The embedded nP’s world argument is coindexed with the local complementizer by agreement. The
contrast in possibilities for nonspecific de re readings falls out of the general account of possibilities
for modally independent readings (non-local readings of world arguments) with nPs vs. n∗Ps.
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(8.70) mod [CP C … [v∗P … [vP … wi … ]]]
A purely agreement-based approach is inadequate for the general case.
Our type-driven movement of the complementizer obviates this issue. The com-
plementizer C0⟨i,s⟩ raises for type reasons from main predicate’s world-argument
position, leaving a coindexed trace in v0is (nn. 13, 105). In a vP-internal dependent
noun phrase inside the domain of v∗P, FC applies with v0is, yielding a coindexed
world-variable in n0is. in a vP-external dependent noun phrase inside the domain of
CP, FC applies with C0⟨i,s⟩ . Either way, coindexing among the local C0⟨i,s⟩, v0is, and n0is
is ensured, and the complementizer binds the world-variables of the main predicate
and any dependent nPs in the clause. The interaction between syntax and semantics
at its best.107
8.6 Taking stock
Let’s recap. §6 investigated how an assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for
headed relative clauses can capture various linguistic shifting phenomena with rela-
tivization and donkey pronouns. §7 begun to explore how the account of quantifiers
107A possible interesting connection is Kratzer’s (2009) “minimal pronoun” account of fake index-
icals. Following Kratzer 2004, Adger & Ramchand 2005, Kratzer treats binders of individual
pronouns as being introduced by verbal inflectional heads v∗, which may be related via feature
transmission with local bindees (Kratzer’s v is our v∗). Our world variables introduced as n0s in
nonpresuppositional nPs (case (ii) above in the main text) might be construed analogously as
“minimal world pronouns” (i.e. minimally specified for type), which receive relevant features from
the local [+s] functional head. Kratzer’s treatment of v∗ as mediating agreement with individual
variables would be a natural counterpart of the proposed role for v in mediating agreement with
world variables. However, from what I can tell, Kratzer stipulates the needed individual-binders
introduced by v∗, as in e.g. (i)–(ii). Kratzer is explicit that the binders aren’t introduced by movement
of the antecedent. It isn’t said whether they are introduced in all verb phrases or whether there
is some movement operation relating v∗ and the bound pronouns. (Kratzer doesn’t treat v∗ as
quantificational. The binder couldn’t in general be introduced due to type-driven movement of v∗
from the position of a bound (minimal) pronoun, since not all verb phrases have bound pronouns.
Treating v∗ as optionally raising to create a binder when needed, even though not for type reasons,
would undercut the claimed advantage over the account in Heim & Kratzer 1998 in which the
binder is created by not-necessarily-type-driven movement of the antecedent DP.)
(i) a. I blame myself.
b. [v∗P I [v∗ [⋋[n] [blame [n] ]]]]
(ii) a. We are the only people who brush our teeth.
b. … [v∗P ∅[n] [v∗ [⋋[n] [brush ∅[n]’s teeth]]]] (Kratzer 2009: 194, 202; labels adapted)
Though I have been ignoring v∗ in the semantics, perhaps a more detailed syntax/semantics for verb
phrases could provide a basis for a (movement-driven) assignment-variable-based treatment of fake
indexicals along Kratzer’s lines (see §8.9, nn. 10, 51, 127).
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with relative clause complements might be extended to other types of quantified
expressions. In §§7.1–7.2 I suggested that the proposed D+XP syntax may provide
a common basis for certain notions of specificity from the literature. This section
has examined the internal syntax and compositional semantics more carefully with
an aim of developing a more general assignment-variable-based account of noun
phrases. The proposed account coheres with current work in syntax on parallels
between noun phrases and verb phrases; it provides precise derivations for var-
ious properties often going under headings of “specificity” and the weak/strong
quantifier distinction — e.g., existence implications, contextual domain restriction,
notional definiteness, compatibility with predicative uses and existential ‘there’ sen-
tences, and modal independence; and it captures various data involving local/global
readings with different types of quantificational expressions, in English and in cer-
tain other languages. I hope that these features may provide a fruitful contribution
to broader crosslinguistic work on the syntax and compositional semantics of noun
phrases and quantifier words.
Key features of the account are as follows. Contrasts between broadly non-
presuppositional and presuppositional uses are captured in terms of the structural
complexity of the noun phrase. First, noun and verb phrases are given a parallel
basic structure. The light noun/verb n/v provides the locus of world variables.
nP noun phrases represent nonpresuppositional readings and provide the nominal
analogue of “defective” vPs. The syntax/semantics of [n NumP] noun phrases is fun-
damentally predicative. Cardinal readings of numerals and certain quantifier words
are represented as modifiers in NumP, yielding a property-type denotation (perhaps
analogous to how aspectual heads may modify the verb in a verb phrase). In predi-
cate nominals the world argument is supplied by the world-trace from the movement
of the complementizer, (cf. (8.8b), (8.24), (8.50)–(8.52), (8.135), n. 105; more
on this in §8.9). In non-predicative uses the world-variable in n is determined by
agreement with the local v in the v∗P phase or with the local C in the CP phase. In
both cases the world argument for the noun phrase is derived to be identical with
the world argument of the clause’s main predicate (cf. (8.66)–(8.69)). The modal
dependence of nonpresuppositional noun phrases — the obligatory local reading of
the nominal predicate’s world argument — follows from the proposed nP analysis,
the general clausal architecture from §3, and independent syntactic mechanisms
(e.g., feature transmission, PIC).
What distinguishes presuppositional uses of noun phrases is that the nP is in-
tegrated in a larger structure. We delineated three relevant heads above nP (per-
haps among others; cf. (8.40)): F, for elements such as specific indefinites, certain
uses of relative/wh words, and implicit choice-function elements, perhaps along
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with certain uses of definite articles and other determiners (§7.1); n∗, for elements
such as the genitive morpheme and certain (possibly implicit) case-assigning ele-
ments (§7.2); and Q, for certain uses of quantifier words. Various “specificity”-
related phenomena are derived from characteristic properties of positions in the
larger structure.
The modal independence of specific indefinites, definites, and presuppositional
uses of quantifier words — the possibility for non-local readings of the nominal’s
world argument — is an instance of the general syntactic/semantic independence of
the nominal phase (see §8.5). Since the world-argument position in n is inaccessible
for agreement operations with an outside verbal head, the world argument may —
and, for compositional semantic reasons, typically must — be supplied by a world-
pronoun. The interpretation of the world-pronoun may or may not be identified
with the world of the clause’s main predicate. So, de re (global) readings of nominal
predicates embedded under a modal are predicted to be available only with noun
phrases having at least the structure of [(n∗) FP] (cf. §4.2).
The analysis delineates the sources of specific readings, existence implications,
and notional definiteness. Insofar as the F head selects an individual from the set
denoted by the nP, [FP F nP] structures are characteristically associated with specific
readings and existence implications (cf. (8.20)–(8.22)). In larger noun phrases
the quantification introduced by a higher element may lead to readings that aren’t
intuitively specific, in the sense of being about a particular individual. In embedded
contexts such as attitude ascriptions, the existence implication may be relative to
a local domain (cf. §§1, 7.1, 8.8.3). The n∗ head, analogous to v∗ in complete
verb phrases, may provide a source of contextual domain restriction (cf. (8.22),
§§7.1–7.2). Importantly, such elements in the FP or n∗P needn’t be associated with
semantic definiteness. Absent additional semantic definiteness features or lexical
constraints, the relevant individual or set of individuals denoted by an FP or n∗P
may or may not be “familiar,” in the sense of having been previously introduced
in the discourse (§§7.1, 8.3). Further consideration of how notional definiteness
phenomena may be implemented with different expressions and uses is called for.
Finally, “true” quantifiers — nominal elements with a quantificational seman-
tics — provide the locus of proportional readings and assignment quantification.
As in the previous sections, the quantifier word is base-generated in a relevant inter-
nal assignment-argument position, such as in F0, and raises as the maximal element
of the nominal layer. I suggested that the distinction between “weak” vs. “strong”
quantifiers corresponds to a distinction between quantifier words that can vs. cannot
function as modifiers in NumP. Strong quantifiers across languages are predicted
to be those which express inherently relational quantificational concepts, such as
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‘all’, ‘each’, ‘most’. Their abstract semantics and the general syntactic architecture
predict that they can only be used in QPs, and thus that they will be invariably exhibit
properties such as presuppositionality, proportional readings, independence, etc.
What relevantly distinguishes weak quantifiers is that they express quantificational
concepts that they can be associated with cardinal modifier entries such as (8.23);
insofar as they can function as number modifiers, they can be used in the sorts of nP
structures which give rise to predicative and nonpresuppositional uses. Although
their abstract semantics may be compatible with modifier and quantificational en-
tries, languages may have forms which are only associated with a particular entry —
e.g., forms expressing some that are exclusively number modifiers, and thus can
only be used in (predicative) nPs with nonpresuppositional, cardinal, dependent
readings; or forms expressing some that are exclusively quantificational, and thus
can only be used in QPs with presuppositional, proportional readings (cf. (8.41)–
(8.49)). Some languages may lack the lexical or semantic type shift for nPs ((8.26)–
(8.27)), leading to systematic correlations between predicative/non-predicative en-
vironments and cardinal/proportional readings ((8.53)–(8.55)). Although I treated
the quantifier words as heading QPs, an alternative is to treat them as adjoining
to n∗P; delineating other categories for elements above n∗ may also be called for
(cf. (8.40); see also §10.3). It might not be surprising if the distinction between
quantifier words that are necessarily quantificational (i.e., inherently or lexically
specified strong quantifiers) and those that aren’t was grammaticalized in certain
languages. Phenomena such as compatibility with different types of existential
sentences call for more careful investigation (more on which in §8.9).
A central feature of our assignment-variable-based account is that it helps cap-
ture various types of local and global readings of broadly context-dependent ex-
pressions. Yet just as important for an overall theory is to provide explanations
for why certain readings may be systematically not available. We have seen that
different mechanisms may apply in different cases. For instance, for the obligatory
local reading of the world argument of a clause’s main predicate, §3 offered a move-
ment-based explanation (cf. §8.1): the complementizer is base-generated in the
world-argument position (now identified as little v) and moves for type reasons as a
quantifier over worlds; and the interpretation of the world variable is determined by
an embedding modal element, which raises as a quantifier over assignments from
an internal argument in C0. Obligatory local/global readings of particular expres-
sions may be determined by lexical constraints — e.g., that a relevant pronoun’s
assignment-variable be bound by the local or topmost assignment-binder (§4.3.3).
For some expressions, such as perhaps epistemic modals, the relevant lexical con-
straints might be explainable in terms of the truth-conditional content and general
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features of contexts of use (cf. Blutner 2004, Leckie 2013, Silk 2016a, 2017);
for other expressions, the constraints may be language-specific and idiosyncratic
(cf. §8.4). Third, in §8.5 I suggested that the modal/temporal dependence of non-
presuppositional noun phrases (Musan 1995) — the obligatory local readings of
world arguments in nPs — may have a purely syntactic explanation. Appealing to
multiple explanatory mechanisms in these ways shouldn’t be regarded as a defect.
Indeed we should expect the different parts of the theory — narrow syntax, lexical
and compositional semantics, pragmatics — to (conventionally) constrain interpre-
tation in different ways. A linguistic theory with assignment variables can provide
compositional derivations of the varieties of local and global readings, while offering
principled bases for reining in the flexibility of the system.
8.7 A revised analysis of relative clauses: Internal heads and intensional gaps
Now that our more general assignment-variable-based analysis of noun phrases is on
the table, let’s revisit the issues raised for the account of restrictive relative clauses
from §6. The analysis in §6.1 treats the relative phrase as originating in Spec,Crel,
and the relative complementizer as moving from the gap position as a quantifier over
individuals. Yet §6.3 raised critical syntactic and semantic issues for any account
along these lines. In particular, it is hard to see how a syntax/semantics in which the
relative phrase originates external to the relative IP could apply to languages with
circumnominal relative constructions, or capture intensional gap readings, in which
the nominal predicate’s world argument receives a non-global reading under an
IPrel-internal element, as in (6.56) and (6.59)–(6.63), reproduced in (8.71)–(8.72).
(8.71) a. [CPrel Atia
Atia
n
c
da’
buy.perf
[bua
goat
seka]
rel
da’a
market
zaam]
yesterday
la
d
bɔi
lose.perf
mɛ.
prt
(lit. ‘The [Atia bought which goat at the market yesterday] got lost.’)
‘The goat that Atia bought at the market yesterday got lost.’
(Hiraiwa et al. 2017: 5; Gurenɛ (Niger-Congo))
b. [Mary
Mary
[taku/∅]
something
ka￿ ￿ e]
make
ki
the
ophewathų.
I.buy
(lit. ‘I bought the [Mary made (something)]’)
‘I bought what Mary made.’
(Williamson 1987: 188–189n.4; Lakhota (Siouan))
(8.72) Callie wants to hug every unicorni which Timmy thinksi he found __.
It is worth exploring how we might develop a syntax/semantics applicable across
the broader spectrum of examples.
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§6 developed an improved assignment-variable-based compositional semantics
for head-raising analyses. The remainder of this section outlines an alternative
“matching” analysis that maintains the features of the §6-account and avoids the
bugs. Matching analyses agree with head-raising analyses that the relative phrase
originates inside the relative clause; however, matching analyses posit that the
nominal head also has an independent representation external to CPrel (Lees 1960,
Carlson 1977, Sauerland 1998, 2003, 2004, Bhatt 2002; see also Cinque 2013,
2015 for comparisons with raising analyses). Although one of the “internal” and
“external” heads is in general deleted in the phonological component, both are
semantically interpreted. The following matching account captures the data from
§6.2 with donkey sentences, as well as shifting phenomena with intensional gap
readings and further crosslinguistic data with circumnominals. The treatment of
restrictive relative clauses is layered directly into the general syntax/semantics for
noun phrases developed in this section.
8.7.1 A matching account of relative clauses
In §§7.1, 7.2, 8.2 we saw how certain types of restrictive modification could be
captured in the n∗P layer. A natural idea is to extend the analysis to restrictive
relative clauses. As with the n∗Ps in (8.62) from §8.5, extraction from the nominal
head of a relative clause is generally degraded — notably, even when the noun
phrase occurs with a nonpresuppositional use of a weak quantifier, as reflected in
(8.73). The restrictive relative clause in (8.76) functions analogously for purposes
of compositional semantics to the restrictive modifier in the free R genitive in (7.42),
reproduced in (8.74) (cf. n. 64).
(8.73) a.*?Who did you say there are sm/many/three pictures of which Alice likes?
b. There are sm/many/three pictures of Bert which Alice likes.
c. Who did you say there are sm/many/three pictures of (in the newspaper)?
(8.74) ‘cats of Alice’s’
[n∗P [R-g Alice] [n∗ ’s [Fcf-tia cats]]]
(8.75) “Matching” structure (schematic)
[n∗P [CPrel … [Fcf-tia (n) NumP] …] [n∗ [Fcf-tia (n) NumP]]]
(8.76) ‘cats which are owned by Alice’≈ [n∗P [CPrel …whcf-tia cats are owned by Alice] [n∗ n∗ [Fcf-tia cats]]]
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A matching structure for relative clauses falls out of our general approach to modi-
fication and the syntax/semantics of noun phrases.108
In languages with double-headed circumnominal relative constructions (Dryer
2005, Heath 2008, Cinque 2013: ch. 17, 2017), the structure in (8.75) may be
equivalent to the pronounced form, as in (8.77b)–(8.78). In Kombai (8.77) the
connective marker -o in double-headed relatives is the same marker used with gen-
itives, as well as other types of prenominal modifiers. In Jamsay (8.78) the particle
mediating the relative clause and external head is a possessive morpheme (cf.Dixon
1969, 1972, Matisoff 1972, Gil 2013, Nikolaeva & Spencer 2013, Thurgood
& LaPolla 2017). The relative clause functions analogously to the structural “pos-
sessor” in free R genitives, delimiting the relevant domain (see n. 69, §§7.2, 8.2).
(8.77) a. momof-o
uncle-conn
lã
wife
‘uncle’s wife’
b. [doü
sago
adiyano-n-o
give.3pl.nonfut-tr-conn
doü]
sago
deyalukhe
finished.adj
‘the sago that they gave’
(de Vries 1993: 77–78; Kombai (Trans–New Guinea))
(8.78) [[ ìjɛ̀
position
è
2pl
íjɛ́
stand
bèrɛ̂ː ]
can.impf-ppl.nonhum
mà
poss
ìjɛ]́
position
‘the position (/situation) where you stand’
(Heath 2008: 481; Jamsay (Niger-Congo))
Each element in (8.75) is overtly realized.
Let’s start by examining the specific internal syntax of the relative clause. The
external nominal head and the relative clause are constructed independently. To a
108Here and in what follows I will bracket which of the internal/external heads represents the
elided head. It is often assumed in matching accounts that the elided head is the head inside the
relative clause, though see Cinque 2013 for arguments that which head is pronounced can vary
across within and across languages (cf. Law 2014). Given our purposes we can leave open how the
phonological deletion operations are determined in the syntax and phonological component. To fix
ideas I follow Cinque 2003, 2013 in representing the relative clause as being merged left of n∗ in
the narrow syntax; however, as discussed below, the compositional semantics is compatible with
representing the relative clause as right-adjoined to (say) n∗. To anticipate, observe that even if the
relative clause is merged as a left-adjunct, (syntactically driven) movement of the external nominal
head to Spec,n∗ would derive the pronounced word order in languages such as English (see also
n. 64):
(i) [n∗P nP/FP [n∗ [CPrel … nP/FP …] [n∗ n∗ (t)]]]
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first approximation, the relative phrase inside the relative clause can be formed as
a copy of the [Fcf-g n Num N] complement of n∗ (see Sauerland 2004, Cinque
2013: ch. 17 for potential complications). In light of data such as (8.71) with
circumnominals, the relative phrase is now treated as originating in the gap position
inside the relative clause. The remainder of the relative clause can be constructed
largely like main clauses. The relative clause’s main predicate can be interpreted
independently of a matrix modal (or tense) (cf. n. 74).
(8.79) It would be better if sm students who failed didn’t fail.
One option would be to treat the main predicate’s world argument as supplied by a
world-pronoun (as in §6) and treat the relative complementizer as generated in its
interpreted position. Alternatively, the relative complementizer might be analyzed
like other types of complementizers as raising from little v as a quantifier over
worlds; however, the complementizer’s internal assignment argument would be
supplied by an assignment variable representing the relevant local/global reading of
the main predicate. Examples such as (8.80)–(8.81) may provide (theory-internal)
evidence against the former option. (8.80b) is sad; (8.80a) is disturbing.
(8.80) a. In the sixties, few children who sm senatorsi/∗k bulliedi were invited to
their birthday parties.
b. In the sixties, few children who most senators bullied were invited to
their birthday parties.
(8.81) [Context: Bert doesn’t think there are spies, but we know better.]
Bert thinks that if people who most/#sm spies are friends with come to the
party, it will be fun.
As in matrix clauses, the modal (temporal) interpretation of the subject-position
nonpresuppositional quantifiers depends on the modal (temporal) interpretation
of the relative clause’s main predicate. This follows straightforwardly from the
account in §8.5 if the relative complementizer has world-index features: the modal
interpretation of the nP in Spec,v∗ is determined by feature transmission in the CPrel
phase, as reflected in (8.82a). If the relative complementizer lacks world-index
features, more would need to be said to rule out (e.g.) (8.82b) in which the world-
pronoun in n is contextually identified with the world of the discourse.
(8.82) a. … [CPrel C0
⟨2,s⟩
rel [v∗P [nP u2s sm spies] v∗ vP]] …
b. … [CPrel Crel [v∗P [nP w1-g1 sm spies] v∗ vP]] …
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So, for uniformity with our analyses of other types of clauses, let’s assume the
implementation reflected in (8.82a). What distinguishes individual relative clauses
in nominals from matrix clauses and subordinate clauses in verbal environments is
that the modal domain isn’t determined by type-driven movement of an embedding
modal assignment-quantifier; the relevant embedding element is the assignment-
quantifier determining the individual domain (more on which below). A revised
structure for the n∗P is in (8.83).
(8.83) a. ‘cats which meowed’
b. [n∗P [CPrel [Crel gk]⟨j,s⟩ [whcf-tia (w) [pl]-cats] tjs meowed]
[n∗ n∗ [Fcf-tia (w) [pl]-cats]]]
In this way, noun phrases with headed relative clauses are given the structure
of any other n∗P. There are various approaches one might take regarding the com-
positional semantics. Presumably the relative IP is type t, as usual. If we assume
for simplicity that any modifiers in specifier positions are type ⟨e, t⟩ (see n. 64), one
straightforward option would be to give Crel the same semantics as Cd but with an
additional (vacuous) individual argument. A preliminary derivation is in (8.84).
(I will continue to ignore v∗ for introducing external individual arguments, and
I leave open which of the internal/external heads represents the head ultimately
deleted in the phonological component.)
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(8.84) ‘Every cat which meowed jumped.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
every⟨2,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨2,s⟩
Crel g1 FP
wh2cf t2a
nP
w1-g1 cat
vP
t2s meowed
X FP
F2cf t2a
nP
w1-g1 cat
vP
t2s jumped
JCrelK = λaa.λpst.λxe.λgg .∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′)), p(w)(g)JCPrelK ≈ λxe.λgg . g(2a)(2cf)(catg(1a)(1s)) meowed in @(g(1a))Jn∗PK ≈ λxe.λgg . x(g) = g(2a)(2cf)(catg(1a)(1s)) ∧ g(2a)(2cf)(catg(1a)(1s))
meowed in @(g(1a))JSK ≈ λgg .∀x∀a∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(catg−(1s)) ∧ a(g)(2cf)(catg−(1s))
meowed in @(g−))→ x(g) jumped in @(g−)
In contrast to the head-raising account from §6, the present matching account af-
fords a unified syntax/semantics for quantifier words with relativized and non-rel-
ativized complements: as in §§7.1–7.4, the matrix quantifier in (8.83) raises from
the internal assignment argument of the choice-function pronoun and takes a nom-
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inal complement.109 The assignment-variable g1 in C0rel is bound by the topmost
assignment-binder, which anchors the interpretation of the relative clause’s main
predicate ‘meowed’ to the world of the discourse. Roughly put, the matrix quan-
tifier quantifies over those individuals o for which there is some choice function F
such that F selects o from among the actual cats (=catgc(1s)), and F(catgc(1s)) (=o)
meowed. Insofar as the relative phrase in the “gap position” is formed as a copy of
the external FP, both conditions are derived as conditions on the same individual
o = F(catgc(1s)). The sentence is true iff every such o jumped.
The account of donkey anaphora from §6.2 carries over to the above matching
analysis. The donkey pronoun in (6.24), reproduced in (8.85), is represented as a
copy of its linguistic antecedent; the assignment-binding introduced by the quanti-
fier captures the apparent anaphoric connection (n. 108). (I continue to assume the
“universal donkey” entry for the quantifier (§§6.2.1–6.2.2).)
(8.85) ‘Every baby who got a toy liked it.
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [[every⟨2,a⟩
109If the relative clause is merged cyclically and the relative phrase is formed by a copy operation,
the higher assignment-quantifier may raise by ATB movement (perhaps via sideward movement
(Nunes 2004) of the external head to the relative clause). Such an analysis may provide an
independent basis for wh/Op-movement in relative clauses: the relative phrase would need to move
to the edge of the CPrel phase in order to be accessible for operations such as the movement of the
higher assignment quantifier (§§3.5, 8.5; cf. Iatridou et al. 2001). Crosslinguistically, the presence
of [wh]/[op]-features is independent of a wh format, and it is independent of whether the nominal
head is pronounced in situ. The relative phrases in the circumnominals in (i) exhibit the same sorts
of island effects as their English glosses.
(i) a. *[Atim
Atim
[ale
c
ŋa
saw
[nuru-waai
man-rel
[ale
c
da
bought
mango-kuui]
mango-rel
(la)]]
dem
la]
dem
‘the mango that Atim saw the man who bought __’
(Hiraiwa 2005: 204; Bùlì (Niger-Congo))
b. *[Waka-q
cow-gen
uña-n
baby-3sg
suwa-pu-sqa-nku]
steal-definitively-nm-3pl
‘the cow whose calf they stole’ (ok only as ‘the cow’s calf which they stole’)
(Hastings 2004: 126; Cuzco Quechua)
Alternatively, if the relative clause is constructed and merged countercyclically, the relative phrase
would be formed after the movement of the assignment-quantifier. Perhaps differences in these
respects could help explain intralinguistic and crosslinguistic differences in island-sensitivity for
different types of relative clauses within and across languages (see also Chomsky 1977, Williamson
1987, Grosu 2002, de Vries 2002, Bodomo & Hiraiwa 2010, Grosu & Hoshi 2016, Hiraiwa
2017). To fix ideas I will represent the assignment-variables in the internal and external choice-
function pronouns as traces, and assume that the assignment-quantifier raises by ATB movement.
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[n∗P [CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩ [[FP wh2-t2a w1-g1-baby] [vP t2s got a3-g2 toy-w1-g1]]]
[X [FP wh2-t2a w1-g1-baby]]]]
[vP t1s liked it3-g2 toy-w1-g1]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s)) ∧ a(g)(2cf)(babyg−(1s))
got a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in @(g−))→
x(g) liked a(g)(3cf)(toyg−(1s)) in @(g−)
The derived truth condition is equivalent to that derived with the head-raising anal-
ysis in §6.2.1.
8.7.2 Intensional gap readings
Let’s return to intensional gap readings. Consider the preliminary analysis in (8.86).
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(8.86) Callie thinks that the monsteri which Timmy thinksi Alice found ate Fluffy.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
Callie
t1s
thinks⟨2,a⟩ CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
the⟨4,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨4,s⟩
Crel g2
Timmy
t4s
thinks⟨3,a⟩ CP
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a
Alice
t3s
found FP
wh2 t4a
w1-g??? monster
X FP
F2cf t4a
w1-g??? monster
vP
t2s ate Fluffy
Informally, (8.86) ascribes to Callie a belief that the thing o which is a monster and
found by Alice in Timmy’s belief-worlds ate Fluffy. The worry is that no represen-
tation of the internal/external world-pronouns seems to capture the target read-
ings implying that (Callie thinks that) Timmy believes in monsters. Identifying the
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world-pronoun with [w1 g1], bound by the topmost assignment-binder, represents
the global (de re) reading that implies the existence of monsters. Identifying the
world-pronoun with [w1 g2], bound by the higher attitude verb, fails to capture
Timmy’s belief that the individual is a monster; the individual which Callie thinks ate
Fluffy would be an individual that is a monster in Callie’s belief-worlds, though not
necessarily in Timmy’s. Representing the world-pronoun as [w1 g3] would correctly
link the interpretation of the internal nominal head ‘monster’ to Timmy’s belief-
worlds; however, the external head wouldn’t be bound since the attitude verb is
inside the relative IP.
The challenge is to capture the local reading of the internal head under the IP-
internal attitude verb, while still determining the domain of quantification via the
external head. Let’s start by revisiting the internal structure of the relative phrase.
In §6 we noted that it is crosslinguistically common for relative and wh words to be
morphologically related to indefinites (e.g. de Vries 2002, Bhat 2004). Thus far
we have been representing the relative phrase parallel to specific indefinites, with
an independently supplied world-pronoun. However, just as there are indefinite
elements in nP and n∗P noun phrases, so too, we might expect, for relative or wh
elements.
Suppose, as a first step, that the relative phrase in intensional gap readings is an
nP. Let’s assume as a working hypothesis that the world-variable (if any) is supplied
after any modification of the noun as the highest element in the nP — schematically,[nP w wh-g Num N]. For present purposes we can leave open what specific position
the intensional choice-function element occupies above Num. One option would be
to posit an alternative F (focus?) position under n, as reflected in (8.87).110
110Cf. e.g.Harley 2009, 2013, 2017, Ramchand 2017 on functional projections FP between (our)
v and v∗, and between v and V. Alternatively Fcf∗ might be treated in Spec,Num or adjoined to NumP.
In circumnominals such as (i) the number word occurs between the noun and relative morpheme.
(i) a. Amok
Amok
ale
c
da
bought
[mango-ta
mango-pl
ŋa-nu
cl.pl-five
tii]
rel
diem
yesterday
la
dem
‘the five mangos that Amok bought yesterday’ (Hiraiwa 2005: 221; Bùlì)
b. A
d
[mongo-ri
mango-pl
ata
three
na]
rel
Dakoraa
Dakoraa
nang
c
da
buy
‘the three mangoes that Dakoraa bought’ (Hiraiwa et al. 2017: 20; Dàgáárè)
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(8.87) ⋮
n∗P
n∗ (FP)
(F)
Fcf g
nP
n (FP)
(F)
Fcf∗ g
NumP
Choice-function elements under n can be analyzed as (what we might call) inten-
sional choice function pronouns Fcf∗ — pronouns for functions F∗ ∶ [W→ [E→ T]]→ EW
from properties P to individual concepts o∗ that manifest P. One might posit a
principle such as (8.88) requiring that F∗(P)(u) ∈ P(u), for any u (cf. Ojeda 1993,
Chierchia 1998); the value F∗ of an intensional choice-function pronoun, on this
line, maps a property P to a (possibly non-atomic) part of the maximal P(u)-individual.
(We will revisit the status of such a constraint shortly.)111
(8.88) For any property P ∶W → E → T and world u ∈ W such that P(u) ≠ ∅:
P(u)(F∗(P)(u))
Treating the relative phrase as an nP has non-trivial implications for the inter-
pretation of the world argument. Since nP isn’t a nominal phase, the account in
§8.5 predicts that its world-variable is determined by feature transmission FC with
the local verbal head ((8.63)–(8.64)). First, the resulting structure for the relative
111Intensional choice functions in the sense of (8.88) might be compared to Chierchia’s (1998)∩ operator, as reflected in (i). For a property P, or function from worlds u to sets of individuals
P(u), ∩P (if defined) is the function from worlds u to the maximal P(u)-individual, i.e. the individual
concept λu.ιP(u).
(i) For any world u ∈W and property P ∶W→ E→ T in the domain of ∩:
F∗(P)(u) ⊑ (∩P)(u)
where ∩P ∶= λu.ιP(u)
In Chierchia’s account of nominalization, applying ∩ to the property denotation of a bare noun
shifts it to a kind-level denotation — represented as an individual concept — which can serve as
an individual argument (see also Partee 1986a,b, Chierchia 1988, Ojeda 1993). An intensional
choice function pronoun is, in effect, a choice-functional lexicalization of ∩, generalized to apply to
properties with/without corresponding kinds. Chierchia treats the individual concepts representing
kinds as type e; for our purposes intensional choice functions can be typed as ⟨⟨s, et⟩, se⟩.
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clause CPrel is as follows (again ignoring v∗ and using underlining to indicate the
result of FC).
(8.89) [CPrel [Crel g2]⟨4,s⟩ Timmy [thinks t4s]⟨3,a⟩
[CP [Cd t3a]⟨3,s⟩ Alice [vP t3s found [nP u3s wh2cf∗-t4a monster]]]]
Insofar as the relative phrase is interpreted in its base position, the world argument
is supplied by a [+s] variable that agrees with the local c-commanding v in the
v∗P phase. By FC this yields a variable of type s with numerical index feature 3 —
i.e., a world-variable bound by the local complementizer under ‘Timmy thinks …’
The internal head’s world argument is thus anchored by agreement to the attitude
state representing Timmy’s beliefs.
The external head originates as the complement of n∗. One approach might be
to treat the world argument as determined by FC via some movement to the edge
of QP, as reflected in (8.90). The world-variable in the external head would be
determined as u2s, anchored to the local modal domain representing Callie’s beliefs.
(8.90) (… Callie thinks …) C0⟨2,s⟩I … [QP … [n u2s] … Q …]
However, we needn’t assume that the external nP’s world argument must be de-
termined via movement/agreement. A critical question is whether, in examples
with intensional gap readings, the world argument of the external head can itself
receive a modally independent interpretation. Examples such as (8.91) may provide
preliminary support. Callie’s utterance makes a claim about a certain actual monster
o, and implies that things would be better if o wasn’t a monster. Yet the belief
ascribed to Timmy is still de dicto and nonspecific.
(8.91) [Context: Callie believes in monsters. She thinks that Timmy thinks Alice
found some monster or other, but that he doesn’t know which. Callie says:]
It would be better if the monster which Timmy thinks Alice found wasn’t a
monster.
Treating the external head’s world argument as being independently supplied al-
lows for such interpretations. The world-pronoun supplying the external nP’s world
argument would be bound by a non-local assignment-binder.
To fix ideas I assume the latter analysis, where the world argument of the
external head is supplied by a world-pronoun. The resulting revised LF and semantic
value for (8.86) is as follows:
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(8.92) S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
Callie
t1s
thinks⟨2,a⟩ CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
the⟨4,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨4,s⟩
Crel g2
Timmy
t4s
thinks⟨3,a⟩ CP
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a
Alice
t3s
found nP2
u3s
wh2cf∗-t4a monster
X nP1
w1 g2
F2cf∗-t4a monster
vP
t2s ate Fluffy
JF2cf∗-t4a monsterK = λws.λgg . g(4a)(2cf∗)(monster)(w(g))JCPrelK = ∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMTimmy,@(g(2a)) →
Alice found g(4a)(2cf∗)(monster)(@(a(g))) in @(a(g))
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JSK ≈ λgg .∀aa∶ a(g) is compatible with SOMCallie,@(g−) →([ιx(g)∃a′a∶ x(g) = a′(g)(2cf∗)(monster)(a(g)(1s))∧ ∀a′′a ∶ a′′(g) is compatible with SOMTimmy,@(a(g)) →
Alice found a′(g)(2cf∗)(monster)(@(a′′(g))) in @(a′′(g))]
x(g) ate Fluffy in @(a(g)))
Roughly put, this says that (8.86) is true iff for all possibilities h compatible with
Callie’s state of mind, the o such that, for some individual concept of a monster
F∗(monster), [o is identical to the manifestation of F∗(monster) in @(h), and for
all possibilities h′′ compatible with Timmy’s state of mind in @(h), Alice found the
manifestation of F∗(monster) in @(h′′)], ate Fluffy in @(h).
Rather than selecting a particular individual in a given world, [F2cf∗-t4a monster]
in the representations of the internal and external heads selects an individual con-
cept: an individual concept of a monster, F∗(monster) = o∗. What world is supplied
depends on the position of the nP. The world argument for the internal head —
the head inside the relative clause CPrel — is supplied by the world-variable u3s
anchored to Timmy’s belief-worlds; o∗(@(h)) ∈ monster@(h), for any possibility h
compatible with Timmy’s state of mind. The resulting semantic value for CPrel
requires that, for any such h, Alice found such-and-such individual o∗(@(h)) se-
lectable among the monsters in @(h). The local (intensional, de dicto) reading of
the relative phrase follows from the general feature transmission mechanisms from
§8.5.
Although the relative phrase denotes an individual concept, the account avoids
ascribing to Callie a belief that Fluffy was eaten by an individual concept. While
there may be intensional verbs that take property-/individual-concept objects, ‘find’
and ‘eat’ aren’t among them. Likewise, though the internal nP2 picks out an individ-
ual in Timmy’s belief-worlds, the derived truth conditions don’t imply a commitment
to transworld eating. The world argument for the external head is supplied by the
world-pronoun [w1 g2] anchored to Callie’s belief-worlds. nP1 picks out the mani-
festation of F∗(monster) = o∗ in the world@(h) of the given possibility h compatible
with Callie’s state of mind. The entities which ate Fluffy and Alice found are ordinary
concrete individuals.
Though the internal and external heads receive different world arguments, the
denotation of the n∗P can still capture the intuitive quantificational domain. For-
mally, an individual concept is a function from worlds to individuals. We can
suppose that, in the intended interpretation, the sorts of functions F∗potentially rep-
resented by cf∗ indices map properties P to relevant “transworld” lines — functions
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from worlds u to individuals F∗(P)(u) such that the manifestations of F∗ at the
worlds in F∗(P)’s domain are relevant counterparts of one another (i.e., for any
u, v on which F∗(P) is defined, F∗(P)(u) is a relevant counterpart of F∗(P)(v);
cf. e.g. Ojeda 1993). So, for each of Callie’s belief-worlds @(h), the definite noun
phrase picks out the unique individual o ∈ E such that (i) omanifests some individual
concept o∗ of a monster, o = o∗(@(h)); and (ii) Alice found the relevant counterpart
of o in each of Timmy’s belief-worlds @(h′′), i.e. the manifestation of o∗ in @(h′′),
o∗(@(h′′)). (8.92) says that the attitude ascription is true, on the intended reading,
iff for each such @(h), that o = o∗(@(h))— the manifestation of the individual
concept o∗ in @(h)— ate Fluffy in @(h).
The above account allows for the possibility that the internal and external heads
with [nP n FP] relative phrases may receive different world arguments. Such an
account is compatible with a matching analysis which treats one of the heads as
deleted under (semantic or syntactic) identity, even an account which constructs
the internal relative phrase via a syntactic copy operation. For instance, the copy
operation could be treated as applying to the constituent constructed upon merg-
ing the choice-function pronoun — following (8.87), the FP. The n heads in inter-
nal/external nPs would thus be free to enter the derivation with alternative world
variables or pronouns (subject to other syntactic and interpretive constraints).
There may be reasons to avoid treating the condition in (8.88) as a general re-
quirement on the ⟨set, se⟩ denotations of relative words in [nP n FP] relative phrases.
Consider (8.93).
(8.93) The monsteri which you thinki you saw was a shadow.
The intensional gap reading of (8.93) needn’t imply a commitment to monsters. In-
deed (8.93) would generally be interpreted as saying that the object which you think
you saw wasn’t a monster, as you believe, but a shadow. The predicted structure
and semantic value would presumably be as in (8.94) (leaving ‘be-a-shadow’ as an
unanalyzed predicate, again using ‘cf∗’ in indices for type ⟨set, se⟩).
(8.94) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [[the⟨3,a⟩ [n∗P [CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩ you2e-g1 t2s think⟨2,a⟩
[CP [Cd t2a]⟨3,s⟩ you2e-g1 t3s saw [nP u3s wh2cf∗-t3a monster]]]
[X [nP u1s F2cf∗-t3a monster]]]]
[vP t1s-was-a-shadow]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg . [ιx(g)∃a∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(monster)(@(g−))
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∧ ∀a′∶ a′(g) is compatible with SOMg−(2e),@(g−) →
g−(2e) saw a(g)(2cf∗)(monster)(@(a′(g))) in @(a′(g))]
x(g) was a shadow in @(g−)
Dropping the assumption that assignments a(g) necessarily map ⟨set, se⟩/cf∗ indices
to intensional choice functions captures the intended reading. The subject noun
phrase picks out the o such that, for some individual concept o∗ = a(g)(2cf∗)(monster),
o is the manifestation of o∗ in the actual world, i.e. o = o∗(@(gc)), and, for all possi-
bilities h compatible with your state of mind, you (=gc(2e)) saw the counterpart of
o in@(h), i.e. o∗(@(h)) = a(g)(2cf∗)(monster)(@(h)). Though the manifestations
of o∗ throughout your belief-worlds@(h)may be monsters, o∗(@(h)) ∈ monster@(h),
the “world-line” of the individual concept o∗ may include worlds in which the man-
ifestation of o∗ isn’t a monster but a (monster-looking) shadow. The sentence is
true iff the actual world @(gc) is such a world, i.e. iff the relevant counterpart
o∗(@(gc)) in @(gc) of the monsters o∗(@(h)) you saw in your belief-worlds @(h)
was a shadow in @(gc). For interpretive reasons ⟨set, se⟩/cf∗ indices will typically
represent intensional choice functions satisfying the condition in (8.88). Compare
(8.93) with the anomalous (8.95).
(8.95) ??The monster which you think you saw hit Bert.
Absent substantial contextual setup it is hard to imagine a plausible non-monster
counterpart of the monsters in your belief-worlds that would be the sort of thing
that would hit Bert.
8.8 Extensions?
In closing I would like to mention several potential further applications of the match-
ing analysis and approach to intensional gap readings from §8.7. §8.9 briefly con-
siders how the parallel layered n/v analyses of noun/verb phrases in this section
might be further developed in the semantics of verb phrases vP/v∗P; a speculative
assignment-variable-based event semantics is introduced as a basis for future re-
search.
8.8.1 Relativization and implicit/explicit operator movement
Our examples thus far have focused on headed relative clauses in which the choice-
function pronoun is bound by a matrix quantifier. Headed restrictive relative clauses
can also occur with nonpresuppositional uses of quantifiers, as in (8.96).
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(8.96) The prize went to a woman (/sm/several/three women) who got a perfect
score.
In §6.1.2 I suggested treating the source of assignment-quantification/binding in
free relatives as being the implicit definite-like element that is often posited on
independent grounds. A hypothesis is that in some languages restrictive relative
clauses may also introduce an implicit assignment binder. Rather than yielding
a definite interpretation, the implicit element in restrictive relative clauses would
function as a sort of existential closure operator. The entry in (8.97) is an existential
analogue of the entry for T; the resulting denotation for the noun phrase is in (8.98).
(To fix ideas suppose that ∃r raises above the relative clause in the n∗P area. For
simplicity, in the following examples I assume an [F nP] structure for the relative
phrase.)
(8.97) J∃rK = λAat.λgg .∃aa∶A(a)(g)
(8.98) a. [n∗P1 [n∗P2 ∃⟨2,a⟩r [CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩ [[wh2-t2a w1-g1-woman]
[vP t2s got-perfect]]] [X [F2cf-t2a w1-g1-woman]]]]
b. Jn∗P1K = J∃⟨2,a⟩r K ○ Jn∗P2K = λxe.J∃⟨2,a⟩r K(Jn∗P1K(x))≈ λxe.λgg .∃aa∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(womang(1a)(1s))∧ a(g)(2cf)(womang(1a)(1s)) got-a-perfect-score in @(g(1a))
∃⟨2,a⟩r of type ⟨t, t⟩ and the lower segment of the n∗P of type ⟨e, t⟩ combine by
function composition to yield the type ⟨e, t⟩ denotation for the noun phrase. The
n∗P picks out, roughly, the set S of individuals o such that for some choice function
F, F selects o from among the women (=womangc(1s)) and F(womangc(1s)) = o got
a perfect score. Given the sigma type shift (§8.2, (8.96) is true iff (roughly) the
maximal recipient of the prize is in S. The derived semantic value correctly predicts
that the set S denoted by the headed relative construction needn’t be singleton.
Continuations such as in (8.99) are coherent.
(8.99) The prize went to a woman who got a perfect score. Two others also got
perfect scores, but they were disqualified for cheating.
Positing an implicit operator leads one to expect that there might be crosslin-
guistic variation in its presence or specific content. For instance, one might wonder
whether languages might have an implicit definite counterpart of ∃r. In §9 we will
see crosslinguistic and syntactic/semantic evidence for precisely such an element in
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‘if’-clauses and correlatives of individuals. ‘If’-clauses and correlative clauses will be
analyzed essentially as maximalizing free relatives of possibilities (assignments).
Or suppose an element such as ∃r was unavailable for a relative construction
in a given language. Such a relative construction would be invariably headed by
a (possibly implicit) presuppositional quantifier, and incompatible with nonpresup-
positional readings. Interestingly, this is precisely what is observed with so-called
“maximalizing” relatives (Grosu & Landman 1998, Grosu 2002, 2012). Unlike
their English counterparts, the maximalizing relatives in (8.100) are incompatible
with continuations implying a non-maximal interpretation.
(8.100) a. [Nuna
man
ishkay
two
bestya-ta
horse-acc
ranti-shqa-n
buy-perf-3
alli]
good
bestya-m
horse-valid
ka-rqo-n.
be-past-3
‘(the) two horses that the man bought were good horses’
(Srivastav 1991: 683; Ancash Quechua)
b. [Ken-ga
Ken-nom
mittu-no
3-gen
mangoo-o
mango-acc
kattekitekure-ta
buy.come-past
no]-wa
c-top
tabe-ta
eat-past
(#ga
but
(hoka-no)
other
mittu-wa
3-top
tabe-nakat-ta)
eat-neg-past
‘I ate three mangoes that Ken bought for me (#but I didn’t eat three
others).’ (Hiraiwa et al. 2017: 19; Japanese)
The relative in (8.100a), for instance, is interpreted as ‘the two horses that the man
bought’. In some languages the definite element is overt (Hiraiwa 2005, Hiraiwa
et al. 2017). Maximalizing relatives might be represented as in (8.102), using
‘3-mangoesu’ for the set of individuals o such that#o′[o′ is a mango in u ∧ o′ ⊑ o] ≥ 3,
i.e. individuals having three mangoes as atomic parts. (The metalanguage ‘ι’ is again
a plural maximality operator, reflected in (8.101); cf. Link 1983.)
(8.101) JιoK = λPaet.λQaet.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶ (P(a)(x)(g) ∧ ∀ye∶P(a)(y)(g)→ y(g) ⊑ x(g))∧ Q(a)(x)(g)= λPaet.λQaet.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶ x(g) = the maximal o s.t. (↓P)(a(g))(o)∧ Q(a)(x)(g)≈ λPaet.λQaet.λgg . [ιx(g)∃a∶P(a)(x)(g)] Q(a)(x)(g)
(8.102) “Maximalizing” headed relative clause
a. ‘(Alice ate) three mangoes which Ken bought’ (cf. (8.100b))
b. [S … [ι⟨2,a⟩o [n∗P [CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩
[Ken [vP t2s bought [wh2-t2a w1-g1 three#-mangoes]]]]
[X [wh2-t2a w1-g1 three#-mangoes]]]]…]
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c. JSK ≈ λgg . [ιx(g)∃a∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(3-mangoesg−(1s))∧ Ken bought a(g)(2cf)(3-mangoesg−(1s)) in @(g−)]
Alice ate x(g) in @(g−)
Given the hypothesized absence of ∃r, the merely existential interpretation of the
noun phrase is unavailable. The (here implicit) definite operator binds the choice-
function pronouns. So, the headed relative is “maximalizing” insofar as the noun
phrase denotes the maximal (plural) o such that o is selectable from the set of
pluralities having three mangoes as atomic parts, and Ken bought o. The sentence is
true iff Alice ate o. Hence a continuation such as ‘… and Alice didn’t eat three other
mangoes which Ken bought’ is infelicitous: Every collection of three mangoes that
Ken bought is a part of o.
We noted above that it is also common to posit an implicit definite element
in analyses of DP-like free relatives. There are well-attested syntactic and semantic
differences among free and headed relatives crosslinguistically; however, it is worth
observing that the matching analysis in this section may also be applied to at least
some free relatives in certain languages (see Basilico 1996, Grosu & Landman
1998, Grosu 2002 on comparisons between free relatives and maximalizing headed
relatives). It is common to gloss free relative ‘what’ along the lines of ‘the thing(s)
which’, free relative ‘who’ along the lines of ‘the person(s) which’, and so on. Many
languages manifest such intuitive interpretations explicitly (cf. Citko 2004, Cinque
2017). The free relative interpretations in (8.103) are expressed via maximalizing
relatives with a general class noun such as ‘thing’, ‘person’, etc. In some cases
the definite element, implicit in English, is also pronounced. The double-headed
circumnominal relative in (8.103c) wears the relevant matching structure on its
sleeve.
(8.103) a. le
d
ba’ax
rel.thing
k-in
hab-erg.1s
tsikbal-t-ik-∅
chat-trans-ind-abs.3s
te’ex-a’
2.pl-cl
‘what (lit. this thing which) I’m telling you about’
(Gutiérrez-Bravo 2012: ex. 10; Yucatec Maya)
b. márô
he.likes
gìn
thing
àmê
rel+prt
cámô
he.eats
‘He likes what (lit. which thing) he eats.’
(Noonan 1992: 220; Lango (Nilo-Saharan))
c. mi
person
qɑ
1sg
nə-xeɹ-m
dir-scold-nom
mi-le:
person-def.cl
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‘(the person) who scolded me’
(Huang 2008: 761–762; Ronghong Qiang)
(8.104) Matching “light-headed” free relative (cf. (8.103))
a. ‘(Bert likes) who Alice likes’
b. [def⟨2,a⟩ [n∗P [CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩ [Alice [vP t2s likes [wh2-t2a w1-g1-person]]]]
[X [wh2-t2a w1-g1-person]]]]
c. J(8.104b)K ≈ λgg . ιx(g)∃a∶ x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(persong(1a)(1s))∧ Alice likes a(g)(2cf)(persong(1a)(1s)) in @(g(1a))
The analysis in (8.104) parallels our examples with (non-)maximalizing headed
relatives. As with the maximalizing relative in (8.102), the assignment-binder in the
noun phrase is a definite-like maximality item. What distinguishes the free relative
is that the “head” is a light/class noun. In languages such as English the relevant
class restriction is reflected in the relative pronoun via the morpheme fused with the
‘wh-’ stem. Roughly put, (8.104) says that the free relative refers to the maximal
o such that o is selectable from the set of persons (o = h(2cf)(person) for some h)
and Alice likes o (=h(2cf)(person)) — i.e., the maximal person that Alice likes.
It is controversial how to capture various syntactic and semantic differences
among free relatives and maximalising and non-maximalising headed relatives, and
whether there is a common underlying structure for the different types of relative
constructions.112 Suffice it to say that the proposed matching structure is compatible
with overtly and non-overtly headed relative constructions, and maximalising and
non-maximalising interpretations. It is worth investigating more carefully how the
alternative assignment-variable-based head-raising and matching analyses here and
in §6 might be applied to different types of free and headed relative constructions in
different languages. (We will return to free relatives in conditionals and correlatives
in §9.)
8.8.2 Resumptive pronouns
I have suggested that at least some relative phrases may be realized alternatively
with FPs above or below n. As with indefinites, one may expect there to be dis-
tributional differences for different relative elements within and across languages.
One interesting connection in this respect may be to relative constructions with
112Cf. e.g. Culy 1990, Dayal 1996, Grosu & Landman 1998, Grosu 2002, 2012, de Vries 2002,
2005, Caponigro 2003, Citko 2004, 2009, Hastings 2004, Gračanin-Yuksek 2008, Cinque
2013, 2017, Law 2014, Kalivoda & Zyman 2015, Hiraiwa 2017, Hiraiwa et al. 2017, Sportiche
2017.
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resumptive pronouns. Doron 1982 observes that resumptive pronouns in languages
such as Hebrew are incompatible with certain sorts of intensional readings (see also
e.g. Sells 1987, Suñer 1998, Sharvit 1999, Boeckx 2003, Bianchi 2011). The
“highly preferred reading” (Sharvit 1999: 593) of (8.105b) with the resumptive
pronoun is the reading implying the existence of a salient woman who is the object
of Dani’s seeking (cf. Sells 1987: 287–288). (8.105b) lacks the otherwise available
“concept interpretation” (Sells 1987) of (8.105a) on which Dani is merely “looking
for a woman with certain properties” — e.g. a woman to lead his team — “but does
not know who such a woman might be” (Sells 1987: 288).113
(8.105) a. Dani
Dani
yimca
find.fut
et
acc
ha-iša
the-woman
še
that
hu
he
mexapes
seeks
__
b. Dani
Dani
yimca
find.fut
et
acc
ha-iša
the-woman
še
that
hu
he
mexapes
seeks
ota
her
‘Dani will find the woman he is looking for’
(Doron 1982: 25; Hebrew)
Suppose that resumptive pronouns are pronounced realizations of the (lowest copy
of the) relative phrase with an elided head noun (cf. §6.2). If resumptive pronouns
in (e.g.) Hebrew have at least the structure of [F nP], using a resumptive pronoun
will be incompatible with the sorts of structures representing intensional gap read-
ings. In examples such as those in this section, the relative phrase would be (at
least) an [F nP] with a world-pronoun bound by an assignment-binder above the
relative clause, as in (8.106) (again ignoring any copy of the relative phrase in
Spec,Crel, and ignoring any semantically vacuous n∗ head in the representation of
the resumptive pronoun (see §8.5)). Or if intensional verbs such as ‘seek’ in (8.105)
may optionally take intensional objects such as individual concepts, the richer struc-
ture would be excluded — or at least “highly [dis]preferred” (Sharvit 1999) — for
113Sells 1987 characterizes the distinction in readings as a distinction between specific vs.
nonspecific readings — e.g., in (8.105), readings which do/don’t imply that there is a particular
woman o such that Dani is looking for o (1987: 288). Sharvit 1999 characterizes the distinction as
a distinction between de re vs. de dicto readings — e.g., readings which do/don’t imply the existence
of a (salient) woman (1999: 593). (Doron 1982 labels the distinction as de re/de dicto, but glosses
examples in terms specificity/nonspecificity (1982: 305). Bianchi 2011 uses the distinctions inter-
changeably (2011: 320).) Further data would be needed to tease apart precisely which distinction
is operative (§§4.2, 8.8.3), and which type of reading is generally associated with the resumptive
pronoun. Sharvit illustrates connections between resumptive pronouns and D-linking, but a formal
analysis isn’t provided. I return briefly to D-linking with interrogative wh phrases in §10.3. Thanks
to Anya Saliy and Amit Ginbar for feedback on the Hebrew data.
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general economy reasons against vacuous functional structure (cf. Cardinaletti &
Starke 1999, Katzir 2011, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017); the denotations for the
nP and FP in (8.107) are equivalent.
(8.106) [S T⟨1,a⟩ … [the⟨3,a⟩ [[CPrel [Crel g1]⟨2,s⟩ Timmy t2s thinks⟨2,a⟩
[CP [Cd t2a]⟨3,s⟩ Alice t3s found [FP ota2cf t3a [nPw1-g1 monster]]]]
[X [FP F2cf t3a [nP w1-g1 monster]]]]] …]
(8.107) a. [vP t2s seeks [nP n∅ F2cf∗ t3a woman]]
b. [vP t2s seeks [FP ota2cf∗ t3a [nP n∅ woman]]]
It would be interesting to compare the behavior of resumptive elements with other
types of reduced structures (“pro-n,” etc.), and in relative constructions with/without
overt relative pronouns.
8.8.3 Donkey pronouns in intensional contexts
In §8.7.2 we examined local intensional readings in relative clauses arising from
copies of choice-function phrases under n. §6.2 proposed treating donkey pronouns
also as copies of their linguistic antecedents. Assuming that choice-functional uses
of indefinites such as ‘a’ may also occupy the lower position under n, one may expect
intensional readings of donkey pronouns to be possible as well. Examples such as
(8.108) adapted from King (2004) confirm this prediction.
(8.108) Every star who has a secret admirer thinks he is stalking her.
(King 2004: ex. 18)
King (2004) argues that such examples are problematic for main approaches to don-
key pronouns such as DRT and dynamic theories. Insofar as these approaches treat
donkey pronouns as semantically bound variables, they predict a specific reading for
‘he’, i.e. a reading which attributes to each relevant star a belief about a particular
individual. However, the attitude ascription can also receive a nonspecific reading
which “can be true even though the women in question don’t know who their secret
admirers are” (2004: 105).
Imagine, à la Dretske, that a trickster sent each zoo-owning epistemologist a
letter accompanying the latest delivery of animals to the effect that some or other
of the zebra-looking animals was a cleverly painted mule. Consider the following
LF and derived semantic value for (8.109) on a nonspecific reading, where which
mule did the ruining may vary across the subject’s doxastic alternatives. (I represent
the relative phrase as having a full [F nP] structure, and treat the relative clause is
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merged left of n∗, though nothing hangs on this. For simplicity I continue to use the
“universal donkey” reading entry for ‘every’ from §6.2.2.)
(8.109) ‘Every epistemologist who got a painted-mule thinks it ruined-epistemology.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
QP⟨2,a⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨4,s⟩
Crel g1
wh2cf-t2a w1-g1 epist
t4s
got nP
u4s
a3cf∗ g2a painted-mule
X
F2cf-t2a w1-g1 epist
t1s
thinks⟨3,a⟩
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a
nP
u3s
it3cf∗ g2a painted-mule
t3s ruined-ep
JSK ≈ λgg .∀xe∀aa∶ (x(g) = a(g)(2cf)(epistg−(1s))∧ x(g) got a(g)(3cf∗)(painted-mule)(@(g−)) in @(g−))→ (∀a′a∶ a′(g) is compatible with SOMx(g),@(g−) →
a(g)(3cf∗)(painted-mule)(@(a′(g))) ruined-epistemology in @(a′(g)))
Roughly put, this says that (8.109) is true, on the relevant reading, iff for any o ∈ E
and individual concept of a painted mule h(3cf∗)(painted-mule) = o∗ such that o is
selectable among the epistemologists and o got the manifestation of o∗ in @(gc), in
each of o’s belief-worlds@(h′) the manifestation of o∗ in@(h′) ruined epistemology.
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The donkey pronoun ‘it’ is again represented as a copy of its linguistic antecedent —
here the intensional choice-function pronoun [a3cf∗-g2 painted-mule], which selects
an individual concept of a painted mule. The world-variable in the indefinite is
anchored to the discourse context. In effect, the quantifier phrase quantifies over in-
dividuals o, o′ ∈ E such that o is selectable among the epistemologists, o′ is the mani-
festation in the actual world of an individual concept o∗ of a painted mule, and o got
o′. The world-variable in the donkey pronoun, in contrast, is anchored (by FC) to the
local attitude state. For each of the quantificational subject o’s belief-worlds @(h′),
the individual(s) o∗(@(h′)) ∈ Ewhich ruined epistemology is a relevant counterpart
of the individual(s) o∗(@(gc)) ∈ E which o received (§8.7.2). The relevant counter-
part of o∗(@(gc)) might be the same across the subject’s belief-worlds; but as far
as the formal semantics is concerned, it need not be. The particular individual that
manifests the individual concept o∗ may vary across the worlds @(h′). The intu-
itively nonspecific reading of the donkey pronoun follows from the §6.2-account of
donkey pronouns as copies of their linguistic antecedents, and the syntax/semantics
for nPs developed throughout this section.
Specific readings of attitude ascriptions such as (8.108)–(8.109) can be repre-
sented with ordinary [F nP] choice-functional phrases for the indefinite and donkey
pronoun, e.g. [F3cf-g2 w1-g1 painted-mule]. The scope condition would require
that the particular individual(s) selected among the actual painted mules ruined
epistemology in every possibility compatible with the subject’s state of mind.
King’s (2004) “Context-Dependent Quantifier” (CDQ) account also treats don-
key pronouns as representing material from the linguistic context. Donkey pronouns
are analyzed as quantifiers which inherit their force and restriction from their lin-
guistic antecedent and other features of the sentence. Yet there are issues with King’s
account, in general and regarding examples with donkey pronouns in intensional
contexts. First, King diagnoses specific vs. nonspecific readings of donkey pronouns
in examples such as (8.108) in terms of differences in scope: insofar as the pronoun is
quantificational, it may take varying scopes with respect to attitude verbs. This diag-
nosis is problematic. Donkey pronouns can receive alternative specific/nonspecific
readings even when embedded in scope islands such as ‘if’-clauses, as in (8.110).
(8.110) Every star who has a secret admireri thinks that if hei is a stalker, hei is
evil.
In contrast, the account in this section diagnoses the distinction between specific
vs. nonspecific readings of donkey pronouns under attitude verbs in terms of the
structure of the noun phrase.
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Second, King characterizes the nonspecific reading of (8.108) as follows:
These sentences certainly appear to have readings on which they at-
tribute de dicto beliefs to the [stars] in question. That is, they have
readings on which they attribute to the [stars] in question general be-
liefs to the effect that they are being stalked by secret admirers. This
is why these sentences can be true even though the [stars] in question
don’t know who their secret admirers are, and so have no beliefs about
particular persons stalking them. (King 2004: 105; underline added)
King’s gloss in the underlined portion is misleading. We saw in §4.2 that the de re/de dicto
distinction cannot be assimilated to the specific/general distinction. The fact that the
subject’s beliefs are nonspecific — the beliefs aren’t about a particular individual —
doesn’t imply that the beliefs are de dicto, in the sense that the subject represents the
stalkers in question as secret admirers. Examples such as (8.111)–(8.112) reinforce
the possibility of a nonspecific non-de dicto reading of the donkey pronoun.
(8.111) Every star who has a secret admirer thinks he is a prankster.
(8.112) [Context: The boys know that the meter says that it “only takes quarters.”
Yet the boys confuse their coins and think that the nickels they have are
quarters.]
Every boy who has a nickel thinks it will fit in the meter.
The stars in (8.111) don’t represent their actual-world (secret) admirers as admirers
but as pranksters; yet they still don’t know who the individuals are, “and so have
no beliefs about particular persons.” The quantified attitude ascription in (8.112)
can be true even if the boys don’t think that their coins are nickels. Absent addi-
tional mechanisms for capturing non-de dicto readings with narrow scope quanti-
fiers, simply saying that the donkey pronoun “has the same quantificational force as
its antecedent” (King 2004: 105) fails to capture readings in which the pronoun’s
intuitive descriptive content isn’t satisfied throughout the local attitude state.
The sort of [nP n FP] analysis in (8.109) allows for nonspecific non-de dicto read-
ings of “intensional donkey pronouns” such as (8.111)–(8.112). For instance, the
indefinite and its copy in the representation of the donkey pronoun [Fcf∗g admirer]
select an individual concept of a secret admirer, F∗(admirer) = o∗. In a context
where a principle such as (8.88) is relaxed, the “world-line” of o∗may include worlds
u in the subject’s belief-worlds in which the manifestation of o∗, o∗(u), isn’t an ad-
mirer but (say) a prankster; the relevant counterpart of the given admirer o∗(@(gc))
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may be a prankster in the subject’s belief worlds. The treatment of nonspecific non-
de dicto readings of donkey pronouns is, in effect, the mirror image of the treatment
of intensional gap readings such as (8.93)–(8.94). In the intensional gap reading in
(8.93)–(8.94) with ‘which monster’, the relevant individual concept is manifested
by a monster throughout the subject’s belief-worlds and by a (non-monster) shadow
in the actual world; in the nonspecific non-de dicto reading of ‘he’ in (8.112), the
relevant individual concept is manifested by a secret admirer in the actual world
and by different (non-admirer) pranksters throughout the subject’s belief-worlds.
Third, King’s account must ensure that the donkey pronoun-quantifier’s restric-
tion isn’t identified with the restriction of its linguistic antecedent, but is rather
“determined by the predicative material in the sentence in which the antecedent occurs”
(2004: 106; emphasis added). For instance, the restriction in (8.113a) must be
recovered from ‘donkey’ and some combination with ‘farmer’ and ‘owns’, so that
‘it’ quantifies over donkeys owned by the quantificational subject; (8.113a) isn’t
equivalent to (8.113b).
(8.113) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats a donkey.
In work applying the account to discourse anaphora, King identifies the restriction
of the anaphoric pronoun with “the intersection of the denotation of its antecedent’s
N-bar constituent, the denotation of the set term the antecedent attaches to, and the
denotation of any predicative material occurring in a sentence intervening between
S and the antecedent which contains a cdq [i.e. anaphoric pronoun] with the same
antecedent” (1994: 224). It isn’t immediately obvious how to implement this idea
in the case of donkey sentences. There is no syntactic constituent in (8.113a)
corresponding to the intuitive restriction ‘is owned by x’ or ‘is a donkey owned by x’.
The relation in more complex examples can be even more indirect:
(8.114) Every farmer who beats a donkey that loves a donkey hates it.
The syntax/semantics developed in the foregoing sections avoids such issues. In-
stances of donkey anaphora are represented syntactically as copies of their linguistic
antecedents. The semantic restriction in interpreting the donkey pronoun is cap-
tured by the assignment-quantification introduced by the matrix quantifier, which
requires that the assignment verifying the scope argument verifies the restrictor
argument.
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8.9 Appendix: Verb phrases and events.
Existential sentences revisited: Predication and possession
The compositional semantics for noun phrases developed in this section builds on
a parallel layered N/V, n/v, n∗/v∗ structure for noun/verb phrases. At times we
gestured at certain syntactic roles for v∗; yet we largely abstracted away from spe-
cific semantic contributions of verbalizing heads, and ignored many further details
regarding the structure of the verbal domain. The remainder of this section begins
to explore how the parallel assignment-variable-based analyses for noun and verb
phrases developed thus far might be extended to incorporate events in the syn-
tax/semantics of vPs/v∗Ps. The account yields a revised syntax/semantics for agen-
tive verb phrases, predicate nominals, and existential ‘there’ sentences (§§8.1–8.4).
Additional composition rules specific to the verbal domain, such as Event Iden-
tification (Kratzer 1996), won’t be required. I leave further developments and
extensions to other categories for future work.
Following the Davidsonian tradition (Davidson 1967, Parsons 1990) it is stan-
dard to treat verbs as predicates of eventualities (events, states) — e.g., ‘rain’ denotes
a set of raining events λe.rain(e); ‘run’ denotes a set of running events λe.run(e).114
In §8.1 we noted the common move in syntax of distinguishing the elements de-
termining nominal/verbal environments n/v from lexical roots (Marantz 1997;
nn. 91, 93). It is rare to find the move represented in compositional semantics
(see Levinson 2007 for a noteworthy exception). Derivations of the contrasting
denotations of simple nominal/verbal predicates from nominalizers/verbalizers and
root phrases (cf. (8.115)) are generally lacking.
(8.115) a. [nP [n /ɑ/] √muorr] ↝ muorra (‘wood’ (n.))
b. [vP [v /e/] √muorr] ↝ murret (‘chop wood’ (v.))
(cf. Julien 2015: 5–6; North Sámi (Uralic))
In what follows I wish to explore treating a semantic role of certain n/v heads as
being to place sortal constraints on the properties expressed by their complements.
Suppose that events and states are conceived as being included among the en-
tities in E (cf. Chierchia 1994, Kracht 2002, Moulton 2015). Along with un-
sorted type e variables x, y, . . . we can use sorted variables xκ for (functions from
assignments to) things in E of particular sorts — e.g., perhaps for atomic objects,
114I will often use ‘event’ both for eventualities generally and for events proper; context should
disambiguate.
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plural objects, or, let’s suppose, for eventualities xε (events xv, states xs).115 First,
basic root phrases can still be treated as denoting type ⟨s, et⟩ properties — functions
from worlds to sets of (unsorted) individuals. For instance, roots such as those in
(8.6)/(8.115) might be given lexical entries as in (8.116). In (8.116b) the metalan-
guage predicate ‘wood’ picks out a spectrum of wood-ish things — “wood objects,”
such as (say) twigs, branches, as well as a range of “wood doings” (which such range
depending on the specific lexical semantics of North Sámi).
(8.116) a. J√bargK = λws.λxe.λgg .work(w(g))(x(g))
b. J√muorrK = λws.λxe.λgg .wood(w(g))(x(g))
In §8.1 we saw how number features such as [sg] or [pl] can modify these denota-
tions by restricting them to properties of atomic or countable individuals. Parallels
such as between the mass/count distinction and the atelicity/telicity distinction have
led many theorists to treat an aspectual category as the verbal counterpart of number
(e.g., Rijkhoff 2002, Borer 2005a,b, Alexiadou et al. 2007, Megerdoomian
2008; n. 90).116 In =∣Hoan the same marker kí indicates plurality for nouns and
“pluractionality” for verbs; just as the modified plural noun kí-!oa-qa in (8.117a)
denotes a set of (countable) head-pluralities, the modified plural verb kí-tchi-tcu in
(8.117b) “gives the sense of repeated action” (Collins 2001: 465) by denoting a
set of (countable) shooting-pluralities.
(8.117) a. =∣ ’amkoe
person
kí-!oa-qa
kí[pl]-house-pl
‘the person’s houses’
b. Jefo
Jeff
kí-tchi-tcu
kí[pl]-shoot-rep
-‘a
perf
⊙’u
duiker
ki
prep
∥a”a-qa.
arrow-pl
‘Jeff shot at the duiker (repeatedly) with arrows.’
(Collins 2001: 459, 464; =∣Hoan (Kx’a))
Not all root (number, aspect) phrases need be compatible with both nominalizing
and verbalizing heads. Compare (8.6)/(8.115) with (8.118); in (8.118b), although
the vP viekhat ‘run’ can be nominalized (‘running’), the root √viekh cannot combine
directly with n.
115See Levinson 2007, Copley & Harley 2015 on the linguistic importance of distinguishing
sorts for events and states.
116Following Hiraiwa 2005, number and aspect might be treated as different manifestations of a
“supercategory” #, realized as Num under n and Asp under v.
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(8.118) a. [nP [n /ɑ/] √viellj] ↝ viellja (‘brother’ (n.)) (/∗vielljet/∗vielljat (v.))
b. [vP [v /ɑ/] √viekh] ↝ viekhat (‘run’ (v.)) (/∗viekha/∗viekhu (n.))
[nP [n /m/] [vP [v /ɑ/] √viekh]] ↝ viekhan (‘running’)
(cf. Julien 2015: 5; North Sámi (Uralic))
The meanings of some roots may themselves be sortally restricted, whether in the
lexicon or as a matter of world knowledge (cf. e.g. Harley 2005, Levinson 2007);
some roots may express properties satisfied only by particular sorts of things in E. I
suggest that a general semantic role of certain nominalizing and verbalizing heads
is to provide an explicit source of such sortal constraints. For instance, the v0
head phonologically realized with /e/ in (8.115) — call it simply ‘v’ — might restrict
the property denoted by its complement to a property of events, as reflected in
(8.119) (cf. Borer 2005b). The world variable is now an internal argument of the
verbalizing head, which receives a substantive lexical entry. (xεe is, again, a sorted
variable over elements of De such that xεe(g), for any gg, is an eventuality. I will
ignore aspect.)
(8.119) a. [vP [v0 v t1s] muorr]
b. JvK = λws.λP⟨s,et⟩.λxεe .λgg .P(w)(xε)(g)JvPK = λxεe .λgg .wood(g(1s))(xε(g))
This treats the vP representing murret ‘chop wood’ as picking out the set of wood-ish
things in the given world (=wood(g(1s))) that are events — for speakers of North
Sámi, events of wood-chopping. Additional composition rules such as Event Identi-
fication (Kratzer 1996) for combining the root and the verbalizer aren’t required.
External arguments can now be introduced in v∗P, where v∗ heads are given
substantive lexical entries (cf. Chomsky 1995, Kratzer 1996, Folli & Harley
2007, Pylkkänen 2008, D'Alessandro et al. 2017; n. 93). Just as the external
possessors in free R genitives are introduced in Spec,n∗ with a relevant posses-
sion relation pronoun, the external subject in an active sentence such as (8.120)
can be introduced in Spec,v∗ with a relevant agentive relation pronoun (see §7.2;
cf. n. 66).117 In both cases the external argument+relation functions semantically
117As with possessive noun phrases, certain v∗ heads may place semantic restrictions on the
relation expressed (e.g., Agent, Experiencer, Possessor; cf. Wood & Marantz 2017, nn. 66, 127).
An alternative would be to treat certain v∗ heads as specifying particular thematic relations in their
lexical entry, as in (i):
(i) a. [v∗P Fluffy [v∗agt [vP [v t1s] meow]]]
b. Jv∗agtK = λPet.λye.λxve.λgg .P(xv)(g) ∧ agent(y(g))(xv(g))Jv∗PK = λxve.λgg .meow(g(1s))(xv(g)) ∧ agent(Fluffy)(xv(g))
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as a restrictive modifier (see n. 64, §7.2). The set of event-entities ov denoted by
the verb phrase can then be quantified over, as usual, such as by existential closure
or a higher aspectual quantifier (Krifka 1992, Bonomi 1997a, Kratzer 1998a,
Hacquard 2006, 2009). A first approximation with a simple existential closure
operation is in (8.120). (For uniformity I treat the thematic relation like our other
relational predicates as type ⟨e, ⟨s, et⟩⟩ (abbreviated R).)
One motivation for the sort of analysis in the main text may come from passives. Crosslinguistic
work provides evidence that passives retain a layered V-v-v∗ structure (Harley 2013, 2017, Julien
2015, Sundaresan & McFadden 2017, Wurmbrand & Shimamura 2017; cf. Legate 2003).
What distinguishes passives from (e.g.) unergatives and active transitives isn’t the category of the
verb phrase (vP vs. v∗P), but whether the v∗ head (in our terms) takes a thematic argument in
its specifier. If this is right, v∗ heads in passive sentences can be given the same (polymorphic)
lexical entry for purposes of compositional semantics as v∗ heads in active sentences. The resulting
approach to the semantics of v∗Ps parallels our treatments of possessive and non-possessive n∗Ps.
As discussed in §7.2, in some languages the connection between the semantic roles of (agentive)
subjects and possessors are reflected in the morphology, as in (7.49), reproduced in (ii), where the
agentive subject is introduced with the same marker distinguishing free R readings of possessive noun
phrases. In some cases the added markers combining with the possessor/subject are synchronically
or diachronically related to elements with a relational syntax/semantics (see n. 66).
(ii) a. nga
art
kur￿
dog
[a
possfr
Mere]
Mere
‘Mere’s dogs’
b. te
art
whakamau-tanga
fasten-nomz
[a
possfr
Mere]
Mere
i
acc
te
art
taura
rope
‘Mere’s fastening of the rope’
c. ka
t/a
whakamau
fasten
[a
possfr
Mere]
Mere
i
acc
te
art
taura.
rope
‘Mere is fastening the rope’
(Harlow 2007: 166, Chung 1973: 652, Maori (Austronesian))
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(8.120) ‘Fluffy meowed.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
(∃) v∗P
u1s
R2 g1 Fluffy
v∗agt vP
v0
v t1s
meow
Jv∗agtK = λPet.λP′et.λxve.λgg .P(xv)(g) ∧ P′(xv)(g)Jv∗PK = λxve.λgg .meow(g(1s))(xv(g)) ∧ g(1a)(2R)(Fluffy)(g(1s))(xv(g))JSK ≈ λgg .∃xve ∶meow(@(g−))(xv(g)) ∧ g−(2R)(Fluffy)(@(g−))(xv(g))
Roughly put, this treats the v∗P representing ‘Fluffy meow’ as denoting the set
of things ov which are meowing events in the world of the discourse @(gc) and
which bear the relevant agent-relation (=gc(2R)) to Fluffy — i.e., the set of meowing
events of which Fluffy is the agent. The sentence is true only if there is such an event.
The sort of analysis in (8.120) may of course be refined. Notably, the derivation
of the quantification over events would ultimately need to take into account the
contributions of particular aspectual heads and their interactions with tense (see also
n. 127).118 As noted in §3.2, Hacquard (2006, 2010) has argued that the higher
aspectual quantifiers raise for type reasons from inside the verb phrase (see also
Moulton 2015). Comparisons with the syntax/semantics developed here of quan-
tifier phrases QP as introducing assignment-quantification/binding are worth ex-
118For instance, a prominent move is to treat aspects such as perfective and imperfective as
(existential) quantifiers which locate the “running time” of an event (written τ(e)) with respect to a
“reference time” (Klein 1994), provided e.g. by a time pronoun in Tense. A sample implementation
of (8.120) with an entry for the perfective adapted from Kratzer 1998a is in (i). (li is a variable for
times, type l; I ignore any presuppositional constraint associated with the past tense.)
(i) [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [TP l1 g1 [AspP prfv [v∗P [u1s R2-g1 Fluffy] [v∗agt [vP v-t1s meow]]]]]]]JprfvK = λPet.λtl.λgg .∃xεe ∶P(xε)(g) ∧ τ(xε(g)) ⊆ t(g)JSK ≈ λgg .∃xve ∶meow(@(g−))(xv(g)) ∧ g−(2R)(Fluffy)(@(g−))(xv(g)) ∧ τ(xv(g)) ⊆ g−(1l)
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ploring. Applications to shifting phenomena such as with temporal (in)dependence,
fake tense, actuality entailments, may yield additional avenues for future research.
The examples thus far have involved eventive predicates. Considering stative
predicates may afford revised analyses of predicative uses of noun phrases, such as
in existential sentences (§§8.1–8.4). First, let’s consider a “bare” existential ‘there’
sentence such as (8.50), reproduced below. As previously, the NumP representing
‘three pillows’ denotes (roughly) the property of being a plural entity with at least
three pillows as atomic parts.
(8.121) There are three pillows.
To fix ideas suppose that predicative ‘be’ is a realization of a stative verbalizer vbe
(n. 92; cf. Harley 1995, Kratzer 1996, Folli & Harley 2007). Treating the
nominalizer in (8.121) as semantically vacuous affords a straightforward semantics
for vbe: vbe converts the nominal predicate to a verbal predicate expressing a property
of states os ∈ E. The higher (existential) quantification over eventualities yields a
type t denotation straightway, reflected in (8.123). (xse is, again, a sorted variable
over elements of De such that xse(g), for any gg, is a state.) Drawing on the approach
to predicate nominals suggested in n. 105, the complementizer may be generated
directly in n0 in the main predicate (more on which shortly).
(8.122) JvbeK = λPet.λxse.λgg .P(xs)(g)
(8.123) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [vP vbe [nP [n0 n∅ t1s] three#-pillows]]]]
b. JNumPK ≈ λws.λye.λgg .#x(g)[pillow(w(g))(x(g)) ∧ x(g) ⊑ y(g)] ≥ 3
c. JSK ≈ λgg .∃yse∶#x(g)[pillow(@(g−))(x(g)) ∧ x(g) ⊑ ys(g)] ≥ 3
(to be revised)
Suppose that ‘⊑’ in our metalanguage is given a generalized “part-of” interpretation,
applicable to algebraic structures such as with plurals (e.g., where Fluffy is part ofJcatsK) as well as to (e.g.) locations, situations, states, events. The vP ‘be’+pivot
denotes the set of states os ∈ E such that the number of pillows in @(gc) that are a
part of os is at least three. (8.123) says that (8.121) is true iff there is such a state.
The semantics for (bare) existential ‘there’ sentences in (8.123) loses two key
features of the account from §8.4. First, the semantics in (8.50)–(8.52) relied on an
implicit type-e domain pronoun above the nominal predicate. In (8.123) the general
existential quantification over eventualities obviates the need for such an element,
at least for type reasons. Yet the basis for capturing the apparent context-sensitivity
of existential ‘there’ sentences is lost with it. Second, the account no longer captures
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examples with nominals expressing downward entailing or non-monotone quantifi-
cational concepts (‘no/few/exactly four Ns’). The truth condition for (8.52) ‘There
are no unicorns’ in (8.124) is too weak.
(8.124) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [vP be [nP [n∅ t1s] no#-unicorns]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∃yse∶#x(g)[unicorn(@(g−))(x(g)) ∧ x(g) ⊑ ys(g)] = 0
The truth of ‘There are no unicorns’ isn’t guaranteed by there being some unicornless
state.
Both problems can be addressed with a common solution. §8.4 assumed as a
baseline hypothesis that the YP “pivots” in ‘There be YP’ sentences such as (8.48)–
(8.52) are nPs. Yet there are good reasons for thinking that the nominal predicates
in existential sentences are in general n∗Ps. Notably, it is crosslinguistically com-
mon to form existential sentences via a genitive/possessive construction where the
pivot functions analogously to the noun for the “possessee” (see Creissels 2014,
McNally 2016 and references therein). In the Serbian example in (8.125a) both the
head noun and nonpresuppositional quantifier receive genitive case morphology.
The pattern of genitive morphology in (8.125a) parallels the pattern of genitive
morphology on the quantifier complement from (7.47) (=(8.125b)). In both cases
n∗ can be treated as assigning genitive Case to its complement. In languages such
as Swahili with comitative existential constructions ((8.126)), the comitative ele-
ment could perhaps be analyzed as a realization of n∗ (cf. §7.2). Though Swahili
has a relatively free word order, the (glossed) ‘there (be) na YP’ order is rigid
(Marten 2013). When used with a non-expletive subject the construction yields
a broadly possessional interpretation (cf. (8.126b)). Indeed a prominent idea, fol-
lowing Szabolcsi (1983, 1994) and Kayne (1993, 1994), is that possessive ‘have’
constructions are (in at least some languages) derived from ‘be’ plus a possessive
noun phrase — i.e., on the present architecture, v+n∗P.119 The existential con-
structions in (8.127) are identical to the possessive construction without an overt
“possessor” subject (cf. e.g. Lynch 1978: 99–100, Fortescue 1984: 81, 171, 173,
Onishi 2000: 133, a.o.). Possessive sentences in languages such as Tolai are liter-
ally expressed via an existential construction with a bare possessive n∗P predicate
((8.128); cf. (7.29), (7.51)–(7.50)). In various languages the ‘be’+n∗P structure
and relation+entity in Spec,n∗are overt in both possessive and existential sentences.
119Cf. Kayne’s suggestive remark: “Szabolcsi’s claim that Hungarian possessive sentences [e.g.≈ John has a cat] contain … a copula plus a single argument” — e.g., [be [n∗P John n∗poss [a cat]]] —
“can become intuitively clear to an English speaker if the Hungarian sentences are thought of as
parallel to the almost acceptable English There is [a cat] of John’s” (1993: 108; see Szabolcsi 1994).
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For instance, in Irish (8.129), using the PP ag YP ‘at YP’ yields a possessive inter-
pretation ((8.129a)), and using the PP ann ‘in it’ yields an existential interpretation
((8.129b)) (see also Freeze 1992, 2001, Boneh & Sichel 2010). Notably, the
structural possessor/location element is apparently obligatory in existential as well
as possessive interpretations; McCloskey 2014 reports that bare ‘be’+pivot exis-
tentials such as (8.129c) without ann are ungrammatical. An n∗P analysis provides
a natural diagnosis. If the relevant n∗ head(s) in (e.g.) Irish have an EPP-property
or assign a (broadly possessional/locational) θ-role, (8.129c) would be excluded
insofar as the EPP-property/θ-role of n∗ isn’t satisfied/discharged.120
(8.125) a. Bilo
be.sg
je
aux.sg
nekih
some.gen
knjiga.
books.gen
‘There were some books.’
120McCloskey emphasizes that Irish ann in existential sentences isn’t simply an expletive present
for purely syntactic reasons; unlike e.g. ‘there’, ann can be structurally focused in existential sentences
(McCloskey 2014: 353–354). Whereas codas such as ‘in the store’ in (i) can function as a verbal
modifier, ann in (8.129b)/(ii) must be noun-phrase-internal; as predicted, the movement in (ii-b),
unlike (i-b), is ungrammatical. Revealingly, whereas ann can co-occur with (noun-phrase-internal/-
external) modifier adjuncts, it is in complementary distribution with ag YP (McCloskey 2014),
reflected in (iii): ann and ag YP cannot co-occur in (iii-c) insofar as they compete for the same
position in Spec,n∗.
(i) a. There is a cat on the couch.
b. On the couch, there is a cat.
(ii) a. Níl
is-not
tae
tea
ar bith
any
ann.
in-it
‘There’s no tea.
b. *Ann,
in-it
níl
is-not
tae
tea
ar bith.
any
(iii) a. Tá
is
daoine
people
ann
in-it
nach
negc
mbeadh
be.cond
sásta
satisfied
glacadh
take.nonfin
leis.
with-it
‘There are people who would not be willing to accept it.’
b. Tá
is
daoine
people
ann
in-it
ar
on
an
the
bhaile.
town
‘There are people in the town.’
c. *Tá
is
leabhar
book
ann
in-it
agt
at
mo
my
dheirfiúr.
sister (McCloskey 2014: 347, 351–352; Irish)
More careful examination of the syntactic and semantic constraints on the element in Spec,n∗, and
interactions among the pivot, Spec,n∗ PPs, and different types of n∗P-internal and n∗P-external
modifiers, is warranted (cf. also nn. 64, 108). It would be interesting to compare the behavior of ann
with the behavior of obligatory locative elements in other languages lacking dedicated existential
constructions (see Creissels 2014: 25–26). See also n. 99 on certain Romance locative clitics and
German da.
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b. Mnogo
many
[nekih
some.gen
ljudi]
people.gen
želi
want
pravdu.
justice
‘Many different people want justice.’
(cf. Hartmann & Milićević 2009: exs. 2, 14, 23; Serbian)
(8.126) a. Ku-li-ku-wa
sm7-pst-stm-be
na
with
ma-endeleo
cl6-development
sana.
much
‘There was a lot of development.’
b. Dunia-ni
cl9.world-loc
ku
sm17
na
with
ku-danganyana
cl15-deceive
kw-ingi.
cl15-much
(lit. ‘in the world therein (is) with much deceit’)
‘The world has a lot of deceit.’ / ‘There is a lot of deceit in the world.’
(Marten 2013: 48, 52, 53, Creissels 2014: 40; Swahili)
(8.127) a. Mayroong
exist.there.lnkr
maysakit
sick
na
lnkr
aso
dog
(si
sbj
Maria).
Maria
‘There is a sick dog’ (‘Maria has a sick dog’)
(cf. Sabbagh 2009: 683, 700; Tagalog (Austronesian))
b. (Ni-)baj-e
1sg-have-pf
ji-iba.
cl11-knife
‘There is a knife’ (‘I have a knife’)
(Bassène & Creissels 2011: exs. 18, 20; Jóola-Banjal (Niger-Congo))
(8.128) a. A
art
lolovina
long
lima-i-diat.
hand-poss.mrk-3pl
‘They had long arms.’ (lit. ‘(there were) long arms of theirs’121)
b. Pa
neg
ka-gu
possfr-1sg
ta
some
vabirau.
light
‘I have not got a light.’ (lit. ‘(there is) no light of mine’)
(Mosel 1984: cf. 157, 164; Tolai (Austronesian))
(8.129) a. Tá
is
leabhar
book
agt
at
Riley.
Riley
‘Riley has a book.’
b. Níl
is-not
arán
bread
ar bith
any
ann.
in-it
‘There’s no bread.’
c. *Níl
is-not
arán
bread
ar bith.
any (McCloskey 2014: cf. exs. 23, 25; Irish)
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In light of such data I offer (8.130) as a revised general v+n∗P analysis for (bare)
existential ‘there’ sentences.122 Analyzing the nominal predicates in existential sen-
tences as n∗Ps helps address the worries with (8.123)–(8.124). The contextual
domain restriction is captured via the broadly possessional/locational relation and
121Tolai doesn’t use an overt ‘be’-like element with non-verbal predicates, as in (i) (Mosel 1984:
138, 159).
(i) a. Ia
she
[a
art
bul]pred.
child
‘She is/was a child.’
b. Iau
I
[mamati]pred.
from-here
‘I am from here.’
122Given economy principles constraining implicit functional structure (Cardinaletti & Starke
1999, Katzir 2011), one might wonder whether predicative uses would be realized with the implicit
choice-function element in the nP. Support for such an analysis may come from languages in which
the pivot nominal can appear with an overt determiner, as in (ii) with Malagasy ny. Notably, although
ny is elsewhere typically interpreted as specific, as in (i), Law (2011: 1616–1618) reports that it lacks
this interpretation in the pivot of existential sentences.
(i) lasa
gone
ny
det
mpianatra.
student
‘The student(s) left.’
(ii) a. tsy
not
misy
exist
ny
det
zaza
child
intsony.
any longer
‘There are no children any longer.’
b. tsy
not
misy
exist
ny
det
fahamarinana.
justice
‘There is no justice.’ (Law 2011: exs. 113, 35, 116; Malagasy (Austronesian))
The proposed ‘be’+n∗P structure and predicative semantics may help capture insights from alter-
native “small-clause analyses” (Moro 1997, Hazout 2004, McCloskey 2014) and “NP analyses”
(Williams 1984, Chung 1987, McNally 1997, Sabbagh 2009): the single n∗P syntactic argument
of the light verb is a type of predicative noun phrase and a type of small clause (given a crosscategorial
conception of “small clauses” as e.g. v∗P/n∗P/p∗P; cf. Bittner & Hale 1996, Harley & Jung 2015,
Wood & Marantz 2017). As discussed below, saying this still allows for intra-/cross-linguistic
differences in syntactic/semantic properties of the relevant heads, and syntactic/semantic differences
between nominal pivots in existential sentences and other types of predicative constructions.
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possessor/location — explicit in languages such as Irish, with ann— in Spec,n∗.123
A revised derivation for (8.124) is in (8.131), using ‘0-unicorns’ to abbreviate the
property of having zero unicorns as a part (cf. §§8.2, 8.8.1).124 (For clarity I will
use ‘Rp.loc’ for the relevant possessional/locational relation.)
(8.130) There be YP (revised)
… [vP vbe [n∗P ∃⟨i,a⟩r [n∗P [us Rp.loc oe-g] [n∗ [nP … tia…]]]]]
123I continue to leave open the relation between the interpreted material supplying the relevant
domain (i.e., the “subject” of the n∗P) and the overt grammatical subject (if any) in particular
languages, such as existential ‘there’ in English (n. 99); and I ignore potential complications from
distinguishing sorts/types for locations (see e.g. Kracht 2002). McCloskey 2014 proposes to give
ann in Irish existential sentences the semantics of an existential generalized quantifier (type ⟨et, t⟩).
The meaning of ann in existential sentences is thus divorced from its general broadly locative meaning
as a PP. For languages without a specialized element such as ann, McCloskey suggests that the
existential meaning attributed to ann may be distributed among the copula or other verbal head.
The meanings of the copula/verbal element in Irish existential sentences is thus distinguished from
its meaning in existential sentences in (all?) other languages. If the approach to ann suggested in the
main text is on the right track, at least some of the distinctive properties of Irish existential sentences
can be captured without treating the syntax/semantics as radically different in these ways. ann may
be given its usual syntax and (bleached) semantics as a “preposition [which] projects a maximal
phrase [PP] and selects a null pronominal as its complement” (McCloskey 2014: 377n.25). (See
§8.4 on general challenges with assertion-of-existence/instantiation analyses.)
124Note that whereas the (external head) nP’s world-pronoun in the QP in (8.91) (cf. (8.92)) could
receive a global reading, the account still predicts that no such reading is available for the pivot in
an existential ‘there’ sentence, even if the pivot is part of an n∗P; see n. 105.
224
(8.131) ‘There are no unicorns.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
(∃) vP
vbe n∗P
∃⟨2,a⟩r n∗P
u1s Rp.loc o3-g1
X nP
t1s
F2cf∗ t2a
no# unicornsJSK ≈ λgg .∃xse∃aa∶ xs(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(0-unicorns)(@(g−)) ∧
Rp.loc(g−(3e))(@(g−))(xs(g))
Roughly put, this says that the bare existential ‘there’ sentence with ‘no’ is true
iff there is a state os ∈ E such that os manifests some individual concept of an en-
tity having no unicorn as a part — intuitively, a state of having no unicorn as a
part — and the location of os (in @(gc)) is the contextually relevant location gc(3e).
Analogously to our examples of free R genitives, the type ⟨e, t⟩ relation+entity in
Spec,n∗ functions semantically as a restrictive modifier. The relevant locational
domain gc(3e) functions as a sort of metaphorical “possessor” of the witness state
os (see Lyons 1968: §8.4, Clark 1978, Freeze 1992, Barker 1995, Langacker
1995, Heine 1997, Marantz 1997, Borschev & Partee 2002, Heine & Kuteva
2002, Uriagereka 2002b, Larson & Cho 2003, Francez 2007, 2010, Zeshan &
Perniss 2008, Payne 2009, Creissels 2013 for relevant discussion). In a free R
possessive noun phrase ‘X’s N’, the relation+possessor restricts the denotation to
the set of Ns that are R-“possessed” by X; analogously, in (8.131), the denotation
of the vP is restricted to the set of “being-nP” states that are “possessed” by, in the
sense of being located at, gc(3e). If the relevant domain gc(3e) corresponds to the
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entire world, the truth condition requires that the actual world-state be unicornless.
As in §8.4, there is no implication of N-instantiation/existence associated with the
“existential” ‘there’ construction itself (n. 100). The context-sensitivity of existential
sentences is now derived from the domain pronoun in Spec,n∗. Continuations such
as in (8.51) are still predicted coherent:
(8.132) There are no pillows (… so we should go buy some)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [(∃) [vP vbe [∃⟨2,a⟩r
[n∗P [u1s Rp.loc o4e-g1] [X [nP t1s F2cf∗-t2a no#-pillows]]]]]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∃xse∃aa∶ xs(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(0-pillows)(@(g−)) ∧
Rp.loc(g−(4e))(@(g−))(xs(g))
The fact that the witness state os at the relevant location gc(4e) is a state no part of
which is a pillow needn’t imply that there are there are no pillows in the world.
The above v+n∗P analysis extends directly to existential sentences with an addi-
tional “coda” phrase — sentences ‘There be YP ZP’ where the post-copular nominal
YP “pivot” co-occurs with a ZP “coda.” The alternative structures in (8.133) are
equally interpretable given our semantics for vbe and n∗ heads (cf. n. 108). In each
case ∃⟨i,a⟩r QRs to adjoin to its nearest interpretable position (whether in the n∗P or
vP area). The compositional semantics for (b), with a ZP coda (right-)adjoined to
n∗/n∗P, proceeds as in (8.131)–(8.132) (cf. n. 108). In (c) the coda modifies the
verb phrase, as reflected in (8.135) with ‘on the couch’. As previously, vbe converts
the n∗P argument to a predicate of states. The locative coda supplies a further
restrictive modifier, restricting the denotation to states of being on the couch.125
A generalized polymorphic version of the lexical entry from (8.122) is in (8.134)
(cf. n. 64). The type-⟨e, t⟩ denotation for the lower vP segment combines (as in
(a)–(b)) via function composition with ∃⟨i,a⟩r of type ⟨t, t⟩, yielding the type-⟨e, t⟩ vP
125Interestingly, the same linkers marking restrictive modification in (i-a) are used also in pred-
icative uses such as (i-b).
(i) a. Karamihan
most
sa
obl
mga
pl
internasyonal
international
na
lnkr
transaksyon
transaction
ay
ay
nangangailangan
imperf.act.require
ng
gen
tiyak
specific
na
lnkr
mga
pl
dokumento
document
na
lnkr
transportasyon.
transportation
‘Most international transactions require specific transportation documents.’
b. Ang
sbj
premyo
prize
ay
ay
isa-ng
a.lnkr
asul
blue
na
lnkr
dokumento
document
na
lnkr
transportasyon.
transportation
‘The prize is a blue transportation document.
(cf. Sabbagh 2016: 652; Tagalog (Austronesian))
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predicate. (For simplicity I leave ‘the couch’ unanalyzed, and I ignore any additional
domain pronoun in Spec,n∗.)126
(8.133) a. … [vP vbe [n∗P ∃⟨i,a⟩r [n∗P [us Rp.loc oe-g] [n∗ nP]]]]
b. … [vP vbe [n∗P ∃⟨i,a⟩r [[n∗ nP] ZP]]]
c. … [vP ∃⟨i,a⟩r [vP [[vbe [n∗P n∗ nP]] ZP]]]
(8.134) JvbeK = λP1et . . . λPnet.λxse.λgg .P1(xs)(g) ∧⋯ ∧ Pn(xs)(g)
126To fix ideas I assume an argument structure for the preposition parallel to that for relational
nouns. See Kracht 2002, Levinson 2007 for general analyses of locative PPs as predicates of
eventualities. Such a sortal restriction might be encoded in the lexical entries for certain prepositional
elements, though more would then need to be said to accommodate adnominal uses of locatives
with non-eventive noun phrases (seeKracht 2002: 199–202) — compare (i-a) vs. its ungrammatical
Finnish counterpart with locative adessive case in (i-b). (Thanks to Jussi Suikkanen.)
(i) a. The pillow on the couch is soft.
b. *[Tyyny
pillow
sohva-lla]
sofa-ade
on
is
pehmeä.
soft
c. Jussi
Jussi
[on/nukkui
is/slept
sohva-lla].
sofa-ade
‘Jussi is/slept on the couch.’
There are syntactic and semantic differences among codas inside and outside the noun phrase, such
as regarding extraction and discourse status (see Williams 1984, McNally 1997, Hazout 2004,
Bhatt 2006, Francez 2007, 2009, Hartmann 2008, Villalba 2013; also n. 89), e.g.:
(ii) a. There are three cats (in room 12) with a lot of hair.
b. *With how much hair are there three cats (in room 12)?
(iii) a. There are three cats in room 12 (with a lot of hair).
b. In which room are there three cats (with a lot of hair)?
(iv) a. The winners are three cats in room 12.
b. *In which room are the winners three cats?
(v) a. There is usually a teacher in a school.≈ “for most situations in which there’s a school, there’s some teacher or other in it”
b. There is usually a teacher teaching in a school.≈ “for most situations in which there’s a school, there’s some teacher or other teaching in it”
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(8.135) There are three pillows on the couch.
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
(∃) vP
∃⟨2,a⟩r vP
vbe n∗P
X nP
t1s
F2cf∗ t2a
three# pillows
pP
u1s on
the-couch
JSK ≈ λgg .∃xse∃aa∶ xs(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(3-pillows)(@(g−)) ∧
on(the-couch)(@(g−))(xs(g))
This says, roughly, that (8.135) is true iff there is an on-the-couch state os which
includes three pillows as parts.
The revised compositional semantics of existential ‘there’ sentences in this sec-
tion has been speculative. Yet the proposed analyses may help systematize a range
of syntactic and semantic data, and avoid concerns with certain prominent accounts.
§8.4 focused on the distribution of quantifier words in the pivot. In addition, first,
the analyses maintain with much syntactic work that the pivot provides the main
predicate, and that overt codas such as in (8.135) are optional and function as (re-
strictive) modifiers (e.g. Williams 1984, McNally 1997, Hazout 2004, Sabbagh
2009,McCloskey 2014, pace Barwise&Cooper 1981,Keenan 1987,GutiérrezMorales
2006: 25–26). Second, the account avoids syntactic and compositional semantic
problems with attempts to impose a generalized quantifier structure (e.g. Milsark
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1974, Barwise& Cooper 1981, Keenan 1987, Zucchi 1995, Francez 2007, 2010,
Law 2011; see McNally 2011). The syntax/semantics of quantifier words in the
pivot is unified with their syntax/semantics in predicative uses generally (§8.4).
Third, the analyses provide structural grounds for commonalities between existen-
tial ‘there’ sentences and copular, possessive, and locative sentences, while still dis-
tinguishing them in their syntax and semantics. For instance, although the pivot pro-
vides the main predicate, the account avoids assimilating existential ‘there’ sentences
to copular sentences (e.g. Keenan 1987); and it avoids the semantic challenges
observed in §8.4 with assertion-of-existence/instantiation analyses (Milsark 1974,
McNally 1997, 1998, 2009, Chung& Ladusaw 2004, Sabbagh 2009, McCloskey
2014, Irwin 2018; (8.131)–(8.132)). The contextual domain pronoun+relation
in Spec,n∗ allows for interpretive connections between existential ‘there’ sentences
and locatives. The condition in (8.136a) is intuitively satisfied in our context c
iff the condition in (8.136b) is. Yet in (8.137a) ‘fires’ provides the main predicate
(cf. (8.136a)); in (8.137b) it is an nP subject of a predication structure, generated in
a possible θ-position (whether in the small clause complement of ‘be’ as per (8.136b)
(cf. Wood & Marantz 2017), or in an embedding v∗P; see nn. 92, 124). ((8.136b)
illustrates the structure prior to QR-ing the nP to the edge of the small clause (see
§§7.4, 8.2).)
(8.136) a. ‘There are three pillows on the couch’ (=(8.135))
… [vP ∃⟨i,a⟩r [[vbe [n∗P [nP tjs Fcf∗-tia 3-pillows]]] [ujs on the-couch]]]
(a) is true in c iff (roughly) there are os ∈ E,h ∈ G such that
os = h(2cf∗)(3-pillows)(@(gc)) ∧ on(the-couch)(@(gc))(os)
b. ‘Three pillows are on the couch’
… [vP vbe [[ujs Rposs ujs-3-pillows] [X [tjs on the-couch]]]]
(b) is true in c iff (roughly) there is an os ∈ E such that
the maximal o′ such thatRposs(o′)(@(gc))(os) ∧ on(the-couch)(@(gc))(os)
is such that #o′′[pillow(@(gc))(o′′) ∧ o′′ ⊑ o′] ≥ 3
(8.137) a. There are fires in the school.
b.??Fires are in the school.
(McNally 2011: 1836; cf. Hornstein et al. 2002)
Similarly, our general ‘be’+n∗P analysis for existentials extends naturally to pos-
sessive sentences such as those in (8.127)–(8.129), in which possessive ‘have’ is
overtly expressed via ‘be’ and a possessor PP: (8.138b) says, roughly, that Irish
(8.129a)/(8.138a) (literally ‘a book is at Riley’) is true iff there is some being-a-
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book state of which Riley is the possessor (cf. (8.128b), nn. 66, 127). Yet it is
controversial whether ‘have’ is generally analyzable in this way across languages
(see Freeze 1992, Kayne 1993, den Dikken 1995, 1997, Harley 1995, 2002,
Español-Echevarría 1997,Heine 1997, Zeshan& Perniss 2008, Boneh& Sichel
2010, Creissels 2013, Harley & Jung 2015, Myler 2016).
(8.138) (8.129a) Tá leabhar ag Riley (‘Riley has a book’; Irish)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [(∃) [vP vbe [∃⟨2,a⟩r
[n∗P [pP u1s Rposs Riley] [X [nP t1s F2cf∗-t2a book]]]]]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∃xse∃aa∶ xs(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(book)(@(g−))∧ Rposs(Riley)(@(g−))(xs(g))
Finally, the analyses in (8.135) and of nonpresuppositional uses in §8.2 may also
shed light on the correlation, observed by Milsark (1974, 1977), between pred-
icates excluded from codas and from copular sentences with nonpresuppositional
noun phrase subjects. Although the predicted LFs for (8.139a) and (8.139b) are
distinct (cf. (8.136)), the resulting semantic values both ultimately involve charac-
terizing an indefinite number of individuals as jackasses (cf. (8.136)). Whatever
exactly explains the oddity of predicating the “individual-level predicate” (Carlson
1980) ‘jackass’ in (8.139a) carries over to (8.139b). (If codas of the form in (8.139b)
are analyzed as reduced relatives, the point is even more straightforward; ‘jackass’ is
directly predicated of the relative-internal representation of ‘sm people’ (cf. Kayne
1994, Law 1999, Bhatt 2006, Sabbagh 2009).)
(8.139) a.#sm people are jackasses (/okavailable).
b.#There are sm people jackasses (/okavailable).
Additional resources specific to existential constructions needn’t be required (con-
trast McNally 1997, Francez 2007).
In these ways, each element in the interpretation of existential ‘there’ sentences
is layered into the general syntax/semantics for noun and verb phrases developed in
these sections. The key feature relevant for interpretation is that the pivot nominal
provides the main predicate, along with a stative v. We should expect languages
to fill in the relevant functional material in different ways, as in fact they do. As
we have seen, there is variation within and across languages regarding the external
syntax of codas, the morphosyntactic properties of n∗ and light verb, and nature and
presence of the (expletive or semantically bleached) subject. For instance, whereas
English uses ‘there’ — an element elsewhere used as a locative pronoun — to serve
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as the grammatical subject, other languages lack an overt subject (e.g. (8.125a),
(8.127), (8.128), nn. 99, 122). The verbal element may be implicit, realized in
(say) v or V, or distributed over multiple positions (cf. (8.125a), (8.128), nn. 92, 99).
English uses ‘be’; other languages use a dedicated predicate or co-opt devices else-
where used with locatives or possessives (e.g. (8.126)–(8.129), (8.138), (8.140),
nn. 120, 121, or the present tense version of (8.125a) in (8.141)). The choice of
light verb may provide further sources of crosslinguistic variation in the structural
complexity of the verb phrase.
(8.140) a. È-tí !í
3-be.at
ɛǹk-áyíóní
fsg-boy.nom
ɔ̀l-kɛj̀ʊ.́
msg-river.acc
‘The boy is at the river.’
b. K-é-tí !í
dscn-3-be.at
dòí
indeed
ìn-kɛŕâ
fpl-children.nom
n-áà-bìk
rel.f-3fpl.rel.nom-wait
ɔ̀-m-ɛ-̀shɔḿɔ̀.
until-sbjv-3-go.sbjv
‘There are children that stay until they are able to walk.’
(Payne 2009: exs. 30, 40; Maa (Nilo-Saharan))
(8.141) Ima/∗Imaju
have.sg/∗have.pl nekihsome.gen knjigabooks.gen (uin sobi).room
‘There are some books (in the room).’
(cf. Hartmann & Milićević 2009: exs. 3, 7; Serbian)
One needn’t assume that all types of existential constructions across languages have
a uniform underlying syntax (contrast Freeze 1992, 2001). It is worth examining
more carefully to what extent the proposed compositional semantics for existential
‘there’ sentences might be adapted for different existential constructions in other
languages. Comparisons among bare existential sentences and existential sentences
with different types of codas (non-relative, reduced relative, relative), and appli-
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cations to related predicate nominal and possession constructions, may provide
additional directions for future research.127
127For relevant discussion see Lyons 1968: §8.4, Clark 1978, Mosel 1984: ch. 4, Szabolcsi
1986, Hoekstra&Mulder 1990, Tellier 1991, 1994, Kayne 1993, 2008, denDikken 1995, 1997,
Harley 1995, 2002, Langacker 1995, Español-Echevarría 1997, Heine 1997, McNally 1997,
2016, Freeze 2001, Borschev & Partee 2002, Czinglar 2002, Dixon 2002, Vangsnes 2002,
Francez 2007, Lee-Schoenfeld 2007, Hartmann 2008, Payne 2009, Sabbagh 2009, Boneh &
Sichel 2010, Bosse et al. 2012, Frajzyngier 2013, Gaeta 2013, Villalba 2013, Wang & Xu
2013, Creissels 2014, McCloskey 2014, Tortora 2014, Myler 2016, Moro 2017; also nn. 66,
89, 92, 99, 120, 122, 126. For instance, the distinction between free R and inherent R readings
of possessive noun phrases (§7.2) has a counterpart with possessive sentences. In some languages,
morphological realizations of the distinction (see (7.29), (7.48)–(7.51), n. 66) are reflected also in
verbal possessives, as in (i)–(ii) with the added marker -tȟá- in free R possessive pronouns ((i-a))
and corresponding free R possessive verb itȟáwa ((ii-a)) (see also Nedjalkov 1997: §1.10, Heine
1997, Dixon 2010: 301–305, Stassen 2009: 210, 660–661, Aikhenvald 2013 and references
therein). The analysis of the n∗P in (8.138) corresponds to the §7.2-analysis of free R readings
(now representing the world-indexing with the relation pronoun). A corresponding LF for an
inherent R possessive sentence such as (iii) (cf. (8.128a)) is in (iv). In (8.138) the relevant relation
is contextually supplied by a world-indexed pronoun; in (iv) it is lexically supplied by the relational
noun ‘brother’. (Cf. Mosel 1984: §§4.3, 4.6, Tellier 1991, 1994, den Dikken 1995, Harley 1995,
2002, Español-Echevarría 1997, Heine 1997, Boneh & Sichel 2010, Myler 2016 for relevant
discussion; also nn. 66, 70, 71. I ignore any additional domain restriction in (iv).)
(i) a. mi-tȟá-
1sg-poss
wámakȟaškaŋ-pi
animal-pl
kiŋ
def
‘my animals’
b. mi-
1sg
tȟuŋkašila
grandfather
‘my grandfather’
(ii) a. Ni-mi-tȟawa.
2sg-1sg-have
‘You are mine.’ / ‘I have you.’
b. Tȟuŋkášila-wa-ya.
grandfather-1sg-have.kin
‘I have him as grandfather.’
(Helmbrecht 2016: 448–451, Williamson 1979: 359; Lakota (Siouan))
(iii) Tá
is
deartháir
brother
agt
at
Riley.
Riley
‘Riley has a brother.’
(iv) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [(∃) [vP vbe [∃⟨2,a⟩r [n∗P (…) [X [nP t1s F2cf∗-t2a brother-Riley]]]]]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg .∃xse∃aa∶ xs(g) = a(g)(2cf∗)(bro-of-Riley)(@(g−))
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The distinction between inherent R and free R readings also has a prima facie counterpart in the
verbal domain with double object constructions. In “high applicatives” (Pylkkänen 2000, 2008)
such as (v), the direct object is an argument of the verb, and the non-selected applied object(s)
supplies an additional thematic participant of the event; in the “true” benefactive in (v-a) the applied
object (‘Jose’) is introduced as the beneficiary of the event described by the verb+direct object
(‘close the door’). In “low” applicative constructions such as (vi), by contrast, the objects are directly
related by a possession-like relation (see also Marantz 1993, den Dikken 1995, Pesetsky 1995,
Harley 2002, Legate 2003, McGinnis 2003, Lecarme 2004, Lee-Schoenfeld 2007, Levinson
2007, Bruening 2010, Larson 2010, 2014, Bosse et al. 2012, Dixon 2012: ch. 25, Bosse 2015,
Harley & Jung 2015).
(v) a. Inepo
I
Hose-ta
Jose-acc
pueta-ta
door-acc
eta-ria-k.
close-appl-prf
‘I closed the door for Jose.’ (Harley 2013: ex. 8; Hiaki (Uto-Aztecan))
b. kit
I
laa-lii-ȼṵq-yaa-na
applcom-applinst-write-impfv-applcom
hun
det
karta
letter
[hun
det
pluma]inst
pen
[hun
det
Mario]com
Mario
‘I with Mario write a letter with a pen.’
(MacKay 1999: 283; Misantla Totonac (Totonacan))
(vi) a. Bert baked Alice the cookies (for Jose).
b. Minä
I
keräsi-n
show-1sg
jokaise-lta
every-toposs
opiskelija-lta
student-toposs
hänen
his/her
lopputyö-nsä.
grade-poss
‘I showed every student their grade.’ (Pylkkänen 2000: 201; Finnish)
c. A:sha
Asha
mw-andik-il-ile
3sg.obj-write-appl-t/a
Nu:ru
Nuru
xati.
letter
‘Asha wrote Nuru a letter.’
(Kisseberth & Abasheikh 1977: 190; Chimwiini (Niger–Congo))
It would be interesting to explore how the proposed approach to the free/inherent R reading
distinction might be applied to different types of double object constructions. For instance, drawing
on the comparison between high applicatives such as (v) and inherent R readings, the direct object
might be merged as an internal argument of the verb, as reflected in the first-pass analysis in (vii) for
(v-a) (≈ ‘Bert closed (for) Jose the door’). The verb phrase denotes a certain set of closing-the-door
events — those of which Jose is the beneficiary and Bert is the agent. Like with external arguments,
the phrases introducing the non-subject roles supply additional restrictive modifiers (cf. (8.134)).
Different verbal applicative heads may place alternative restrictions on the relation introducing the
applied object, as reflected in (viii) for the instrumental+comitative double applicative in (v-b) (with
verbal prefix lii- + circumfix laa-…-na; cf. nn. 66, 68, 117). Interestingly, in Somali, benefactive
applicative constructions contrast with other types of applicatives in lacking genitive case ((ix-a) vs.
(ix-b); Lecarme 2004). There is no (possessive) n∗P in the representations of the “high” applicatives
in (vii)–(viii). (I continue to ignore potential sortal restrictions in the denotations of certain types of
roots (cf. Harley 2005, Levinson 2007).)
(vii) a. … [v∗P [u1s Ragt Bert] [v∗agt [vP [u1s Rben Jose] [vappl [vP v t1s [VP close the-door]]]]]]
b. JcloseK = λye.λws.λxe.λgg .close(y(g))(w(g))(x(g))JvapplK = λPet.λP′et.λxεe .λgg .P(xε)(g) ∧ P′(xε)(g)
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Jv∗PK = λxve.λgg .close(the-door)(g(1s))(xv(g)) ∧ Rben(Jose)(g(1s))(xv(g))∧ Ragt(Bert)(g(1s))(xv(g))
(viii) a. … [v∗P [u1s Ragt Bert] [v∗agt [vP [u1s Rcom Mario] [vappl.com [vP [u1s Rinst the-pen] [vappl.inst
[vP v t1s [VP write the-letter]]]]]]]]
b. Jv∗PK = λxve.λgg .write(the-letter)(g(1s))(xv(g)) ∧ Rinstr(the-pen)(g(1s))(xv(g))∧ Rcom(Mario)(g(1s))(xv(g)) ∧ Ragt(Bert)(g(1s))(xv(g))
(ix) a. waa
decl
noó
us+applben
dagáal.
war
‘it is war for us’
b. is
refl
kú
applto
kay
poss.1s
shéeg!
say
(lit. ‘Introduce me.poss you.refl’)
‘Introduce yourself to me!’ (Lecarme 2004: 467, 465; Somali)
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In “low” applicatives such as (vi-a), in contrast, the verb (‘bake’) specifies the type of event, and
objects in the double object frame (‘the cookies’, ‘Alice’) are directly related, as reflected in (xii)
for (vi-a). The n∗P introduces the set of individuals o′ that are identical to the cookies and to which
Alice bears the relevant possession-like relation. Importantly, the n∗P cannot in general be embedded
under (say) an extensional vcause, implying a “cause-to-have” interpretation (contrast e.g. Harley
2002, Bruening 2010, Harley & Jung 2015). As is well known from the (so-called) “imperfective
paradox,” the intended object may never come into existence. Discourses such as (x-a) are coherent;
likewise with the perfective in (x-b). The existence of the object o′ — and in double object sentences
such as (vi-a), its possession by the applied object — must rather be introduced as an intended goal
of the baking event ov. There are various ways of deriving this in the syntax and semantics. For
instance, the nominal small clause could be embedded under an intensional verbalizer vgoal, where
the verb originates as a modifier of little v (cf. (xii-a)); or the modality could be introduced directly in
an alternative entry for the root, where LFs with the “wrong” entry are filtered out for type reasons
(cf. (xii-b)) (see Marantz 2005, Levinson 2007, Harley & Jung 2015 on manner modification
in double object constructions; see Arad 2003, Levinson 2007 for general discussion on verbal
polysemies due to multiple denotations for roots). The first-pass alternative analyses in (xii-a)–(xii-b)
yield equivalent denotations for the vP, as reflected in (xii-c). For instance, the entry in (xii-b) says,
roughly, that vgoal takes properties F,F′ and returns the set of F′-events oε such that, for every world
in which oε isn’t interrupted and everything relevant to whether oε is completed proceeds as normal
or intended (written: every u ∈ goal(oε)), there is an F-individual (cf. Bonomi 1997b, Portner
1998, Silk 2016b). Whether the sentence implies that an entity corresponding to the direct object
exists can depend on the contribution of aspect, as reflected in the revised Parsons-style entries for
perfective vs. progressive in (xi), where ‘cul(oε)’ says that oε culminated and ‘in.prog(oε)’ says
that oε is in-progress (cf. Parsons 1990, Szabó 2008, Silk 2016b). The resulting semantic value
for the perfective sentence in (vi-a) is in (xii-c). (I ignore context-dependence of the set of worlds
given by goal (cf. Portner 1998, Silk 2016b). The modalized entries in (xii-a)/(xii-b) might also
explicitly encode that the possible eventuality in which the aim of oε is satisfied include oε as a
nonfinal subpart. For present purposes we can assume that such considerations are reflected in the
nature of the goal relation. I ignore world-indexing of the cul, in.prog, goal relations. I continue
to label the small clause representing the double object frame as n∗P, though, adapting proposals in
Pesetsky 1995, Harley 2002, Harley & Jung 2015, perhaps it might be treated as a p∗P, headed
by a null preposition.)
(x) a. Bert was baking Alice a cake, but he got interrupted; so there’s no cake (for her).
b. Bert baked Alice a cake, but he dropped it on the way to the party; so she never got it.
(xi) a. J∃pvK = λPet.λgg .∃xεe ∶P(xε)(g) ∧ cul(xε(g))
b. J∃progK = λPet.λgg .∃xεe ∶P(xε)(g) ∧ in.prog(xε(g))
(xii) [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [∃pv [v∗P [u1s Ragt Bert] [v∗ [v∗ v∗agt …
a. [vP [v0 [vgoal t1s] bake]⟨2,s⟩ [n∗P [t2s Rposs Alice] [X the-cookies]]]] [pP u1s forben Jose]]]]]]JvgoalK = λws.λP⟨s,et⟩.λP′⟨s,et⟩.λxεe .λgg .P(w)(xε)(g) ∧ ∀w′s∶w′(g) ∈ goal(xε(g))→ ∃ye∶P′(w′)(y)(g)
b. [vP v t1s [VP bake⟨2,s⟩2 [n∗P [t2s Rposs Alice] [X the-cookies]]]]] [pP u1s forben Jose]]]]]]Jbake2K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λxe.λgg . bake(w(g))(x(g)) ∧ ∀w′s∶w′(g) ∈ goal(x(g))→ ∃ye∶P(w′)(y)(g)
c. JbakeK = λws.λxe.λgg . bake(w(g))(x(g))JvPK = λxεe .λgg . bake(g(1s))(xε(g)) ∧ ∀ws∶w(g) ∈ goal(xε(g))→ ∃ye∶ Jn∗PK(y)(g[w(g)/2s])
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JSK = λgg .∃xve ∶ bake(@(g−))(xv(g))∧ ∀ws∶w(g) ∈ goal(xv(g))→ (∃ye∶ y(g) = the-cookies ∧ Rposs(Alice)(w(g))(y(g)))∧ Rben(Jose)(@(g−))(xv(g)) ∧ Ragt(Bert)(@(g−))(xv(g)) ∧ cul(xv(g))
This says, roughly, that (vi-a) is true iff there is an ov such that (a) ov is a baking event of which
(b) Bert is the agent and (c) Jose is the beneficiary; (d) a goal of ov is the existence of an o′ that Alice
possesses (in the relevant sense) and is identical to the cookies — roughly, an o′ such that for all
worlds u in which no relevant interruptions occur and things proceed as intended (Bert doesn’t get
distracted, etc.), the cookies o′ exist and Alice has them (in the relevant sense); and (e) ov culminated.
Intuitively put: in baking, Bert did something with an aim of Alice having the cookies, and Bert did
it for Jose. Examples with combined high and low applicatives, such as (arguably) (xiii), may be
analyzed as in (xiv) (cf. also Kimenyi 1980: 101–107, Legate 2003: 194–199). The verb takes the
double-object n∗P structure as argument, and the verbal applicative head vappl introduces the dative
2nd-person possessor.
(xiii) Alla
child
holisso
paper
chim-im-a:-li-tok.
2dat-3dat-give-1nom-past
‘I gave your papers to the child.’ (Davies 1981: 140; Choctaw (Muskogean))
(xiv) [vP [u1s Rdat.poss Jose] [vappl [vP [[vgoal t1s] give]⟨2,s⟩ [n∗P [t2s Rposs the-child] [X the-papers]]]]]JvPK = λxεe .λgg .give(g(1s))(xε(g)) ∧ Rdat.poss(Jose)(g(1s))(xε(g))∧ ∀ws∶w(g) ∈ goal(xε(g))→ ∃ye∶ y(g) = the-papers ∧ Rposs(the-child)(w(g))(y(g))
Notably, the analysis derives a key move in Silk’s (2016b) largely informal account of creation verbs
and the imperfective paradox, in distinguishing the intensionality associated with the direct object
from the contribution of aspects such as the progressive. Unlike in modal accounts of the progressive
(Portner 1998), (xi) gives ∃prog a simple extensional semantics. There needn’t be any intensionality
in the interpretation of progressive sentences such as (xv) describing activities or processes (Silk
2016b: 28).
(xv) Alice is running.
The semantics in (xii) also avoids the problematic entailments pointed out in Larson 2010 for
Pylkkänen’s (2008) semantics for low applicatives; it captures the modal aspect of the intuitive
“(intended) transfer of possession” interpretation (contrast e.g. Levinson 2007, Pylkkänen 2008,
Bosse 2015); and it does so without ad hoc, non-compositional mechanisms such as in Bruening
2010, Bosse 2015 (e.g., interpreting the lexical verb in an intermediate landing site of non-type-
driven head movement, and not in its base position; vs. interpreting the direct and indirect/applied
objects both in their base positions and in their pronounced positions following non-type-driven
movement to the vP area; and invoking an additional composition rule specific to nodes combining
a Verb of type ⟨e, . . . ⟨e, vt⟩⟩ and Small Clause of type ⟨v, t⟩, yielding a “cause to have” implication
(Bruening 2010: 550–554)). It is worth exploring how the sorts of analyses in (8.138) or (xii) might
be extended to other double object verbs and constructions (see references above and in the main
text). A further interesting connection may be to Beavers 2011, which argues that many double
object sentences more generally have a modal aspect to their meaning (also Harley & Jung 2015).
236
(In the remaining chapters I will put aside the complications from this section
regarding events, the semantics of verbalizing heads, and the argument structures
of verbs. Unless otherwise relevant I will often ignore internal structure of nPs
and assume familiar NP, VP, DP category labels — NP for nP, VP for vP, DP for the
spread of functional projections above nP. I will generally represent quantifier words
introducing assignment-quantification as projecting their own category (QP, DP,
etc.); but, as discussed in §8.3, the account is compatible with treating quantifier
phrases as n∗Ps in which the quantifier adjoins to the lower n∗P segment.)
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Part III
9 Conditionals
9.1 Local and global readings
Conditionals provide diverse sources of local and global readings of variables and
context-sensitive expressions. For instance, there are (i) global readings in both ‘if’-
clause and consequent clause, as in (9.1); (ii) local readings in the ‘if’-clause, as in
(9.2); and (iii) local readings in the main clause, as in (9.3).
(9.1) If itj breaks, hek will cry.● ≈ If gc(j) breaks, gc(k) will cry.
(9.2) a. [Context: Giving to Charity X wouldn’t maximize overall utility.]
Ifi we shouldi give to Charity X, classical utilitarianism must be incorrect.● ≈ If the correct norms are i and i requires us to give to Charity X, then
classical utilitarianism must be incorrect.
b. Ifi it’s rainingi, we should bring an umbrella.
c. [Context: We know how much everyone’s income is. Rita is getting a tax
break. We haven’t settled on what level of income should count as rich.]
Ifi Rita is richi, then Miguel is rich. So Miguel should get the tax break too.
(9.3) a. [If John wasn’t invited,]i everyonei will come.● ≈ [If John wasn’t invited,]i everyone who is relevant given i will come.
b. [If it rained,]i John broughti an umbrella.
c. [If the intersection is clear,]i we shouldi speed through.
Semantic work on conditionals has focused nearly exclusively on examples where
the ‘if’-clause combines with a clause. Yet there are also conditionals where the ‘if’-
clause appears sentence-finally and modifies the verb, or appears sentence-internally
and modifies a nominal subject, as in “adnominal” conditionals. Syntactic tests
confirm that the ‘if’-clauses in such examples cannot be construed as scoping over
the rest of the sentence, but rather combine with the VP/NP, as reflected in the
VP-ellipsis and Condition C data in (9.4) and coordination data in (9.5) (Iatridou
1991, Lasersohn 1996, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006).
(9.4) Sentence-final ‘if ’-clause. VP-adjunction
a. I will leave if you do and John will [VP leave if you do] too.
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b. *Shei yells at Bill if Maryi is hungry.
(Bhatt & Pancheva 2006: exs. 19a, 21a)
(9.5) Adnominal ‘if ’-clause. NP-adjunction
[[The [NP location if it rains]] and [the [NP location if it doesn’t rain]]] are
within five miles of each other. (Lasersohn 1996: ex. 10)
Shifted readings can be observed in each of these positions, as in (9.7)–(9.8) as
well. For instance, Santorio 2012 argues that examples such as (9.6) involve a
shifted (i.e. local) reading of ‘I’, referring to epistemic counterparts of the speaker
(see 2012: 363n.2 for precedents). Shifted readings of ‘I’ are no less possible when
the ‘if’-clause combines with the VP, as in (9.7d)–(9.7e); likewise for the shifted
readings of ‘my’ in (9.8b) when the ‘if’-clause combines with an NP.
(9.6) [Context: Lingens and Lauben know they are kidnapped amnesiacs. They
are informed that they will be anesthetized, and a coin will be flipped: if it
lands tails, Lingens will be released in the Stanford library and Lauben will
be killed; if it lands heads, Lauben will be released in the Harvard library and
Lingens will be killed. After the experiment, one of them wakes up and says:]
If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard.
(Santorio 2012: ex. 6)
(9.7) a. John broughti an umbrella [if it rained]i (…and Alice did [bringj an umbrella
[if it rained]j] too).
b. Everyonei will come [if John wasn’t invited]i.
c. We shouldi block Shaft A [if the miners are in Shaft A]i.
(cf. Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010)
d. Ii [VP am in Widmore Library [if the coin landed heads]i].
e. Bert is in Widmore Library if the coin landed heads, and Ii am in Widmore
Library [if the coin landed heads]i too).
(9.8) a. The [NP righti thing [if utilitarianism is correct]i] is to donate.
b. [[DP Myi location [if the coin landed heads]i] and [DP myj location [if the
coin landed tails]j]] are on opposite coasts.
Most existing semantics for (sentence-initial) conditionals are inapplicable as
they stand to VP-/NP-adjunction examples. For instance, on a standard restrictor
semantics (Kratzer 1981, 1991), the ‘if’-clause combines with a (possibly implicit)
operator/modal and restricts its modal base, or domain of quantification. It isn’t
immediately obvious how such an analysis might be generalized to compositionally
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derive the relevant range of shifted/non-shifted interpretations in examples such as
(9.4)–(9.5) or (9.7)–(9.8) where the ‘if’-clause combines with a VP or subject NP.
Historically, work on the semantics of conditionals has proceeded largely in
isolation from syntax literatures on ‘if’-clauses and other types of conditional con-
structions. To some extent this is to be expected. Many questions regarding the
semantics of conditional can be addressed without taking a stand on, say, whether
‘if’ is in C or Spec,C in different languages, possibilities for reconstruction, etc. But
if our project is to provide a genuine compositional semantics, we must ensure
that whatever type of semantics we go in for will generalize across the spectrum
of environments in which ‘if’-clauses (and other markers of conditionality) appear.
Whatever syntactic/semantic package we take on board must (i) derive local
readings in the consequent and in the antecedent — shifting in the scope of a sup-
position as well as in the supposition itself, as in (9.2)–(9.3); (ii) must do so in
a way that still allows for global readings in both clauses, as in (9.1); and (iii)
must capture how ‘if’-clauses can combine directly with a VP/NP and shift the in-
terpretation of material within the VP/NP they modify, as in e.g. (9.7a)/(9.8a), as
well as of external material in the sentence, as in e.g. (9.7d). The type of the ‘if’-
clause must be suitable to combine with and modify expressions of multiple types.
The remainder of this section shows how we can satisfy these desiderata, drawing
on independent syntactic work on ‘if’-clauses as free relatives/correlatives. The
compositional semantics affords a uniform analysis of ‘if’-clauses in diverse types
of conditionals — conditionals with sentence-initial/-internal/-final ‘if’-clauses, and
in conditionals with/without an overt modal or a proform such as ‘then’. As we
will see further in §10, the account affords uniform treatments of conditional and
individual proforms, and of conditional, correlative, and interrogative clauses.
9.2 ‘If’-clauses as plural definite descriptions of assignments (possibilities).
Free relatives + clause-internal operator movement
A standard story following Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1981, 1991) is that ‘if’-
clauses restrict the domain of a modal or other operator. Yet as von Fintel notes, “it
is very probable… that tripartite structures are merely a convenient meta-level no-
tation” (1994: 77), and that movement operations don’t literally generate tripartite
LFs for conditionals like (9.9) parallel to determiner quantifiers (cf. Partee 1995b).
(9.9) [S [modi [if-clause]j] [CP tj [. . . ti . . . ]]]
So I assume that our best syntactic story for conditionals will involve some other
way of capturing the idea that ‘if’-clauses function to modify a domain. In §§6, 8.7
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we drew on crosslinguistic data and syntactic analyses to motivate treatments of
individual- and assignment-quantification in headed relative clauses. Syntactic anal-
yses of ‘if’-clauses as free relatives (Iatridou 1991, Lycan 2001, vonFintel 1994,
Bittner 2001, Schlenker 2004, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006) provide analogous mo-
tivations for sources of world- and assignment-quantification in conditionals. Like
other free relatives (Jacobson 1995, Dayal 1996, Caponigro 2012), ‘if’-clauses are
interpreted as definite descriptions. In some languages conditionals are overtly real-
ized as such (cf. also Furbee 1973: 15, Welmers 1973: 433–434, Hale 1976). The
Somali conditional clause from (6.28b) (§6.2.1), reproduced in (9.10), is realized
as a remoteness-marked (modal-past) definite description (cf. §8.8.1). The Warlpiri
construction in (9.11) is ambiguous between a conditionalizing interpretation and
an interpretation as an individual definite description.
(9.10) a. Nin
man
hád-díi
time-def.rem
uu
3
seexdó
sleeps
oo
and
sóo
dir
toosó,
wakes-up
waa
decl
isá-gíi
him-emph.past
ún.
only
‘If a man goes to sleep and then wakes up, he is only himself (i.e. the
same as he was before).’
b. Hád-díi
time-def.rem
aad
you
rabtó
want
na
us
ráac!
follow.imp
‘Come along with us, if you want!’ (Lecarme 2008: ex. 19; Somali)
(9.11) [Maliki-rli
dog-erg
katji-ŋki
same.top-3sg.2sg
yarlki-rni
bite-nonpast
nyuntu]
you
ŋula-ju
dem-top
kapi-rna
fut-1sg.3sg
luwa-rni
shoot-nonpast
ŋatjulu-rlu.
me-erg
a. ‘[As for the dog that bites you,] I’ll shoot it.’
b. ‘[If a dog bites you,] then I’ll shoot it.’
(Hale 1976: 80, Bittner 2001: ex. 7; Warlpiri (Pama–Nyungan))
However, rather than treating the variable relativized over as a variable over worlds
or events (as in Schein 2003, Schlenker 2004, Bhatt& Pancheva 2006,Haegeman
2010), we can treat it as a variable over assignments: ‘if’-clauses are analyzed as
definite descriptions of possibilities, represented via assignments.
Given the variable means of expressing conditionality, both in English and cross-
linguistically, it is common to treat conditional interpretations as arising indepen-
dent of particular complementizers such as ‘if’ (Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, Rawlins
2008). A prominent approach is to treat the conditional element as raising above the
241
complementizer from within the ‘if’-clause (Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, Arsenijević
2009, Haegeman 2010; cf. Larson 1985, Kalivoda & Zyman 2015). Movement
analyses of conditional clauses provide independently motivated resources for im-
plementing an analysis of ‘if’-clauses into the §3-framework — notably, a comple-
mentizer such as ‘if’, and clause-internal movement of an operator responsible for
conditional interpretations. A schematic LF is in (9.12), where ιh is the raised
operator (implicit in English), parallel to ιo in certain free relatives of individuals
(§§6.1.2, 7.2).128 Preliminary lexical entries for ‘if’ and ιh are in (9.13)–(9.14).
(9.12) CP
ι⟨i,a⟩h C
⟨j,s⟩
if tia
IP
. . . tjs . . .
(9.13) JifK = λaa.λpst.λws.λgg .@(a(g)) ⊑ w(g) ∧ ∀w′s = λg′g.@(a(g′)), p(w′)(g)
(to be revised)
(9.14) JιhK = λAat.λA′at.λgg .∃aa∶ (A(a)(g) ∧ ∀a′′a ∶A(a′′)(g)→ a′′(g) ⊑ a(g))∧ A′(a)(g)= λAat.λA′at.λgg .∃aa∶ (a(g) = the maximal h ∈ G s.t. (↓A)(h)) ∧A′(a)(g)≈ λAat.λA′at.λgg . [ιa(g)∶A(a)(g)] A′(a)(g)
The lexical entry for ‘if’ in (9.13) is a sort of intensional analogue of the entry
for the relative complementizer Crel. The world argument determines a relevant
domain of possibilities. ιh converts the set of possibilities into a definite description
of the maximal plural possibility in the set. The type-⟨at, ⟨at, t⟩⟩ entry for ιh is a
modal analogue of the type-⟨aet, ⟨aet, t⟩⟩ entry for ιo (§§6.1.2, 7.2, 8.8.1). (9.14)
128Although Bhatt & Pancheva (2006) don’t specify the generation site of the conditional
operator, Haegeman (2010) argues against treating it as moving from within the VP. Haegeman
treats the operator as semantically modal and as sharing properties specifically with syntactically
high (broadly epistemic) modals. Such a view may provide further support for the present treatment
of the operator as moving from above the VP (in particular, from an internal argument in C0if).
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is essentially a definite version of the entry for modal verbs such as ‘may’ in §3.129
Let’s consider these components in turn.
First, following general treatments of free relatives as plural definite descrip-
tions, the assignment described by the ‘if’-clause may be a plural assignment repre-
senting a plural possibility (cf. Jacobson 1995, Dayal 1996, Grosu & Landman
1998, Schein 2003, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006). As discussed in §8, the components
of the model E,W,G are structured to include plural objects, or sums (Link 1983,
1998, Schwarzschild 1996). The metalanguage ι operator in (9.14) can again be
understood along the lines of Link’s (1983) σ operator, which returns the maximal
element of a set (formally, the m in the set S such that ∀m′ ∈ S∶m′ ⊑ m). The
uniqueness implication applies to the items in the model. Just as there may be
multiple functions x ∶Dg → E mapping g to the unique individual o ∈ E picked out
by a definite description, there may be multiple functions a′ ∶Dg → G mapping g to
the relevant unique possibility h ∈ G described by an ‘if’-clause.
Even after incorporating plurality, our analysis should reflect some way of re-
stricting the quantification to relevant (salient/live/remote) assignments satisfying
the antecedent. Informally put, the external argument of ‘if’ supplies a topical
129In languages such as Toqabaqita, Oceanic the same element mada used in introducing con-
ditional clauses, with the irrealis marker sa ((i-a)), introduces an epistemic possibility when used
alone in main clauses ((i-b)). The conditional marker (a)sika in (ii-a) is etymologically related to the
marker for possibility (a)sik in (ii-b); in (ii-c) the introduction of the relevant possibility functions as
a threat (cf. e.g. Dixon 1972: 113, 362, Dixon 2009).
(i) a. Mada
mada
sa
irr
dani
rain
qe
3sg.nonfut
qaru
fall
…
‘If it rains, …’
b. Mada
mada
qe
3sg.nonfut
mataqi.
be.sick
‘He might be sick.’ (Lichtenberk 2008: 8, 38, 776; Toqabaqita (Austronesian))
(ii) a. Sika chan d￿ ngia tham￿ n s￿ th￿ m ngo.
‘If he comes, you tell me.’
b. Ngua tu gus￿ ￿ n￿ ￿ ng ia saika angama marupki, sik mailu chia mat angama sechithom
ma mndu ngua munaik nithom bono.
‘I thought that possibly one of the cassowaries, maybe it got one of the traps that I left there.’
c. Ngia
2sg.cl1
thamon
tell.fut
s￿ th￿ m
to
ngo
1sg.cl3
marik,
really
asik
asik
tiathik
now
k￿ lan,
only
asik
asik
ngu
1sg.cl2
chut.m￿ -nge
spear.nonpres-you
n￿ =gu=a
inst=1sg.poss=art
chep-ki
spear-f.sg
tiathik.
emph.this
‘Tell me truly, otherwise this time it’s like this, I’ll shoot you with this spear of mine.’
(Stebbins 2012: 47, 157, Stebbins 2009: 372; Mali (Baining, New Britain))
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(plural) possibility which provides the backdrop for the supposition, as reflected
in (9.15).130
(9.15) CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h C′′ ∶ t
w2 g1 C
′ ∶ ⟨s, t⟩
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a
IP ∶ t
t2s rainedJC′K = λws.λgg .@(g(2a)) ⊑ w(g) ∧ it rained in @(g(2a))JCP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λTt.λgg . [ιaa(g)∶@(a(g)) ⊑ (g(1a)(2s))∧ it rained in @(a(g))] T(g[a(g)/2a])≈ λT.λgg .∃aa∶ a(g) = the maximal h s.t. (@(h) ⊑ (g(1a)(2s))∧ it rained in @(h)) ∧ T(g[a(g)/2a])
Like the declarative complementizer, ‘if’ is base-generated in the world-argument
position of the clause’s main predicate, and moves for type reasons as a quantifier
over worlds. The main predicate in the ‘if’-clause receives an obligatory local reading
under the supposition. Like (presuppositional) nominal quantifiers and modal quan-
tifiers, the conditionalization element ιh is base-generated in the complementizer’s
assignment-argument position, and moves for type reasons (here clause-internally),
introducing an assignment binder. The external argument of ‘if’, [w2 g1], supplies a
relevant plural modal possibility (=gc(2s)) which further restricts the domain of ιh.
The ‘if’-clause picks out the plurality of relevant possibilities in which it rained. (I
won’t distinguish singular vs. plural predicates; my saying that a property holds of
an object leaves open whether the predication is of an atomic object, a plurality, or
every atomic part of a plurality. So, for instance, saying that it rained in @(h) can
be understood as saying that it rained in the world of every possibility that is a part
of h.)
The preliminary structure in (9.15) treats the external argument of ‘if’ as a
relevant plurality of worlds, and the semantics for ‘if’ requires the world of the
internal assignment-argument to be a part of that plurality. Our approaches to free
130In the definition of the binder-index (§3.5): with if, τ = s; σ = ⟨s, t⟩; with ιh, τ = a; σ = ⟨at, t⟩.
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relatives of individuals treated the external argument of Crel as a selected individual
o in a contextually relevant domain, supplied by the relative phrase.
(6.13) a. ‘what Alice likes’
b. ≈ [ι⟨i,a⟩o [wh-gi P-g [Crel …]]]
Given the proposal that ‘if’-clauses are free relatives of possibilities, it is worth ex-
ploring how we might unify our analyses of the relevant types of free relatives. The
alternative analysis in (9.16)–(9.17) parallels the analysis of DP-like free relatives.
(9.16) JifK = λaa.λpst.λws.λgg .@(a(g)) = w(g) ∧ ∀w′s = λg′g.@(a(g′))∶ p(w′)(g)
(9.17) CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h t
wh2sf g2 p1st g1
⟨s, t⟩
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a
IP ∶ t
t2s rainedJCP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λTt.λgg . [ιaa(g)∶@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))∧ it rained in @(a(g))] T(g[a(g)/2a])
Just as the relative phrase ‘what’ is analyzed intuitively as “which relevant thing(s),”
the external argument of ‘if’ is analyzed intuitively as “which relevant world(s).”
The external argument could be construed as an implicit ‘whether’ analogous to the
relative phrase (see e.g. Larson 1985, Kayne 1991 on ‘whether’ being in Spec,C).
In §6 we analyzed relative words as choice-function pronouns. A natural move is
to analyze the ‘whether’-like element in an ‘if’-clause likewise as a choice function
pronoun of worlds— a function s ∈ D⟨st,t⟩ such that p(s(p)) for any pst ((4.19)).
(For clarity I distinguish ‘sf’ for choice-function indices/variables of type ⟨st, s⟩; I
continue to use ‘cf’ with choice functions of type ⟨et, e⟩.) The proposition pronoun[pst g] functions analogously to the class restrictions in free relatives of individu-
als (§8.8.1). Free relative ‘what’ selects an individual from a subdomain of things,
and free relative ‘who’ selects an individual from a subdomain of persons; likewise
the constituent [whsf-g pst-g] in a free relative ‘if’-clause selects a world from a
domain of relevant worlds. The choice-function pronoun is again (obligatorily)
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coindexed with the conditional complementizer’s assignment argument. In (9.17)
the assignment-quantification introduced by the raised pluralization operator ι⟨2,a⟩h
binds the choice-function pronoun, here [wh2sf g2], and quantifies over possibilities
in the restricted set that satisfy the property denoted by the ‘if’-clause C. The
compositional semantics derives that the conditional free relative (9.17) picks out
(roughly) the sum of relevant possibilities in which it rained — the unique maximal
possibility h ∈ G such that it rained in@(h), where@(h) is identical to some or other
selected relevant world u ∈ gc(1st) ⊆W.131 Free relative ‘if’-clauses are analyzed as
intensional analogues of free relatives of individuals. (I return to the extent of the
similarities in §§9.7, 10.)
Note that the semantic type of the ‘if’-clause CP is derived to be type ⟨t, t⟩— the
same type of the adjoined DPs in our examples with inverse linking and genitive
binding from §7.4 (n. 87). We will see that function composition and the ⟨t, t⟩-
type of the ‘if’-clause can similarly be exploited to help satisfy our desiderata from
§9.1 — e.g., capturing the spectrum of (non-)shifted readings with sentence-initial
‘if’-clauses as well as with sentence-final ‘if’-clauses adjoined to VP and with NP-
adjoined ‘if’-clauses in adnominal conditionals.
9.3 Adnominal conditionals. (Non-)modificational ‘if’-clauses
Though rarely considered in semantics literatures on conditionals, let’s start with an
adnominal conditional such as (9.18) (cf. (9.5)), where the free relative ‘if’-clause is
131Strict conditional and material conditional interpretations could be understood as cases where
the semantic value for [p g] in the specifier argument is ultimately identified with W vs. @(gc),
respectively. Extensions to aspect, mood, tense may afford resources for an assignment-variable-
based treatment of counterfactuals (cf. §8.9). It would be interesting to examine whether our parallel
treatments of the syntax for individual relative clauses and conditional clauses — in particular the
extra structure afforded in the external argument of the complementizers — might provide a locus
for capturing parallel crosslinguistic phenomena of modal interpretations of past morphology in DPs
(in languages with nominal tense) and counterfactuals (Iatridou 2000, Palmer 2001, Nordlinger
& Sadler 2004, Aikhenvald 2008, Lecarme 2008, Adamou 2011, Romero 2014). Interestingly,
in languages such as Aneityum, the distinct forms of ‘if+T’ in counterfactual vs. non-counterfactual
interpretations have become grammaticalized into distinct morphemes ((i)), analogous to proximal
vs. non-proximal demonstratives in the spatial domain.
(i) a. el
if
ek/kis
1sg.aor/1sg.past
apan
go
añak…
I
‘if I go/had gone…’
b. elet/elis
if.r/if.irr
apan
go
añak…
I
‘if I go/had gone…’ (Lynch 2000: 160; Aneityum (Austronesian))
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adjoined to an NP in the main clause (Lasersohn 1996).132 (For simplicity assume
that ‘the’ has a standard ⟨et, ⟨et, t⟩⟩ entry, and treat ‘expensive’ as an ⟨e, t⟩ predicate.)
(9.18) Adnominal conditional (NP-adjunction)
‘The fine if you drive is expensive.’
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
DP
the NP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
NP1 ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
w1 g2 fine
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a you2-g1 t2s drive
t1s expensive
JCP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λTt.λg . [ιa(g)∶ g(1a)(2e) drives in @(a(g))∧ @(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))] T(g[a(g)/2a])
132Dixon (1972: 362) reports that in languages such as Dyirbal the (adnominal) NP+relative-
clause structure is the primary means for expressing hypothetical ‘if’ conditionals, as in (i).
(i) bayi
cl1.m
yara
man
rudu
hollow
balga-ŋu
hit-rel
guyibi-ñ
die-fut
‘If a man is hit in the hollow in the back of his neck, he will die.’ (lit. ‘A man if hit … will die’)
(Dixon 1972: 362; Dyirbal (Pama–Nyungan))
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JNPK = JCP⟨2,a⟩K ○ JNP1K= λxe.JCP⟨2,a⟩K(JNP1K(x))≈ λxe.λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g(1a)(2e) drives in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))] x(g[a(g)/2a]) is a fine in a(g)(1s)JSK ≈ λgg . [ιx(g)∶ [ιa(g)∶ g−(2e) drives in @(a(g))∧ @(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))] x(g) is a fine in a(g)(1s)]
x(g) is expensive in @(g−)
This says, roughly, that the fine in the maximal relevant possibility h where you
drive is expensive in the actual world @(gc). The modified subject DP picks out the
unique o ∈ E such that o is the fine in the world (=h(1s)) of the maximal relevant
possibility where you gc(2e) drive — i.e., the maximal possibility in which you drive
and which is identical to some or other possibility h(2sf)(gc(1st)) in the contextually
relevant domain gc(1st). The sentence is true iff o is expensive in the world of the
discourse @(gc).
Like in simple sentences, the main clause complementizer raises from the world-
argument position of the clause’s main predicate (‘(be) expensive’). The world
argument of the subject predicate ‘fine’ is supplied by a world pronoun. However,
the assignment binder-index on the ‘if’-clause shifts the coindexed world pronoun[w1 g2] to the world of the assignment representing the hypothetical possibility,
i.e. the maximal relevant possibility a(g) where you drive. The ‘if’-clause CP is type⟨t, t⟩, the predicate is type ⟨e, t⟩, and they combine via function composition to yield
the modified subject NP of type ⟨e, t⟩.
The §9.2-semantics compositionally derives the local reading of the subject NP’s
world pronoun in (9.18). Yet nothing said thus far excludes an LF where the world
pronoun is coindexed with the topmost assignment-binder, e.g. [NP1 fine w1 g1],
representing an unattested reading implying that the fine in the actual world is
expensive. Although the complex subject NP needn’t receive a local reading in an
embedded adnominal conditional, as reflected in (9.19), the interpretation of the
world pronoun must still shift, it seems, with the adjoined ‘if’-clause.
(9.19) Alice thinks that the location if it rains is sure to go out of business before
the party.
a. [We’re talking about Alice’s beliefs about the prospects of the different
possible venues for our party, depending on the weather:]
Specific ≈ “the venue in the possibility where it rains is such that Alice
thinks it will go out of business before the party”
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b. [We haven’t settled on particular possible venues, depending on the
weather; Alice is a downer:]
Nonspecific ≈ “Alice thinks that there will be some venue or other in the
possibility where it rains, and it, whatever it is, will go out of business
before the party”
In response, one option would be to derive the (apparent) obligatory shifted
reading by treating the ‘if’-clause as originating in the NP’s world argument. The
‘if’-clause in (9.20) moves for type reasons, leaving a coindexed trace.133
(9.20) Adnominal conditional (alternative)
[S T⟨1,a⟩ [[Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [[DP the [NP [NP1 w1 t2 fine] [CP⟨2,a⟩ …]]] [t1s expen-
sive]]]]
An alternative is to treat the ‘if’-clause as base-generated in the adjoined position,
and understand LFs representing global readings as generally excluded for conversa-
tional reasons, failing to represent cooperative uses. In an LF for (9.18) where NP1’s
world pronoun is bound by T⟨1,a⟩, the ‘if’-clause would be trivial in the interpretation
of the complex subject and the sentence. An interpretive principle against such
semantically trivial modifications might be represented roughly as follows:
(9.21) Non-triviality principle:
Let i be a set of binder-index features {⟨i1, τ1⟩, ⟨i2, τ2⟩, . . .}, and γ be a
branching node in the domain of J K whose daughters are α and β i, where
β i occupies anA-position. For any binder-index feature k ∈ i that is semanti-
cally necessary in γ, there are g′ ≈k g′′ such that JαK(⋯)(g′) ≠ JαK(⋯)(g′′).
a. h ≈k h′ iff h and h′ are otherwise identical except that h(k) ≠ h′(k)
b. k is semantically necessary in γ iff, for γ∗ a branching node whose daugh-
ters are α and β i/{k}, γ∗ is not in the domain of J K.
Intuitively put, this says that  binder-indices necessary for interpretability in a given
step in a derivation must do non-trivial semantic work in that step in the derivation.
(9.21) is of course directly satisfied in cases of QR, where the moved expression
necessarily binds its trace. With a base-generated adjunct, (9.21) amounts to a
norm that the modifier genuinely modify the expression to which it is adjoined.
In an adnominal conditional such as (9.18) the ‘if’-clause’s assignment-binder is
“semantically necessary” in the sense of (9.21); without it, CP and NP1 would be
133The pronounced word order could be derived by rightward QR (cf. e.g. Fox 2002), alternatively
by leftward QR followed by leftward movement of NumP. For simplicity I assume the former.
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types ⟨at, t⟩ and ⟨e, t⟩, respectively, and hence the complex NP node would be
uninterpretable. So, lest the non-triviality principle be violated, the world-pronoun
must be coindexed with the ‘if’-clause’s assignment-binder, representing the shifted
reading.
Adjudicating between these options would require careful examination of nar-
rowly syntactic considerations. Given our purposes we needn’t take a stand here.134
In either case, note that accepting (9.20) is compatible with treating certain ‘if’-
clauses as base-generated adjuncts; and accepting (9.18) is compatible with treating
(9.21) as a violable (extra-grammatical) interpretive principle. For instance, con-
sider the syntax/semantics for the relevance conditional in (9.22). Like in simple
sentences, the topmost assignment-binder raises from the assignment-argument po-
sition of the main clause complementizer, linking the modal domain for the main
clause to the world of the discourse via the definition of truth-in-a-context. The
‘if’-clause is base-generated in its interpreted position adjoined to the main clause.
(9.22) Biscuit conditional (CP-adjunction)
‘If you’re hungry, I baked’
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [ι⟨2,a⟩h [wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 [[if t2a]⟨2,s⟩ you2-g1 t2s hungry]]]⟨2,a⟩
[CP [CI t1a]⟨1,s⟩ I1-g1 t1s baked]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g−(2e) is hungry in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(1st)]
g−(1e) baked in @(g−)
Roughly put, (9.22) is true in c iff the maximal relevant possibility where you (=gc(2e))
are hungry — the maximal possibility where you’re hungry and which is included in
the contextually relevant domain gc(1st)— is such that I (=gc(1e)) baked in the
actual world @(gc). The LF and semantic value in (9.22) thus derive common
intuitions about relevance conditionals, such as that they involve an assertion of
the consequent, and independence of the antecedent and consequent: The ‘if’-clause
introduces a modal topic — the possibility that you’re hungry — but then fails to
comment on it in the main clause; the sentence implies that I actually baked. The
‘if’-clause in the relevance conditional is treated on a par with a “frame-setting” topic
(Reinhart 1981) such as (9.23).
(9.23) Frame-setting topic
As for cats, I like Fluffy.
(We will return to hypothetical conditionals with sentence-initial ‘if’-clauses shortly.)
134See below for related discussion regarding the proform binding requirement in correlatives.
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9.4 Sentence-final ‘if’-clauses
The account of ‘if’-clauses combining with subject predicates carries over to condi-
tionals with sentence-final ‘if’-clauses that adjoin to verbal predicates. First, note
that treating the world argument of the main predicate as supplied by a world-trace
coindexed with the higher complementizer would fail to capture the role of the ‘if’-
clause in shifting the modal domain:
(9.24) a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [CI t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [Alice [VP [VP1 t1s won] [CP if-clause]⟨2,a⟩ ]]]]
b. JVP1K = λxe.λgg . x(g) won in g(1s)JVPK = λxe.λgg . [ιa(g)∶ . . . ] x(g[a(g)/2a]) won in g[a(g)/2a](1s)JCPK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ . . . ] Alice won in @(g(1a))JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ . . . ] Alice won in @(g−)
Our syntax/semantics for declaratives from §3 helped capture (among other things)
the apparent obligatory local reading of the predicate’s world argument. Yet we
needn’t assume that all occurrences of complementizers necessarily undergo raising
from their base-generated position (cf. §8.7.1). The relevant modal domain for
interpreting the main predicate in examples with VP-modifiers isn’t in general a do-
main determined by the embedding assignment-quantifier — e.g., T⟨1,a⟩, determin-
ing @(gc)— but rather a domain as modified by the adjunct. Accordingly, I suggest
that the main predicate’s world argument in such examples may be supplied by a
world-pronoun. The matrix complementizer in (9.25) can be treated as denoting
the identity function. An LF and derived semantic value is in (9.7d), assuming the
context from Santorio 2012 in (9.6) where ‘I’ receives a local reading.135
135Note that the vacuous complementizer C∅ is distinct from the unpronounced complementizer
Cd. I represent the world-pronoun in VP1 with an ordinary assignment variable; though, as discussed
in §9.3, I leave open whether the coindexing with the ‘if’-clause may be derived via A-movement.
In terms of the architecture from §8, in an adnominal conditional the ‘if’-clause would QR out of n
adjoining to nP; likewise in an adverbial conditional such as (9.25) the ‘if’-clause would QR out of v
adjoining to vP.
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(9.25) Sentence-final ‘if ’-clause. Shifted indexical. (VP-adjunction)
‘I am in Widmore Library if it landed heads.’
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
C∅ t1a IP
I1 g2 VP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
VP1 ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
w1 g2 in-WL
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 ⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2 g1 t2s landed-headsJIPK = (JCP⟨2,a⟩K ○ JVP1K)(λgg.g(2a)(1e))≈ [λxe.[λTt.[λgg.[ιa(g)∶ g(1a)(2e) landed heads in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))] T(g[a(g)/2a])]](λgg.x(g) is in WL in g(2a)(1s))] (λgg.g(2a)(1e))≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g(1a)(2e) landed heads in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))] a(g)(1e) is in WL in a(g)(1s)JC∅K = λaa.λTt.λgg .TJSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g(2e) landed heads in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))]
a(g)(1e) is in WL in a(g)(1s)
The conditional is true iff the maximal relevant possibility h ∈ G where the contex-
tually relevant object gc(2e) landed heads, @(h) = h(2sf)(gc(1st)), is such that the
shifted counterpart individual h(1e) is in WL in the world of that possibility h(1s).
The pronoun ‘it’ in the ‘if’-clause is interpreted with respect to the discourse
assignment, while the predicate ‘landed-heads’ receives an obligatory local reading
derived via movement of the complementizer ‘if’. As with the adnominal conditional
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in (9.18)/(9.20), the ‘if’-clause combines with the lower VP segment via function
composition, yielding the complex VP of type ⟨e, t⟩. The ‘if’-clause shifts the inter-
pretation of the coindexed world-pronoun in VP1, capturing the local reading of the
sentence’s main predicate. Crucially, although the ‘if’-clause doesn’t combine at the
level of the main clause, the subject pronoun ‘I’ can still receive a local reading under
the supposition. The shifted reading of the subject is compositionally derived from
the general analysis of ‘if’-clauses and function composition. (As in our examples
with modals, one might invoke additional principles specifying that the syntactic
indexing determined by the concrete discourse be such that a(g)(1e) represents an
epistemic counterpart of gc(1e), who is the speaker of c (§§3–4).)
9.5 Sentence-initial ‘if’-clauses
Conditionals with sentence-initial ‘if’-clauses may be treated as adjoined to IP or
CP (cf. Iatridou 1991, von Fintel 1994, Izvorski 1996, Bhatt & Pancheva
2006). Consider the following alternative LFs for (9.26) on the reading where ‘tall’
receives a local reading targeted by the supposition. (Assume a toy context-sensitive
semantics for positive form relative gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, where d is a
variable for degrees d ∈ Dd and ‘o is s-tall’ abbreviates that o’s height is at least
as great as the degree-standard s for counting as tall. For simplicity treat ‘made-
the-team’ as an unanalyzed predicate. The ‘if’-clause CP in (9.28) is as in (9.27). As
previously, the assignment-variables g2 highlighted in (9.27)–(9.28) might be traces
from A-movement of the ‘if’-clause (§9.3).)
(9.26) [Context: We know everyone’s height. We haven’t settled on how tall one
must be to count as tall.]
Ifi she is talli, she made the team.
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(9.27) Sentence-initial ‘if ’-clause (CP-adjunction)
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 ⟨2,s⟩
if t2a she3 g1 t2s tall d1 g2
CP1 ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd g2 she3-g1 t1s made-the-team
JtallK = λdd.λws.λxe.λgg . x(g) is d(g)-tall in w(g)JCP1K ≈ λgg . g(1a)(3e) made the team in @(g(2a))JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g−(3e) is a(g)(1d)-tall in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))]
g−(3e) made the team in @(a(g))
(9.28) Sentence-initial ‘if ’-clause (IP-adjunction)
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [C∅ t1a] [IP [CP . . . ]⟨2,a⟩ [IP she3-g1 w1-g2 made-the-team]]]]
b. JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ . . . ] g−(3e) made the team in a(g)(1s)
In both (9.27) and (9.28), the individual pronoun representing ‘she’ receives a global
reading. Whereas the world argument of the predicate ‘is tall’ in the ‘if’-clause re-
ceives an obligatory local reading, derived from type-driven movement, the degree-
standard pronoun [d1 g2] associated with the adjective receives an optional local
reading, represented via coindexing with the clause-internal assignment-binder ι⟨2,a⟩h :
The relevant standard for tallness is the standard in the supposition. The possibility
described by the ‘if’-clause is thus a possibility h ∈ G in which gc(3e)’s height in
@(h) = h(2sf)(gc(1st)) is at least as great as the standard determined by h for
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counting as tall. The conditional is true iff gc(3e) made the team in the world of
that possibility.
In (9.28) the world argument of the sentence’s main predicate (‘made-the-team’)
is supplied, as in §9.4, by a world-pronoun receiving its interpretation from the ad-
joined ‘if’-clause; the derived modal domain, given our metasemantic assumptions,
represents the world of the possibility represented by a(g), i.e. a(g)(1s) = @(a(g)).
The predicted semantic value for (9.29) with IP-adjunction is equivalent to the
semantic value derived in (9.25) where the ‘if’-clause is sentence-final, adjoined to
VP (again on the “shifted indexical” reading from Santorio 2012, where the inter-
pretation of ‘I’ in the main clause is determined relative to the possibility introduced
by the ‘if’-clause).
(9.29) ‘If it landed heads, I am in Widmore Library.’
a. [S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [C∅ t1a] [IP [CP ι⟨2,a⟩h [wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 [[if t2a]⟨2,s⟩ [it2-g1 t2s heads]]]]⟨2,a⟩
[IP I1-g2 w1-g2 in-WL]]]]
b. JSK = J(9.25)K ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g−(2e) landed heads in @(a(g))∧ @(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))] a(g)(1e) is in WL in a(g)(1s)
By contrast, in (9.27) the modal domain for interpreting the main clause is explicitly
identified with @(a(g)). The main predicate’s world argument is supplied by a
world-trace left from movement of the complementizer; and the complementizer’s
assignment argument is supplied by an assignment-variable coindexed with the ‘if’-
clause. In both cases the topmost assignment-binder raises from the assignment
argument position of C∅, as in (9.25). However, in (9.27), where the ‘if’-clause
adjoins to a full CP, there is an independently motivated mechanism for generating
the vacuous complementizer embedding the conditional: CP-recursion (Iatridou &
Kroch 1993; see Vikner 1995, Browning 1996, Nyvad et al. 2017 for general
discussion). Conditionals with sentence-initial ‘if’-clauses — and correlatives gener-
ally (de Vries 2002) — follow the complementizer in attitude ascriptions.
(9.30) Alice thinks [CP1 that [CP2 [if it snows] [CP3 (then) school will close]]]
Treating the complementizer embedding the conditional as vacuous satisfies the
requirement for CP-recursion in Iatridou & Kroch 1993 that any content of the
higher complementizer be recoverable from the content of the lower complemen-
tizer. C∅ may be pronounced, as in (9.30), where what raises from the assignment-
argument position in C0 is the embedding attitude verb, or implicit, as in (9.27),
where what raises is the topmost assignment-binder T.
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Hypothetical conditionals (in the sense of Iatridou 1991) can be understood
as a type of correlative construction, in which the free relative clause (obligatorily)
binds a correlate in the main clause (Geis 1970, Iatridou 1991, von Fintel 1994,
Bittner 2001, Schlenker 2004, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, Arsenijević 2009).
(9.31) [[CP free relative clause]i [ … correlatei …]]
Syntactic work on correlatives indicates that fronted correlative proforms must be
structurally adjacent to the sentence-initial relative clause (Bhatt& Pancheva 2006,
den Dikken 2009, Lipták 2012).136 This requirement can help capture the appar-
ent obligatory local reading of the main clause’s modal domain in a hypothetical
‘if…’ conditional, even if the ‘if’-clause is treated as a base-generated adjunct (§9.3)
The ‘if’-clause in (9.27) binds the assignment-variable in the main clause comple-
mentizer, shifting the modal domain to that of the topical antecedent possibility.
It is common in analyses of ‘if’-clauses as free relatives to treat conditional ‘then’
as the correlate proform in correlative constructions.
(9.32) [If it snowed,]i theni it was cold.
Not all sentence-initial ‘if…’ conditionals are compatible with ‘then’:
(9.33) a. If John is dead or alive, (#then) Bill will find him.
b. Even if John is drunk, (#then) Bill will vote for him.
(Iatridou 1994: exs. 6, 10)
(9.34) a. What does John think that if his mother comes (∗then) the guests will
eat?
b. How/where did Mary say that if her mother visits (∗then) the car will
be fixed?
(Iatridou & Kroch 1993: exs. 58–59)
Such data lead Bhatt& Pancheva 2006 to deny that hypothetical ‘if…’ conditionals
without ‘then’ are correlatives. This strikes me a prima facie cost. Like other cor-
relatives, hypothetical ‘if…’ conditionals without ‘then’ consist of a sentence-initial
free relative clause which shifts the interpretation of an element in the main clause.
136One way of formalizing the relevant notion of adjacency might be that β is structurally adjacent
to α iff (i) α c-commands β, and (ii) there is a non-branching path from β which terminates at
the sister of α. (One could say that α and β are structurally adjacent iff α is structurally adjacent
to β or β is structurally adjacent to α.) For broader discussion of locality effects in correlatives
crosslinguistically, see Dayal 1996, Bhatt 2003, Davison 2009a, Leung 2009, Lipták & Rebuschi
2009, Lipták 2012, Beshears 2017.
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Unlike relevance conditionals, where the main clause intuitively describes a condi-
tion in the actual world (cf. §9.3), hypothetical conditionals shift the modal domain
with or without ‘then’. The main clause correlate needn’t be overtly expressed —
in conditional correlatives, or in certain correlatives of individuals, such as (9.36b)
from §6.2.1 (see also Iatridou 2013). The relation between relevance conditionals
and hypothetical conditionals with/without ‘then’ is analogous in this respect to
the relation between “frame-setting” topics and individual correlatives (“aboutness”
topics) with/without a proform (Reinhart 1981; cf. Lipták 2012).
(9.35) Relevance conditionals vs. Hypothetical ‘if…(then)’ conditionals
a. If you’re cold, I have a jacket.
b. If you’re cold, (then) you should shut the window.
(9.36) Frame-setting topics vs. Individual correlatives
a. As for music, I like jazz.
b. [jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai]
is
(vo)
dem
lambii
tall
hai
is
‘The girl who is standing is tall.’ (Srivastav 1991, Bhatt 2003; Hindi)
The analysis in this section captures the connection between hypothetical ‘if…’ con-
ditionals and correlatives. The free relative ‘if’-clause is coindexed with the assignment-
variable determining the modal domain relevant for interpreting the main clause.
We will return to analyses of ‘then’ and correlative proforms in §9.7. For now,
note that treating hypothetical conditionals generally as correlatives is compati-
ble with acknowledging a contrast between conditionals with and without ‘then’.
Overtly expressing the conditional proform requires raising it from its base position
and topicalizing it (cf. Izvorski 1996, Arsenijević 2009, Lipták 2012), as reflected
in (9.37) (bracketing for now any internal structure in the ‘then’-ZP).
(9.37) [S … [CP [CP if-clause]⟨i,a⟩ [CP [ZPk theni] [C … tk… ]]]]
Explicitly topicalizing the proform can have distinctive interpretive and syntactic
effects. It is often claimed that ‘If p, then q’ conditionals carry an implication to the
effect that some/all ¬p-possibilities are ¬q-possibilities (cf. Iatridou 1991, 1994,
von Fintel 1994).
(9.38) If the weather is good, Alice will win↝ In some possibility where the weather isn’t good, Alice won’t win
Izvorski 1996 shows that this exhaustiveness implication associated with condi-
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tional ‘then’ is shared among correlative proforms generally. In correlatives of in-
dividuals the proform is also interpreted at LF in a topicalized position in the left
periphery of the main clause (Lipták 2012). It isn’t implausible that focusing the
proforms in this way leads to the apparent exhaustiveness implications — hence the
exclusion of ‘then’ in (9.33) where the antecedent is already exhaustive. Topi-
calizing the proform can also have syntactic implications, as in (9.34); A-raising
the proform to Spec,C excludes further argument or adjunct extractions out of the
main clause (Iatridou 1991, Iatridou & Kroch 1993, Collins 1998, Bhatt &
Pancheva 2006, Lipták 2012; cf. Dayal 1996, Izvorski 1996, Hiraiwa 2005).
So, the assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for hypothetical condition-
als in this section unifies ‘if…(then)’ with correlatives in the sense that there is a
left-adjoined free relative clause which binds a correlate in the main clause. In
conditionals with ‘then’ the proform is topicalized. We can capture the idea that
‘if’-clauses function notionally as topics (Haiman 1978, Bittner 2001) without
analyzing all conditional constructions as involving topicalization-driven movement.
9.6 Modalized conditionals: Restricting and shifting
So far we have focused on “bare” conditionals — conditionals without an overt op-
erator in the main clause. Although there may be evidence for a covert operator in
some bare conditionals (epistemic, generic, frequency; Lewis 1975,Kratzer 1991),
the account in this section captures the function of ‘if’-clauses in shifting a modal
domain without needing to posit an additional operator. Let’s turn now to modalized
conditionals, and examine the role of ‘if’-clauses in modifying the interpretation of
a modal. (I focus on hypothetical conditionals with sentence-initial ‘if’-clauses.)
9.6.1 Direct restriction
The traditional Kratzerian (1981, 1991) line is that the ‘if’-clause in a modalized
conditional such as (9.39) restricts the domain of the modal.
(9.39) If it rains, he might cry.≈ “for some epistemic possibility in which it rains, he cries”
Adapting the approach to quantifier domain restriction in vonFintel 1994 (cf. n. 26),
one option would be to treat modal verbs as taking a resource domain argument in
addition to the modal background representing the reading of the modal (epistemic,
deontic, etc.), as reflected in (9.40). (As previously, I use ‘r’ in indices for type ⟨s, at⟩.
Ignore any contextual restriction in the external argument of ‘if’, where W represents
a pronoun contextually identified with W. See n. 28.)
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(9.40) Modalized conditional (IP/ModP-adjunction)
‘If it rains, he may cry.’
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 W
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a
t1s rains
t
⟨3,a⟩
may g2 r1 g1 t1s
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a
he3-g1 t3s cry
JmayK = λaa.λAat.λA′at.λgg .∃a′a∶ a′(g) ⊑ a(g) ∧A(a′)(g) ∧A′(a′)(g)JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ it rains in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(W)]∃a′∶ a′(g) ⊑ a(g) ∧ g−(1r)(@(g−))(a′(g)) ∧ g−(3e) cries in @(a′(g))
This treats the modalized ‘may’ conditional as saying that the maximal relevant
possibility h in which the antecedent is verified is such that some accessible pos-
sibility that is a part of h verifies the consequent. Roughly put, (9.40) is true iff the
maximal relevant possibility where it rains h is such that the contextually relevant
individual gc(3e) cries in some possibility h′ that is a part of h and is included in
the set of accessible possibilities, as determined by the contextually relevant modal
background gc(1r) at the actual world (gc).
The modal ‘may’ in the consequent is interpreted with respect to the same con-
textually relevant domain of possibilities (=gc(1r)(@(gc))) as would figure in the
interpretation of an unembedded ‘may’ sentence. The relevant reading is supplied
by the discourse assignment, and the modal background is indexed to the actual
world. The binder-index on the ‘if’-clause is coindexed with the assignment-variable
supplying the modal’s resource domain argument; the role of the ‘if’-clause is simply
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to restrict the domain to possibilities where it rained. As von Fintel (1994) notes,
this relation between the ‘if’-clause and the modal’s restrictor argument is apparently
stronger than an optional binding relation. For instance, in nested conditionals such
as (9.41) the modal receives the restriction of the closest ‘if’-clause (cf. Bhatt &
Pancheva 2006).
(9.41) If you get back in time for the show, then [if Timmy isn’t tired]i we’ll have toi
take him.
The connection between the topical possibility described by the ‘if’-clause and the
modal’s resource domain may be understood as an instance of the locality require-
ment on correlative correlates discussed above (cf. n. 136). Indeed, drawing on
Dayal’s (1996) account of individual correlatives, von Fintel suggests analyzing
the relation between the ‘if’-clause and restrictor argument as an A-chain (1994:
88–89). On the movement-based approach discussed in §9.3, the (obligatory) coin-
dexing between the ‘if’-clause and the modal’s resource domain argument follows
by type-driven movement.
9.6.2 Indirect restriction/modification: “Double modal” and “information-sensitive”
readings
The above analysis captures the correlative binding requirement and the restricting
function of the ‘if’-clause via the modal’s resource domain. In (9.40) the modal’s
resource domain variable is the correlate, and (as in §§3–4) the embedding comple-
mentizer raises from the modal’s world argument. One might wonder what would be
predicted if the complementizer raised locally under the ‘if’-clause, schematized in
(9.42) (n. 28). As with the bare conditional in (9.27), the complementizer adjacent
to the ‘if’-clause in (9.42) supplies the correlate, and the modal domain for the (here
modalized) main clause is determined by the ‘if’-clause (cf. n. 129). (Hereafter I will
ignore any modal resource domain arguments.)
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(9.42) Modalized conditional (CP-adjunction)
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
…if…
CP ∶ t
⟨3,s⟩
Cd g2
⟨3,a⟩
may
r g t3s
. . . t3a . . .
I suggest that such LFs can represent so-called “double modal” and “information-
sensitive” readings of modalized conditionals.
First, examples such as (9.43) have led some theorists to posit that at least
some modalized conditionals have a covert modal in addition to overt modal in the
consequent (Frank 1996, Geurts 2004, von Fintel & Iatridou 2005, Swanson
2010).
(9.43) If marijuana is illegal here, we have to report Alice. (cf. Geurts 2004: ex.
1) ≈ “for every epistemically accessible world u where marijuana is illegal,
every world v conforming to the law in u is such that we report Alice
in v”
In a Kratzerian restrictor approach, the ‘if’-clause restricts the domain of the covert
(epistemic) necessity modal, and the overt deontic modal is evaluated at each world
in the covert modal’s restricted domain. The (simplified) derivation in (9.44) cap-
tures such “double modal” readings without positing a covert modal. (Assume that
in the intended interpretation r2 represents a modal background for the relevant
laws.)
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(9.44) “Double modal” reading
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 W ⟨2,s⟩
if t2a t1s pot-illegal
CP1 ∶ t
⟨3,s⟩
Cd g2 ⟨3,a⟩
have-to
r2 g1
t3s
⟨4,s⟩
Cd t3a we1-g1 t4s report AliceJCP1K ≈ λgg .∀a′a∶ g(1a)(2r)(@(g(2a)))(a′(g))→ g(1a)(1e) report Alice in @(a′(g))JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶marijuana is illegal in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(W)]∀a′a∶ g−(2r)(@(a(g)))(a′(g))→ g−(1e) report Alice in @(a′(g))
This says, roughly, that the maximal possibility where marijuana is illegal h is such
that for every possibility h′ compatible with the law in@(h), i.e. every h′ ∈ gc(2r)(@(h)),
we report Alice in @(h′).
As in (9.27), the correlative ‘if’-clause is coindexed with the assignment-variable
g2 in the adjacent complementizer, which determines the modal domain for evalu-
ating the main clause. The felt “double modal” interpretation follows from the fol-
lowing combination of features: (i) the modal’s modal-background pronoun [r2 g1]
receives its interpretation from the discourse assignment gc, as in (9.40); however,
(ii) the world applied to the modal background is the world of the antecedent-
verifying possibility @(h). The discourse context supplies the relevant function⟨s, at⟩ from worlds to sets of possibilities, gc(2r), which represents the law and
determines the intended deontic reading of the modal. What the law provides may
vary across worlds. In contrast to (9.40), the specific content of the law relevant
for evaluating the modalized main clause is the law in the possibility h in which
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marijuana is illegal. The ‘if’-clause introduces a topical possibility, and the modal’s
deontic modal background is indexed to the world of that possibility.
The informal intuition in the literature on information-sensitivity is that the
deontic modal’s modal background seems to be updated, in some sense to be ex-
plained, in light of the information in the antecedent, as reflected informally in
(9.45) (e.g.Kolodny&MacFarlane 2010,Dowell 2012,Charlow 2013b,Cariani
et al. 2013, Silk 2014b, 2016a).137
(9.45) [Context: Ten miners are trapped in shaft A or shaft B, but we don’t know
which, and floodwaters are threatening. All ten miners will be saved if we
block the shaft they’re in, but all ten will drown if we block the wrong shaft.
One miner will drown if we block neither shaft.]
If the miners are in shaft A, we have to block shaft A.≈ If the miners are in shaft A, then, given that information, the deon-
tically preferred worlds are worlds where we block shaft A. (Though,
given our actual information, the deontically preferred worlds are worlds
where we block neither shaft.)
The “shifty” interpretation in examples such as (9.43)–(9.44) was derived by apply-
ing the shifted worlds of the possibility introduced by the antecedent to the deontic
modal background supplied by the global context. I suggest that LFs in which the
modal-background variable receives its interpretation from an assignment-variable
bound by the ‘if’-clause can represent information-sensitive readings. The putative
non-restricting function of the conditional clause is diagnosed as a local readings of
the modal’s modal-background pronoun, as reflected in (9.46).
137On related phenomena with modalized conditionals generally, see Gillies 2010, Yalcin 2012,
Charlow 2013a. Given our purposes I ignore any differences between weak/strong necessity modals
in information-sensitivity (see Charlow 2013b, Silk 2016c).
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(9.46) “Information-sensitive” reading
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 ⟨2,s⟩
if t2a the-miners t1s in-A
CP ∶ t
⟨3,s⟩
CI g2 ⟨3,a⟩
have-to
r3 g2
t3s
⟨4,s⟩
Cd t3a we1-g1 t4s block-A
JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ the miners are in A in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))]∀a′a∶ a(g)(3r)(@(a(g)))(a′(g))→ g−(1e) blocks A in @(a′(g))
This says, roughly, that the maximal relevant possibility where the miners are in
shaft A, h, is such that, for every possibility h′ compatible with the deontic ideal
determined by h— i.e. every h′ ∈ h(3r)(@(h))— we block shaft A in @(h′).
As in (9.44) the modal domain for evaluating the modalized main clause is set by
the assignment-variable g2 in the complementizer coindexed with the correlative ‘if’-
clause. However, the deontic modal-background pronoun — here [r3 g2]— receives
a local reading as well. The deontic modal background for evaluating the modal’s
prejacent is determined by the topical antecedent possibility that the miners are in
shaft A. Crucially, this possibility may be a plural object. The plural possibility a(gc)
represents a state throughout which the miners are in shaft A. Which deontic ideal,
set of accessible worlds, etc. is determined by a possibility may be due to a feature of
the possibility qua plurality. The discourse context may be such that gc(3r) implies
that we block neither shaft; yet its image under a, such that the miners are in shaft
A in the world of every part of the plurality a(gc), may determine a deontic ideal
a(gc)(3r) implying that we block shaft A.
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Some theorists have appealed to information-sensitive readings to motivate re-
vising traditional semantics for modals and conditionals. For instance, modals’
domains of quantification may be treated as determined relative to an additional
parameter such as an information state (e.g. Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010, Silk
2014b). Plural domains may provide the structure to capture intuitions behind cer-
tain revisionary approaches to information-sensitivity while still relativizing modal
backgrounds simply to worlds, as in the traditional semantics. An analysis of condi-
tionals as plural definite descriptions may thus be of general interest, independent
of the assignment-variable implementation developed here.
Let’s recap. This section has examined how an assignment-variable-based ap-
proach to local/global readings and our accounts of modals and relative clauses
may be extended to conditionals. The syntax/semantics in §9.2 yields a uniform
analysis of ‘if’-clauses in various positions and conditional structures — in sentence-
final positions adjoined to VP, in sentence-initial positions adjoined to IP/CP, and
in adnominal conditionals when adjoined to NP; in conditionals with/without a
proform such as ‘then’; and in conditionals with/without a main clause modal.
‘If’-clauses are analyzed syntactically as free relatives and interpreted as plural defi-
nite descriptions of possibilities, represented by assignments. The account composi-
tionally derives various types of local readings and ways ‘if’-clauses may shift/modify
the interpretation of modals and other expressions, while still allowing for global
readings in the ‘if’-clause and the rest of the sentence. In correlative constructions
the sentence-initial ‘if’-clause binds a correlate in the main clause. The correlate may
be overtly expressed and topicalized such as in hypothetical ‘if…then’ conditionals.
The next section briefly considers how the proposed assignment-variable-based syn-
tax/semantics for hypothetical conditionals might be extended to correlatives and
correlative proforms more generally.
9.7 Correlatives and proforms: Individual and conditional
Crosslinguistic work demonstrates robust links among conditionals, interrogatives,
and correlatives of individuals (e.g. Dayal 1996, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, Citko
2009, Dixon 2009, Lipták 2009b, Rebuschi 2009). For instance, there are system-
atic structural parallels between conditional and interrogative clauses, and many
languages (e.g. Bulgarian) use the same type of complementizer in expressing con-
ditionals and questions. Although English doesn’t have correlatives of individuals,
many languages where correlativization is more productive use the same type of
marker in both conditionals and individual correlatives for introducing the relative
clause, and for the main clause proforms. In some languages the same construction
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can be ambiguous between a conditional and individual correlative interpretation,
as we saw in (9.11), reproduced in (9.47), and (9.48) (see also Cable 2009 on
Lhasa Tibetan, Davison 2009b on Sanskrit).
(9.47) [Maliki-rli
dog-erg
katji-ŋki
same.top-3sg.2sg
yarlki-rni
bite-nonpast
nyuntu]
you
ŋula-ju
dem-top
kapi-rna
fut-1sg.3sg
luwa-rni
shoot-nonpast
ŋatjulu-rlu.
me-erg
a. ‘If a dog bites you, then I’ll shoot it.’
b. ‘As for the dog that bites you, I’ll shoot it.’
(Hale 1976: 80, Bittner 2001: ex. 7; Warlpiri (Pama–Nyungan))
(9.48) [Ako
if
je
aux
ko
who
ve￿ ￿
already
ustao]
raised
onda
then
neka
let
taj
that
i
and
izađe.
go.out
a. ‘If anyone already stood up, then let him also go out.’
b. ‘Whoever stood up, let him also go out.’
(Arsenijević 2009: ex. 10; Serbo-Croatian)
Suppose as a working hypothesis that we give a uniform analysis of correlative
clauses in conditionals and individual correlatives. (We will return to interrogative
clauses in §10.) I suggest that what distinguishes conditional and non-conditional
interpretations of correlative clauses (cf. (9.47)–(9.48)) is the nature of the com-
plementizer’s external world argument and its relation to the main clause’s modal
domain. In conditional correlatives, the ‘if’-clause introduces a topical modal pos-
sibility, and the correlative binding requirement is satisfied by binding a correlate
determining the main clause’s modal domain. In individual correlatives the topical
possibility is still the possibility described by the correlative clause. However, rather
than introducing a modal possibility, the correlative clause introduces an actual
possibility about certain topical individuals. The modal domain for both clauses is
the world of the discourse: the external argument of the correlative clause comple-
mentizer is identified with the actual world, and the main clause’s modal domain is
determined by the embedding modal/assignment-binder. The correlative binding
requirement is satisfied by binding an individual correlate in the main clause. Ex-
tending the treatments of linguistic anaphora from §§6–8, conditional and individual
proforms may be represented alike as copies of their antecedent relative/wh word.
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9.7.1 Individual correlatives and proforms
An example with a multiple correlative of individuals is in (9.49).138 (I use Cif for
the complementizer, where JCifK = JifK. The external argument could be repre-
sented with [whsf-g pst-g], as in conditionals, where the semantic value for [p g] is
ultimately identified with {gc(1s)} = {@(gc)}. However, for clarity I represent the
external argument in individual correlative interpretations with a world-pronoun. I
use the English glosses and word order.)
(9.49) Correlative of individuals
[jis
rel
laRkii-ne
girl
jis
rel
laRke-ke
boy
saath
with
khelaa]
played
us-ne
dem
us-ko
dem
haraayaa.
liked
‘Which girl played with which boy, she defeated him.’
(Dayal 1996: 197; Hindi)
138As previously I use abbreviations such as ‘babyu’ for the characteristic function of the set of
individuals o ∈ E such that o is a baby in u. As in §§6, 9.2 with the relative complementizer and
‘if’, I assume that the relative word must have the same assignment-variable as Cif (cf. Davison
2009a; more in §10). For simplicity I represent the relative phrases and proforms as having a
basic FP structure. Analyzing them alternatively as topic phrases might help capture connections
between correlatives and topicalization, such as the topic-driven movement of demonstrative cor-
relates (esp. Lipták 2009b, 2012, also Bhatt & Pancheva 2006, Arsenijević 2009). Indeed
§10.3 will suggest analyzing D-linked interrogative wh-phrases (e.g. ‘which baby’) as [TopP Top n∗P];
a parallel analysis of relative phrases and their correlates in correlatives would be fitting given
the crosslinguistic commonalities between correlatives and interrogatives. Perhaps the alternative
FP/TopP structures could be a source of crosslinguistic variation.
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S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1
⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1 t2s
played-with
wh3-g2 boy-w1-g1
IP1 ∶ t
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1 t1s
defeated
him3-g2 boy-w1-g1
JIP1K ≈ λgg . g(2a)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)) defeated g(2a)(3cf)(boyg(1a)(1s)) in g(1s)JCP⟨2,a⟩K ≈ λTt.λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)) played with a(g)(3cf)(boyg(1a)(1s))
in @(a(g)) ∧@(a(g)) = g(1a)(1s)] T(g[a(g)/2a])JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) played with a(g)(3cf)(boyg−(1s)) in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = g−(1s)] a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) defeated a(g)(3cf)(boyg−(1s)) in @(g−)
Informally, this treats the correlative as saying that the assignment providing a true
answer to the question “which girli played with which boyj?” verifies the matrix
clause statement “that girli defeated that boyj”. The correlative clause describes the
unique possibility in which the selected girl o (=a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1s))) played with
the selected boy o′ (=a(g)(3cf)(boyg(1s))), where the world u of that possibility is
such that u = gc(1s). The sentence is true iff o defeated o′ in @(gc).
First, the individual correlative clause in (9.49) is given the same structural
representation as an ‘if’-clause. In (9.49) the world of the possibility introduced in
the correlative clause is specified as being identical to, gc(1s)— given our metase-
mantic assumptions, the world identical to the world of the discourse @(gc). The
topical possibility is the unique actual possibility in which a certain girl played with
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a certain boy. The main clause says that that same girl defeated that same boy. The
correlative binding requirement is captured by (i) the syntactic representation of the
proform as a copy of its antecedent relative word and here elided NP,139 and (ii) the
assignment-quantification introduced by ιh in the correlative clause.
In a slogan: Individual correlatives are material relevance conditionals with
donkey pronouns (cf. n. 131, §9.3) — (i) “material” insofar as the modal domain for
the correlative clause is restricted to the actual world gc(1s): the correlative clause
describes a possibility in the actual world; (ii) “relevance” insofar as the modal
domain for the main clause is identified directly with@(gc) via the syntax/semantics
interface: the main clause comments on the actual world; and (iii) “donkey” insofar
as the main clause proforms are anaphorically identified with their non-c-command-
ing antecedents [wh-g2 P], via the correlative clause assignment-binder from ι⟨2,a⟩h .
The relevant similarity between correlative proforms and donkey pronouns is
that both are represented (roughly) as copies of a non-c-commanding linguistic
antecedent. Comparing them in this way isn’t to assimilate correlative constructions
to donkey sentences (see also n. 77; more on this below).140 For instance, as
discussed in §6.2, in Hindi a bare nominal can serve as a donkey pronoun but not
the correlate in a correlative.
139Recall that the anaphoric expression need only be a copy with respect to interpreted material
at LF (§6.2). Possible differences such as with respect to case raise no issues (see Bhatt & Lipták
2009). I assume that [wh]-features are present for syntactic and phonological reasons; correlate
proforms needn’t be [+wh] or spelled-out as relative/wh-phrases. The analysis is also compatible
with there being differences in ϕ-features in certain examples, as in (i) where the plural proform is
linked to both singular relative phrases. As in §6.2 for the case of donkey pronouns, such examples
may be understood analogously to other phenomena where pronouns’ ϕ-features are uninterpreted,
such as with “fake indexicals”; see n. 51.
(i) [jo
which
laRkiii
girl
jis
which
laRkej
boy
se
with
baat
talk
kar rahii hai]
do-prog-pres
ve{i,j}
they
ek saath
together
sinemaa
movie
jaayeNge
go
‘Which girl is talking to which boy, they will go to the movies together.’ (Dayal 1996: 204)
140Other types of non-c-command anaphora with conventionally anaphoric expressions, as in (i)
with Sinhala ee ‘that.anaph’, may be analyzed similarly. Though conventionally anaphoric pro-forms
are used as the obligatory correlates in correlatives (in languages that have them, as in (1.11) with
Bangla), they may also be used in environments not requiring a matching anaphoric expression, such
as donkey configurations, as in (i) (contemporary Sinhala lacks correlatives; Gair 1998: 306n.5).
(i) [Gunәpaalәgei
Gunapala.gen
pawulә
wife
gœnә
about
wiswaasәyә
belief
nisaa]
because
eyaai
that.anaph
karәdәree
trouble
wœṭuna.
fell
‘Because of Gunapala’si faith in his wife, hei fell into trouble.’ (Gair 1998: 134)
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(9.50) a. har
every
aadmii
man
jis
rel
ke paas
with
koii
some
gadhaai
donkey
hotaa hai
has
gadheKOi
donkey
maartaa hai.
beats
‘Every man who has a donkey beats it.’
b. *[jo
rel
aadmii
man
aayaa]i
came
aadmiii
man
acchaa
nice
hai.
is
‘Which man came, man is nice.’ (Srivastav 1991: ex. 45; Hindi)
Individual correlates are also often overtly realized as morphologically complex (see
§§6.2.1, 7.3). In some cases the overt NP in the correlate may differ from the
antecedent NP, typically denoting a contextual superset (e.g. Dayal 1996, Davison
2009a, Beshears 2017) — hence the qualification above that the proforms are an-
alyzed as copies of the antecedent relative/wh word.
That said, there are interesting crosslinguistic similarities between donkey sen-
tences and correlatives. For instance, though Cable 2009 avoids giving “a ‘simple’
conditional analysis” (219n.7; 204–205) of Tibetan correlatives, he notes that the
correlatives are glossed literally as conditional donkey sentences:
(9.51) [Khyodra-s
you-erg
gyag
yak
gare
what
nyos
buy
yod
aux
na]
if
nga-s
I-erg
de
that
bsad
kill
pa
perf
yin.
aux
‘I killed whatever yak you bought.’
lit. ‘If you bought what/a yak, I killed that/it.’ (Cable 2009: 195; Tibetan)
Indeed correlative proforms are typically formed from a demonstrative — or, in lan-
guages which have them, a specialized anaphoric pronoun.141 Individual correlates
also pattern with donkey pronouns, in contrast to bound-variable anaphors, in being
replaceable with an epithet, as reflected in (9.52) vs. (9.53)/(9.54).
(9.52) Every donkey sued its/*the damn thing’s owner.
(9.53) Every farmer who had a donkey took it/the damn thing to court.
141It may be interesting to compare the proposed representation of correlative proforms with
Sportiche’s (2006) informal analysis of copies reconstructed from preposed/A-bar positions as
demonstratives, as in (i).
(i) a. ‘Je lui ai donné la photo que le vieux peintre m’a demandée.’
b. ‘I gave him the picture the old painter asked for yesterday.’
c. [The picture the old painter asked for]i I gave him this picturei
(Sportiche 2006: ex. 132; indexing added)
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(9.54) [jis
rel
aadmii-se
man
tum
you
bahut
much
pyaar-se
love
baat
talk
kar
do
rahe
prog
the]
be
us
dem
aadmii-ne/haraamii-ne
man/bastard
mujh-pe
me-on
muqadma
court.case
Thonk
hammer.in
rakh-aa
keep
hai.
be
‘Which man you were talking with so nicely, that man/bastard is suing me.’
(Potts et al. 2009: exs. 27, 29)
Although correlative clauses characteristically appear sentence-initially adjoined
to the matrix clause, in some languages certain correlative clauses can be adjoined
directly to the correlate DP, as reflected overtly in (9.55).
(9.55) Ram-ne
Ram
[DP [jo
rel
laRkaa
boy
tumhaare
your
piichhe
behind
hai]i
is
us
dem
laRke-koi]
boy
[DP [jo
rel
kitaab
book
Shantiniketan-ne
Shantiniketan
chhaapii
print
thii]k
was
vo
dem
kitaabk]
book
dii
give
(lit. ‘Ram gave [[which book Shantiniketan had published] that book] to [[which
boy is behind you] that boy]’)
‘Ram gave the book that Shantiniketan had published to the boy behind you.’
(Bhatt 2003: ex. 32; Hindi)
A key feature of the account of ‘if’ conditionals in this section is that it yields a uni-
fied semantics for ‘if’-clauses in various structural positions, such as in conditionals
involving adjunction to NP, VP, IP, CP. This feature carries over to correlatives, as
reflected in the DP-adjunction example in (9.56).142
(9.56) Individual correlative (DP-adjunction)
[[jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai]
be
vo]
dem
lambii
tall
hai.
be
‘Which girl is standing, she is tall.’
142Dayal 1996 argues that examples such as (9.56) actually involve IP adjunction, but for purposes
of illustration I follow her in assuming an LF where the correlative clause forms a constituent with the
correlate. Bhatt 2003 argues that Hindi single correlatives are in general base-generated adjoined to
DP and optionally move via scrambling to adjoin to IP/CP in overt syntax. See also Beshears 2017.
For present purposes I treat ‘tall’ as a simple predicate and ignore any context-sensitivity associated
with the positive form; we will return to this in §10.
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S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP ∶ t
DP ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1 ⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t2s standing
DP1 ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1
VP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
t1s tall
JDP1K = λPet.λgg .P(λgg.g(2a)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)))(g)JDPK = JCP⟨2,a⟩K ○ JDP1K = λPet.JCP⟨2,a⟩K(JDP1K(P))≈ λPet.λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)) is standing in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = g(1a)(1s)] P(λgg.g(2a)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)))(g[a(g)/2a])JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) is standing in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = g−(1s)] a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) is tall in @(g−)
The correlative clause CP⟨2,a⟩ describes the unique possibility in which the selected
girl o ∈ E (=a(g)(2cf)(girl1s)) is standing, where the world of that possibility is
identical to the world of the discourse g(1s) = @(gc). The sentence is true iff that
selected girl o is tall in @(gc).
The type e individual proform can be lifted to type ⟨et, t⟩ in the usual way.
Analogous to our examples with NP-/VP-adjoined ‘if’-clauses in §§9.3–9.4, the type⟨et, t⟩ proform DP1 combines via function composition with the adjoined type ⟨t, t⟩
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correlative clause CP⟨2,a⟩, yielding the main subject DP of type ⟨et, t⟩. The complex
subject denotes, roughly, the set of properties P characterizing the selected girl
o = a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1s)) in the relevant actual possibility in which o is standing.
As in the clausal adjunction example in (9.49), the identification of the topical
individual picked out by the relative phrase with the individual picked out by the
correlate is captured by the representation of the anaphoric expression as a copy of
its antecedent, here [F2cf-g2 girl-w1-g1], and the assignment-quantification/binder
introduced by the definite pluralization operator in the correlative clause.
To my knowledge the only compositional semantics for correlatives to explicitly
address DP-adjunction correlatives is Dayal 1996. Dayal gives the correlative clause
the semantics of a generalized individual quantifier (type ⟨et, t⟩), which, in clausal
adjunction examples, binds the proform — represented as a variable — in the main
clause. For DP-adjunction examples Dayal briefly suggests invoking a mechanism of
crosscategorial quantification (1996: 207). Very roughly, the proform variable DP1
is first lifted to type ⟨et, t⟩, yielding λPet.P(i); this is then converted to type ⟨e, t⟩
by adding a property variable Q and abstracting over the proform variable, yielding
λx.[λP.P(x)](Q) = λx.Z(Q). This combines with the type ⟨et, t⟩ correlative clause
to yield an object of type t for the subject DP, which is then converted to type ⟨et, t⟩
by abstracting over the previously introduced property variable Q, yielding roughly
λZet.Z(ιx∶ girl(x) ∧ standing(x)) for a DP such as in (9.56).
This is not compositional. Dayal’s account invokes independent abstraction
rules and principles for introducing property variables into the semantics in order to
derive the semantic value for the modified subject DP — notably, in converting the
proform to predicative type ⟨e, t⟩ to combine with the correlative clause, and then
in converting the result of type t back to generalized quantifier type ⟨et, t⟩ in order
to combine with the clause’s main predicate. Note that in combining the nodes of
type ⟨et, t⟩ it must be stipulated which node is to be converted to predicative type⟨e, t⟩ (namely, the node for the proform).
The account in this section avoids needing to introduce additional semantic
mechanisms such as these. Correlative clauses and proforms in examples involving
IP/CP adjunction and DP adjunction are given a uniform syntax/semantics: In both
cases the correlative clause denotes an object of type ⟨t, t⟩, and the proform is
represented as a copy of its linguistic antecedent. The shifted interpretation of the
proform is derived from the general analysis of the relevant anaphoric expressions
(following §6.1), and the derived assignment binder projecting to the correlative
clause. The semantic value derived in (9.56) is equivalent to the semantic value
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derived for the alternative structure in which the correlative clause adjoins at the
clausal level.
(9.57) Individual correlative (IP-adjunction)
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
. . .
IP1 ∶ t
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t2s tall
JSK = J(9.56)K ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) is standing in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = g−(1s)] a(g)(2cf)(girlg−(1s)) is tall in @(g−)
Finally, it is common in semantics for correlatives to give roughly uniform in-
terpretations of correlative clauses and ordinary DP-like free relatives, say as plural
definite descriptions (e.g. Srivastav 1991, Dayal 1996, Grosu & Landman 1998).
Yet it is interesting that individual correlative clauses pattern with interrogative and
conditional clauses with respect to various syntactic/semantic properties, in contrast
to non-correlative free relatives. For instance, they also pattern with interrogative
clauses in the availability of multiple wh-words, reconstruction effects, and exhaus-
tivity (Dayal 1996, Cable 2009, Citko 2009).
(9.58) a. Which boy read which book? (cf. (9.49))
b. Everyone got what she/*who wants.
The account in this section assimilates individual correlative clauses and conditional
clauses; they include the same definite operator of assignments, which raises from
an equivalent complementizer. In contrast, the implicit quantifier in non-correlative
free relatives such as (6.13), reproduced in (9.59), may be given the same sort of
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assignment-quantificational semantics as the matrix determiners in §§6–8 (ignoring
worlds and any contextual restriction associated with ‘what’; n. 46).
(9.59) ‘what Alice likes’
ι⟨2,a⟩o CPrel
wh3-g2 E
C
⟨1,e⟩
Crel t2a Alice likes t1eJ(9.59)K ≈ λgg . ιx(g)∃a∶ x(g) = a(g)(3cf)(E) ∧ Alice likes x(g)
The plural definite element ιo picks out a unique maximal individual. The plural def-
inite element ιh in a correlative/conditional picks out a unique maximal possibility.
9.7.2 Conditional correlatives and ‘then’
Despite extensive syntactic and typological research on correlatives, there has been
surprisingly little work on the compositional semantics of conditional proforms such
as ‘then’. Pioneering developments came with Iatridou 1991, 1994, who showed
that conditional ‘then’ isn’t semantically inert, and with Izvorski 1996, who ob-
served that the exhaustivity implications associated with ‘then’ are shared among
correlative proforms generally, as discussed in §9.5. Yet specific derivations of these
apparent interpretive effects aren’t provided. A prominent approach, following
especially Schlenker 2004, is to analyze ‘then’ as a world pronoun (see also Bhatt
& Pancheva 2006, Arsenijević 2009). Such a move is certainly compatible with
the present framework; ‘then’ could be analyzed as a topicalized expression of the
main predicate’s world argument, as reflected schematically in (9.60).
(9.60) [S … [CP [CP if-clause ]⟨k,a⟩ [CP [YP then1s gk]⟨1,s⟩ [C … t1s… ]]]]
Yet I think there are reasons to be dissatisfied with approaches along these lines,
reasons both theory-internal and independent of an assignment variable framework.
Analyzing ‘then’ as a simple pronoun leaves various linguistic phenomena with
conditional proforms unexplained. First, crosslinguistic work on correlatives shows
that correlative proforms undergo movement to the left periphery of the main clause
(esp. Izvorski 1996, Lipták 2009b, 2012, also Bhatt 2003, Arsenijević 2009).
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Interestingly, whether this movement occurs overtly or covertly in a given language
often patterns with certain A-movements. For instance, in English, an overt wh-
movement language, ‘then’ also raises overtly, as in (9.61). An individual correlative
analogue of (9.61a) is in (9.63).
(9.61) a. If it rains then I think that we should stay at home.
b. *If it rains I think that then we should stay at home.
(Izvorski 1996: ex. 29)
(9.62) Whoi did you persuade (ti) to come?
(9.63) [Akik
rel
korán
early
jönnek]i
come
azokati
those-acc
Péter
Peter
hallotta,
heard
hogy
that
ingyen
free
beengedik
admit
ti.
lit. ‘Who comes early, Peter heard that they will be admitted for free.’
(Lipták 2012: ex. 51)
With individual proforms, one might say that the movement patterns with wh move-
ment given their association with the relative/wh phrases in the correlative clause
(cf. n. 138). One might wonder what would provide the basis for the movement
patterns with a conditional proform like ‘then’, if the correlative construction simply
involves world pronoun anaphoric to a pluralization operator. Even if the proform
isn’t itself a wh-phrase and the raising may be triggered for reasons of topicalization,
analyzing (e.g.) ‘then’ as a simple variable leaves it obscure why the overt/covert
status of the movement would correlate with that of wh-words.
Second, if ‘then’ is a simple world pronoun, one might wonder why the pronoun
would in many cases be lexicalized by an expression specified as being anaphoric
to an ‘if’-clause. For instance, although English has various proforms which prima
facie serve as propositional anaphors, such as ‘that’, ‘it’, or ‘so’, only ‘then’ can be
anaphoric to an ‘if’-clause (or other supposition). Likewise, in German, although
proforms such as es can be anaphoric to a proposition, only dann ‘then’ can correlate
with a conditional wenn ‘if’ clause:
(9.64) Q: Unter
under
welcher
which
Bedingung
condition
bedauert
regrets
Max,
Max,
[dass
that
Lea
Lea
singt]i?
sings
‘Under which condition does Max regret that Lea sings?’
A: Max
Max
bedauert
regrets
esi
it
DANNk,
then
[wenn
if
Lea
Lea
nicht
not
geÜBT
practiced
hat]k.
has
‘Max regrets it then if Lea has not practiced.’
(Schwabe 2016: ex. 42; German)
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It isn’t the case that correlative proforms in general lexically specify a particular type
of antecedent. Crosslinguistically, the proform is typically a demonstrative.
Third, in individual correlatives the correlate may consist of a bare demonstra-
tive, as in (9.65a), or a demonstrative with an explicit nominal, as in (9.65b).
(9.65) a. jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai
is
vo
dem
lambii
tall
hai
is
(lit. ‘Which girl is standing, that is tall’)
b. [jo
rel
khaRii
standing
hai]
is
vo
dem
laRkii
girl
lambii
tall
hai
is
(lit. ‘Who is standing, that girl is tall’)
‘The girl who is standing is tall.’ (Srivastav 1991: ex. 13a; Hindi)
One might wonder whether additional structure is similarly involved in conditional
proforms, especially given the point, noted above, that many languages use the same
type of marker for the proforms in conditionals and individual correlatives.
Our revised syntax/semantics for ‘if’-clauses from §9.2 affords a straightforward
way of capturing the above data and of unifying our analyses of correlative proforms:
Correlative proforms are topicalized copies of their antecedent relative/wh word,
bound by the correlative clause. The proform in an individual correlative is a copy
of the choice-function pronoun of individuals and (elided) NP ((9.58), §9.7.1).
In conditional correlatives the antecedent is the (possibly implicit) ‘whether’-like
element in the specifier argument of ‘if’. ‘Then’ is a copy of the choice-function
pronoun of worlds and (elided) proposition-type argument.
‘Then’ may still be analyzed as a topicalization of the main predicate’s world
argument. However, it is represented as anaphoric to the implicit ‘whether’-like
element in Spec,C of the correlative conditional clause, as reflected in (9.66).143
143As in §§9.3, 9.5, I bracket whether the coindexing between the ‘if’-clause and assignment-
variable g2 in the correlate may be derived via movement. I leave ‘then’ in its fronted position,
though I leave open whether it might instead be interpreted in its trace position (cf. Bhatt 2003,
Sportiche 2006). The LF in (9.66) leaves the main clause complementizer position empty. This
choice of representation isn’t forced on us. For instance, one could represent the structure of the
‘if…then’ conditional as in (9.27), and analyze ‘then’ as topicalizing the unpronounced declarative
complementizer’s assignment-variable; the derived semantic value would be equivalent. Yet one
motivation for (9.66) may come from comparisons with V2 (verb-second) languages such as German,
where ‘then’ (e.g. dann) is followed directly by the verb in the complementizer position (see Iatridou
1991, Iatridou & Kroch 1993 for discussion in the context of CP-recursion). ‘Then’ could still be
analyzed as in (9.66), though with the verb in C. I return to these issues in §10.5 when considering
conditional questions.
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(9.66) ‘If…then’
‘If it landed heads, then I am in Widmore Library’
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
YP⟨1,s⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
then2sf-g2 p1st-g1
C ∶ t
e IP
I1 g2 t1s in-WLJYP⟨1,s⟩K = λTt . [λpst.[λgg.p(λgg.g(2a)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st)))(g)]](λws.λgg.T(g[w(g)/1s]))= λTt.λgg .T(g[g(2a)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))])/1s])JSK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st)) ∧ . . . ]
a(g)(1e) is in WL in a(g)(2sf)(g−(1st))
The type s world argument is lifted to type ⟨st, t⟩ in the usual way, and after at-
tachment of the binder-index becomes type ⟨t, t⟩. The ‘then’-phrase combines via
function application with the consequent, shifting the relevant modal domain to
that determined by the ‘if’-clause. Parallel to the individual correlative in (9.49),
the correlative binding requirement is captured by (i) the representation of the
proform as a copy of the implicit ‘whether’-element in the correlative clause, here[wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1], and (ii) the assignment-quantification introduced by ιh. Roughly
put: ‘then’ is to ‘whether’ ((9.66)) as dem/‘that’ is to rel/‘which’ ((9.58)/(9.65)).
Let’s recap. The accounts of relative clauses and conditionals in §§6–9 have
developed a unified assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for relativization.
This subsection suggested one way of extending the comparisons to correlative
clauses and proforms in individual and conditional correlatives. Alternative inter-
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pretations are derived from differences in the (individual, modal) relative phrases
in the correlative clause and their relation to corresponding (individual, modal)
elements in the main clause. For instance, individual correlative interpretations
arise when (among other things) the correlative clause is such that the external
argument for the complementizer is identified with the actual world, the relative
(individual) choice-function pronoun [whcf gi] is bound by ι⟨i,a⟩h , and the world pro-
noun in the relative-phrase NP is bound long-distance and anchored to the world of
the discourse. Correlative proforms are analyzed uniformly as topicalized copies of
their relative/wh antecedent. I am not aware of other analyses of ‘then’ that capture
the syntactic/semantic connection between conditional proforms and proforms in
individual correlatives.
Our discussion has been speculative. It is worth examining more thoroughly
how the accounts of relativization and conditionality in these sections might help
capture other similarities/differences among free relatives, correlatives, condition-
als, and interrogatives — e.g., regarding the connections between exhaustivity and
uniqueness interpretations and topicalization/wh-movement. §10 examines how
the assignment-variable-based treatments of conditionals and correlatives can be
extended to interrogatives.
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10 Interrogatives
This section begins investigating how the assignment-variable framework may be
applied to non-declarative sentences, focusing on interrogatives. Key features of
the proposed account are as follows:
• it affords a unified syntax/semantics of interrogative, conditional, and cor-
relative clauses (§10.2)
• it unifies the treatment of wh-words with the previous treatments of relative
pronouns and (certain) indefinites as choice-function pronouns (§10.3)
• it provides a precise diagnosis of “interrogative flip” in terms of local readings
under the question operator (§10.4)
• it integrates with the §9-accounts of ‘if’-clauses and correlatives, providing
compositional derivations for various types of conditional questions (§10.5
The resulting assignment-variable account affords a unified approach to condition-
ality, relativization, and questions.
10.1 Local and global readings in questions
A principal aim of the assignment-variable framework has been to capture various
types of local/global readings of variables and context-sensitive expressions. Con-
sider (10.1)–(10.5) with interrogatives. (Following common practice I typically use
‘interrogative’ for the clause/sentence and ‘question’ for the semantic object.)
(10.1) Did youi feed itj? (global reading)
a. ≈ Given that gc(i) = o1 and gc(j) = o2, did o1 feed o2?
(10.2) Is it rainingi? (local reading)
a. ≈ Is there a relevant raining event in the actual world, whatever it is?
(10.3) [Context: S isn’t sure who the killer is, and wants to see if A has a better
idea:]
Mighti the gardener have done it? (local reading)
a. ≈ What is the relevant evidence like (=value for g(i))? Is our informa-
tion, whatever it is, compatible with the gardener’s being the killer?
(10.4) [Context: We all accept classical utilitarianism. S isn’t sure about Charity
X’s reliability in getting aid to the people who need it most:]
Shouldi we give to Charity X? (global reading)
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a. ≈ Does our giving to Charity X follow from what our norms gc(i) enjoin?
Would our giving to Charity X maximize overall happiness?
(10.5) Is Rita richi?
a. [Context: S knows approximately how much money Rita earns (say,
$X/yr), and S thinks that A does too. Hoping to ascertain A’s views on
whether such a salary counts as rich, S utters (10.5).]≈ What is the standard for richness like (=value for the degree standard
g(i))? Is it, whatever it is, greater than around $X/yr? (local reading)
b. [Context: We’re millionaires and we agree that one must be a million-
aire to count as rich. Hoping to ascertain Rita’s income, S utters (10.5).]≈ Is Rita’s income enough to make her a millionaire? (global reading)
Informally put, an expression receiving a “local reading” in an interrogative sentence
is one whose value or interpretation is being questioned. S’s question in (10.5a)
targets the relevant standard associated with ‘rich’ — how rich one must be to count
as rich. If A gives a yes-answer S can infer that A assumes that the standard for
richness g(i) is no greater than $X/yr. S’s question in (10.4), by contrast, isn’t
asking A what substantive normative view to accept; it’s presupposed that classical
utilitarianism is correct. S is inquiring about the implications of these norms given
the empirical facts. Likewise, whereas the individual-pronouns in (10.1) receive
their interpretation from the discourse context, the value for the world-variable in
(10.2) is targeted by the question. Possible answers to (10.2) aren’t propositions
(roughly) like {w ∶ it is/isn’t raining in u} which take as given a particular world,
say g(i) = u.
Data such as (10.1)–(10.5) will constrain how we formalize interrogative el-
ements’ lexical entries and implement world- and assignment-binding in the syn-
tax/semantics. (i) Like with declarative sentences, the interpretation of certain vari-
ables in an interrogative must be provided by the discourse assignment, to capture
global readings of expressions whose values aren’t being questioned. Yet (ii) the
question operator should allow certain variables to be targeted by the question, so
that the values for expressions receiving local readings vary across possible answers.
In particular, (iii) unlike with the declarative complementizer and T, the world
argument of the main predicate shouldn’t be linked to the discourse but should
receive a local reading.
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10.2 Syntax, semantics, metasemantics
It is standard to distinguish at least two elements in the interpretation of interrog-
ative sentences: (i) an interrogative complementizer (call it C?), which may e.g.
trigger interrogative movement in languages such as English, and (ii) a question
operator (call it Q), which provides the source of the question semantics (e.g. Dayal
1996, Cable 2010, Kotek 2014; note that the lexical item Q is distinct from the po-
tential Q(uantifier) category from §§7.1, 8). Heim 2012 suggests a syntax in which
the question operator is base-generated as an argument of the interrogative com-
plementizer and raises as a quantifier over propositions. Heim’s account provides
precisely the sort of precedent for an interrogative analogue to our §3-treatment of
declaratives. Our syntax/semantics for declaratives treated assignment-quantifiers
as raising for type reasons from an internal assignment argument position of the
declarative complementizer (e.g. ‘that’). Drawing on Heim’s suggestion, we can try
treating Q as raising for type reasons from an assignment argument position of C?.
Whereas Heim includes an independent node for the binder-index to trigger a non-
compositional Predicate Abstraction rule, we can treat Q as combining via function
application with the generalized binder-index, as reflected in (10.6).
(10.6) S
Q⟨i,a⟩ [C0]⟨j,s⟩
C? tia
IP
…tjs…
The semantic interactions among the question nucleus, interrogative complemen-
tizer, and question operator are fully compositional.
In §9 we noted systematic crosslinguistic links among conditional, correlative,
and interrogative clauses. §§9.5, 9.7 applied an analysis of ‘if’-clauses as free rela-
tives of assignments (possibilities) to correlative ‘if…(then)’ conditionals; §9.7 con-
sidered how the syntax/semantics might be extended to correlative clauses gener-
ally. In light of the crosslinguistic data an attractive idea is that (at some relevant
level of analysis) interrogative clauses share a common linguistic representation
with conditional/correlative clauses. So, let’s suppose as a working hypothesis that
C? has a roughly parallel argument structure and semantics as ‘if’/Cif.
I offer (10.7)–(10.8) as lexical entries for the interrogative complementizer C?
and question operator Q— where ‘g ≈ g′’ says, intuitively, that g and g′ are equiv-
alent in the values assigned across indices, yet potentially different in what world
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constitutes the world of the possibility represented by the assignment. (For clarity I
use the underlining in (10.7) to visually distinguish the presuppositional constraint.)
(10.7) JC?K = λaa.λpst.λws.λgg ∶@(a(g)) = w(g) .∀w′s = λg′g.@(a(g′))∶ p(w′)(g)
(10.8) JQK = λAat.λTt.λgg .∀aa = λgg.g−∶ ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′ ∶ g′ ≈ g′′ .A(a)(g′) = A(a)(g′′)]
a. g ≈ g′ ∶= ∀iτ [¬(τ = s ∧ g(iτ) = g′(iτ) = @(g) = @(g′))→ g(iτ) = g′(iτ)]
(10.9) JQ⟨j,a⟩K = JQK(J⟨j,a⟩K) = λT′t.λTt.λgg .∀aa = λgg.g−∶ ∃g′′g ∶
T = [λg′ ≈ g′′ .T′(g′[a(g′)/ja]) = T′(g′′[a(g′′)/ja])]
To fix ideas I assume an approach to interrogatives which treats question meanings
as a set of possible answers (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977, Heim 1994). The
interrogative complementizer C? in effect forms an equivalence class with respect
to the embedded proposition (cf. Groenendijk & Stockhof 1984). Q constructs a
set of possible answers, where answers are represented by sets of assignments; the
semantic value of an interrogative sentence is type ⟨t, t⟩. Following our generalized
theoretical interpretation of assignments as representing possibilities (§2), the pos-
sibilities constituting a question’s answers may fix facts including facts determining
values for context-sensitive expressions. Local readings are captured by shifting
assignment-variables coindexed with Q⟨j,a⟩ to the assignment in the given answer.
The values for items targeted by the question may vary across the possible answers;
yet the constraint g′ ≈ g′′ requires the assignments in each answer to agree on the
particular value assigned.
To clarify, let’s start with a simple yes/no question:144
144Officially, as with T, I leave open whether Q raises to Spec,C or projects its own phrase such as
ForceP (n. 17). In the general definition of the binder-index (§3.5): with C?, τ = s, σ = ⟨s, t⟩; with
Q, τ = a; σ = ⟨t, t⟩.
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(10.10) Simple yes/no question
‘Did you laugh?’
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨2,a⟩ CP ∶ t
w1 g2 C
⟨1,s⟩
C? t2a
IP
you2 g1 t1s laughJCPK ≈ λgg ∶@(g(2a)) = g(2a)(1s) . g(1a)(2e) laughed in @(g(2a))≈ λgg . g(1a)(2e) laughed in @(g(2a)) = g(2a)(1s)JSK ≈ λTt.λgg .∃g′′∶T = [λg′ ≈ g′′ . g′(1a)(2e) laughed in @(g′−) = g′−(1s)
iff g′′(1a)(2e) laughed in @(g′′−) = g′′−(1s)]
This treats the semantic value of the interrogative sentence in (10.10) as a set of
propositions T, where each such proposition is a set of assignments g′ that return
the same truth value for the proposition that a certain individual — the individual
assigned to 2e by the assignment g′ happens to assign to 1a— laughed.
First, note the world pronoun [w1 g2] supplying the external argument of the
complementizer. With complementizers such as Crel and ‘if’/Cif in subordinating
clauses there was a natural story about what would supply the external (individual,
world) argument: In restrictive relatives the quantifier’s restrictor argument tar-
gets a specified subset of individuals supplied by the relative phrase. In individual
correlatives the correlative clause targets topical individuals in the (actual) world.
In conditionals the ‘if’-clause targets a topical subdomain of the background modal
possibility relevant for the supposition supplied by the ‘whether’-like element. For
interrogatives a natural thought is that the argument determines the possibility
targeted by the question. In simple unembedded questions such as (10.10) the
external argument of C? supplies a world argument bound by Q;145 the question is
about what is the case in the actual world. In (10.10) the argument is semantically
145Parallel to the case of correlative clauses discussed in §9.7, the world argument might be rep-
resented with a complex [whsf g2 pst-g], where the semantic value for [p g] is ultimately identified
with (e.g.) {g′−(1s)}. However, to clarify the intended interpretation I represent the world argument
with a simple world-pronoun.
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trivial, given our general metasemantic assumption that, for any h ∈ G, h(1s)
represents the world of h (§§2, 6.1). We will see more substantive roles for the
argument in more complex examples.
The semantic value in (10.10) captures the local reading of the main predicate’s
world argument: the question nucleus places a constraint on the worlds of the
assignments g′ in each possible answer T. Which world represents the world of the
assignments may vary. The assignments in each answer are otherwise equivalent in
what values are assigned across indices, via the constraint g′ ≈ g′′; this constraint
will help capture local readings of context-sensitive expressions (below).
The derived semantic value in (10.10) obviously fails to represent the intended
global reading of ‘you’. The semantic value represents the question as targeting
what assignment to associate with the index 1a, rather than as targeting a property
of the particular individual gc(2e) ∈ E determined by the discourse assignment gc.
The assignments in each T may not even agree on the identity of the individual o ∈ E
that did/did not do the laughing.
One response would be to capture global readings by complicating the semantics
of Q. An alternative is to maintain the simpler lexical entry and semantic value for
interrogative clauses, and capture global readings in the metasemantics of answers.
Our metasemantics for declaratives from §2 treated a declarative sentence S as
true in a context c iff the derived semantic value JSK was true with respect to
the assignment gc representing the context. Correspondingly, I treat a proposition
T ∈ JS?K in the semantic value of an interrogative sentence S? as an answer to S?
in c iff every assignment g′ ∈ T assigns g−c to all assignment-indices.
(10.11) Metasemantics
a. A declarative sentence S is true in c iff JSK(gc) = 1
b. Tt is an answer to an interrogative sentence S? in c iff (i) T ∈ JS?K, and
(ii) for all g′ ∈ T and assignment-indices ia, g′(ia) = g−c .
Applied to our example (10.10) above, for any T ∈ JSK, T is an answer to S in c
iff ∀ia, g′ ∈ T∶ g′(ia) = g−c . Since g′(1a) = g−c , answers will be sets of assignments
g′ such that g−c (2e) (=g′(1a)(2e)) did/did not laugh in @(g′−). The assignments
in each answer constitute an equivalence class with respect to the possible-worlds
proposition that g−c (2e) individual laughed, as desired. (Hereafter I continue often
to omit the superscripts in ‘g′−’, ‘g−c ’, etc., though they should be understood when
relevant.)
In effect, what T does in the semantics of declarative sentences, (10.11b) does
in the metasemantics of interrogative sentences. Yet we shouldn’t overstate the
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contrast: In both cases a bridge principle is required to link a sentence’s com-
positional semantic value to an interpretation and function in discourse.146 The
semantics of T links a certain assignment-index, say 1a, to the assignments g in
the sentence’s semantic value JSK; and the metasemantics of declaratives treats the
sentence as true in c iff the assignment representing the context, gc, is in that set of
assignments JSK. Analogously, the metasemantics of interrogatives treats a set of
assignmentsT as constituting an answer in c only if every assignment inT assigns the
assignment representing the context, gc, to that same index — the index that would
be targeted by T in a use of a declarative. In this sense, for declarative sentences
and interrogative sentences alike, global readings are ultimately captured in the
metasemantics.
Capturing global readings in interrogative sentences in the metasemantics has
the advantage of maintaining a uniform theoretical interpretation of assignment-
variables/quantification. If a concrete discourse determines that the assignment
index 1a represents the context, it does so regardless of whether a sentence be-
ing used is declarative or interrogative. Just as assignment-variables coindexed
with ‘wonder’ in (10.13) represent readings of expressions whose values are objects
of Alice’s wondering, assignment-variables coindexed with Q in (10.12) represent
readings whose values are being questioned.
(10.12) a. Is Rita richi?
b. ≈ Q⟨i,a⟩… Rita rich-gi
(10.13) a. Alice wondered whether Rita is rich.
b. ≈ …Alice wondered⟨i,a⟩… Rita rich-gi
Coindexing between assignment variables and assignment binders represents read-
ings of expressions whose interpretation is targeted by the assignment quantifier.
10.3 wh questions
There is a divide in approaches to interrogativewh-words about whether they are re-
lated to relative pronouns, typically construed as λ-binders (Groenendijk& Stock-
hof 1982), or related to indefinites (Karttunen 1977). For instance, on the one
hand, in many languages the same forms can be used for interrogative pronouns
and indefinites (e.g., various Sino-Tibetan and Australian languages; Li 1992, Gair
et al. 1999, Lecarme 1999a, Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, Mortensen 2003,
Bhat 2004, Thurgood & LaPolla 2017). On the other hand, it is crosslinguis-
146Cf. e.g. Stalnaker 1978, 2014, Lewis 1980, Dummett 1973, Stanley 1997, MacFarlane
2014, Yalcin 2014.
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tically common for interrogative words to be morphologically related to relative
words. Relative words generally also have a [wh] feature like interrogative wh
words (n. 109). In some languages the relative clauses in correlatives are even
introduced with interrogative wh words (e.g. Polish; Citko 2009); on the flip side,
in languages such as Sanskrit (Davison 2009a) and Somali (Lecarme 1999a), com-
plement questions are expressed by substituting the interrogative with a relative
construction, and, in the case of Sanskrit, using a correlative.
§§6–9 developed analyses of certain indefinites, relative pronouns, and several
types of anaphoric pronouns as choice-function pronouns. A natural move is to
extend the account to interrogatives and treatwh-words similarly as choice-function
pronouns (see Yatsushiro 2001, Cable 2010 for precedents).147 Indeed relative
forms that are morphologically related to demonstratives are also common (e.g.,
German, Dutch, Tuvaluan (Polynesian); Heine & Kuteva 2002, de Vries 2002,
Bhat 2004). Some languages even use the same pro-forms for each of these func-
tions, as in Lyele (Niger-Congo) (Showalter 1986; see Bhat 2004: esp. §8.3).
Giving the expressions a common semantic contribution, at some level of abstrac-
tion, reflects this (more on which shortly). In the case of [+wh] choice-function
pronouns, just as relative words are targeted by a determiner quantifier so that
the domain is determined from the set of NP-individuals, interrogative words are
targeted by the question operator so that the values for wh-phrases vary across
answers.
An example with a simplewh question is in (10.14). (For purposes of illustration
I show how the variation in values for the wh-phrase can be derived while keeping
the wh-word in situ below C; more on this below. Ignore any contextual restriction
associated with ‘what’, and assume E represents the domain of individuals. Here-
after when describing the answers to a question I often omit the presuppositional
constraint when trivial.)
147Note that the account is neutral on Cable’s “Q-particle”-based syntax for wh movement and
pied piping. Cable’s Q-particle — also a variable over choice functions — is posited as an element in-
dependent of wh words and functional interrogative elements (complementizer, question operator).
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(10.14) wh question
‘What hit you?’
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨2,a⟩ CP ∶ t
w1 g2 ⟨1,s⟩
C? t2a wh1-g2 E t1s hit you2-g1Jwh1 g2K = λPet.λgg . g(2a)(1cf)((↓P)(g))JCPK ≈ λgg ∶@(g(2a)) = g(2a)(1s) . g(2a)(1cf)(E) hit g(1a)(2e) in @(g(2a))
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ . g′−(1cf)(E) hit g−c (2e) in @(g′−)
iff g′′−(1cf)(E) hit g−c (2e) in @(g′′−)]
The possible answers to the wh question are propositions T, where each such propo-
sition is a set of assignments g′ that return the same truth value for the proposition
that a selected individual g′(1cf)(E) ∈ E hit gc(2e).
First, as in (10.10), the global reading of ‘you’ is captured via the metasemantic
condition on answerhood: A set of assignments T in the sentence’s semantic value
constitutes an answer only if g′(1a) = gc. Given the constraint that g′ ≈ g′′, the
assignments in each answer constitute an equivalence class with respect to a proposi-
tion about the contextually relevant individual g′(1a)(2e) = g′′(1a)(2e) = gc(2e) ∈ E.
Second, the “shifting” of wh-words in the interpretation of interrogatives is as-
similated to the general phenomenon of local readings of context-sensitive expres-
sions. The local reading of ‘what’ is captured in the coindexing between the question
operator and the choice-function pronoun [wh1 g2] representing the wh-phrase. I
assume that wh-words, having the feature [wh], must have the same assignment-
variable as the interrogative complementizer, e.g. due to agreement (cf. Chung
1998, Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, Kratzer 2009, Cable 2010, Johnson 2012).
Relative andwhwords thus receive obligatory local readings under the local assignment-
binder — e.g., a matrix determiner in a restrictive relative (§6), ιh in a conditional or
individual correlative (§9), or the question operator in an interrogative. Given the
constraint that g′ ≈ g′′, the assignments g′ in each answer T assign the same value to
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the choice-function index and hence select the same individual. Yet the particular
value assigned and individual selected may vary across answers: If E = {o1, o2}, the
possible answers are the propositions that o1 hit gc(2e), and that o2 hit gc(2e). The
wh-phrase is targeted by the question, and the possible answers are about different
individuals.
Third, although the assignments g′ in each answer assign the same choice func-
tion to the index 1cf and agree about whether the selected individual hit gc(2e), they
may differ regarding other worldly facts. The possible answers T aren’t singleton
sets.
Questions with multiplewh-phrases raise notorious syntactic/semantic challenges —
e.g., regarding movement and reconstruction, single-/pair-list readings and answers,
and exhaustiveness and uniqueness, such as the apparent implication of (10.15)
that each baby liked a unique toy (e.g. Rullmann 1995, Dayal 2006, 2016 and
references therein).
(10.15) Which baby liked which toy?
a. ≈ Timmy liked the doll, Clio liked the blocks, …
For present purposes I simply note two features of the assignment-variable account
in this section. It is common in diverse approaches to the semantics of questions
to require all wh-phrases to be interpreted in a specifier position of the interroga-
tive complementizer (e.g. Karttunen 1977, Pesetsky 2000, Cable 2010, George
2011).148 A critical issue in such accounts is what in general requires the movement
and how the order at LF of wh-phrases in multiple wh-interrogatives is derived,
given the crosslinguistic variation in pronunciation rules for wh-words (e.g., re-
quiring all wh-words to be fronted (Bulgarian), requiring all wh-words to be in
situ (Japanese), or allowing variation in movement (English)). Even for languages
such as English with overt wh movement, Rullmann & Beck (1998) have argued
that D-linked wh-phrases (‘which N’) are obligatorily interpreted in situ (also e.g.
Boeckx & Grohmann 2004). The account in this section is compatible with al-
ternative approaches to the syntax/phonology of wh-movement and reconstruction
in different languages. The account captures the local reading of wh-words and
the contribution of wh-words to the semantics of the question without requiring or
forbiddingwh-movement to Spec,C at LF. Further, the semantics extends to multiple
wh questions without requiring innovations such as (e.g.) a type-flexible question
148Contrast Chomsky 1995, Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002. The movement may be triggered for
semantic reasons (Kotek 2014), or syntactic reasons, e.g. that any XP headed by an item with [wh]-
features move to Spec,C.
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operator or tuple types, which track the number of wh-words and their relative
positions (as in e.g. Higginbotham & May 1981, Groenendijk & Stockhof 1984,
George 2011).
A derivation for a multiple wh question such as (10.15) is as follows (I continue
to use abbreviations such as ‘babyu’ for the characteristic function of the set of
individuals o ∈ E such that o is a baby in u (§§2, 6.1.3).)
(10.16) Multiple wh question
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨2,a⟩ CP ∶ t
w1 g2
⟨2,s⟩
C? t2a
wh2-g2 baby-w1-g1
t2s
liked
wh1-g2 toy-w1-g1
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ . g′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)) liked g′−(1cf)(toyg−c (1s)) in @(g′−)
iff g′′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)) liked g′′−(1cf)(toyg−c (1s)) in @(g′′−)
This says, roughly, that given sets of actual babies and toys — say, b1, b2, b3 ∈ babygc(1s)
and t1, t2, t3 ∈ toygc(1s) — the set of possible answers is the set of propositions that bi
liked tj. Given the metasemantic condition on answerhood, the world-pronouns in
the noun phrases ‘baby’ and ‘toy’ receive global readings anchored to gc(1s), which
is taken to represent the world @(gc) of the discourse (§6.1.3). However, as in
(10.14), the world-argument of the main predicate ‘liked’ and the wh-words receive
(obligatory) local readings, targeted by the question. For each possible answer T,
the set of assignments g′ ∈ T constitute an equivalence class with respect to what
actual baby bi = g′(2cf)(babygc(1s)) ∈ E and what actual toy tj = g′(1cf)(toygc(1s)) ∈ E
are selected, and whether the selected baby bi liked the selected toy tj in the world
@(g′) of the possibility represented by g′. The account derives how each answer in
the multiple wh question is about a particular pair of individuals.
The proposed syntax/semantics of wh interrogatives may afford an improved
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treatment of examples with intuitively bound readings of pronouns such as (10.17).
The value for the wh-phrase ‘which baby’ varies across possible answers; and the
interpretations of the subject-internal pronoun ‘his’ and the object pronoun ‘him’
are linked to the value for the wh-phrase, though ‘him’ isn’t c-commanded by the
specifier position for the possessor in the genitive DP.
(10.17) Which baby’s picture of his grandmother made him cry?
a. {Timmy’s picture of Timmy’s grandmother made Timmy cry, Clio’s pic-
ture of Clio’s grandmother made Clio cry, …}
Consider how we might capture such a reading in a traditional framework and
Karttunen-style (1977) semantics for wh interrogatives. Wh-words such as ‘which’,
on Karttunen’s account, are given the same quantificational lexical entry as indefi-
nites; what distinguishes their contribution to the meanings of questions is a syntac-
tic requirement that (all and only) [+wh] phrases be in Spec,C at LF, as reflected in
(10.18). (I ignore compositional details about how the question meaning is derived
from the interrogative complementizer and question operator; see Heim 2012.)
(10.18) Which studenti (ti) left?
a. [CP … which student 1 [C C0 [IP t1 left]]]
b. JwhichKw = JsomeKw = λPet.λQet.∃x∶P(x) ∧Q(x)
c. JCPKw = λpst .∃x∶ x is a student in w ∧ p = [λw′ . x left in w′]
The wh existential quantifier scopes over the interrogative complementizer identi-
fying the form of the answers, and the set of answers includes one proposition per
student quantified over.
In a complex genitive such as ‘which baby’s NP’ in (10.17), the [wh]-feature of
the wh-phrase projects/percolates to the DP, triggering wh-movement of the entire
phrase to Spec of C:
(10.19) overt wh-movement to Spec,C:
[CP … [DP [wh] [which baby] ’s NP] 1 [C C0 [IP t1 …]]]
The challenge is to derive the intuitively bound readings of both pronouns from
operations on this (possibly intermediate) syntactic structure. One might posit that
for some syntactic or semantic reason there is subsequent covert movement of the
wh-phrase, and that — unlike the examples of DP-internal movement from §7.4 —
the wh-phrase raises above the entire DP, as in (10.20). (Assume a simplified
analysis of ‘his grandmother’ as ‘the-grandmother-of-him’.)
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(10.20) a. [CP … [which baby [2 [[DP t2 [D ’s pic-of-the-GM-of-him2]] [1
[C C0 [IP t1 made him2 cry]]]]]]]
b. JCPKw ≈ λpst .∃x∶ x is a baby in w∧the y such that y is a picture-of-the-
GM-of-x in w is such that p = [λw′.y made x cry in w′]
Such an analysis derives how the wh-phrase binds both pronouns, but at the cost of
requiring an unlikely movement operation (cf. May 1985, Heim & Kratzer 1998)
and denying that ‘which baby’s picture of his grandmother’ forms a constituent. Al-
ternatively, one might treat the wh-phrase as raising (for some syntactic or semantic
reason) internal to the DP, and posit a mechanism of partial syntactic reconstruction
by which the non-wh portion of the DP is interpreted inside the IP at LF. By some
reconstruction operations to be specified, the wh-phrase and λ-binder generated
from the DP-internal movement remain in Spec of C; hence thewh-phrase existential
quantifier scopes over the interrogative complementizer, which identifies the form
of the answers, and binds the pronouns, roughly as in (10.21).
(10.21) a. covert movement of ‘which baby’:
[CP … [[DP which baby [2 [t2 [D ’s pic-of-the-GM-of-him2]]]] [1 [C … t1 …]]]]
b. post-reconstruction LF:
[CP … [which baby [2 [C C0 [IP [DP t2 [D ’s pic-of-the-GM-of-him2]]
made him2 cry]]]]]
c. JCPKw ≈ λpst .∃x∶ x is a baby in w ∧ p = [λw′.the y such that y is a
picture-of-the-GM-of-x in w′ made x cry in w′]
Details of how the requisite (partial) reconstruction is realized, and whether re-
construction is to be understood in syntactic terms at all, are controversial (cf. e.g.
Chomsky 1995, Heycock 1995, Sternefeld 1998, Fox 2000, Fox & Nissenbaum
2004, Sportiche 2006). Note that the fronted DP ‘which baby’s picture of his
grandmother’ still fails to receive a semantic value.
The assignment-variable-based syntax/semantics for wh interrogatives in this
section captures the intuitively bound reading of (10.17) without requiring particu-
lar commitments on issues regarding the movement of wh-phrases, pied-piping, or
reconstruction. (For present purposes I continue to assume the simplified represen-
tation of the possessive pronoun (see §7.2); and I ignore world-indexing with the
relation pronoun, again using ‘R’ for type ⟨e, et⟩ (see §8.9).)
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(10.22) Which baby’s picture of his grandmother made him cry?
S
Q⟨2,a⟩ CP
w1 g2
⟨2,s⟩
C? t2a
DP⟨3,a⟩
ι⟨3,a⟩o XP
R1 g1
wh2-g2 baby-w1-g1
’s
w1-g1 picture the-grandmother-of-he2-g2-baby-w1-g1
t2s scared he2-g2-baby-w1-g1
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff (roughly) ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .[ιxe(g′)∃a′a∶ g−c (1R)(g′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)))(x(g′))∧
x(g′) = a′(g′)(3cf)(picture-of-the-grandmother-of-g′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s))-in-g−c (1s))]
x(g′) scared g′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)) in @(g′−)
iff[ιxe(g′′)∃a′a∶ g−c (1R)(g′′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)))(x(g′′))∧
x(g′′) = a′(g′′)(3cf)(picture-of-the-grandmother-of-g′′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s))-in-g−c (1s))]
x(g′′) scared g′′−(2cf)(babyg−c (1s)) in @(g′′−)]
Roughly put, each possible answer T is a set of assignments g′ that return the
same truth value for the proposition that [the o′ such that o′ bears the contextually
relevant relation gc(1R) to a selected baby o = g′(2cf)(babygc(1s)) ∈ E and o′ is
a picture of the grandmother of o (=g′(2cf)(babygc(1s)))] is such that o′ scared o
(=g′(2cf)(babygc(1s))) in @(g′). For each answer T, the set of assignments g′ ∈ T
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constitute an equivalence class with respect to what actual baby oi = g′(2cf)(babygc(1s)) ∈ E
is selected, and whether oi’s picture of oi’s grandmother scared oi in the world@(g′)
of the possibility represented by g′.
The apparent anaphoric connections between the pronouns ‘his’/‘he’ and the
wh-phrase ‘which baby’ are captured derivatively via (i) the local reading of the wh-
phrase under the question operator, and (ii) the representation of the pronouns as
copies of the antecedent wh-phrase (see n. 139). The variation in values for the
wh-phrase across answers and the intuitive bound readings of the pronouns can be
captured while leaving the wh-phrase in situ and giving the complex subject DP a
particular semantic value. Controversial assumptions about pied piping and wh-
movement of the complex genitive DP, subsequent movement of the DP-internal
wh-phrase, and syntactic reconstruction aren’t required.
The previous examples have ignored differences between interrogative ‘which’
phrases and simplex interrogative pronouns such as ‘who’. Notable differences in
light of the discussion of “specificity” from §§7.1, 8 are differences in D-linking and
related phenomena, such as presuppositionality and syntactic/semantic indepen-
dence. Following Pesetsky 1987, 2000, ‘which N’ phrases are “D(iscourse)-linked”
in the sense that uses generally imply that the individuals in the possible answers
are from a contextually relevant domain. As Pesetsky remarks, the “semantics of
D-linked wh phrases closely tracks the semantics of the definite article the. Context
sets previously mentioned in the discourse qualify a phrase as D-linked, but so do
sets that are … salient” (Pesetsky 2000: 16; cf. Cinque 1990, Rullmann 1995,
Rullmann & Beck 1998). Using ‘which’ in (10.23) is anomalous unless a set of
musicians are relevantly salient (e.g. if Pat is a writer for a music publication, and
A and B have been talking about her recent efforts to scope out a new story).
(10.23) A: Pat met someone famous.
B: Who did she meet?
B′:#Which musician did she meet?
The syntax/semantics from §8 captured contextual domain restriction in struc-
tural properties of n∗P noun phrases. A natural approach would be to analyze
D-linked wh phrases as having a structure roughly analogous to the structure pro-
posed for prenominal genitives from §7.2 — as n∗Ps with an implicit definite-like
element. In a prenominal genitive, n∗ is overtly realized by the genitive morpheme,
the choice-function pronoun in F is implicit, and the implicit definite raises for
type reasons from inside F0 and introduces quantification over assignments. By
comparison, in a D-linked wh phrase, n∗ is implicit, the choice-function pronoun
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is overtly realized by the wh element, the implicit definite-like element is base-
generated in its interpreted position, and the choice-function pronoun is bound by
the question operator, as in the alternative structures in (10.24). The D-linked wh
phrase can be represented as, say, a Top(ic) Phrase (Rizzi 2001, Grohmann 2003;
cf. (8.40), n. 138). A simplified LF and semantic value with the (a)-option is in
(10.25) (letting ι be a simple type-⟨et, e⟩ definite).149
(10.24) D-linked wh-phrase (alternatives)
a. Q⟨i,a⟩ … [TopP ι [n∗P Pet-g X [whcf-gi nP]]]
b. Q⟨i,a⟩ … [TopP whcf-gi [n∗P Pet-g X [Fcf-g(i) nP]]]
(10.25) ‘Which baby laughed?’ ((a)-option)
a. [S Q⟨2,a⟩ [CP w1-g2 [[C? t2a]⟨1,s⟩ [[TopP ι [n∗P P1et-g1 X [wh1-g2 [w1-g1
baby]]]]
t1s laughed]]]]
b. JTopPK ≈ λgg . the o s.t. g(1a)(1et)(o) ∧ o = g(2a)(1cf)(babyg(1a)(1s))
c. A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .
the o s.t. g−c (1et)(o) ∧ o = g′(1cf)(babyg−c (1s))
laughed in @(g′−)
iff the o s.t. g−c (1et)(o)) ∧ o = g′′(1cf)(babyg−c (1s))
laughed in @(g′′−)]
“Discourse linking” to a set of contextually relevant individuals is captured in the
same way as with presuppositional uses of quantifier phrases from §§7.1, 8.2, 8.6:
the domain pronoun [Pet g] in Spec,n∗ restricts the denotation of the ‘which N’
phrase and thereby restricts the possible answers to the question to individuals in
the contextually relevant domain. Roughly put, the possible answers in (10.25) are
propositions T, where each such proposition is a set of assignments g′ that return
the same value for the proposition that a selected baby g′(1cf)(babygc(1s)) in the
contextually relevant domain gc(1et) laughed.
Work on D-linking has focused primarily on distinctive syntactic properties such
149Alternatively, the wh element might be treated (like presuppositional quantifiers) as occupying
the higher position, as in (10.24b), perhaps as a copy of the choice-function pronoun in F. Such an
approach would afford a unified analysis with ‘which’-phrases in explicit partitives (see §§7.2, 8.3):
(i) ‘Which (of the) babies laughed?’
a. Q⟨i,a⟩ … [TopP whcf-gi [n∗P Pet-g X [Fcf-g [w-g [pl]-babies]]]] …
b. Q⟨i,a⟩ … [TopP whcf-gi [n∗P Pet-g of [thecf-g [w-g [pl]-babies]]]] …
295
as island (in)sensitivity and (absence of) Superiority effects (Dayal 2006). For
instance, in (10.26) the markedness resulting from crossing the wh island is dramat-
ically reduced with the D-linked wh phrase ‘which movie’. In (10.27)–(10.28), the
lower wh phrase can move over the higher wh phrase only when both are D-linked.
(10.26) a. *What does Alice wonder whether Bert watched?
b. ?Which movie does Alice wonder whether Bert watched?
(10.27) a. Who likes what?
b. *What does who like?
(10.28) a. Which baby likes which toy?
b. Which toy does which baby like?
It would be worth exploring whether the account of modal/temporal independence
of presuppositional quantifier phrases from §8.5 might help capture syntactic and
semantic independence properties of D-linked wh phrases. Sharvit (1999) claims
that in languages such as Hebrew, resumptive pronouns are only available in inter-
rogatives with D-linked wh phrases, as in (10.29). If resumptive pronouns were also
analyzed as copies of their linguistic antecedent, and the use of resumptive pronouns
in interrogatives correlates with D-linked wh phrases in Hebrew, one might expect
syntactic and semantic properties of n∗Ps, such as contextual salience requirements
and modal independence, to be associated with resumptive pronouns as well.
(10.29) a. *mi
who
nifgaSta
you-met
ito
with-him
‘Who did you meet with?’
b. eyze
which
student
student
nifgaSta
you-met
ito
with-him
‘Which student did you meet with?’ (Sharvit 1999: 591; Hebrew)
I leave further investigation of applications to D-linking and resumptive pronouns
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for future research (see also §8.8.2). (Hereafter, given our purposes, I will generally
assume the simpler [wh-g NP] syntax/semantics for complex wh phrases.)150
10.3.1 Recap: Choice functions and choice-function variables
At various points we have appealed to variables for choice functions in the represen-
tations of various types of expressions — e.g., names (§4.4), relative words (§§6.1,
8.7, 8.8), certain indefinites (§§6, 8.5, 8.8.3), certain anaphoric proforms (§§6.2,
7.3, 7.4, 8.8.3, 9.7), quantificational DPs (§§7.1, 8.2), and wh words (§§9.2, 10.3).
We have seen the empirical fruits of these analyses in developing assignment-variable-
based compositional semantics for a wide range of constructions, including relative
clauses, donkey sentences, conditionals, correlatives, and interrogatives, among
others. It is also worth also briefly recapping certain of the independent motivations
for the unified approaches, and relevant comparisons among the different types of
expressions.
As discussed in the previous sections, researchers in various subdisciplines have
demonstrated crosslinguistically robust morphosyntactic parallels among the ex-
pressions. For instance, we noted, first, that relative words generally have the
same format as interrogative wh-words or d-words, and that in many languages
wh-words are also morphologically related to indefinites (Gair et al. 1999, Heine
& Kuteva 2002, deVries 2002, Bhat 2004, Thurgood & LaPolla 2017). Second,
in many languages (strong) quantifiers are diachronically related to or transparently
composed with a relative/wh or definite/demonstrative form (Haspelmath 1995).
150I leave open whether simplex interrogative wh words (‘who’, ‘what’) are in general nPs vs.
FPs/n∗Ps, or whether they may optionally realize structures of both types (see §§8.5, 8.7.2). Wher-
ever exactly the class restrictions associated with wh pronouns are represented — person with ‘who’,
thing with ‘what’, etc. — the world variable can receive alternative local or global readings. The
answer to (i) might be ‘Ducky’ even if Ducky is a person only in Ernie’s belief-worlds, and is actually
a thing or doesn’t exist. Alternatively, (ii) might be used in a context in which it’s presupposed that
the pets, who are plausible candidates for being at the door, are persons; a possible answer might be
‘Fido, the dog’ even if it’s presupposed that Bert thinks that all non-human animals are just things.
(i) Who does Ernie want to find?
(ii) Who does Bert think is barking at the door?
Treating the choice-function pronoun as occupying the higher F position above n captures this; the
noun phrase is a phase, and the world-pronoun in n may or may not be contextually identified with
the world of the local modal domain. However, an alternative might be to treat the wh pronoun as an
nP and explain the apparent modal independence as a side-effect ofwh-movement: if thewh pronoun
could be interpreted in an intermediate landing site of wh-movement at which feature transmission
((8.64)) could apply, the world variable determined by FC needn’t be coindexed with the verbal head
local to the pronoun’s base position. I leave the matter open.
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Third in some languages bound-variable pronouns and/or donkey pronouns can
be expressed as morphologically complex or with bare nominals (Srivastav 1991,
Mortensen 2003). Although German d-words take an elided complement, in other
languages pronominal elements can be used with an overt nominal (Déchaine &
Wiltschko 2002). Fourth, the proforms in correlatives are generally formed from
a demonstrative element; indeed the correlative binding requirement is typically
referred to as the “demonstrative requirement” (Dayal 1996, Bhatt 2003, Lipták
2009b). Interestingly, theA-movement of the demonstrative correlate in a language
often patterns with wh-movement (Izvorski 1996; cf. n. 138). Uniqueness and
exhaustivity implications associated with wh interrogatives are also observed with
correlatives (Dayal 1996, Izvorski 1996). Some languages even use the same pro-
nouns for each of these functions — as demonstratives, indefinites, interrogatives,
and relatives (Bhat 2004).
The proposed unified semantics gives semantic expression to such intra- and
inter-linguistic relations among the expressions. This isn’t to say that there are
no differences among them — not only morpho-phonologically, but also syntacti-
cally, semantically, distributionally (see nn. 51, 77). For instance, though I have
been ignoring internal projections for features such as ϕ-features, differences in
the internal structure and pronunciation rules for pronominal elements are to be
expected (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, 2017b, Kratzer 2009, Grosz & Patel-
Grosz 2016, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017). Ordinary simplex pronouns are in effect
a conventionalized system of demonstratives prioritizing the expression of certain
packages of ϕ-features151 — over (say) spatial features or the overt realization of a
nominal complement — for retrieving the relevant selectional domain. (Indeed in
some theories the class of pronouns is defined in terms of lacking an overt comple-
ment (cf. Baltin 2012, Patel-Grosz&Grosz 2017).) It isn’t uncommon, in various
language families, for the same format to be used for certain types of pronouns
151And in some languages features such as tense, aspect, mood, as in (i)–(ii) (Demirdache 1996,
Bhat 2004, Nordlinger & Sadler 2004, Aikhenvald 2008, Adamou 2011; see §6.2):
(i) Isá-gíi
he.emph.past
baa
decl
hádal-kíi
talk-def.past
qaatáy,
take.past
oo
and
yiri:
said
‘He began to speak, and said:’ (Lecarme 2008: ex. 10a; Somali)
(ii) Ma
you.nondecl
taha
follow
na
my.nondecl
fyè
footprints
e!
in
‘Follow me (lit. in my tracks), please!’ (Carlson 1994: 522; Supyire (Niger-Congo))
As Lecarme (2008) puts it regarding Somali, “Since pronouns do not contain nouns that can be
predicated of a stage,” the nominal tense in examples such as (i) is used to “[locate the] individual
temporally, at a past time which overlaps (or coincides with) the time of the event.”
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and demonstratives, such as in various Chinese dialects with third-person pronouns
and distal demonstratives (cf. Jespersen 1924, Postal 1969, Gair et al. 1999,
Bhat 2004, Luján 2004, Thurgood & LaPolla 2017). Conversely, recall our
examples with nominal tense in Somali from §6.2.1. Like individual pronouns,
Somali demonstratives are compatible with syntactic definiteness marking; in both
cases the co-occurrence has an intensifying effect, as we saw with the emphatic
pronouns in (6.27)–(6.28).
(10.30) a. ani-ga
1sg-emph.nonpast
waxaa
decl
i
1sg.obj.cl
arkay
saw.past
Axmed.
Axmed
‘Axmed saw me.’ (Özyıldız & Ivan 2017: ex. 10a)
b. Tuulá-dóo
village-dem.emph.nonpast
horé
before
éeg!
look
‘Look at that village in front!’ (Lecarme 2008: ex. 5a)
However, unlike pronouns, demonstratives are obligatorily deictic in Somali (Lecarme
2004, 2008, 2012). Even if (say) both types of pronominal elements were rep-
resented via choice-functions, the choice-function-qua-individual-pronoun plays a
distinctive syntactic/semantic role in the expressive potential of the pronominal
system.
Other differences may be derived from differences in [wh] features — notably,
distinguishing relative andwhwords, on the one hand, and indefinites and anaphoric
pronouns, on the other. For instance, in languages such as Chinese the relation
between wh words and indefinites is morphologically transparent: wh words just
are, in some cases, indefinites with a phonetically unrealized [wh]-feature. In
other languages the [wh]-feature may be realized via an interrogative morpheme,
or indefinites and wh words may be derived from a more basic underlying form,
as in languages with systems of “indeterminate” pronouns such as Japanese. Sec-
ond, that there should be a specifically demonstrative requirement with correla-
tives is in one sense unsurprising. A “demonstrative correlate,” on the analysis in
§9.7.1, just is a copy of the interpreted material in a relative/wh phrase — at some
level of abstraction, REL/WH = [wh]-DEM. Put the other way, a relative/wh word
in a correlative clause is a spelled-out [+wh] demonstrative in agreement with a
[+wh] Cif (cf. Davison 2009a). The “matching requirement” between correlates
and antecedents is then, in effect, a form of topic-comment congruence.
Leaving matters here would of course be much too simplistic, even at an informal
impressionistic level. For instance, not all correlatives are syntactically realized
across languages via a particular type of topicalization structure (Lipták 2012).
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Characterizing a crosslinguistically applicable matching requirement (what is uni-
versal, and what is parameterized), and deriving the relevant locality effects in
particular languages has proven far from straightforward (Bhatt 2003, Davison
2009a, Leung 2009, Lipták 2012). Likewise for analyses of syntactic/semantic rela-
tions between indefinites and interrogatives, the internal and external syntax of dif-
ferent classes of pronouns, interactions among the syntax and the phonological and
morphological components in the realization of pronominal and anaphoric expres-
sions, etc. The aim in these sections has been simply to provide an account which
captures a common semantic core among the expressions in question, and thereby
reflects various relations among them crosslinguistically. For present purposes what
relevantly unifies e.g. certain indefinites, relative and wh words, d-words, and cer-
tain anaphoric expressions is that they are analyzed in terms of choice-function pro-
nouns. We have seen how integrating these common analyses in broader assignment-
variable-based syntax/semantics can compositionally derive a wide range of linguis-
tic shifting phenomena in various types of relativization, conditional, and interrog-
ative structures. I hope the proposed semantics may provide a fruitful basis for
delineating further dimensions of difference.
10.3.2 Aside: Weak crossover revisited
§7.4 suggested an account of weak crossover in various types of examples with QR’d
DPs. The account was deliberately neutral regarding weak crossover with wh inter-
rogatives in light of independent contrasts between QR-chains and wh-chains (e.g.,
Safir 1999, Iatridou et al. 2001, Cecchetto 2004, Tanaka 2015), and con-
tentious issues regarding the data and the syntax/semantics ofwh-movement (n. 88).
For instance, there are cases where wh weak crossover configurations are accept-
able, both in English and crosslinguistically. Not all languages with weak crossover
effects exhibit those effects in wh interrogatives, as reflected in (10.33) for Yoruba;
although the bound reading of the pronoun is unavailable in the quantificational
construction, the wh interrogatives corresponding to (10.31b) are grammatical. In
English, wh weak crossover examples improve in certain focus constructions, as in
(10.34) with ‘only’.
(10.31) a. Whoi (ti) likes heri child?
b. *Whoi does heri child like (ti)?
(10.32) a. [Which boyi’s friend]k (tk) accidentally introduced hisi girlfriend to hisi
mother?
b. *[Which boyi’s mother]k did hisi friend accidentally introduce hisi girl-
friend to (tk)?
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(10.33) a. *Ìyá
mother
rèi
his
féràn
like
enìkòòkani.
everyone
(intended: ‘everyonei is liked by hisi mother’)
b. Tai
who
ni
be
ìyá
mother
rèi
his
féràn
like
(ti)?
‘Whoi does hisi mother like?’
(Adésolá 2005: 55, 11; Yorùbá (Niger-Congo))
(10.34)?Which babyi did only itsi mother say (ti) was cute?
How to diagnose such examples is controversial (see Safir 2017 for an overview).
Yet given such intralinguistic and crosslinguistic variations, it isn’t implausible that
wh weak crossover effects shouldn’t follow simply from general binding principles,
such as (7.74) in §7.4, but from properties of wh chains within the language. I won’t
pretend to provide a general account of wh weak crossover here; as emphasized
above, the proposed semantics for wh interrogatives is compatible with different
views on the syntactic/semantic status of wh movement. But now that the treat-
ment of wh words is on the table, it may be worth briefly speculating on binding
configurations with pronouns.
To a rough (inadequate) first approximation, consider the constraint in (10.35)
on relations among copies of wh-phrases.152
(10.35) Let αi be an expression with feature [wh] such that there is no coindexed
γi higher than αi; and let C = (a1i , . . . , ani ) be the sequence of (lower)
copies coindexed with αi. Then for every aji ∈ C, there is some aki ∈ C and
[+wh]-β such that (β, aji) is a chain and β ’s [wh]-feature percolates from
aki .
Copies of movement are typically required to be identical to the moved item; in theo-
ries relaxing this requirement the lower copies must at least have the sameϕ-features
(person, number, gender), agreement features, etc. (cf. Nunes 2004, van Koppen
2007; n. 13). Non-movement copies, in contrast, need only be equivalent with
respect to elements relevant to satisfying requirements for coindexing; that is, they
152The superscripts in (10.35) are included simply to delineate the copies; they have no theoretical
import. I continue to use ‘copy’ broadly both for traces (n. 13) as well as for copies not derived via
movement (§6.2). Likewise for ‘chain’: the chains needn’t be movement chains (though one may
assume other familiar conditions such as uniformity and c-command); the principle is compatible
with treating chain relations as represented in the narrow syntax or the interfaces. The principle is
formulated to apply at a level at whichwhmovement has taken place, though it could be reformulated
in other terms.
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must have the same ϕ-features (e.g. Kratzer 2009). The principle in (10.35) thus
permits examples such as (10.31a): the copies of whoi = [[wh] wh-g person-w-g]i
are the trace ti and bi = [she-g person-w-g]i in the representation of the possessive
pronoun; ti = [[wh] wh-g person-w-g]i is [+wh]; and (ti) and (ti, bi) are chains
(the former trivially so). Examples such as (10.31b), however, are excluded: there
is no [+wh]-β, whose [wh]-feature arises from some aki ∈ C, such that (β, bi) is a
chain; the pronoun bi lacks a [wh]-feature (n. 139), and the [+wh] trace ti doesn’t
c-command bi. The treatment of “secondary weak crossover” effects, as in (10.32),
proceeds likewise. Unlike (10.32a), (10.32b) is excluded since the only potential
[+wh]-β is tk = [[wh] Which boyi’s mother]k, and tk c-commands neither copy in the
representations of the possessive pronouns.
Note that the principle in (10.35) carries over to weak crossover effects in (En-
glish) relative clauses — even on the analysis in §6 in which the relative phrase
originates in Spec,Crel, as reflected schematically in (10.36)–(10.37) (cf. §8.7).153
(10.36) a. Every cat which likes its owner…
b. every [CPrel wh cat C0
⟨i,e⟩
i ti likes the-owner-of-oi]
c. “every cat x such that x likes the owner of x…”
(10.37) a. Every cat which its owner likes…
b. *every [CPrel wh cat C0
⟨i,e⟩
i the-owner-of-oi likes ti]
c. ≉ “every cat x such that x is liked by the owner of x…”
In (10.36)–(10.37) the IP in the relative clause includes two copies of the [+wh]-
C0rel — the [+wh] trace ti, and the coindexed variable oi in the representation of the
pronoun ‘its’. (Representing the pronoun with a copy of the relative phrase would
violate Principle B.) The configuration in (10.36) is permitted since (ti) and (ti, oi)
are both chains. (10.37) is excluded since the higher copy oi lacks a [wh] feature;
hence there is no available [+wh]-β such that (β, oi) is a chain.
The general binding principle in (7.74) (§7.4) essentially functions to constrain
movement for purposes of repairing a type-mismatch from introducing new kinds
of binding relations; the interpretive effects arising from QR’ing an expression α are
153Though relative pronouns are often morphologically related to interrogative pronouns, forms
morphologically related to demonstratives are also common (e.g., in German). Crosslinguistically,
the presence of [wh]/[op]-features with relative pronouns is independent of a wh format, and it is
independent of whether the nominal head is pronounced in situ; see n. 109. For languages with
relative constructions that lack [wh]/[op]-features, the principle in (10.35) wouldn’t apply; weak
crossover effects thus needn’t be predicted (cf. Itô 1986 on the absence of weak crossover effects in
Japanese circumnominals).
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restricted to those associated with α’s semantic role in its base position. Whereas
QR is a semantically driven mechanism applying for reasons of interpretability, wh
movement and associated reconstruction effects depend on principles and represen-
tations at various grammatical levels. Hence it might not be surprising to find greater
crosslinguistic variation with respect to weak crossover with wh-interrogatives, as
we in fact do. Crosslinguistic variations in weak crossover with wh-interrogatives
might be diagnosed in terms of differences in the status and precise formalization of
a principle such as (10.35) along with independent grammatical differences regard-
ingwhmovement — e.g., differences with respect to parameters such as the relevant
command relations in (10.35), at what syntactic level the principle is checked, the
syntactic/semantic status of wh movement, reconstruction, pied-piping etc. I leave
further developments and investigation of relations among different types of weak
crossover configurations for future research.
10.4 “Interrogative flip”
The assignment-variable account in §10.2 affords a precise diagnosis of so-called
“interrogative flip” (Speas& Tenny 2003): cases of “interrogative flip” can be assim-
ilated to (possibly conventionalized) local readings (§§3.1, 4.3). Consider (10.38),
on the salient reading which questions the relevant evidence and the doings of the
contextually relevant individual. (I treat ‘be the killer’ as an unanalyzed predicate.
As previously I use ‘r’ in indices for type ⟨s, at⟩.)
(10.38) Might he be the killer?
S
Q⟨2,a⟩ CP
w1 g2
⟨1,s⟩
C? t2a ⟨3,a⟩
might
r1 g2
t1s
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t3a he3-g1 t2s-be-the-killerJSK ≈ λTt.λgg .∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .∃aa∶ g′−(1r)(@(g′−))(a(g′)) ∧
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g′(1a)(3e) is the killer in @(a(g′))
iff ∃aa∶ g′′−(1r)(@(g′′−))(a(g′′)) ∧ g′′(1a)(3e) is the killer in @(a(g′′))]
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .∃aa∶ g′−(1r)(@(g′−))(a(g′)) ∧ g−c (3e) is the killer in @(a(g′))
iff ∃aa∶ g′′−(1r)(@(g′′−))(a(g′′)) ∧ g−c (3e) is the killer in @(a(g′′))]
Each possible answer T is a set of assignments g′ that determine the same modal
background R (=g′(1r), via g′ ≈ g′′), and return the same truth value for the
proposition that the contextually relevant individual gc(3e) (=g′(1a)(3e)) is the
killer in the world of some epistemic possibility R(@(g′)), as determined by g′.
Roughly, answers to the epistemic modal question are propositions of the form that
there is/is not an epistemic possibility (=g′(1r)(@(g′))) where gc(3e) is the killer.
Local readings under assignment-quantifiers are represented uniformly in terms
of coindexing between assignment-variables and binder indices (§10.2). The com-
positional semantics of the interrogative elements C? and Q derive the obligatory
local reading of the modal’s world argument t1s. The question nucleus places a
constraint on the worlds of the assignments g′ in each possible answer, i.e. that
gc(3e) is the killer in some world accessible from @(g′). Likewise the obligatory
local reading of the embedded predicate’s world argument t2s is captured via the
coindexing between the embedding (declarative) complementizer and the modal’s
binder index. The local reading of the epistemic modal is captured by allowing
the value for the modal-background pronoun [r1 g2] to vary across the propositions
comprising the possible answers. The assignments in each answer assign the same
value to 1r; however, the particular epistemic modal background assigned may differ
across answers. The relevant evidence is targeted by the question.
In §4.3 we discussed how there may be reasons for positing conventionalized
locality/globality principles for certain context-sensitive expressions — e.g., a glob-
ality principle for gendered pronouns, or a locality principle for certain types of
epistemic uses of modals. We noted that a locality principle requiring certain modal-
background pronouns to be coindexed with the closest c-commanding assignment-
binder may help capture the linking of epistemic modals to the subject in attitude
ascriptions. Such a principle would apply to epistemic modals in questions as well:
An epistemic modal question such as (10.38) would typically be interpreted as being
about what the evidence is — represented by what modal background in D⟨s,at⟩ to
assign to the index 1r— rather than about what the logical implications are of a
contextually agreed-upon body of evidence gc(1r) at the evaluation world (contrast
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(10.4)). For present purposes I leave open whether conventionalizing such an
interpretation is appropriate in the general case (cf. Silk 2016a, 2017).
10.5 Conditional questions
Informally, whereas the possible answers in a non-conditional question partition the
relevant space of possibilities, the possible answers to a conditional question such
as (10.39) partition the subdomain of possibilities that verify the antecedent.
(10.39) If it snows, will school be canceled?
Capturing this idea has proven a persistent challenge for traditional approaches to
questions and quantificational analyses of conditionals (see Isaacs&Rawlins 2008,
Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009, 2010, Starr 2010; cf. Charlow 2010, 2011 on
challenges with conditional imperatives). An additional challenge is to capture the
various types of local and global readings in both the ‘if’-clause and interrogative
main clause. Consider the following conditional-question analogues of the shifted-
indexical example from Santorio 2012 in §9:
(10.40) [See (9.6). After the experiment, one of the amnesiacs wakes up. Feeling
fuzzy about the experimental protocol, he asks himself:]
If it landed heads, might I be in Widener?
(10.41) [The awoken amnesiac also can’t remember if funds were going to be left
in one of the libraries, or what the standards for richness are wherever he
is.]
(Qk) [If iti landed heads]j am Ij in Widener and richk? (cf. Santorio
2012)
In (10.41), for instance, we need to capture (among other things) (i) the global
reading of ‘it’ in the ‘if’-clause; (ii) the local reading of ‘I’ in the consequent, inter-
preted with respect to the assignment representing the conditional supposition; and
(iii) the local reading of the world argument and standard of richness associated
with ‘rich’ in the consequent, targeted by the question operator and varying across
possible answers. The conditional question in (10.41) is in part a question about
how rich one must be to count as rich, on the supposition that the coin landed heads.
In light of crosslinguistic links among conditionals, correlatives, and interrog-
atives, §10.2 suggested as a working hypothesis that we treat the interrogative
complementizer C? as having an analogous argument structure and semantics as
‘if’/Cif. As a way of developing the approach I suggested interpreting the external
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argument of C? as determining a relevant possibility targeted by the question. In
unembedded questions the argument has been a world argument coindexed with
Q (n. 145); the questions are about what is the case in the actual world. We will
see that this argument, though semantically trivial in the examples thus far, can
play a non-trivial role in the interpretation of complex sentences such as conditional
questions.
10.5.1 Relevance conditional questions
Before turning to hypothetical conditional questions such as those in (10.40)–(10.41),
let’s start with a “non-shifty” relevance conditional question such as (10.43).
(10.42) If Alice is hungry, there are biscuits in the kitchen.
(10.43) If Alice is hungry, are there biscuits in the kitchen?
In an ordinary relevance conditional such as (10.42), the ‘if’-clause introduces a
modal topic and the main clause declarative is used to assert something about the
actual world: that there are biscuits. Likewise in the relevance conditional question
in (10.43), the ‘if’-clause introduces a modal topic and the main clause interrogative
is used to question something what is actually the case: whether there are biscuits.
Relevance conditional questions raise no new complications (cf. §9.3). The
sentence-initial ‘if’-clause can be analyzed as in §9.5, and the interrogative main
clause can be analyzed as in our examples with unembedded interrogatives, as in
(10.44) (here leaving the existential ‘there’ construction unanalyzed; see §§8.4, 8.9).
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(10.44) Relevance conditional question
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1 ⟨2,s⟩
if t2a Alice t2s is hungry
CP1 ∶ t
w1-g3 ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a t1s there are biscuits
JCPK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶Alice is hungry in@(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))]
there are biscuits in @(g(3a)) = g(3a)(1s)
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .[ιa(g′)∶ Alice is hungry in @(a(g′)) ∧@(a(g′)) = a(g′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
there are biscuits in @(g′−) = g′−(1s) iff[ιa(g′′)∶ Alice is hungry in @(a(g′′)) ∧ @(a(g′′)) = a(g′′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
there are biscuits in @(g′′−) = g′′−(1s)]
Roughly put, each possible answer T is a set of assignments g′ that return the same
truth value for the proposition that the contextually relevant possibility where Alice
is hungry is such that there are biscuits in @(g′).
First, the ‘if’-clause introduces the maximal relevant possibility h where Alice is
hungry. The global reading of the pronoun [p1st g1] which supplies the contextually
relevant background domain is captured in the metasemantic answerhood condi-
tion: for each answer T, every g′ ∈ T is such that g′(1a)(1st) = gc(1st). Second, just
as external argument of ‘if’ determines the possibility targeted by the supposition,
the external argument of C? determines the possibility targeted by the question.
In relevance conditional questions this possibility is the actual world: Intuitively,
(10.43) isn’t about whether there are biscuits in some modal subdomain where Alice
is hungry; it’s about whether there are actually any biscuits. The external argument
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of C? is again supplied by a world-pronoun coindexed with the question operator.
The assignments g′ in each answer T constitute an equivalence class with respect to
whether there are biscuits in the world @(g′) of the possibility represented by g′.
A remark on interpreting the metalanguage quantification over assignments is
in order. The argument of a in the denotation of the ‘if’-clause varies across the
assignments g′, g′′ in the set of possible answers; however, as discussed in §§2.2, 9.2,
the items in terms of which the uniqueness condition is stated are images of the
assignments under a, i.e. items h ∈ G in the model. The metalanguage expression
“ιa(g)∶ . . . ” abbreviates the quantificational condition that for some function a ∈ Da,
its value constitutes the unique maximal plurality h ∈ G such that… (§9.2). Varying
the argument of a has no effect on which h ∈ G constitutes the unique such maximal
plurality in the model.
10.5.2 Correlative questions
Correlatives with main clause interrogatives are rarely if ever considered in seman-
tics for interrogatives or correlatives. It is instructive to compare the treatment of
relevance conditional questions in (10.44) with the predicted analysis of an indi-
vidual correlative question such as (10.45). (Assume a local reading targeted by
the question for ‘tall’; as in §9.5, d is a variable for degrees d ∈ Dd and ‘o is s-tall’
abbreviates that o’s height is at least as great as the standard s for counting as tall.
To highlight the intended reading I continue to represent the external arguments of
the complementizers with a simple world-pronoun (§9.7).)
(10.45) jo
rel
laRkii
girl
khaRii
standing
hai
is
vo
dem
lambii
tall
hai?
is
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‘Which girl is standing, is she tall?’ (cf. Srivastav 1991: ex. 3a; Hindi)
S ∶ t
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1 ⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t2s standing
CP1 ∶ t
w1 g3 ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t1s tall
d1 g3
JtallK = λdd.λws.λxe.λgg . x(g) is d(g)-tall in w(g)JCPK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)) is standing in @(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = g(1a)(1s)]
a(g)(2cf)(girlg(1a)(1s)) is g(3a)(1d)-tall in @(g(3a)) = g(3a)(1s)
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .[ιa(g′)∶ a(g′)(2cf)(girlg−c (1s)) is standing in @(a(g′)) = g−c (1s)]
a(g′)(2cf)(girlg−c (1s)) is g′−(1d)-tall in @(g′−) = g′−(1s) iff[ιa(g′′)∶ a(g′′)(2cf)(girlg−c (1s)) is standing in @(a(g′′)) = g−c (1s)]
a(g′′)(2cf)(girlg−c (1s)) is g′′−(1d)-tall in @(g′′−) = g′′−(1s)]
Like with the relative conditional question in (10.44), the modal domain for the
main clause interrogative is targeted directly by the question operator. But whereas
the ‘if’-clause in (10.44) introduces a topical modal possibility, the correlative clause
introduces an actual possibility about a topical individual. As in (9.49), the world
of the possibility introduced in the correlative clause is identified with the world of
the discourse, gc(1s). Though the correlative clause in (10.45) doesn’t shift a modal
domain, it shifts the interpretation of the correlative proform. The correlative clause
introduces a topical girl (=a(g)(2cf)(girlgc(1s))) who is actually standing, and the
interrogative main clause comments on that same girl, asking whether she is tall.
Each possible answer T is, roughly, a set of assignments g′ which determine the
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same standard s for counting as tall (=g′(1d)), and return the same truth value for
the proposition that the selected girl (=a(g)(2cf)(girlgc(1s))) who is standing in the
actual world @(gc) is s-tall in @(g′).
So, our analyses of correlatives, proforms, and interrogatives compositionally
derive the relevant inventory of readings: (i) the global reading of ‘girl’ in the
correlative clause, (ii) the local reading of the proform in the main clause bound
by the correlative clause, and (iii) the local reading of ‘tall’ in the main clause,
targeted by the question. The global reading of ‘girl’ and correlative clause domain
is captured via the metasemantic condition on answerwood. The local reading of the
correlate follows from the representation of the proform as a copy of its antecedent
relative expression, here [she2-g2 girl-w1 g1], and the correlative clause assignment-
binder from ι⟨2,a⟩h . The proform in the interrogative clause correctly receives a local
reading under the correlative clause without being targeted by the question. On
the flip side, the world-argument and standard-pronoun [d1 g3] associated with
‘tall’ receive local readings under the question operator without being shifted by
the correlative clause. (10.45) is in part a question about how tall one must be
to count as tall. The assignments g′ in each answer determine the same standard
of tallness g′(1d) (via g′ ≈ g′′), though which standard is determined varies across
possible answers. So, the correlative interrogative is correctly derived as a question
about whether a certain girl who is actually standing is tall.
10.5.3 Hypothetical conditional questions
Finally, let’s turn to hypothetical conditional questions such as (10.39)–(10.41).
The §10.2-syntax/semantics of interrogatives integrates straightforwardly with the
account of correlative conditionals in §§9.5–9.7. The predicted LF and interpreta-
tion for (10.41) are as follows, on the shifted reading of ‘I’ under the conditional
supposition, and local reading targeted by the question of the relevant standard for
richness associated with ‘rich’.154
154As with ‘tall’ in (10.45), assume a simplified context-sensitive semantics for ‘rich’, where ‘o is
d-rich’ abbreviates that o’s degree of wealth is at least as great as the degree-standard d for counting
as rich. As in §9, I leave open whether the coindexing between the ‘if’-clause and adjacent assignment
variable may be established via movement.
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(10.46) Hypothetical conditional question
‘If it landed heads, am I rich?’
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
w1 g2 ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a I1 g2 t1s rich
d1 g3JCP1K ≈ λgg ∶@(g(3a)) = g(2a)(1s) . g(2a)(1e) is g(3a)(1d)-rich in@(g(3a))JCPK ≈ λgg . [ιa(g)∶ g(1a)(2e) landed heads in@(a(g))∧@(a(g)) = a(g)(2sf)(g(1a)(1st))]
a(g)(1e) is g(3a)(1d)-rich in @(g(3a)), provided @(g(3a)) = a(g)(1s)
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .[ιa(g′)∶ g−c (2e) landed heads in@(a(g′))∧@(a(g′)) = a(g′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
a(g′)(1e) is g′−(1d)-rich in @(g′−), provided @(g′−) = a(g′)(1s) iff[ιa(g′′)∶ g−c (2e) landed heads in@(a(g′′))∧@(a(g′′)) = a(g′′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
a(g′′)(1e) is g′′−(1d)-rich in @(g′′−), provided @(g′′−) = a(g′′)(1s)]
Roughly, each possible answer T is a set of assignments g′ which (i) determine the
same standard s for counting as rich (=g′(1d)), and (ii) return the same truth value
for the proposition that the relevant possibility hwhere the coin gc(2e) landed heads,
@(h) = h(2sf)(gc(1st)), is such that the shifted individual h(1e) is s-rich, provided
(iii) that the world of g′ is identical to the world of h.
The account derives the range of local/global readings for conditional questions
discussed above and in §10.1 — notably, global readings (e.g. ‘it’), local readings
under the conditional supposition (e.g. ‘I’), and local readings in the interrogative
consequent targeted by the question (e.g. ‘rich’). The standard associated with ‘rich’
correctly receives a local reading under the question operator. (10.46) is in part a
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question about what standard of richness to accept; the question is about the nature
of a topical possibility, not simply about the world narrowly construed. The assign-
ments in each answer agree in what standard of richness g′(1d) they determine
(via g′ ≈ g′′), though which standard is determined varies across the possible an-
swers. By contrast, the interpretations of the pronouns ‘it’ and ‘I’ are constant across
answers. Just as in each possible answer the topical modal possibility h is about
the same contextually relevant object gc(2e), likewise each possible answer is a
proposition about the individual h(1e) representing (say) the epistemic counterpart
of the speaker in that possibility (§3.4). ‘I’ in the interrogative consequent receives a
local reading under the conditional supposition without necessarily receiving a local
reading targeted by the question. The global readings of ‘it’ and specifier argument
of ‘if’ are again captured via the metasemantic condition on answerhood, anchoring
their interpretation to the discourse context. I am not aware of other accounts of
conditionals, questions, or conditional questions which similarly derive the observed
range of local and global readings.
The semantics captures the intuition that the possible answers in a hypotheti-
cal conditional question are specifically about the possibility described by the an-
tecedent. There are two critical moving parts: the presupposition associated with
the interrogative complementizer, and the correlative binding requirement.
First, drawing on on crosslinguistic links between interrogative and conditional
clauses, §10.2 pursued a unified semantics for the complementizer C? in inter-
rogatives and ‘if’/Cif in relativization of possibilities. The relevant contrast in the
entry for C? in (10.7) is that the condition on the external (world, individual)
argument is a presupposition. Intuitively, a no-answer to a conditional question
such as (10.39) shouldn’t end up including possibilities where school is canceled
(and perhaps even where it snows) but fail to verify the interrogative due to being
outside the contextually relevant set of snow-possibilities. The possibilities in each
answer should count as relevantly equivalent due to being equivalent with respect
to whether school is canceled. Implementing the condition as a presupposition
captures this. The assignments in each possible answer T in (10.46) are restricted to
assignments representing the topical modal possibility described by the ‘if’-clause —
assignments g′ such that @(g′−) = h(1s) = @(h).
By contrast, there isn’t an analogous no-answer relevant in the semantics of
relative clauses or ‘if’-clauses. For purposes of deriving the embedding operator’s
restrictor argument, what matters is simply the items that do satisfy both of the
conditions in question — e.g., in ‘if it snows’, the snow-possibilities which are part of
the relevant domain. That said, it would be interesting to compare presuppositional
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variants of the lexical entries for Crel/‘if’ in (6.20)/(9.16), analogous to the entry for
C? in (10.7), as in e.g. (10.47).
(10.47) JifK = JCifK = JC?K = λaa.λpst.λw′s.λgg ∶@(a(g)) = w′(g) .∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′)), p(w)(g)
Developing the account in this way might be understood as providing a general
presuppositional approach to quantifier domain restriction. The connections with
notions of “specificity” (Enç 1991) and “discourse linking” (Pesetsky 1987) from
§§7.1, 8 may provide additional avenues to explore.
Second, as part of the unified approach to relative, conditional, and interrog-
ative clauses, I suggested understanding the external world argument in a condi-
tional/interrogative clause as determining the relevant possibility to be targeted by
the supposition/question. The questions in our previous examples were about what
is the case in the actual world. Accordingly, the external argument was a world
pronoun receiving a local reading under Q, and the presuppositional constraint was
the trivial constraint that@(g′−) = g′−(1s) (given our general metasemantic assump-
tion). In contrast, in hypothetical conditional questions the possibility targeted by
the interrogative clause is the possibility introduced in the antecedent. The external
argument of C? receives a local reading under the antecedent supposition rather
than the question operator, represented via the world-pronoun [w1 g2] coindexed
with the ‘if’-clause (cf. n. 145). The derived presuppositional constraint is the non-
trivial constraint @(g′) = @(h) that the assignments g′ in each possible answer
represent the world of the topical possibility h. The possible answers T are correctly
diagnosed as being propositions specifically about the relevant possibility where the
coin landed heads.
There is an important contrast between the treatments of the correlates/proforms
in hypothetical conditionals with main clause interrogative vs. declarative CPs. In
§§9.5–9.7, the predicted correlate of the ‘if’-clause was directly linked to the main
predicate’s world argument. The assignment-binder T— or an embedding modal,
as in (9.30) reproduced in (10.48) — was treated as raising from a semantically
vacuous complementizer generated by CP-recursion above the conditional.
(10.48) Alice thinks [CP1 that [CP2 [if it snows] [CP3 (then) school will close]]]
In contrast, in correlative conditional questions the correlate cannot be directly
linked to the main predicate’s world argument; the (non-vacuous) embedded inter-
rogative complementizer must be generated (e.g.) to trigger wh movement, satisfy
the selection requirements of the question-embedding operator, and derive the in-
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tended question meaning. The predicted correlate is instead the adjacent world
argument in Spec,C — an adjacent world-pronoun, as in (10.46), or a topicalized
proform such as ‘then’, as in (10.49) (n. 145).
(10.49) ‘If…then’ conditional question
‘If it landed heads, then am I rich?’
S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
XP⟨3,s⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
then2sf-g2 p1st-g1
t3s ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a I1-g2 t1s rich d1-g3
A proposition Tt ∈ JSK is an answer to S in c iff ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′g ≈ g′′ .[ιa(g′)∶ g−c (2e) landed heads in@(a(g′))∧@(a(g′)) = a(g′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
a(g′)(1e) is g′−(1d)-rich in@(g′−), provided@(g′−) = a(g′)(2sf)(g−c (1st)) iff[ιa(g′′)∶ g−c (2e) landed heads in@(a(g′′))∧@(a(g′′)) = a(g′′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
a(g′′)(1e) is g′′−(1d)-rich in@(g′′−), provided@(g′′) = a(g′′)(2sf)(g−c (1st))]
Just like in our examples with unembedded interrogatives, the question operator
raises from the assignment argument position of the embedded interrogative com-
plementizer. No mechanism of CP-recursion is predicted. This is a critical feature of
the account, since CP-recursion has been argued to be degraded or impossible under
interrogative complementizers (e.g. Iatridou & Kroch 1993). Unlike (9.30), the
examples in (10.50)–(10.51) are unacceptable with ‘then’.
(10.50) Every boy wonders if his mother comes (∗then) what he will eat.
(Iatridou & Kroch 1993: exs. 54a–55a)
(10.51) Every boy wonders whether if his toy breaks (∗then) he will get a new one.
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The A-movement from topicalizing the proform, as in (10.49), degrades the fur-
ther wh movement in (10.50)–(10.51) (cf. §9.5). The contrast between embed-
ded ‘then’ conditionals with main clause declaratives vs. interrogatives falls out of
our general account of conditional proforms and syntax/semantics for interrogative
(conditional, relative) clauses.155
10.6 Recap: Standardizing quantification. Unifying relativization, condition-
als, questions
The compositional semantics of interrogatives in this section parallels our previous
treatments of type-driven movement with other quantifiers and complementizers:
• Interrogative, conditional, and (non-vacuous) declarative complementizers
raise from v as quantifiers over worlds, capturing the obligatory local reading
of the main predicate’s world argument.
• Modal quantifiers — including the topmost assignment-binders T andQ, modal
and attitude verbs, and ιh — raise from inside their complement clause as
quantifiers over assignments, determining the local modal domain. Analo-
gously, determiner quantifiers raise from inside their complement, determin-
ing the relevant domain of individuals.
• Relative/wh pronouns are analyzed as choice-function pronouns — type ⟨et, e⟩
(alternatively ⟨⟨s, et⟩, se⟩) in relativization of individuals, type ⟨st, s⟩ in rel-
ativization of possibilities. Conditional and individual proforms are repre-
sented as copies of their antecedent relative/wh expression.
• Relative, conditional, correlative, and interrogative complementizers —Crel
in relativization of individuals, ‘if’/Cif in relativization of possibilities, C? in
interrogatives — relate a pair of individuals/worlds with respect to the prop-
erty of individuals/worlds expressed by the complement.
– In individual relatives the relative clause targets a topical subset of indi-
viduals supplied by the relative phrase. The set of individuals may then
be commented on by a determiner quantifier’s scope argument.
– In conditional interpretations with ‘if’, the ‘if’-clause targets a topical
subdomain of a relevant modal possibility. This topical possibility may
then be commented on by an adjoined phrase (NP/VP/IP/CP).
155It is interesting that conditional ‘then’ questions such as (10.49) (where ‘then’ is fronted) are
ungrammatical in V2 languages; unlike in (9.66), there is no empty complementizer position for
the verb to move to. This of course isn’t a general account of the licensing of embedded ‘then’
conditionals. CP-recursion is degraded in various environments, not simply in questions (Iatridou
1991, Iatridou & Kroch 1993, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006).
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– In individual-correlative interpretations with Cif the correlative clause
targets a possibility describing topical individuals in the actual world.
This topical possibility is commented on by the adjoined main clause.
– In interrogatives the interrogative clause targets the possibility to be
targeted by the question.
The proposed assignment-variable-based account affords a unified approach to con-
ditionality, relativization, and questions, and a generalized treatment of quantifica-
tion in various types of sentences and clausal structures (cf. §§1, 3.2, 6.1, 7.1, 8.6,
8.7, 9.7).156
156If only.
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11 Taking stock
This manuscript has initiated a project of developing a linguistic theory which posits
variables for assignment functions in the syntax, and treats semantic values sys-
tematically in terms of sets of assignments in the model. Principal features of the
account are that it standardizes quantification across domains, and it systematizes
various seemingly diverse linguistic shifting phenomena. Such phenomena include
data with quantifiers and scope, intensionality, and local/global readings in vari-
ous embedded environments, such as with modals, attitude verbs, questions, and
conditionals. The semantics affords a unified analysis of the context-sensitivity of
pronouns, epistemic modals, etc., in the spirit of contextualist theories. Yet it im-
proves in compositionally deriving certain distinctive shifting/binding phenomena
(e.g. with epistemic modals), and in providing a framework for theorizing about
expressions’ different tendencies for local/global readings. Resources for capturing
these phenomena have grown increasingly complex in current theories.
The syntax and lexical/compositional semantics delineate the sources of inten-
sionality and assignment-shifting in the clausal architecture. Binding with indi-
viduals/worlds/assignments is derived uniformly from a generalized binder-index,
which attaches directly to expressions. The account avoids introducing added pa-
rameters of interpretation, quantification-specific composition rules, or interpre-
tive principles (such as for reconstructed phrases, pronouns vs. traces, donkey pro-
nouns). The semantics is fully compositional.
Along the way I appealed to independently motivated resources from the syntax
and semantics literatures in motivating analyses of particular constructions. Cer-
tain features of the account are of general interest, independent of the particu-
lar assignment-variable-based implementation. These include the formalization of
assignment modification; the definition of the generalized binder-index; the ap-
proach to the syntax/semantics interface with determiner quantifiers, modal quan-
tifiers, and various types of complementizers; the treatments of locality/globality
constraints (e.g., with pronouns, epistemic modals); applications to classic puzzles
with names in attitude ascriptions, including apparent non-specific, de dicto, and
bound uses; a unified analysis of certain indefinites, wh-words, relative words, and
anaphoric demonstrative proforms; a general layered n analysis for noun phrases,
with applications to distinctions among weak and strong quantifier words regarding
presuppositionality, specificity, modal independence, and existential ‘there’ sen-
tences (with and without a coda); a unified treatment of various types of relative
and non-relative restrictive modification, with applications to “free R” (modifier)
and “inherent R” (argument) readings of English possessive constructions; a dis-
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tinction between trace- and pronoun-binding, with applications to weak crossover;
a speculative general treatment of apparent binding out of DPs and weak crossover
effects with donkey pronouns, inverse linking, and genitive binding; compositional
semantics for alternative head-raising and matching analyses of relative clauses,
with extensions to head-internal relative constructions and intensional readings of
relative phrases; uniform compositional semantics for ‘if’-clauses when adjoined to
NP, VP, IP, and CP, and for individual correlative clauses adjoined to the main clause
or directly to the correlate DP; unified analyses of ‘if’-clauses and individual correl-
ative clauses, and of conditional and individual proforms; a unified approach to
relative, conditional, and interrogative complementizers; and a fully compositional
semantics for quantifier raising, wh interrogatives, and relativization.
Our initial focus was on applying the assignment-variable-based framework to
local/global readings with quantifiers, attitude verbs, and modal verbs; however,
we have seen that the potential applications of the account extend more broadly.
Diverse types of shifting phenomena were examined across a range of linguistic
environments, such as relativization structures, conditionals, and interrogatives.
Although I emphasized certain formal similarities among context-sensitive expres-
sions, there are of course differences among them. Issues regarding further (gram-
matical, lexical, metasemantic, conversational) constraints on readings, to help rein
in the flexibility of the system, call for more thorough investigation. The specu-
lative discussions of different types of pronoun binding (bound-variable pronouns,
resumptive pronouns, reflexives), events and the semantics of different verbalizing
heads, and comparisons among conditionals, individual correlatives, and interrog-
atives raise difficult questions about binding principles, traces vs. pronouns, (non-
)linguistic anaphora, interactions with tense/aspect, and wh movement and topical-
ization, among many others. Applications to other types of conventional meanings,
such as conventional implicature, presupposition, and expressives; categories such
as tense, aspect, voice, mood; and expressions and constructions such as resump-
tive pronouns, control constructions, imperatives, counterfactuals, nominalizations,
modal adjectives/adverbs, and ellipsis, may provide further avenues to explore. It
would be interesting to examine possible extensions of the proposed movement-
and agreement-based accounts of different types of local/global readings to issues
such as actuality entailments (Bhatt 2006, Hacquard 2006, 2009), or temporally
(in)dependent readings and nominal/verbal tense (Musan 1995, Lecarme 1999b,
2008). I hope the preliminary developments here may illustrate the fruitfulness
of an assignment-variable-based approach to investigating these and additional lin-
guistic phenomena.
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Appendix Formal overview: Syntax, Semantics, Metasemantics
A Sample lexical entries
(8.9) JlikesK = λxe.λws.λye.λgg . y(g) likes x(g) in w(g) (cf. (8.116))
(2.4) JviσK = λaa.λγnσn . . . λγ1σ1 .λgg . a(g)(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g))
a. For α ∈ {e, s, t}, JviαK = λaa.λgg . a(g)(iα) b. JgiK = λgg . g(ia)
(2.5) JtiσK = λγnσn . . . λγ1σ1 .λgg . g(iσ)((↓γn)(g)) . . . ((↓γ1)(g))
a. For β ∈ {e, s, t, a}, JtiβK = λgg . g(iβ) (cf. n. 13)
(3.11) Generalized binder-indexJ⟨i,τ⟩K = λα⟨⟨τ,⟨1σ1⋯σn, t⟩1⋯⟩n⟩,σ⟩ . λβ⟨1σ1⋯σn, t⟩1⋯⟩n .
α(λχ.λγ1⋯λγn.λg . β(γ1)⋯(γn)(g[(↓χ)(g)/iτ]))
(3.6) JthatK = JCdK = λaa.λp⟨s,t⟩.λgg .∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′)), p(w)(g)
(9.16) JifK = JCifK = λaa.λpst.λw′s.λgg .@(a(g)) = w′(g) ∧ ∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′))∶ p(w)(g)
(10.7) JC?K = λaa.λpst.λw′s.λgg ∶@(a(g)) = w′(g) .∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′))∶ p(w)(g)
(6.20) JCrelK = λaa.λPet.λye.λxe.λgg . x(g) = y(g) ∧ P(x)(g) (head-raising)
(8.84) JCrelK = λaa.λpst.λxe.λgg .∀ws = λg′g.@(a(g′))∶ p(w)(g) (matching)
(alternatives in (7.11a), §10.5.3)
(8.9) JthinkK = λA⟨a,t⟩.λws.λxe.λgg .∀aa∶ (a(g) is compatible with x(g)’s state of
mind in w(g))→ A(a)(g)
(3.9) JmayK = λA′⟨a,t⟩.λA⟨a,t⟩.λgg .∃aa∶A′(a)(g) ∧A(a)(g)
(3.8) JTK = λA⟨a,t⟩.λgg .∀aa = λgg.g−∶A(a)(g)
(10.8) JQK = λAat.λTt.λgg .∀aa = λgg.g−∶ ∃g′′g ∶T = [λg′ ∶ g′ ≈ g′′ .A(a)(g′) = A(a)(g′′)]
(6.22) JeveryK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∀xe∀aa∶P+(a)(x)(g)→ Q+(a)(x)(g)
(cf. (6.54) for existential donkey reading)
(8.41) JsomeQK = λP+⟨a,et⟩.λQ+⟨a,et⟩.λgg .∃xe∃aa∶P+(a)(x)(g) ∧Q+(a)(x)(g)
(8.23) Jδ#K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg .#o[P(w)(λgg.o)(g) ∧ o ⊑ y(g)] Rδ nδ
● #o[ . . . o . . . ] ∶= the cardinality of the set of atoms o s.t. . . . o . . .
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(8.10) J[sg]K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg ∶ atom(y(g)) .P(w)(y)(g)J[pl]K = λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λye.λgg ∶ count(y(g)) .P(w)(y)(g)
(7.10)/(7.41) JXK = J’sK = λxe.λPet.λye.λgg . y(g) = x(g) ∧ P(y)(g)
(cf. n. 64, (7.11b))
(8.119), (8.120), (8.122), n. 127Jv∗agtK = λPet.λP′et.λxve.λgg .P(xv)(g) ∧ P′(xv)(g)JvapplK = λPet.λP′et.λxεe .λgg .P(xε)(g) ∧ P′(xε)(g)JvbeK = λPet.λxse.λgg .P(xs)(g)JvdoK = λws.λP⟨s,et⟩.λxεe .λgg .P(w)(xε)(g)JvgoalK = λws.λP⟨s,et⟩.λP′⟨s,et⟩.λxεe .λgg .P(w)(xε)(g) ∧ ∀w′s∶w′(g) ∈ goal(xε(g))→ ∃ye∶P′(w′)(y)(g)
Choice-function pronouns (§§4.4, 6, 7.1, 7.3, 8.2, 8.7, 8.8, 9.2, 9.7, 10.3)
a. JFi,cfK = λaa.λPτ t.λgg . a(g)(icf)((↓P)(g))
b. JFi,cf∗K = λaa.λP⟨s,et⟩.λws.λgg . a(g)(icf∗)(↓P)(w(g))
B Metasemantics / Metalanguage
(2.1) ModelsM:
– E: set of entities
– T: set of truth-values, {0, 1}
– W: set of worlds
– G: set of assignmentsM
(2.2) Domains / Semantic types:
– De = EDg
– Dt = {0, 1}Dg
– Ds =WDg
– Da = GDg
– Dg =domain of assignmentsD
– Dαβ = DDαβ
(4.9) Assignment modification
a. [z/iτ] ∶= λgg . ιmg∶m(iτ) = z ∧m(jσ) = g(jσ), for all jσ ≠ iτ
b. gg[⋯]1 . . . [⋯]n ∶= [⋯]1 ○ . . . ○ [⋯]n(g)
Constraints on readings / Interpretation of assignments: §§1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1,
4.3.3, 5, 7.4, 8.5, 8.7, 9.7
Metasemantics: §§2.2, 3.3, 4.1, 6.1.3, 8.7.2, 9.2, 10.2, 10.5
(10.11)a. A declarative sentence S is true in c iff JSK(gc) = 1
b. Tt is an answer to an interrogative sentence S? in c iff (i) T ∈ JS?K, and
(ii) for all g′ ∈ T and assignment-indices ia, g′(ia) = g−c
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C Syntax
Sample trees:
(3.3)
X⟨i,a⟩ CP/C′
⟨j,s⟩
C0 tia
⋮
V tjs
(10.6) S
Q⟨i,a⟩
⟨j,s⟩
C? tia
IP
…tjs…
(9.12) CP
ι⟨i,a⟩h C
⟨j,s⟩
if/Cif tia
IP
. . . tjs . . .
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(8.11)/(8.40)/(8.87)
QP
Q⟨i,a⟩ (TopP)
(Top) n∗P
n∗ (FP)
(F)
(Fcf g)
nP
n (FP)
(F)
(Fcf∗ g)
NumP
Num
δ#
N
(4.1) S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP
he1 g1 VP
⟨2,a⟩
thinks t1s
CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
IP
it2 g1 t2s cried
(4.21) ‘Freddoi met Freddok.’
[S T⟨1,a⟩ [CP [Cd t1a]⟨1,s⟩ [[DP F1cf g1 [NP Freddo w1 g1]]
[VP met t1s [DP F2cf g1 [NP Freddo w1 g1]]]]]]
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(6.25) S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP
DP⟨2,a⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ CPrel
wh2 g2 baby-w1-g1
C
⟨2,e⟩
Crel t2a t2e
got-w1-g1 a3 g2 toy-w1-g1
VP
liked t1s
it3 g2 toy-w1-g1
(7.6a) DP: D XP (alternative)
[DP every⟨i,a⟩ [XP (YP) [X0 [FP Fcf-tia baby]]]] (cf. (7.24) Qn∗P/n∗)
(7.42) D+XP free R prenominal/postnominal genitive LFs (alternative)
a. Alice’s cat / every cat of Alice’s
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ιo/every⟨2,a⟩ [XP [R1-g1 Alice] [’s [NP F2cf-t2a cat]]]]
(7.43) D+XP inherent R prenominal/postnominal genitive LFs (alternative)
a. Alice’s brother / every brother of Alice’s
b. [DP⟨2,a⟩ ιo/every⟨2,a⟩ [XP [P1et g1] [’s [NP F2cf t2a [brother Alice]]]]]
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(8.84) D+XP matching relative clause (alternative)
S
T⟨1,a⟩
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
every⟨2,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨2,s⟩
Crel g1 FP
wh2cf t2a
nP
w1-g1 cat
vP
t2s meowed
X FP
F2cf t2a
nP
w1-g1 cat
vP
t2s jumped
(7.80) ‘every boy’s cat’
DP{...⟨2,a⟩...} ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩} ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-g2 boy-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩ ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
ι⟨3,a⟩o XP
R1-g1 t2e ’s
F3cf-g3 cat-w1-g1
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(7.83) ‘some child of every parent’
DP {...⟨2,a⟩...} ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
DP∗∗{⟨2,e⟩,⟨2,a⟩} ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
every⟨2,a⟩ XP
. . .F2cf-g2 parent-w1-g1
DP∗⟨3,a⟩ ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
some⟨3,a⟩ XP⋮
F3cf g3
child-w1-g1
t2e
(8.69) S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
Bert
t1s
thinks⟨2,a⟩ CP
⟨2,s⟩
Cd t2a
v∗P
nP
(σ)
u2s NumP
sm F-o-M
(v∗) vP
t2s smoke
325
(8.92) ‘Callie thinks that the monster which Timmy thinks Alice found ate Fluffy.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ ⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
Callie
t1s
thinks⟨2,a⟩ CP
⟨2,s⟩
that t2a
the⟨4,a⟩ n∗P
CPrel
⟨4,s⟩
Crel g2
Timmy
t4s
thinks⟨3,a⟩ CP
⟨3,s⟩
Cd t3a
Alice
t3s
found nP2
u3s
wh2cf∗-t4a monster
X nP1
w1 g2
F2cf∗-t4a monster
vP
t2s ate Fluffy
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(8.120) ‘Fluffy meowed.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
(∃) v∗P
u1s
R2 g1 Fluffy
v∗agt vP
v0
v t1s
meow
(8.135) ‘There are no unicorns.’
S
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
(∃) vP
vbe n∗P
∃⟨2,a⟩r n∗P
u1s
Rp.loc o3e g1
X nP
t1s
F2cf∗ t2a
no# unicorns
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(9.17) CP⟨2,a⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h t
wh2sf g2 p1st g1
⟨s, t⟩
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a
t
t2s rained
(9.18) ‘fine if you drive’ (cf. (9.20))
NP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
NP1 ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
w1 g2 fine
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a you2-g1 t2s drive
328
(9.49) Hindi multiple correlative:
‘Which girl played with which boy, she defeated him.’ (Dayal 1996)
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1
⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1 t2s
played-with
wh3-g2 boy-w1-g1
IP1 ∶ t
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1 t1s
defeated
him3-g2 boy-w1-g1
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(9.56) Individual correlative (DP-adjunction)
S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP ∶ t
⟨1,s⟩
Cd t1a
IP ∶ t
DP ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1 ⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t2s standing
DP1 ∶ ⟨et, t⟩
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1
VP ∶ ⟨e, t⟩
t1s tall
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(10.45) Correlative question
S ∶ t
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
w1 g1
⟨2,s⟩
Cif t2a
wh2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t2s standing
CP1 ∶ t
w1 g3
⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a
she2-g2 girl-w1-g1
t1s tall d1 g3
(9.66) S ∶ t
T⟨1,a⟩ CP
C∅ t1a CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
YP⟨1,s⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
then2sf-g2 p1st-g1
C ∶ t
e IP
I1-g2 t1s in-WL
(10.25)[S Q⟨2,a⟩ [CP w1-g2 [[C? t2a]⟨1,s⟩ [[TopP ι [n∗P P1et-g1 X [wh1-g2 [w1-g1 [sg]-baby]]]]
t1s laughed]]]]
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(10.46) S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
w1 g2 ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a I1 g2 t1s rich d1 g3
(10.49) S ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
Q⟨3,a⟩ CP ∶ t
CP⟨2,a⟩1 ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
ι⟨2,a⟩h
wh2sf-g2 p1st-g1
⟨2,s⟩
if t2a it2-g1 t2s heads
CP1 ∶ t
XP⟨3,s⟩ ∶ ⟨t, t⟩
then2sf-g2 p1st-g1
t3s ⟨1,s⟩
C? t3a I1-g2 t1s rich d1-g3
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